In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.
Denti E., Prati N. (2004). Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations. THEORY AND DECISION, 56, 183-192 [10.1007/s11238-004-5644-4].
Relevance of Winning Coalitions in Indirect Control of Corporations
DENTI, ENRICO;
2004
Abstract
In this paper we study coalitions of indirect stockholders of a company showing that they can have different controlling power, and therefore different relevance in the control problem. We then introduce a suitable classification, and three algorithms to find all the coalitions of all relevances.File in questo prodotto:
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