Corruption opportunities attract people who would exploit them and repel people who anticipate the cost of resisting them. I study both margins in a model of occupational choice with self-control costs. Three results stand out. First, when temptation is strong, small corruption rents can shrink the pool of entrants. Second, the public sector can lose integrity while it shrinks, so a stable or falling headcount can conceal a deteriorating workforce. Third, at equal net corrupt surplus, removing corruption opportunities yields weakly lower corruption than deferred sanctions, both at a given wage and with a fixed number of posts. When rents rise with the share of corrupt incumbents, the ranking carries over to steady states, and prevention can eliminate a high-corruption equilibrium that an equivalent sanction preserves.
Rosso, M. (2026). The Tipping Point of Temptation: Prevention, Sanctions, and Selection into Public Service. CRENoS Working Papers 26/15 [10.2139/ssrn.7610318].
The Tipping Point of Temptation: Prevention, Sanctions, and Selection into Public Service
Rosso, Marco
2026
Abstract
Corruption opportunities attract people who would exploit them and repel people who anticipate the cost of resisting them. I study both margins in a model of occupational choice with self-control costs. Three results stand out. First, when temptation is strong, small corruption rents can shrink the pool of entrants. Second, the public sector can lose integrity while it shrinks, so a stable or falling headcount can conceal a deteriorating workforce. Third, at equal net corrupt surplus, removing corruption opportunities yields weakly lower corruption than deferred sanctions, both at a given wage and with a fixed number of posts. When rents rise with the share of corrupt incumbents, the ranking carries over to steady states, and prevention can eliminate a high-corruption equilibrium that an equivalent sanction preserves.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.



