We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm.
Levine, D.K., Mattozzi, A., Modica, S. (2026). Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Online Version, 1-12 [10.1111/iere.70098].
Labor Associations: The Blue Wall of Silence
Levine, David K.;Mattozzi, Andrea;Modica, Salvatore
2026
Abstract
We present a model showing that when the demand for labor services is inelastic and individual behavior is imperfectly monitored, a firm's employees may prefer to protect its shirkers and conceal information about peers' performance from the firm.File in questo prodotto:
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