Labour rights protection has recently emerged as one of the key objectives of antitrust law, alongside sustainability and privacy. The application and enforcement of competition rules differ significantly between the workers’ and employers’ sides of the market, a distinction that is particularly visible in cases concerning remuneration. Wage-setting may fall within the scope of Article 101 TFEU where it results from coordination between undertakings; whether competition law applies therefore depends on how wages are fixed. While employer cartels that suppress pay are treated as restrictive agreements, collective bargaining arrangements are assessed under a markedly different analytical framework. This article examines the distinct strategies through which the CJEU and the European Commission are enhancing worker protection through antitrust law. It contributes to the broader discussion on the use of competition law beyond purely economic objectives, while highlighting the limitations inherent in the different approaches to wage-setting practices.
Mangiafico, G. (2026). When Antitrust Meets Labour: Exemption and Enforcement Under Article 101 TFEU. YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES, 19(33), 8-26 [10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2026.11.33.4].
When Antitrust Meets Labour: Exemption and Enforcement Under Article 101 TFEU
Giulia Mangiafico
Primo
2026
Abstract
Labour rights protection has recently emerged as one of the key objectives of antitrust law, alongside sustainability and privacy. The application and enforcement of competition rules differ significantly between the workers’ and employers’ sides of the market, a distinction that is particularly visible in cases concerning remuneration. Wage-setting may fall within the scope of Article 101 TFEU where it results from coordination between undertakings; whether competition law applies therefore depends on how wages are fixed. While employer cartels that suppress pay are treated as restrictive agreements, collective bargaining arrangements are assessed under a markedly different analytical framework. This article examines the distinct strategies through which the CJEU and the European Commission are enhancing worker protection through antitrust law. It contributes to the broader discussion on the use of competition law beyond purely economic objectives, while highlighting the limitations inherent in the different approaches to wage-setting practices.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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When Antitrust Meets Labour_ Exemption and Enforcement.pdf
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