Colà onde si puote ciò che si vuole?" Sul problematico innesto della leale collaborazione nella funzione legislativa

This article examines the constitutional principle of loyal cooperation between the State and the Regions in the Italian legal order, focusing on its judicial construction and its role within the legislative process. While the Constitutional Court has consistently portrayed Italian regionalism as cooperative rather than dual, the article argues that loyal cooperation often operates as a jurisprudential metaphor masking unresolved conflicts over the allocation of legislative competences. In the absence of explicit constitutional provisions establishing general political coordination mechanisms, the Court has assumed a mediating role, transforming loyal cooperation from a method of governance into a standard of judicial review. The analysis highlights the fragmentation and variability of cooperative obligations imposed by constitutional case law, as well as the asymmetrical treatment of State and regional legislation. The article ultimately contends that the Court’s reluctance to impose procedural constraints on the national legislative process is both understandable and justified, while also questioning the systemic implications of extending cooperative mechanisms within an unreformed institutional framework.