Why Does the Theory-of-Mind Paradigm of Autism Persist?

LaCroix makes a persuasive Lakatosian case regarding the theory-of-mind paradigm (ToM) in autism research as a degenerating research program. From a philosophy of science perspective, it is therefore interesting to explore its persistence: why does it continue to attract effort and authority despite its questionable empirical and theoretical adequacy? We suggest the answer may lie in the convergence of three main forces: underdetermination, epistemic-network structure, and the standardization payoff. Taken together, these forces showcase why amassing counterevidence rarely suffices to dislodge entrenched and influential research lines. In what follows, we take a deeper look at each of these forces and we further corroborate LaCroix’s argument by drawing on other strands of autism research (camouflaging in particular) and on different research programs with similar features.