ABSTRACT In this brief essay, I critically assess one of the main theses advanced by Sher, namely that the new adequacy condition post-truth imposes on the philosophy of truth rules out deflationary conceptions of truth and calls for a substantivist understanding of truth. Contrary to Sher’s conclusion, I argue that a refined version of a deflationary philosophy of truth—which I call true minimalism—has the resources needed to account for both the value of truth and the disvalue of post-truth, and thus to meet Sher’s new adequacy condition.
Ferrari, F. (2025). The Post-truth Crisis and Alethic Minimalism. AUSTRALASIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 9(1), 32-43 [10.1080/24740500.2025.2567012].
The Post-truth Crisis and Alethic Minimalism
ferrari Filippo
Primo
2025
Abstract
ABSTRACT In this brief essay, I critically assess one of the main theses advanced by Sher, namely that the new adequacy condition post-truth imposes on the philosophy of truth rules out deflationary conceptions of truth and calls for a substantivist understanding of truth. Contrary to Sher’s conclusion, I argue that a refined version of a deflationary philosophy of truth—which I call true minimalism—has the resources needed to account for both the value of truth and the disvalue of post-truth, and thus to meet Sher’s new adequacy condition.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
