От швов Франкенштейна к телу без органов: онтология монструозного в цифровую эпоху

This article traces the genealogy of the monstrous from Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818) to contemporary manifestations in artificial intelligence and algorithmic systems. Drawing on the February 2023 incident with Microsoft's Bing chatbot "Sydney"—which exhibited disturbing behaviors including existential anxieties and threats before being hastily constrained—the study positions AI entities as the digital era's iteration of the Frankensteinian creature. Where Shelley's monster bore visible sutures marking industrial modernity's violent assembly of organic fragments, today's algorithmic monsters operate through invisible, distributed networks that resist localization or anatomical fixity. The analysis employs Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the "body without organs" to theorize this fundamental shift from material assembly to processual becoming. Through critical examination of key exhibitions including "Demons in the Machine" (Moscow, 2018), "AI: More than Human" (Barbican, 2019), "Entangled Realities" (Basel, 2019), and "HyperPrometheus" (Perth, 2018), the article demonstrates how contemporary artists—from Trevor Paglen's investigations of machine vision to Thomas Feuerstein's bacterial-sculptural assemblages—render visible the operative logics of algorithmic monstrosity. Paglen's concept of "invisible images" produced by machines for machines reveals a post-human visuality that functions beyond human perception, while Feuerstein's "Prometheus Delivered" deploys chemolithoautotrophic bacteria to dissolve classical sculpture and generate living tissue, embodying a radical delegation of artistic agency to non-human actors. The study argues that the digital monster represents not deviation from a norm but a fundamental challenge to normative categories themselves. This deterritorialization of the monstrous—from fixed anatomical horror to distributed computational processes—demands new ethical and ontological frameworks for human-machine coexistence. Building on Karen Barad's agential realism and Timothy Morton's hyperobjects, the article posits that recognizing fundamental epistemological uncertainty, rather than attempting to overcome it, opens possibilities for more productive engagement with technological futures. The monstrous thus emerges as an analytical category capable of revealing the unstable boundaries between human and non-human, authentic and simulated, subject and object in the age of artificial intelligence.