Hoping on insufficient evidence: how epistemically rational can action‐centred faith be?

Daniel McKaughan has recently argued that conceiving faith as an ‘action-centred’ attitude whose cognitive component falls short of outright belief can play a central role in explaining how people who regard the truth of Christianity as significantly less probable than naturalism can respond with faith to the gospel proclamation without believing its core claims or presuppositions on insufficient evidence, and without violating the requirements of either pragmatic or epistemic rationality. In this paper I object to McKaughan that hope—the attitude to which he assigns the cognitive role of action-centred faith—is ill-suited for the intended purpose, and that having to the core claims and presuppositions of the gospel proclamation any attitude that is suited for the intended purpose is not going to leave a person who takes her overall evidence to run against some of those claims and presuppositions ‘free to follow the arguments and evidence where it leads’.