Fenômeno vs. Fenomenicidade: Husserl e Natorp no pano de fundo de um debate atual

Does phenomenology allow us to pave the way for a privileged understanding of phenomena? A glance at the philosophical history of the concept of “phenomenon” suffices to confront us with complex results, not always easy to grasp. We need only mention two: the definitions of what a “phenomenon” is vary considerably both within and outside the phenomenological tradition; the phenomenological understanding of phenomena has been the object, especially since Husserl, of various objections from direct opponents, and continues to be so in the current debate that puts phenomenology to the test of criticism from other philosophical approaches –from analytically inspired philosophy of mind to the so-called cognitive sciences. We will therefore focus on the dialogue between Husserl and Natorp in order to demonstrate the originality of the Husserlian approach, limiting ourselves to Natorp’s critique of the theses expressed in the fifth of the Logische Untersuchungen. These criticisms allow us to articulate a twofold strategy, consisting in a direct confrontation with Husserl’s positions; in an indirect parallel with some of the main arguments we find in the current debate, where, besides the concept of phenomenon, other apparently related concepts appear. The first of these is “phenomenality”, which would indicate the purely subjective character of experience, as opposed to the objective contents that we experience. Our aim is therefore twofold: to formulate the necessary arguments to counter Natorp’s objections by focusing on the Logische Untersuchungen; to defend, in perspective, the specificity of the phenomenological understanding of phenomena in the face of certain alternatives that we find in the current debate. Keywords: rationalism; modern technique; metaphysics; dasein