The literature on cabinet formation duration has traditionally revolved around two fundamental explanatory drivers: uncertainty and complexity of the bargaining environment. While the role of these factors in the cabinet formation process is well-established, little can be said about their impact on bargaining delays under different institutional settings, such as unicameral vs. bicameral legislatures. In this chapter, we contribute to this literature by investigating whether the effect of uncertainty and complexity on bargaining delays is conditional on the parliamentary structure in which negotiations take place. Our analysis of about 700 government formation processes in 28 European countries highlights that the impact of uncertainty and complexity on the duration of government negotiations is stronger in bicameral systems than in unicameral parliaments.
Giannetti, D., Pedrazzani, A., Pinto, L. (2024). Uncertainty, Complexity and Bicameralism: Parliamentary Structure and the Duration of the Government Formation in Europe. Cham : Springer [10.1007/978-3-031-69347-2_6#DOI].
Uncertainty, Complexity and Bicameralism: Parliamentary Structure and the Duration of the Government Formation in Europe
Giannetti, Daniela;Pedrazzani, Andrea;Pinto, Luca
2024
Abstract
The literature on cabinet formation duration has traditionally revolved around two fundamental explanatory drivers: uncertainty and complexity of the bargaining environment. While the role of these factors in the cabinet formation process is well-established, little can be said about their impact on bargaining delays under different institutional settings, such as unicameral vs. bicameral legislatures. In this chapter, we contribute to this literature by investigating whether the effect of uncertainty and complexity on bargaining delays is conditional on the parliamentary structure in which negotiations take place. Our analysis of about 700 government formation processes in 28 European countries highlights that the impact of uncertainty and complexity on the duration of government negotiations is stronger in bicameral systems than in unicameral parliaments.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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601257_1_En_6_Chapter_Author LP.pdf
Open Access dal 09/12/2025
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