The EC/EU is often described as a civilian or soft power. Through a critical historical overview of what the EC/EU actually did, how and why it did it and how it was perceived by its interlocutors, this chapter argues that the EC/EU grew determined to play an international political role since the late 1960s and did not act simply as a civilian power. While the promotion of multilateralism and international law was a stable element of its foreign policy, the EC/EU did not limit itself to pursuing civilians ends and using soft power tools. Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EC became the largest and richest trading bloc and aid donors in the world. It could thus exercise much leverage in its external relations, and it seems quite unplausible that it would have limited its methods to soft power. In fact, the EC/EU had diverse means to pressure several of its interlocutors into the desired behaviour and used carrots and sticks whenever it considered that its interests and goals so required. This becomes even more visible when the perceptions of the countries at the receiving end are appraised. This chapter explores the foreign policy of the EC polity from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s focusing on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and ensuing Helsinki process, East-West relations and the political use of development aid. From refusal to compromising during negotiations to granting access to its rich market, from withdrawal of preferences to suspension of aid and loans, the image of a multipolar hardball comes closer to describe how developing countries, socialist regimes and even the two superpowers came oftentimes to see the EC/EU.
Romano, A. (2024). From ”Helsinki” and Development Aid to Multipolar Hard Ball. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press [10.1017/9781108780865.016].
From ”Helsinki” and Development Aid to Multipolar Hard Ball
Romano, Angela
Primo
2024
Abstract
The EC/EU is often described as a civilian or soft power. Through a critical historical overview of what the EC/EU actually did, how and why it did it and how it was perceived by its interlocutors, this chapter argues that the EC/EU grew determined to play an international political role since the late 1960s and did not act simply as a civilian power. While the promotion of multilateralism and international law was a stable element of its foreign policy, the EC/EU did not limit itself to pursuing civilians ends and using soft power tools. Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EC became the largest and richest trading bloc and aid donors in the world. It could thus exercise much leverage in its external relations, and it seems quite unplausible that it would have limited its methods to soft power. In fact, the EC/EU had diverse means to pressure several of its interlocutors into the desired behaviour and used carrots and sticks whenever it considered that its interests and goals so required. This becomes even more visible when the perceptions of the countries at the receiving end are appraised. This chapter explores the foreign policy of the EC polity from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s focusing on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and ensuing Helsinki process, East-West relations and the political use of development aid. From refusal to compromising during negotiations to granting access to its rich market, from withdrawal of preferences to suspension of aid and loans, the image of a multipolar hardball comes closer to describe how developing countries, socialist regimes and even the two superpowers came oftentimes to see the EC/EU.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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