In what follows I will defend a basic sense of normativity for concepts. My first step will be to show that Kripke’s two claims should not be assumed or refuted en bloc. I will call Kripke’s first claim ‘Basic Normativity Requirement’, and the further negative thesis ‘Thick Normativity Thesis’. I will argue that the Basic Normativity Requirement is all what follows from Kripke’s dialectic. On the contrary, Kripke’s arguments for the Thick Normativity Thesis are not equally compelling  there is no apriori argument for the claim that no natural fact can constitute a standard of correctness for word or concept-applications.

Basic Normativity of Concepts. A Re-reading of Kripke’s Sceptical Argument

LALUMERA E
2005

Abstract

In what follows I will defend a basic sense of normativity for concepts. My first step will be to show that Kripke’s two claims should not be assumed or refuted en bloc. I will call Kripke’s first claim ‘Basic Normativity Requirement’, and the further negative thesis ‘Thick Normativity Thesis’. I will argue that the Basic Normativity Requirement is all what follows from Kripke’s dialectic. On the contrary, Kripke’s arguments for the Thick Normativity Thesis are not equally compelling  there is no apriori argument for the claim that no natural fact can constitute a standard of correctness for word or concept-applications.
2005
Facets of Concepts
155
184
LALUMERA E
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/890682
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