Metaphor and Persuasion at work with Emotions and Identity in Interaction

Persuasion as a mechanism functions on the basis of the capability of having a grip on somebody’s attention and being capable of holding their interest so to have influence and produce a change in their psychological, interactional, societal and political positioning. Among the fundamental existential needs of people, apart from their basic survival essentials (food and water ‘in primis’) is the need of being somebody and possibly belonging to something. This translates into the capability of mentally defining, or “framing” (cf. “frame” Chilton, 2004, as “system of metaphors”, Ferrari, 2011, 2018) their own self conceptually, which, in an integrated way, means cognitively, emotionally and bodily (Ferrari, 2018). In a contextual environment, which is the norm if we exclude hermitage, this also implies framing their own self interactionally, that is with respect to others. As regards framing, the simplest kind of frames, and the more easily exploitable in terms of persuasion, are conflictual frames. If we think about it, the easiest way to define ‘myself’ is against another. This also recalls the basic mechanism of social systems, in which their ‘shape’ is defined by means of their difference (Luhmann, 1995). Inclusive frames instead, which is to say those presiding over integration, are conceptually and operatively more complex, both in terms of psychological articulation, and of persuasion applicability. Using an inclusive frame I can define ‘myself’ as the result of my interaction with the other: . An example of strategic discoursal use of conflictual vs. inclusive frames is offered by Conflict vs. Inclusive Rhetoric in Bush vs. Obama argumentational attitudes, styles and strategies (Ferrari, 2018). Psychologically, these frames can also be used diachronically by individuals in order to frame their identity at the present time with respect to their past and their future projections and also with respect to others. This can concern activities of internal storytelling (cf. Toolan, 2001) reconstruction but also affect choice making and action. They manifest as two opposed structures of conceptually framing one’s own identity with respect to others and in time: or, as I say, two structurally different “interactional identity framings”, one based on a conflict structure, the other on inclusion and integration.