The article reconstructs Rorty’s dismissal of realist positions in epistemology and semantics, his reframing of the realist claim that the world is determinate, material, and independent from our thoughts and descriptions, his position regarding scientific realism, and the comforting role that truth and realism play in metaphysical realism. Further, the article addresses the open question of whether Rorty had a realist turn toward the end of his career.
Rorty on realism, antirealism, and antirepresentationalism
Huetter-almerigi
2022
Abstract
The article reconstructs Rorty’s dismissal of realist positions in epistemology and semantics, his reframing of the realist claim that the world is determinate, material, and independent from our thoughts and descriptions, his position regarding scientific realism, and the comforting role that truth and realism play in metaphysical realism. Further, the article addresses the open question of whether Rorty had a realist turn toward the end of his career.File in questo prodotto:
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