In this chapter I critically discuss - and dismiss - the idea that Russia might use non-strategic nuclear weapons early into a conflict for 'de-escalation' purposes. I argue that such hypothesis rests on shaky empirical grounds and is incoherent with contemporary Russian military thought. Russia's conventional military capabilities are what NATO should be afraid of in the initial phase of conflict.

The shaky grounds of Russia's escalate to de-escalate doctrine

Nicolò Fasola
2021

Abstract

In this chapter I critically discuss - and dismiss - the idea that Russia might use non-strategic nuclear weapons early into a conflict for 'de-escalation' purposes. I argue that such hypothesis rests on shaky empirical grounds and is incoherent with contemporary Russian military thought. Russia's conventional military capabilities are what NATO should be afraid of in the initial phase of conflict.
Challenging NATO's Nuclear Strategy
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Nicolò Fasola
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11585/842340
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