In this chapter I critically discuss - and dismiss - the idea that Russia might use non-strategic nuclear weapons early into a conflict for 'de-escalation' purposes. I argue that such hypothesis rests on shaky empirical grounds and is incoherent with contemporary Russian military thought. Russia's conventional military capabilities are what NATO should be afraid of in the initial phase of conflict.
The shaky grounds of Russia's escalate to de-escalate doctrine
Nicolò Fasola
2021
Abstract
In this chapter I critically discuss - and dismiss - the idea that Russia might use non-strategic nuclear weapons early into a conflict for 'de-escalation' purposes. I argue that such hypothesis rests on shaky empirical grounds and is incoherent with contemporary Russian military thought. Russia's conventional military capabilities are what NATO should be afraid of in the initial phase of conflict.File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
