Few countries have reformed the institutions potentially affecting legislative speechmaking more often than Italy. Since the enactment of the Republican Constitution in 1948, Italy has experienced several reforms in the electoral system and in the parliamentary rules of procedure. Four electoral reforms have been approved from the 1990s onwards during the highly unstable political phase commonly labeled “Second Republic.”Our study analyzes legislative debates held in the Italian lower house (the Chamber of Deputies, Camera dei Deputati) during the 1996–2018 period. Our findings provide support to the Proksch and Slapin (2012) hypothesis, according to which in systems characterized by the prominence of party government party groups establish strict rules to control speechmaking activity in parliament. As a result, debates in the Italian Chamber are dominated mainly by those MPs holding leading positions within and for their party. This pattern seems to characterize to a more considerable extent the legislative terms elected under party-centered electoral rules.
Daniela Giannetti, Andrea Pedrazzani (2021). “Italy: Legislative Speeches under Changing Electoral Rules”. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
“Italy: Legislative Speeches under Changing Electoral Rules”
Daniela Giannetti
Co-primo
;Andrea PedrazzaniCo-primo
2021
Abstract
Few countries have reformed the institutions potentially affecting legislative speechmaking more often than Italy. Since the enactment of the Republican Constitution in 1948, Italy has experienced several reforms in the electoral system and in the parliamentary rules of procedure. Four electoral reforms have been approved from the 1990s onwards during the highly unstable political phase commonly labeled “Second Republic.”Our study analyzes legislative debates held in the Italian lower house (the Chamber of Deputies, Camera dei Deputati) during the 1996–2018 period. Our findings provide support to the Proksch and Slapin (2012) hypothesis, according to which in systems characterized by the prominence of party government party groups establish strict rules to control speechmaking activity in parliament. As a result, debates in the Italian Chamber are dominated mainly by those MPs holding leading positions within and for their party. This pattern seems to characterize to a more considerable extent the legislative terms elected under party-centered electoral rules.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.