Tamanho Importa na Luta Contra Corrupção? Controles Internos no Legislativo e no Executivo na Esfera Federal (Does size matter in fighting corruption? Internal controls in the federal Legislative and Executive branches in Brazil)

This chapter aims to provide empirical evidence of the intuitive agreement that ‘small fish’ are more likely to be punished by acts of corruption, using Brazil as a case study. Based on the assumption that anti-corruption strategies might be more efficient when they focus on highly visible examples, mainly involving both powerful bribe-takers and bribe-payers, it will compare the results of disciplinary procedures and administrative sanctions against federal civil servants and ministers of the cabinet in the federal executive branch and members of the National Congress in Brazil. As this study shows, in stark contrast to the treatment of ‘big fish’, the number of punishments of bureaucrats is indeed fast expanding in the administrative sphere in the country. There is a visible effort to improve administrative checks and balance mechanisms in Brazil, mainly in the federal executive branch. However, it does not mean greater accountability or less corruption in the short term. This chapter argues that there is a high level of tolerance of corruption and a culture of self-interest and self-preservation, especially among politicians