Signaling is an intriguing behavioral phenomenon observed, almost without exception, when organisms interact. Signaling occurs between a signaler using a display, often conspicuous but sometimes subtle, and a receiver that perceives the display and then responds. We see signaling between individuals with common interests, such as bees dancing to inform their sisters about distant food, and between opponents, such as paper wasps competing over a scrap of food. Signaling is at the center of courtship, begging, fighting, interactions between flower and pollinator, and between prey and predator. Sometimes more than one signaler and receiver are involved, such as in various cases of mimicry, in eavesdropping, or when several males court a female. This chapter is a review of the theory of signal evolution. We will focus on a few main questions: - Why is signaling so common, even when signalers and receivers have conflicting interests? - What information do signals convey? - What prevents signalers from displaying misleading signals, i.e., from cheating? - Why do signals look the way they do?

M. Enquist, P. L. Hurd, S. Ghirlanda (2010). Signaling. OXFORD : Oxford University Press.

Signaling

GHIRLANDA, STEFANO
2010

Abstract

Signaling is an intriguing behavioral phenomenon observed, almost without exception, when organisms interact. Signaling occurs between a signaler using a display, often conspicuous but sometimes subtle, and a receiver that perceives the display and then responds. We see signaling between individuals with common interests, such as bees dancing to inform their sisters about distant food, and between opponents, such as paper wasps competing over a scrap of food. Signaling is at the center of courtship, begging, fighting, interactions between flower and pollinator, and between prey and predator. Sometimes more than one signaler and receiver are involved, such as in various cases of mimicry, in eavesdropping, or when several males court a female. This chapter is a review of the theory of signal evolution. We will focus on a few main questions: - Why is signaling so common, even when signalers and receivers have conflicting interests? - What information do signals convey? - What prevents signalers from displaying misleading signals, i.e., from cheating? - Why do signals look the way they do?
2010
Evolutionary Behavioral Ecology
266
284
M. Enquist, P. L. Hurd, S. Ghirlanda (2010). Signaling. OXFORD : Oxford University Press.
M. Enquist; P. L. Hurd; S. Ghirlanda
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/71728
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