Reasons (and Reasons in Philosophy of Law)

The chapter provides a picture, in relation to the debate on normativity, of the different analyses of reasons and the different ways in which reasons can be evaluated and classified. We start out by distinguishing three different classes of reasons on the basis of their role: normative, motivating, and explanatory. And then we focus on normative reasons, discussing the basis of their capacity to favor actions or beliefs in light of the different understandings of their ontological status as either facts or mental states. We will see, on these premises, that reasons can be distinguished into two different kinds: reasons for belief (epistemic) and reasons for action (practical). Particular attention is devoted to the “weighing conception” of normative reasons (and the understanding of them as pro tanto reasons), as this approach seems best suited to practical (as well as legal) reasoning. This will provide a vantage point from which to analyze the strength of reasons and their modality, most notably their modality as first- and second-order reasons. Finally, we consider how the weighing conception fits into the philosophy of law, in view of the fundamental role this discipline assigns to second-order reasons in the attempt to explain the normative nature of law and its authority.