The article claims that although Bruno de Finetti rejected the idea of objective probability on the account that probability is always subjective, he took seriously the problem of the objectivity of probability assessments. In other words, he was against 'objectivism', not against objectivity. The paper is divided in two parts, the first of which is due to Maria Carla Galavotti, while the second is due to Philip Dawid. The first half of the paper surveys Bruno de Finetti's position regarding 'objective' probability and the problem of objettivity of probabilistic evaluations. The second half focuses on tools for evaluating probability assessments, which are in tune with de Finetti's subjectivism.
P. Dawid, M.C. Galavotti (2009). De Finetti's Subjectivism, Objective Probability,and the Empirical Validation of Probability Assessments. LONDON : College Publications.
De Finetti's Subjectivism, Objective Probability,and the Empirical Validation of Probability Assessments
GALAVOTTI, MARIA CARLA
2009
Abstract
The article claims that although Bruno de Finetti rejected the idea of objective probability on the account that probability is always subjective, he took seriously the problem of the objectivity of probability assessments. In other words, he was against 'objectivism', not against objectivity. The paper is divided in two parts, the first of which is due to Maria Carla Galavotti, while the second is due to Philip Dawid. The first half of the paper surveys Bruno de Finetti's position regarding 'objective' probability and the problem of objettivity of probabilistic evaluations. The second half focuses on tools for evaluating probability assessments, which are in tune with de Finetti's subjectivism.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
