In this paper I develop a version of Evans’ challenge for MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive relativism. The argument is meant to show that, contrary to MacFarlane’s intentions, the correctness of an assertion is a relative matter if the area of discourse has an assessment-sensitive semantics. Thus MacFarlane’s truth-relativism is an inherently unstable doctrine for it is unclear how we should behave in order to achieve the goal of an assertion.
Truth relativism and Evans' challenge / Sebastiano Moruzzi. - STAMPA. - (2018), pp. 385-400. [10.1007/978-3-319-95777-7_18]
Truth relativism and Evans' challenge
Sebastiano Moruzzi
2018
Abstract
In this paper I develop a version of Evans’ challenge for MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive relativism. The argument is meant to show that, contrary to MacFarlane’s intentions, the correctness of an assertion is a relative matter if the area of discourse has an assessment-sensitive semantics. Thus MacFarlane’s truth-relativism is an inherently unstable doctrine for it is unclear how we should behave in order to achieve the goal of an assertion.File in questo prodotto:
Eventuali allegati, non sono esposti
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
