Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical Dolev-Yao adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, originally based on the Dolev-Yao assumptions, with computational aspects based on notions of probability and computational power. The obtained result is that if the cryptosystem is robust enough, then the two adversary models turn out to be equivalent. As an application of our approach, we show how to determine a secrecy property against the computational adversary

A. Troina, A. Aldini, R. Gorrieri (2005). Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy against Computational Adversaries. Heidelberg : Springer [10.1007/978-3-540-31794-4_5].

Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy against Computational Adversaries

TROINA, ANGELO;GORRIERI, ROBERTO
2005

Abstract

Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical Dolev-Yao adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, originally based on the Dolev-Yao assumptions, with computational aspects based on notions of probability and computational power. The obtained result is that if the cryptosystem is robust enough, then the two adversary models turn out to be equivalent. As an application of our approach, we show how to determine a secrecy property against the computational adversary
2005
Global Computing
77
92
A. Troina, A. Aldini, R. Gorrieri (2005). Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy against Computational Adversaries. Heidelberg : Springer [10.1007/978-3-540-31794-4_5].
A. Troina; A. Aldini; R. Gorrieri
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/6522
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