This paper investigates the interaction between investment decisions, company foreclosure, and capital structure in the case of a constrained firm. We consider irreversible investments in R\&D projects with uncertain returns, financed through debt. Uncertainty comes from two different sources: the technological success of the project is probabilistic, and the return from investment evolves stochastically over time. These two elements, together with the lack of historical performance represent a substantial risk to the lenders, which will limit substantially the availability of loans. In our analysis, we first assume that the firm finances the R&D project through debt, and then, we further assume that the firm's debt capacity is limited to a certain amount. We show that leverage distorts the investment threshold and the shareholders of a levered firm accelerate investment with respect to an all equity financed firm. Moreover, when a firm is "financially constrained", it tends to overinvest compared to a non constrained levered firm. Thus, the financial constraint induces firms to play a "bird in the hand" investment strategy.
Daniela Bragoli, Flavia Cortelezzi, P.G. (2018). The Effect of Financial Constraints on R&D Investments. Milano : Vita e Pensiero.
The Effect of Financial Constraints on R&D Investments
CORTELEZZI, FLAVIA;Pierpaolo Giannoccolo;
2018
Abstract
This paper investigates the interaction between investment decisions, company foreclosure, and capital structure in the case of a constrained firm. We consider irreversible investments in R\&D projects with uncertain returns, financed through debt. Uncertainty comes from two different sources: the technological success of the project is probabilistic, and the return from investment evolves stochastically over time. These two elements, together with the lack of historical performance represent a substantial risk to the lenders, which will limit substantially the availability of loans. In our analysis, we first assume that the firm finances the R&D project through debt, and then, we further assume that the firm's debt capacity is limited to a certain amount. We show that leverage distorts the investment threshold and the shareholders of a levered firm accelerate investment with respect to an all equity financed firm. Moreover, when a firm is "financially constrained", it tends to overinvest compared to a non constrained levered firm. Thus, the financial constraint induces firms to play a "bird in the hand" investment strategy.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.