INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the notion of “respect” has come to occupy an increasingly important role in contemporary ethical and political theory. More specifically, the idea of equal respect for persons has often been invoked by scholars and policy-makers as a principle capable of informing a wide array of human interactions in pluralistic societies, especially those which, albeit featuring various forms of conflict, appear ultimately to be rooted in the fundamental values of equality, freedom and dignity. A conspicuous number of scholarly attempts in the philosophy of law, social theory, ethical theory and political philosophy have shown not only that respect represents an appropriate response to a rich array of practical issues, but also that no application of such an ideal can be neatly separated from a preliminary analysis of its theoretical grounds. While, in the area of contemporary political philosophy, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the normative import of the ideal of respect in liberally oriented political communities, scant attention has been accorded to its historic-philosophical roots