Feminist Versus General Philosophy of Science

In the last few decades the literature on feminism and philosophy of science has flourished and continues to raise a vast and varied array of issues, calling attention to a number of ways in which dominant science is gender biased. Philosophy of science, especially its “received view”, has been deemed similarly prejudiced. However, in the last half-century philosophy of science has undergone substantial changes, and is now better equipped to address the issues raised by feminist epistemologists. On the one hand, feminist philosophy has moved from the intent of fighting underrepresentation and eradicating sexist bias in research and scientific activities, to a more general reconsideration of modes of knowledge. On the other, recent philosophy of science has been largely guided by the aim of faithfully representing the production of scientific knowledge as it is actually performed in the sciences, with an eye to disciplinary and contextual specificities. On that basis, there seems to be vast ground for cooperation between the two. In particular, Helen Longino’s contextual empiricism offers some suggestions that can both converge on and reinforce some current trends in philosophy of science.