In strategic argumentation players exchange arguments to prove or reject a claim. This paper discusses and reports on research about two basic issues regarding the game-theoretic understanding of strategic argumentation games in the law: whether such games can be reasonably modelled as zero-sum games and as games with complete information.
Governatori, G., Olivieri, F., Rotolo, A., Scannapieco, S., Sartor, G. (2014). Two faces of strategic argumentation in the law. Amsterdam : IOS [10.3233/978-1-61499-468-8-81].
Two faces of strategic argumentation in the law
GOVERNATORI, GUIDO;OLIVIERI, FRANCESCO;ROTOLO, ANTONINO;SARTOR, GIOVANNI
2014
Abstract
In strategic argumentation players exchange arguments to prove or reject a claim. This paper discusses and reports on research about two basic issues regarding the game-theoretic understanding of strategic argumentation games in the law: whether such games can be reasonably modelled as zero-sum games and as games with complete information.File in questo prodotto:
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