Two parties bargaininig over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one's own independent investment is not secured.
Egalitarianism. An evolutionary perspective / Bagnoli, Lidia; Negroni, Giorgio. - ELETTRONICO. - (2013), pp. 1-41.
Egalitarianism. An evolutionary perspective
BAGNOLI, LIDIA;NEGRONI, GIORGIO GIOVANNI
2013
Abstract
Two parties bargaininig over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Our main result is that egalitarianism is more likely to emerge in situations in which private property over the fruits of one's own independent investment is not secured.File in questo prodotto:
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