In Europe, the topic of the goals of antitrust rules, i.e. the (current) Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, has not attracted as much attention. This may be due to the fact that the Chicago School’s ideas have had much less theoretical and practical impact than in their homeland . Often, the issue has been resolved by recalling the legislation, with little or no annotation, namely the current Article 3, no. 3 of the Treaty on the European Union stating that the Union shall establish an internal market, which, in accordance with Protocol 27, includes a system ensuring that 'competition is not distorted' . However, such a definition of the aims of European antitrust rules is patently insufficient. Firstly, it gives no indication as to the key issues embodied in the subject-matter which, as we have seen, concern both the expediency of maximizing economic wealth, and how any wealth may be distributed. Secondly, from a strictly legal point of view, the principle of undistorted competition is too general and far-reaching to ensure a consistent and predictable interpretation of Articles 101 and 102. The situation is very different for the judges in Luxembourg: numerous decisions mention or outline the goals of antitrust law. Some are mere citations, such as those making generic reference to the protection 'of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers' , or the 'freedom of action of the parties' . Many others, however, serve to form a complete, albeit unsystematic, framework of the problem. The article is an attempt to put this case law in order to show that such a framework has taken a clear and discernible shape in the course of time.
The goals of antitrust
MANZINI, PIETRO
2014
Abstract
In Europe, the topic of the goals of antitrust rules, i.e. the (current) Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, has not attracted as much attention. This may be due to the fact that the Chicago School’s ideas have had much less theoretical and practical impact than in their homeland . Often, the issue has been resolved by recalling the legislation, with little or no annotation, namely the current Article 3, no. 3 of the Treaty on the European Union stating that the Union shall establish an internal market, which, in accordance with Protocol 27, includes a system ensuring that 'competition is not distorted' . However, such a definition of the aims of European antitrust rules is patently insufficient. Firstly, it gives no indication as to the key issues embodied in the subject-matter which, as we have seen, concern both the expediency of maximizing economic wealth, and how any wealth may be distributed. Secondly, from a strictly legal point of view, the principle of undistorted competition is too general and far-reaching to ensure a consistent and predictable interpretation of Articles 101 and 102. The situation is very different for the judges in Luxembourg: numerous decisions mention or outline the goals of antitrust law. Some are mere citations, such as those making generic reference to the protection 'of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers' , or the 'freedom of action of the parties' . Many others, however, serve to form a complete, albeit unsystematic, framework of the problem. The article is an attempt to put this case law in order to show that such a framework has taken a clear and discernible shape in the course of time.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
