The aim of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between the economic elite and Italian fascism during the dictatorship years. This relationship was fundamental in fascism’s rise to power and in the subsequent effort to stabilize the regime. The expansionist and “imperial” aims of fascism attached importance to an economic-elite role: only an industrially powerful State could yearn to be a great power on the international political scene. Meanwhile, the Italian economy’s structural constraints (raw materials and capital shortage, national budget deficit, decreasing international trade) could potentially limit the ability to reach political targets. Mussolini, though not an expert in the field of economics and lacking in technical competence, followed, daily and resolutely, the evolution of economic difficulties. His determination and attention testifies to the importance that “il Duce” gave to those problems. Fascism’s compromise with the economic elite originated not only from the requirements of political stabilization or social consensus but also from the awareness that without it fascism couldn’t overcome the Italian economy’s structural constraints and, therefore, realize its political aims. To deal with the relationship between political power and the economic elite in the fascist regime we can’t restrict ourselves to using concepts such as consensus/dissent, complicity/opposition, exchange, negotiations and dealing. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be possible to explain why the great depression years was the period of highest allegiance by the economic elite with Fascism, in spite of the very bad performance of industrial and finance companies. From the moment of the revaluation of lira at “quota 90” in the middle of the Twenties – the beginning of a fascist economic policy – the relationship between economic and political power was determined not only by negotiations exchange of favours and self-interest but also by deeper and more lasting factors such as: a) a common repulsion of industrial disputes that made possible a social equilibrium guaranteed by fascism, based on low wage levels and abrogation of strikes and freedom in union organization; b) a change in hierarchy and balance between companies e between economic sectors during the Twenties and Thirties, a result of fascist government intervention and not only of economic and social process; c) the growing entwinement of leaders of the National Fascist Party (Partito nazionale fascista), union leaders, public corporation bureaucracy and private company management, caused by decreasing market power and growing public expenditure; d) the development of a “corporatist” way of interaction between State and economic interest, based on direct participation of unions and employers’ associations in public policy; e) a cultural and ideological background shared both by fascist leaders and members of the economic elite (nationalism, colonialism, protectionism, strict hierarchy between social classes). The chapter’s objective is to offer an in-depth analysis of these themes. In this way, it aims to offer a general interpretation of the allegiance of the elite to the dictatorship and then to enlighten on how fascism governed a modern industrial society like Italy and how the economic elite influenced choices and decisions of dictatorship.
A. Gagliardi (2012). The Entrepreneurial Bourgeoisie and Fascism. NEW YORK : Palgrave Macmillan.
The Entrepreneurial Bourgeoisie and Fascism
GAGLIARDI, ALESSIO
2012
Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between the economic elite and Italian fascism during the dictatorship years. This relationship was fundamental in fascism’s rise to power and in the subsequent effort to stabilize the regime. The expansionist and “imperial” aims of fascism attached importance to an economic-elite role: only an industrially powerful State could yearn to be a great power on the international political scene. Meanwhile, the Italian economy’s structural constraints (raw materials and capital shortage, national budget deficit, decreasing international trade) could potentially limit the ability to reach political targets. Mussolini, though not an expert in the field of economics and lacking in technical competence, followed, daily and resolutely, the evolution of economic difficulties. His determination and attention testifies to the importance that “il Duce” gave to those problems. Fascism’s compromise with the economic elite originated not only from the requirements of political stabilization or social consensus but also from the awareness that without it fascism couldn’t overcome the Italian economy’s structural constraints and, therefore, realize its political aims. To deal with the relationship between political power and the economic elite in the fascist regime we can’t restrict ourselves to using concepts such as consensus/dissent, complicity/opposition, exchange, negotiations and dealing. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be possible to explain why the great depression years was the period of highest allegiance by the economic elite with Fascism, in spite of the very bad performance of industrial and finance companies. From the moment of the revaluation of lira at “quota 90” in the middle of the Twenties – the beginning of a fascist economic policy – the relationship between economic and political power was determined not only by negotiations exchange of favours and self-interest but also by deeper and more lasting factors such as: a) a common repulsion of industrial disputes that made possible a social equilibrium guaranteed by fascism, based on low wage levels and abrogation of strikes and freedom in union organization; b) a change in hierarchy and balance between companies e between economic sectors during the Twenties and Thirties, a result of fascist government intervention and not only of economic and social process; c) the growing entwinement of leaders of the National Fascist Party (Partito nazionale fascista), union leaders, public corporation bureaucracy and private company management, caused by decreasing market power and growing public expenditure; d) the development of a “corporatist” way of interaction between State and economic interest, based on direct participation of unions and employers’ associations in public policy; e) a cultural and ideological background shared both by fascist leaders and members of the economic elite (nationalism, colonialism, protectionism, strict hierarchy between social classes). The chapter’s objective is to offer an in-depth analysis of these themes. In this way, it aims to offer a general interpretation of the allegiance of the elite to the dictatorship and then to enlighten on how fascism governed a modern industrial society like Italy and how the economic elite influenced choices and decisions of dictatorship.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.