The paper tries out versions of the classic self-refutation objection against MacFarlane’s truth-relativism as applied to matters of taste. It is concluded that a fourth version of the objection provides a significant challenge because it shows that relativists cannot explain how a dispute on a matter of taste can be rational.

S. Moruzzi (2008). Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism. OXFORD : Oxford University Press.

Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism

MORUZZI, SEBASTIANO
2008

Abstract

The paper tries out versions of the classic self-refutation objection against MacFarlane’s truth-relativism as applied to matters of taste. It is concluded that a fourth version of the objection provides a significant challenge because it shows that relativists cannot explain how a dispute on a matter of taste can be rational.
2008
Relative Truth
207
224
S. Moruzzi (2008). Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism. OXFORD : Oxford University Press.
S. Moruzzi
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11585/125117
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