The paper tries out versions of the classic self-refutation objection against MacFarlane’s truth-relativism as applied to matters of taste. It is concluded that a fourth version of the objection provides a significant challenge because it shows that relativists cannot explain how a dispute on a matter of taste can be rational.
S. Moruzzi (2008). Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism. OXFORD : Oxford University Press.
Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth-Relativism
MORUZZI, SEBASTIANO
2008
Abstract
The paper tries out versions of the classic self-refutation objection against MacFarlane’s truth-relativism as applied to matters of taste. It is concluded that a fourth version of the objection provides a significant challenge because it shows that relativists cannot explain how a dispute on a matter of taste can be rational.File in questo prodotto:
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