How do veto-heavy European welfare systems engage in reform? In this paper we analyse the pension policy reform process in three Bismarckian welfare states - France, Germany, and Italy - against the background of recent theorizing about the scope and nature of welfare reform. We develop the notion of trade-offs to illustrate how governments manage to push forward and succeed with (even innovative) reforms despite the opposition of strong vested interests. In the process, we also reach a number of conclusions about recent theoretical understandings of reform in continental Europe, including both reform processes and the nature of their outcomes.
D.Natali, M. Rhodes (2004). The New Politics of Bismarckian Welfare State: Pension reforms in Continental Europe. Firenze : EUI.
The New Politics of Bismarckian Welfare State: Pension reforms in Continental Europe
NATALI, DAVID;
2004
Abstract
How do veto-heavy European welfare systems engage in reform? In this paper we analyse the pension policy reform process in three Bismarckian welfare states - France, Germany, and Italy - against the background of recent theorizing about the scope and nature of welfare reform. We develop the notion of trade-offs to illustrate how governments manage to push forward and succeed with (even innovative) reforms despite the opposition of strong vested interests. In the process, we also reach a number of conclusions about recent theoretical understandings of reform in continental Europe, including both reform processes and the nature of their outcomes.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
