Why Are ASEAN States Not Sanctioning Russia? Sovereignty, Dependence or Vulnerability?

Why did most ASEAN member states not impose sanctions against Russia after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine? This chapter advances three different explanations. Firstly, the non-imposition of sanction can be associated with interpretative and reactive contestation of key norms of the international order. Those states that are not imposing sanctions have a clear preference for an order rooted in the pluralist/Westphalian principles of sovereignty and non-interference (Wiener 2014, 2018; Betts and Orchard 2014). Consequently, they interpret the imposition of sanctions against Russia as a departure from those principles. It is important to notice that the same preference for sover- eignty and non-interference could as well lead to the opposite interpretation: that Russia has been violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty. As this chapter will further articulate below, post-colonial national- ism, critical positions on the liberal nature of the international order as pro- moted by Western powers, emphasis on sovereignty and the will to maintain non-alignment in disputes between great powers have had a very significant influence on the way in which ASEAN countries have positioned themselves on the issue of sanctions. This normative background has generally inspired positions of neutralism and abstentions from the sanction regime as a form of interpretative contestation. The second explanation regards the degree of political, military and eco- nomic dependence of ASEAN countries on Russia. Some of the ASEAN member states have a history of bilateral cooperation that lasts from the Cold War era, which involves political, military and economic partnerships. This is the case, for instance, of Vietnam. Other countries, such as Myanmar, have a more recent relation, but have developed a significant degree of dependence on Russia, in particular when it comes to the defence sectors. Others depend on Russia’s export in the agricultural sector and for raw materials. In some cases, interests and alignment with Russia have led some ASEAN member to engage in reactive contestation, violating the sanction regime to actively con- solidate their relationship with Moscow. A third explanation regards states’ vulnerability to the global disruption created by the war, added to previous factors of disruption such as the COVID pandemic. Russia’s war against Ukraine led to a global food crisis and energy crisis, and contributed to accelerate global inflation. Some of the ASEAN member states are among the most vulnerable to these trends. Consequently, their position on sanctions and more broadly their ‘not taking sides’ in the war stems from the effort to minimise the economic impact of the food and energy crises. Certain states, despite not being necessarily among the most vulnerable, have strong incentives to assume this same position, presenting themselves as representatives of the developing world. While interest is a key explana- tory factor for foreign policy decisions, this chapter will highlight the ways in which contestation has taken place. The decisions of each state can be traced back to a mix of the three.