This commentary critically discusses Pennisi’s proposal that self-face mirror misidentification (S-FMM) in schizophrenia originates from disruptions of synchronic self-continuity driven by altered corollary discharge mechanisms. While this account offers a plausible route from sensorimotor desynchronization to mirror estrangement, it risks treating S-FMM as an umbrella label that conflates heterogeneous phenomena. By re-examining the clinical vignettes mobilized in support of the model, we argue that several cases primarily involve disturbances of the self observing (depersonalization, loss of embodied anchoring, hyper-reflexive capture) while leaving intact the recognition of the self observed in the mirror. To account for transitions from mirror estrangement to full-fledged misidentification, we propose analyzing mirrors as enunciative prostheses that operationalize an as-if stance (i.e., an unstable mediation between embodied centering and virtual third-person positions) whose breakdown can underwrite transitivistic confusions and, in some cases, delusion-like reinterpretations. In conclusion, I outline a tentative hypothesis, inspired by models of Capgras delusion, according to which mirror misidentification may involve an affective disruption of self-familiarity that triggers aberrant sense-making and narrative stabilization.
Lobaccaro, L. (2025). Mirrors, Enunciation, and the As-If Function in Schizophrenia. Messina : Corisco Editore.
Mirrors, Enunciation, and the As-If Function in Schizophrenia
Luigi Lobaccaro
2025
Abstract
This commentary critically discusses Pennisi’s proposal that self-face mirror misidentification (S-FMM) in schizophrenia originates from disruptions of synchronic self-continuity driven by altered corollary discharge mechanisms. While this account offers a plausible route from sensorimotor desynchronization to mirror estrangement, it risks treating S-FMM as an umbrella label that conflates heterogeneous phenomena. By re-examining the clinical vignettes mobilized in support of the model, we argue that several cases primarily involve disturbances of the self observing (depersonalization, loss of embodied anchoring, hyper-reflexive capture) while leaving intact the recognition of the self observed in the mirror. To account for transitions from mirror estrangement to full-fledged misidentification, we propose analyzing mirrors as enunciative prostheses that operationalize an as-if stance (i.e., an unstable mediation between embodied centering and virtual third-person positions) whose breakdown can underwrite transitivistic confusions and, in some cases, delusion-like reinterpretations. In conclusion, I outline a tentative hypothesis, inspired by models of Capgras delusion, according to which mirror misidentification may involve an affective disruption of self-familiarity that triggers aberrant sense-making and narrative stabilization.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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AS if function mirror.pdf
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