“Anti-Kantianism as a Necessary Characteristic of Pragmatism”

In this paper, I attempt to generally summarize the relationship between the ideas of Peirce and Kant as clearly and faithfully as possible. Peirce passed from his early, original appraisal to a late discontent with Kant's approach to philosophy. I will set aside all the harsh statements Peirce made in the second part of his life charging Kant with superficial or hasty logic. These statements should be avoided because most of them are contained in unpublished manuscripts, raising questions about whether it was Peirce’s intention to express himself in that way. They are useful as background, however, for pointing us in a conceptual direction, a direction followed by European and American classical pragmatists. I describe this anti-Kantian track herein by recapitulating Peirce’s remarks on Kant and casting a quick glance at the views of the philosopher expressed by other classical pragmatists so that we can understand why anti-Kantianism is a necessary characteristic of pragmatism.