Realism

The sciences develop theories that rely on both observable and unobservable entities—i.e., entities accessible only through instruments—to describe and explain the world. Furthermore, unobservables have been changing over time, with new theoretical entities entering scientific discourse in various fields, and others disappearing. What are scientific theories ultimately aimed at: truth, empirical adequacy, predictive success, …? Can our epistemic justification for observable and unobservable entities be the same? Do theoretical entities genuinely refer, or are they merely formal devices? And how can the scientific success achieved through unobservables be reconciled with theoretical change? These are the central issues addressed in the scientific realism/antirealism debate. While tackling the relationship between pure and instrumentally mediated observation and theory, the debate also affects our broader conception of science, its focus and goals. In what follows, we consider some core arguments in this philosophical discussion and their relevance for psychology.