Pragmatism as Antirepresentationalism?

Richard Rorty's suggestion that American Pragmatism be characterized by its endorsement of an antirepresantationalist conception of the contents of our thoughts is critically discussed with reference to the works of Donald Davidso and Robert Brandom. Rorty's preference goes both to Brandom's Inferentialism and to Davidson's truth-conditional approach to language and interpretation, but these two conceptions are at odds with each other. The author suggests that antirepresentationalism is not incompatible with an allegiance to pragmatism, and that a better conception of the content of our utterances which pays close in attention to context and semantic underdetermination can incorporate representationalist claims without inccurring Rorty's criticisms. The author argues that the clash between Pragmatism and Metaphysical Realism, and that moderate representationalism can go hand in hand with pragmatism.