Logical Abductivism: Challenges and Prospects

Logical abductivism is the view that rational theory choice in logic occurs through an abductive method: our justification for accept‑ ing a logical theory relies on whether that theory outperforms alternative theories on some relevant criteria. This contribution ex‑ amines the core principles of logical abductivism, focusing on some core abductive criteria and their role in theory choice (Sections 6.1 and 6.2). Section 6.3 explores the limitations of logical abductiv‑ ism through the contrasting applications of it by two philosophers, Graham Priest, and Timothy Williamson. Using broadly the same abductive method, they arrive at divergent conclusions: Priest en‑ dorses a paraconsistent logic, while Williamson endorses classi‑ cal logic. It is argued that this divergence stems primarily from differing views on the nature of logical data and their underlying metaphysical commitments. This highlights a key limitation of ab‑ ductivism: its dependence on extralogical assumptions, making it non‑neutral in guiding logical theory choice. Section 6.4 deals with two epistemological challenges to logical abductivism: the Adop‑ tion Problem, which questions whether certain basic logical prin‑ ciples can be adopted, and the Background Logic Problem, which highlights the circularity in revising fundamental logical principles while relying on them for such revisions. Section 6.5 concludes the contribution by discussing prospects for logical abductivism.