In previous research, we considered several novel problems posed by robot accidents and assessed related legal and economic approaches to the creation of optimal incentives for robot manufacturers, operators, and prospective victims. In this chapter, we synthesize our previous work in a unified analysis. We begin with a discussion about the problems and legal challenges posed by robot torts. Next, we describe the novel liability regime we proposed, that is, “manufacturer residual liability,” which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts. This regime makes operator and victim liability contingent upon their negligence (incentivizing them to act diligently) and makes manufacturers residually liable for nonnegligent accidents (incentivizing them to make optimal investments in researching safer technologies). This rule has the potential to drive unsafe technology out of the market and also to incentivize operators to adopt optimal activity levels in their use of automated technologies.
Guerra, A., Parisi, F., Pi, D.Y., Seidel, L. (2024). Robotic Torts. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press [10.1017/9781009386708.040].
Robotic Torts
Guerra, Alice
Primo
;Parisi, FrancescoSecondo
;Pi, DanielPenultimo
;
2024
Abstract
In previous research, we considered several novel problems posed by robot accidents and assessed related legal and economic approaches to the creation of optimal incentives for robot manufacturers, operators, and prospective victims. In this chapter, we synthesize our previous work in a unified analysis. We begin with a discussion about the problems and legal challenges posed by robot torts. Next, we describe the novel liability regime we proposed, that is, “manufacturer residual liability,” which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts. This regime makes operator and victim liability contingent upon their negligence (incentivizing them to act diligently) and makes manufacturers residually liable for nonnegligent accidents (incentivizing them to make optimal investments in researching safer technologies). This rule has the potential to drive unsafe technology out of the market and also to incentivize operators to adopt optimal activity levels in their use of automated technologies.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
