Contents lists available at ScienceDirect





### Social Science & Medicine

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed

# Status (in)consistency in education and violent parenting practices towards children

Luca Maria Pesando<sup>a,b,\*</sup>, Elisabetta De Cao<sup>c,e</sup>, Giulia La Mattina<sup>d,e</sup>, Alberto Ciancio<sup>e,f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> New York University (AD), Division of Social Science, United Arab Emirates

<sup>b</sup> McGill University, Department of Sociology, School of Arts, Canada

<sup>c</sup> University of Bologna, Department of Economics, Italy

<sup>d</sup> University of South Florida, Department of Economics, USA

e IZA, Germany

<sup>f</sup> University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School, UK

#### ARTICLE INFO

Keywords: Parental educational similarity Child discipline Violent childrearing Status consistency Sub-Saharan Africa

#### ABSTRACT

Violent childrearing practices represent an invisible threat for global health and human development. Leveraging underused information on child discipline methods, this study explores the relationship between parental educational similarity and violent childrearing practices, testing a new potential pathway through which parental educational similarity may relate to child health and wellbeing over the life course. The study uses data from Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) covering 27 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Results suggest that couples where partners share the same level of education (homogamy) are less likely to adopt violent childrearing practices relative to couples where partners face status inconsistency in education (heterogamy), with differences by age of the child, yet less so by sex and birth order. Homogamous couples where both partners share *high* levels of education are also less (more) likely to adopt physically violent (non-violent) practices relative to homogamous couples with *low* levels of education. Relationships are stronger in countries characterized by higher GDP per capita, Human Development Index, and female education, yet also in countries with higher income and gender inequalities. Besides stressing the importance of female education, these findings underscore the key role of status concordance vs discordance in SSA partnerships. Tested micro-level mechanisms and country-level moderators only weakly explain result heterogeneity, calling for more research on the topic.

#### 1. Introduction

Physical punishment such as shaking, slapping, hitting the child with hard objects, or psychological punishment such as yelling, name-calling, belittling, or withholding affection are common forms of violence against children perpetrated by parents or caretakers to correct misconduct. They represent an invisible public health and human rights problem with potentially dramatic and costly consequences on the victims and the overall society (WHO, 2020). In the literature, these violent practices are interchangeably defined as *harsh parenting* or *child maltreatment* (Backhaus et al., 2022). While harsh parenting is often seen as a less severe form of discipline compared to child maltreatment, child maltreatment is characterized by actions that are harmful or threatening to a child's health, survival, dignity, and development (WHO, 1999).

Compelling evidence from several studies suggests that children experiencing even mild forms of violent childrearing practices such as spanking suffer negative consequences which may persist until adulthood (Gershoff and Grogan-Kaylor, 2016; Norman et al., 2012). Serious long-term consequences include physical health issues like chronic pain or heart disease, and mental health problems such as depression or anxiety. Additionally, they often result in cognitive and developmental delays, emotional difficulties like low self-esteem and attachment disorders, and various behavioral problems (Pieterse, 2015; Schofield et al., 2016; Negriff, 2020; Speyer et al., 2022).

Despite long-lasting adverse effects on child development and wellbeing, violent childrearing practices are widespread globally. In lowand middle-income countries (LMICs), nearly three in four children aged 2–4 regularly experience violent discipline by their caregivers (Cuartas

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2024.116954

Received 2 February 2024; Received in revised form 16 March 2024; Accepted 7 May 2024 Available online 10 May 2024

0277-9536/© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

<sup>\*</sup> Corresponding author. NYU-AD Campus, Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi, Division of Social Science, Office: A5-1207, United Arab Emirates.

*E-mail addresses*: lucamaria.pesando@nyu.edu, lucamaria.pesando@mcgill.ca (L.M. Pesando), elisabetta.decao@unibo.it (E. De Cao), glamattina@usf.edu (G. La Mattina), alberto.ciancio@glasgow.ac.uk (A. Ciancio).

et al., 2019). These estimates vary dramatically within and across regions, with areas such as South Asia (SA) and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) exhibiting the highest prevalence of violent parenting (Akmatov, 2011).

Variables related to family structure and family composition have been found to affect the risk of violent parenting. For instance, some evidence suggests that single-parent families and families with biological mothers and non-biological fathers tend to provide lower-quality childcare which may involve instances of violence (Berger, 2004). Besides aspects that are purely tied to family composition, child discipline (CD) may also be related to *joint* socioeconomic characteristics of parents, which have been found to affect decision-making power dynamics within the couple, (dis)agreement on specific parenting practices, as well as material and non-material resources and investments in children (Abufhele et al., 2022; Beck and González-Sancho, 2009; Martin et al., 2007). One such example is parental similarity or dissimilarity in terms of human capital, a clear marker of status (in)consistency between spouses or partners (Rauscher, 2020; Rangel and Rauscher, 2024).

Extensive research has shown that higher maternal education is associated with better child's health and human capital development (e. g., Chevalier and O'Sullivan, 2007; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Güneş, 2015), as well as higher paternal education is associated with better child outcomes (Chen and Li, 2009; Rangel and Rauscher, 2021). Nevertheless, the social science literature has devoted less attention to understanding whether parents' joint educational characteristics controlling for own level of education - bear any relationship with children's outcomes - not to mention with the adoption of violent parenting practices - especially across LMICs. Most research on violent parenting concentrates on the United States and reveals that corporal punishment tends to be more prevalent among mothers with lower levels of education (Hines et al., 2022; Schneider and Schenck-Fontaine, 2022). Limited work in low-income settings offers similar findings (Cuartas, 2022). Emotional punishment instead has been overlooked because not considered harmful until recently (Moody et al., 2018).

Building on some recent efforts concerned with understanding the implications of parental educational similarity for the next generation (Abufhele et al., 2022; Behrman, 2020; Edwards and Roff, 2016; Pesando, 2022a; Rauscher, 2020), this paper aims to contribute to this literature by exploring whether parental educational similarity is related to the adoption of corporal or emotional violent childrearing practices, thus providing a pathway through which parental educational similarity may shape child developmental outcomes early in life and across the life course. To answer this question, we cover multiple LMICs in SSA where violent parenting is relatively common. When focusing on specific health outcomes such as birth weight or nutritional indicators (e.g., height-for-age, weight-for-height, etc.), one hypothesis is that partners holding similar levels of education within a couple are likely to experience less stressors within their relationship and higher family stability due to more cooperation and less conflict, which in turn correlate with better outcomes for children in an intergenerational perspective, including health and educational outcomes (Abufhele et al., 2022; Bratsberg et al., 2023). When thinking about violent parenting, one extension of the above hypothesis might suggest that parents sharing similar levels of education may be more likely to agree that violent childrearing practices are not appropriate and, as such, adopt violent practices less frequently. However, parents with similar education levels may also be more likely to agree that violent disciplinary methods are necessary and thus use them more frequently. Additionally, interesting variation may exist within the group of educationally homogamous couples (i.e., couples where both partners have the same level of education), as well as within the group of heterogamous ones (i.e., couples where partners have dissimilar levels of education). Similarly, there may be differences across types of punishment, children's characteristics, households, and countries.

This study focuses on 27 SSA countries and collates data from Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) building a sample of over 125,000 couples with complete information on both partners' education and child-discipline modules. We first explore relationships between parental educational similarity and dissimilarity and a range of child discipline outcomes, assessing heterogeneity across punishment types, groups of children, and parental characteristics. In so doing, we distinguish educationally heterogamous couples between *hypergamous* – husband's education higher than wife's education – and *hypogamous* – wife's education higher than husband's education – couples. We then test potential micro-level mechanisms and leverage country-level variables from the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the DHS/MICS to explore whether the strength and direction of the associations vary by demography-, development-, and gender-related country characteristics.

The comparative focus of this study on SSA is appropriate for four reasons. First, one mechanism that is discussed in the literature on parental status inconsistencies and children's outcomes is parental stress - mostly, mother's stress during pregnancy and following birth. Given that poverty is highly correlated with extreme levels of stress, as individuals living in poverty report on average a greater number of stressful events in their lives than individuals not living in poverty (Aizer et al., 2016), and parental stress is associated with a higher prevalence of child maltreatment (Wolf et al., 2021; Brown and De Cao, 2024), the focus of this investigation on LMICs in SSA is all the more needed. Second, violent parenting remains more prevalent in LMICs than in high-income countries (HICs) (Cuartas et al., 2019), with SSA being the most severely affected region (Akmatov, 2011; Moody et al., 2018). Third, the share of homogamous and hypogamous couples in SSA is increasing markedly due to massive female educational expansion, yet unevenly across the region (Lopus and Frye, 2020; Pesando, 2021). Last, building on the above literature, we attempt to shed additional light on the micro- and macro-level factors that may underlie the observed heterogeneity - a research endeavor that is only possible by pooling multiple countries.

#### 2. Background

## 2.1. Existing literature on parental educational similarity and children's developmental outcomes

While no study has delved into the relationship between parental educational similarity and child discipline, there is now a growing interest in the implications of increasing similarity in parental levels of education on child health. Focusing on the United States (US), Rauscher (2020) used administrative data on births coupled with Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques to estimate the effects of parental educational similarity on infant health. Her results suggest that parental educational homogamy is beneficial for infant health, while educational hypergamy is detrimental. In a follow-up study, Rangel and Rauscher (2024) documented racial and ethnic variation in this relationship, documenting larger homogamy returns for highly educated Black, Indian, Asian, and white couples. Similar to Rauscher (2020), leveraging birth-register data as well as step-sibling information, Abufhele et al. (2022) used administrative data to look at a related research question in Chile. Their findings also suggest that parents' educational homogamy is associated with a reduced probability of low birth weight and preterm birth, yet educational hypogamy is detrimental, highlighting the gender-unequal nature of hypogamous couples in Chile, as well as the possible stigma attached to their non-normative nature. Moving towards cognitive, educational and labor market outcomes, using Norwegian register data and counterfactual simulations, Bratsberg et al. (2023) found that mating trends contribute to slight improvements in average education and employment and reduced inequality in the offspring generation. Underlying these associations, authors identify enhanced levels of parental coordination and similarity of preferences in parenting strategies as key mechanisms, supporting the idea that children may benefit from consistency in their family environments, as well as more

congruent parenting. Overall, these studies provide solid single-country evidence with a focus on upper middle- and high-income societies and children's health and educational outcomes across the life course.

Shifting the focus onto LMICs, Pesando (2022a) built on these findings to explore the relationship between parental educational similarity and different measures of children's health from birth to adolescence using longitudinal data from the Young Lives (YL) International Study of Childhood Poverty conducted in Ethiopia, India, Peru, and Vietnam. His findings highlight heterogeneity across contexts. In Ethiopia and India, parental educational homogamy is associated with worse health outcomes in infancy and childhood, while associations are positive in Peru and, foremost, Vietnam. He explains this heterogeneity by leveraging a combination of meso- and macro-level variables such as educational expansion, patriarchal norms in the family, dynamics of gender equality within the household and in society, and levels of socio-economic development, finding more positive and robust associations where both gender equality and socio-economic development are higher (i.e., Peru and Vietnam). Nonetheless, the negative associations documented in Ethiopia and Peru are consistent with Behrman (2020), who also found mother's higher relative educational status to be negatively associated with children's height-for-age z-scores in Malawi, contrary to expectations of bargaining theories.

Overall, while studies on HICs converge towards the idea that parental educational similarity correlates positively with children's outcomes, scholarship on the topic in LMICs is more heterogeneous, pointing towards an array of scenarios that might have to do with the value that women's education holds in society, the commonality and "normativity" of specific parenting practices and couple configurations, the role that women play within and outside of the family, as well as broader – and, often, uneven – trends tied to industrialization, modernization, and socio-economic development.

#### 2.2. Theoretical perspectives and hypotheses

Key to understanding the intergenerational implications of partners' educational similarity is the sociological interest in family-based social capital and its contribution to the transmission of human capital (Beck and González-Sancho, 2009; Coleman, 1988). Following Furstenberg (2005), the implications of parental educational similarity can be interpreted as a form of within-family social capital, whereby educational similarity may translate in a series of parental behaviors and attitudes that enhance the efficacy of parenting practices and investments in children's development by making the flow of information between parents and the coordination of resource-allocation decisions smoother and more friction-less. Considering homogamy as an indicator of homogeneity in preferences and personal monetary and non-monetary resources, we could conceptualize homogamy as a within-couple feature that may positively relate to agreement and coordination within the household, which in turn would increase efficiency in the production of "child quality" and the organization of family life. As such, our first hypothesis is as follows:

**HP1** ["homogamy-benefit" hypothesis]: Parents sharing similar levels of education may be more likely to agree that violent childrearing practices are not appropriate and, as such, be less likely to adopt them.

On top of the benefits accruing from status consistency – such as concordant preferences and more aligned parenting – we may also expect differences depending on which level of education is shared by both parents. Specifically, it is reasonable to expect different scenarios if both parents share no education vs if both parents share a high school degree. This could be the case, for instance, if the mother's and father's educational attainment influence childrearing practices and if complementarities exist such that higher paternal schooling increases the effect of maternal schooling on child discipline. As higher socioeconomic status couples hold a higher level of pooled resources (including immaterial resources, such as time and knowledge), we hypothesize that couples' educational similarity may matter differently for people at different places in the educational distribution:

**HP2** [Homogamy heterogeneity]: Educational homogamy is more strongly associated with the adoption of less violent or non-violent parenting practices at the higher end of the educational ladder.

As for heterogamous couples, expectations are mixed. On one hand, following some US scholarship we may observe different associations between hypergamous and hypogamous couples, with the latter group exhibiting better child outcomes, reflecting the power of female educational expansion and progressive social norms tied to women's role in advanced societies (Rauscher, 2020). If this is the case, we may expect to observe more beneficial associations with CD in hypogamous couples (vis-à-vis homogamous and hypergamous). On the other hand, evidence from LMICs cautions against this "rosy" view of hypogamous couples, as hypogamous couples may lead to "new" and "atypical" female roles within households, including some that may challenge existing conventions (Weitzman, 2014). In theories viewing marriage as an "exchange relationship," cultural expectations put value on different divisions of labor and care roles within the household (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017). Masculinity is conceptualized in relation to femininity, and wives' educational and employment outcomes should be studied in relation to their husbands' (Atkinson et al., 2005; Bertrand et al., 2015). According to status inconsistency theories, where new and atypical roles may threaten male dominance (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017; Hornung et al., 1981), women having higher education, better occupation, or more resources than men could lead to increased conflict between partners, including more IPV (Ackerson et al., 2008; Behrman, 2019; Flake, 2005). One mechanism rests on the idea that expectations about relative status are normative, hence deviations may lead to severe psychological stress (Hornung et al., 1981) and, as household stress is correlated with family violence (Wolf et al., 2021), more violence towards children as a result. It could be that men also use violence towards children, not only towards women, to reinstate their masculinity status within the family. If this is the case, a hypogamy scenario may not be beneficial for children's outcomes and even be characterized by more violent discipline methods relative to a homogamy one. Considering the large and diverse sample of SSA countries included in the study and given the current lack of studies testing the applicability of status inconsistency theories to violence against children, we refrain from developing a hypothesis and leave this aspect as an empirical investigation.

Children's characteristics are important determinants of the adoption of specific discipline methods. For instance, sex may be relevant as previous scholarship suggests that boys are usually at higher risk of experiencing violent parenting (Cui et al., 2016), albeit not everywhere (Endendijk, et al., 2016). As for birth order, parents are often more likely to adopt strict childrearing practices with their first child, followed by a gradual "softening" of parenting practices with later-born children (Hao et al., 2008; Lynn Ng et al., 2014). Lastly, distinguishing between preschool and school-age children is sensible to the extent that childrearing practices may be more prevalent among parents with children in school and also represent a response to children's (mis)behavior in schools (Wang et al., 2018). While existing research only relates specific child characteristics to higher/lower risk of violence (and not to educational similarity itself), we expect parental educational similarity to matter most among subgroups of children that tend to be most at risk of experiencing violent parenting. As such, our third hypothesis is as follows:

**HP3** [Heterogeneity across children]: Parental educational homogamy is more strongly associated with a reduction in violent childrearing

practices among groups of children that are most affected by violent parenting, namely boys, firstborns, and school-age children.

While the homogamy-benefit hypothesis leads to the expectation that parental educational similarity may be related to a lower likelihood of violent parenting, this may not be the case in all contexts. As such, it is essential to theorize on country-level factors that may explain crosscountry variability, as done by Pesando (2022a), focusing on dimensions that vary hugely across SSA countries. Starting from demographic variables, previous research suggests that age differences between partners provide a good proxy for traditional customs and patriarchal norms in LMICs (Carmichael, 2011; Reniers, 2003), as spousal age differences tend to be large in patriarchal societies and societies characterized by patrilineal kinship (such as in West and Central Africa). These age differences are important drivers of assortative mating patterns and, as such, may affect the relationship of interest (Pesando, 2021). The same holds for marriage-market imbalances in the share of men and women of marriageable ages, as well as imbalances in educational distributions of men and women. Relatedly, measures of socioeconomic development - capturing broader processes of development, modernization, and urbanization - such as GDP per capita, HDI, and schooling levels may positively affect the likelihood of forming homogamous couples. Last, we speculate that gender norms and dynamics - proxied by variables such as women's decision-making in the household, women's participation at work, prevalence of polygyny, etc. constitute the strongest contextual factor shaping the association of interest (Klevens et al., 2018). For instance, gender inequity has been shown to be positively correlated with violent discipline methods (Klevens and Ports, 2017). In line with Pesando (2022a), we expect that in contexts with rooted gender inequalities within societies and within couples, the potential benefits of parental educational similarity for the adoption of specific parenting practices might be offset and even reversed as male partners feel threatened by gender-symmetric dynamics. Drawing on the idea that demography, development, and gender-related characteristics at the country level interact with each other to produce an array of different outcomes – and building on the idea that SSA countries differ markedly across all these characteristics our fourth hypothesis is as follows:

**HP4** [*Heterogeneity across countries*]: The relationship between parental educational homogamy and CD outcomes varies across countries. Specifically, we expect educational homogamy to be more strongly associated with a reduction in violent childrearing practices in contexts characterized by less patriarchal norms and more balanced marriage markets, higher socioeconomic development, and lower gender inequalities.

#### 3. Data and methods

#### 3.1. Sample and variables

This study pools multiple waves from the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). MICS are nationally representative household surveys implemented by countries under the UNICEF program developed to provide internationally comparable, statistically rigorous data on the lives of children and women worldwide. These surveys – highly comparable to the DHS in terms of survey structure and sociodemographic variables collected – include a child discipline module (CD) that provides information on the primary caregiver's attitudes and behaviors related to childrearing practices. We consider recent cross-sectional surveys (MICS3, MICS4, MICS5, MICS6, and DHS conducted after 2005) for 27 sub-Saharan African countries keeping couples with complete information on both parents' education and with a complete CD module. A few restrictions were imposed on the sample to identify the proper analytical focus, namely (i) women between the ages 25–40, as by age 25 most women in SSA have entered their first union and achieved their highest level of education (Esteve et al., 2012; Pesando, 2021), (ii) women who are currently married or in a union, and (iii) women who have been married only once and are currently in their first and only union – a restriction made to identify the correct information of the latest/most recent husband provided in the data (Casterline et al., 1986). These restrictions leave us with a sample of about 125,000 couples with complete information on the main variables of interest.

Table 1 provides information on the analytical sample of countries and survey waves included in the analysis. Countries are further categorized by sub-region, using sub-regional categories provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), namely West, Central, East, and South Africa. Note that over half of the sample is from West SSA.

The CD module is adapted from the Conflict Tactics Scale to characterize 11 disciplinary practices in cross-cultural context (Straus et al., 1998; UNICEF, 2010). In the MICS3-MICS5 and DHS, the CD module refers to one randomly selected child aged 2–14, while from MICS6

#### Table 1

Sam	ole	of	countries	and	survey	waves	included	in	the	analy	sis.

Survey/Round	Region	Country	Year	Sample
MICS5-DHS	West	Benin	2014-2017	7484
MICS3	West	Burkina Faso	2006	1671
DUC	Airica	December 1	0016	40(1
DHS	East Africa	Burunai	2016	4861
MICS3-MICS5	Africa	Cameroon	2006–2014	3319
MICS3-MICS4-	Central	Central African	2006-2018-	3354
MICS6	Africa	Republic	2019	
MICS4-MICS6-	Central	Chad	2010-2019-	14,505
DHS	Africa		2014	
MICS5-DHS	Central	Congo	2014-2011	2857
	Africa	0		
MICS4-MICS6-	Central	Congo, DR	2010-2018-	10.133
DHS	Africa	0.0	2013	.,
MICS5	West	Côte d'Ivoire	2016	2347
milliobo	Africa		2010	2017
MICS3-MICS4-	West	Gambia	2006-2010-	6160
MICS6	Africa		2018	
MICS3-MICS4-	West	Ghana	2006-2011-	4687
MICS6	Africa	Giulia	2000 2011	1007
MICS5	West	Guinea	2016	2183
MIG55	Africa	Guinca	2010	2105
MICS3 MICS5	West	Guinea Bissau	2006 2014	3730
MICS	Africa	Guillea-Dissau	2000-2014-	3739
MICSE	South	Locotho	2019	206
MICSO	Africa	Lesotilo	2018	320
DUC	Alfica	Libonia	2006 2010	2626
DHS	west	Liberia	2006-2019	2636
1000	Africa	A. 1	0010	0.07
MICS6	East Africa	Madagascar	2018	3627
MICS5-MICS6	East Africa	Malawi	2014-2020	10,093
MICS5	West	Malı	2015	1182
	Africa			
MICS4-MICS5	West	Mauritania	2011-2015	1463
	Africa			
DHS	West	Niger	2012	3654
	Africa			
MICS4-MICS5	West	Nigeria	2011-2016	12,000
	Africa			
MICS5-MICS6	Central	Sao Tome and	2014-2019	851
	Africa	Principe		
MICS3-MICS4-	West	Sierra Leone	2005-2010-	7744
MICS6	Africa		2017	
MICS4-MICS5	South	Swaziland	2010-2014	882
	Africa			
MICS3-MICS4-	West	Togo	2006-2010-	6719
MICS6-DHS	Africa		2017-2013	
DHS	East Africa	Uganda	2016	4043
MICS5-MICS6	East Africa	Zimbabwe	2014-2019	4136

*Notes*: MICS: Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys; DHS: Demographic and Health Surveys. Regional classifications obtained from the United Nations Statistics Division. onwards it refers to all children 2-4, plus one randomly selected child aged 5-14. For consistency, in our working sample we keep only one child 2-4 from MICS6 (sampled at random), and one aged 5-14. The main respondent, usually the mother, is asked if she or anyone else in the household used any of the following punishment methods in the month preceding the interview: (1) "took away privileges," "explained wrong behavior," and "gave something else to do"; (2) "shook him/her," "spanked, hit, slapped on bottom with bare hand," "hit with belt, hairbrush, stick, or other hard object," "hit/slapped on the face, head or ears, " "hit/slapped on hand, arm of leg," and "beat up, hit over and over as hard as one could"; and (3) "shouted, yelled, screamed" and "called dumb, lazy, or another name". Items in (1) are categorized as "non-violent discipline," in (2) as "physical punishment" (further categorized as "severe physical punishment" in the case of "hit with belt, hairbrush, stick, or other hard object," "hit/slapped on the face, head or ears," or "beat up, hit over and over as hard as one could"), and in (3) as "psychological/emotional punishment" (as in UNICEF, 2010). We then also create a variable for "any violent behavior," pooling 2) and 3) into one unique variable gathering both physical and emotional violence. All CD variables are therefore dichotomous, where the outcome one corresponds to "yes," i.e., experienced over the month preceding the interview. Spearman's rank correlations are provided in Table A1 (Online Appendix), alongside Cronbach's alpha for sub-items.

Focusing on parental education, the MICS and DHS include a categorical and a continuous measure of educational attainment, namely highest level attained and grade attained. The categorical variable is coded as 0 for "no education," 1 for "primary," 2 for "secondary," and 3 for "higher." The continuous variable ranges from 0 to 23. Although the continuous variable offers a more precise measure of schooling achievement, it overlooks the importance of academic boundaries, which matter more for determining whether individuals marry "within their group" (Pesando, 2021). Most importantly, this latter classification captures similar stages in the educational career, even if these stages represent a different number of years across countries (Frye and Lopus, 2018). As such, we build the couple-level measures of parental educational (dis)similarity - the main predictors of interest - relying on the categorical variables further dichotomized. We define a couple as educationally homogamous if both parents share the same level of education and educationally heterogamous otherwise. If the husband's level of education is higher than the wife's level of education (H > W), then the couple is coded as educationally hypergamous; conversely, if the wife's level of education is higher than the husband's (W > H), the couple is coded as educationally hypogamous. Nonetheless, we also include as controls mother's and father's schooling in continuous form. We do this for two related reasons: first, we are interested in the association between joint educational characteristics (joint parental coefficient) and children's outcomes net of parents' own individual levels of education. Second, as the joint predictor is built through the variables in levels, we cannot include as additional controls mother's and father's levels of education in categories as this would result in full collinearity. As such, adding schooling as continuous variables help us circumvent this issue making sure each parent's resources and earning potential are taken into account (Pesando, 2022a; Rauscher, 2020). Methodological implications of this choice are discussed in the Appendix.

The analysis considers a series of individual-, household-, child- and survey-level variables that could explain variability in child discipline outcomes and can be reliably obtained and recoded across both MICS and DHS samples, namely marital status of the woman, age of the woman, age difference between spouses, household location of residence (rural/urban), age and sex of the child, number of household members, number of children below age five in the household, wealth index in quintiles, country dummies and year dummies. Furthermore, albeit on a restricted sample (about a third of the countries, only through DHS), the analysis tests potential micro-level mechanisms including within-household decision-making (DM) power of women, relying on the standard DHS decision-making measure, and dynamics of intimate partner violence (IPV), relying on binary measures of experiencing physical, sexual, and emotional violence over the previous 12 months.

Lastly, to explore cross-country variability in the estimates, we obtain time series of country-level variables that we categorize under the following three labels: demography, socioeconomic development, and gender. Variables in the demography group include the male-female difference in mean age at marriage, computed from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), husband-wife differences in age, aggregated at the country level from MICS and DHS, the ratio of men 25-29 over women 20-24 from the UN World Population Prospects (WPP), and the ratio of educated men 30-34 over educated women 25-29 from the MICS and DHS. Note that the latter variables were constructed to account for marriage-market potential imbalances in the share of men and women, as well as educated men and women (with "educated" defined as individuals having secondary education or above), which are key drivers of assortative mating dynamics (Eika et al., 2019; Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2000). Variables in the socioeconomic development group include Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Human Development Index (HDI) among females, Gini coefficient, and mean years of schooling among females, all from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). Lastly, variables in the gender group include the Gender Inequality Index (GII) from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the female-to-male ratio in labor force participation rates (LFPR) from the WB, the percentage of women in polygynous unions from DHS/MICS, and the percentage of women making decisions alone or jointly with their partners on household purchases from DHS/MICS. Country-level estimates pertain to the same year of the DHS/MICS survey or, if unavailable, to the closest available year. Table A2 provides domain-specific correlations between these country-level variables.

#### 3.2. Empirical strategy

We start our analysis by visualizing child discipline outcomes as well as prevalence of educational homogamy, hypergamy, and hypogamy across countries. We then run a series of Linear Probability Models (LPM) predicting child discipline outcomes  $- CD_{ict}$  with *i* standing for child, c country, and t survey year – as a function of educational homogamy, hypogamy, and hypergamy (par\_educ\_sim), controlling for parents' own schooling (schoolingW and schoolingH). As the average of the outcomes is not close to 1 or 0, we choose LPM over logit for ease of interpretation - logit estimates with reported odds ratios are included in the Appendix. The variable *par\_educ\_sim* is a broad label accounting for a series of dummy variables, one for homogamy, one for hypergamy, and one for hypogamy (results are also tested with a categorical counterpart to these dummies). Model (1) includes the joint parental education variable as well as husband's and wife's grade attained; model (2) adds individual- and child-level controls such as age of the woman, age difference between spouses, marital status, sex of the randomly selected child, and age of the child; finally, model (3) adds household-level controls such as wealth index, rural/urban location of residence, number of household members, and number of children in the household below age 5 (full specification, henceforth, with a vector including all controls labeled X). For the sake of conciseness, only full-specification models are reported in the body of the paper and graphs with coefficients of interest ( $\beta$ ) are chosen over tables, wherever possible. All models account for DHS/MICS survey weights, estimate cluster-robust standard errors at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) level for each country (as the main clusters in the DHS are the PSU), and control for country ( $\zeta_c$ ) and survey-year ( $\eta_t$ ) fixed effects (eq. (1)).

$$\begin{split} CD_{ict} = & \alpha + \beta par\_educ\_sim_{ict} + \gamma schoolingW_{ict} + \delta schoolingH_{ict} + \vartheta X_{ict} + \zeta_c \\ & + \eta_t + u_{ict} \end{split}$$

(1)

Figures plotting interaction coefficients ( $\rho$ ) between the joint

education variables and the moderators – be them individual-, child-, household-, or country-level – are provided to assess whether associations differ by relevant sociodemographic and geographical groups (eq. (2)). As far as country-level variables are concerned, we run analyses keeping them as continuous, as well as dichotomized as above (=1) or below (=0) median.

$$\begin{split} & CD_{ict} = \alpha + \beta par_{educ.sim_{ict}} + \rho \left( par_{educ.sim_{ict}} \right. \\ & \bullet \textit{moderator}_{ict (or ~ct' ~or ~c'')} \right) + \gamma \textit{schoolingW}_{ict} + \delta \textit{schoolingH}_{ict} + \vartheta X_{ict} + \zeta_c + \eta_t \\ & + u_{ict} \end{split}$$

We acknowledge upfront that none of our analyses can be deemed causal and that selection into partnership and into specific couple configurations is not random. Although reverse causality is less of a concern in this setting, endogeneity due to omitted variable bias and selection on unobservables still is. Controlling for both mother's and father's education partially helps address the concern that some other factors may drive both parental educational similarity and child discipline (Rauscher, 2020). Yet socioeconomic inequalities on the marriage and employment markets and/or maternal preferences for specific characteristics in a spouse or partner could bias the estimates by influencing educational similarity and child discipline simultaneously (Abufhele et al., 2022). We highlight these aspects as fundamental yet also recognize that identifying a source of exogenous variation in this context - even more in a cross-country comparative scenario - is extremely challenging. As such, we conduct this descriptive analysis relying on a wealth of unique data to cast light on an under-explored topic such as violent parenting in SSA as well as hoping to spur additional research that may shift this nascent literature in a more causal direction.

#### 4. Descriptive statistics

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the DHS variables of interest, as well as on the country-level moderators. Summary statistics are computed on the pooled analytical sample of 27 countries and, for countries with multiple waves, estimates provided are averages across waves. Evidence from Table 2 suggests that non-violent and violent childrearing practices are widespread across this sample of LMICs. For instance, 86% of caregivers report using non-violent practices, while 72% of caregivers report some sort of physical punishment in response to child behavior, which reduces to 22% when only severe physical punishment is considered. These percentages are driven primarily by spanking, hitting, or slapping children on the bottom with the hand reported by approximately 47% of caregivers - shaking (36%), and hitting or slapping children on the hand, arm, or leg (34%). Emotional punishment is even higher, as 77% of caregivers report either shouting, yelling, screaming at the child, or treating her/him as an idiot. Therefore, when looking at a combined violence index which considers both physical and emotional punishment, estimates are remarkably high, over 85% of the sample reporting some sort of violent childrearing practice, in line with estimates by UNICEF (2010). Women have on average 3.8 years of schooling, while men have on average 4.8. For both men and women there is considerable variability across educational categories, with 47% of women with no education, relative to 36% of men.

Across the 27 countries, the average difference in age at first marriage between men and women is 5.5, while spousal differences in age average around 8. When looking at marriage-market imbalances, the ratio of men 25–29 to women 20–24 is less than 1 (0.8), suggesting a favorable market for men in terms of number of women of marriageable ages, while the ratio of educated men 30–34 to educated women 25–29 is higher than 1 (1.6), confirming the predominantly hypergamous nature of couples in SSA. In this sample of countries, the average HDI is 0.4, and mean years of schooling among women equal 3.4. Not least, 29% of women are in a polygynous union, and 35% of women make decisions

#### Table 2

(2)

Descriptive statistics on child discipline outcomes and country-level moderators,
analytical sample.

Tock avery privileges (1a)       126,583       0.487       0.500       0       1         Explained wrong behavior (1b)       126,579       0.784       (0.411)       0       1         Gave him something else to       126,493       0.397       (0.489)       0       1         Non-violent behavior (1a, 1b, 1c)       126,564       0.363       (0.481)       0       1         Shook him/her (2a)       126,564       0.305       (0.460)       0       1         Hit with belt, stick, or other       126,614       0.772       0       1         Hit vial ped him on the face, 126,460       0.181       (0.385)       0       1         Hit vial ped him on the face, 126,418       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         Stat as one could (2a)       1       126,516       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 126,556       0.716       (0.413)       0       1       1         Stottet, yelled, screamed at him/her (3a)       126,556       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Him/her (3a)       129,534       0.286       (0.423)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, wome       129,534       0.286       (0	Outcomes	Obs.	Mean	(SD)	Min	Max
Explained wrong behavior (1b)         126,579         0.784         (0.411)         0         1           Gave him something clse to do         126,493         0.397         (0.489)         0         1           Non-violent behavior (1a, 1b, 126,661         0.857         (0.350)         0         1           Spanked, hit, slapped him on 126,514         0.472         (0.499)         0         1           bottom with hand (2b)         11         (0.499)         0         1           Hit him with belt, sitck, or other hard object (2c)         126,460         0.181         (0.385)         0         1           Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or l26,514         0.335         (0.472)         0         1           Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or l26,418         0.079         (0.270)         0         1           Severe physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2c, 2d, 2c, 2d, 2c, 126,558         0.717         (0.449)         0         1           Shouted, yelled, screamed at names (3b)         126,574         0.386         (0.487)         0         1           Mean years of schooling, women         129,534         0.380         (6.032)         0         1           Mean years of schooling, women         129,534         0.363         (0.441)         1 <td>Took away privileges (1a)</td> <td>126,583</td> <td>0.487</td> <td>(0.500)</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td>	Took away privileges (1a)	126,583	0.487	(0.500)	0	1
Gave him something else to do         126,493         0.397         (0.489)         0         1           Non-violent behavior (1a, 1b, 1c)         126,516         0.857         (0.350)         0         1           Shook him,/her (2a)         126,536         0.363         (0.481)         0         1           Shook him,/her (2a)         126,514         0.472         (0.499)         0         1           Hit him with belt, stick, or other hard object (2c)         1         126,544         0.355         0         1           Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg (2c)         126,647         0.335         (0.472)         0         1           Severe physical punishment (2a, 2a, 2f)         126,647         0.218         (0.413)         0         1           State distign or thim and idig, azy, or other names (3a)         126,656         0.766         (0.423)         0         1           Emotional punishment (2a, 3b)         126,556         0.766         (0.423)         0         1           Azy, 5a, 3b)         126,558         0.766         (0.429)         0         1           Emotional punishment (2a, 3b)         126,554         0.286         (0.452)         0         1           Mean years of schooling, women	Explained wrong behavior (1b)	126,579	0.784	(0.411)	0	1
(1c)       Non-violent behavior ( $1a$ , $1b$ , 126,661       0.857       (0.350)       0       1         Jook him/her ( $2a$ )       126,386       0.363       (0.481)       0       1         Shook him/her ( $2a$ )       126,514       0.472       (0.499)       0       1         Hit him with helt, sitck, or other       126,564       0.305       (0.460)       0       1         Hit/slapped him on hand, arm       125,167       0.335       (0.472)       0       1         Hit/slapped him on hand, arm       125,167       0.335       (0.472)       0       1         Physical punishment       126,460       0.181       (0.385)       0       1 $2d, 2e, 2f$ 126,658       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         Shouted, yelled, screamed at       126,657       0.338       (0.487)       0       1         names ( $3b$ )       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Any violence ( $2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2d$ 126,558       0.551       0       1         Any violence ( $2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2d$ 2e,558       0.552       0       1         Mean years of schooling, women       129,534       0.854       0.032       0 <td>Gave him something else to do</td> <td>126,493</td> <td>0.397</td> <td>(0.489)</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td>	Gave him something else to do	126,493	0.397	(0.489)	0	1
Non-volent behavior (1a, 1a, 126,061         0.8.57         (0.350)         0         1           Shook him/her (2a)         126,386         0.363         (0.481)         0         1           Spanked, hit, slapped him on beface, 126,514         0.472         (0.499)         0         1           hard object (2c)         1         126,564         0.305         (0.460)         0         1           Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg (2c)         126,418         0.079         (0.270)         0         1           Beat up, hit him over and over as hard as one could (2D)         Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 126,658         0.717         (0.450)         0         1           Ldy, 2c, 2f)         Shouted, yelled, screamed at 126,474         0.218         (0.413)         0         1           Shouted, yelled, screamed at 126,658         0.757         0.388         (0.487)         0         1           names (3b)         126,656         0.766         (0.423)         0         1           Educational punishment (3a, 3b)         126,658         0.752         0         30           Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2e, 126,658         0.654         0.6322)         0         1           Mem years of schooling, wore         129,534	(1c)			(0.0=0)		
Ly       126,514       0.453       0.4811       0       1         Shook him/her ( $2a$ )       126,514       0.472       (0.499)       0       1         bottom with hand ( $2b$ )       126,514       0.472       (0.499)       0       1         Hit him with helt, stick, or other hard object ( $2c$ )       126,516       0.305       (0.460)       0       1         Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg ( $2c$ )       126,618       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         Beat up, hit him over and over as hard as one could ( $2f$ )       126,618       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         Severe physical punishment ( $2a, 2b, 2c, 126,658$ 0.717       (0.449)       0       1         Immoter ( $3a, 3b$ )       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Shouted, yelled, screamed at 126,484       0.719       (0.449)       0       1         Immoter ( $3a, 3b$ )       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Ary violence ( $2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d$	Non-violent behavior (1a, 1b,	126,661	0.857	(0.350)	0	1
bottom unith hand (2k)       126,514       0.472       (0.499)       0       1         htth him vith had (2k)       11       126,564       0.305       (0.460)       0       1         htth him vith belt, stick, or other hard object (2c)       126,664       0.385       0       1         Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg (2c)       126,418       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         Beat up, hit him over and over as hard as one could (2f)       126,418       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 126,658       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         Severe physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 126,658       0.719       (0.449)       0       1         Shouted, yelled, screamed at him sidiol, lazy, or other names (3b)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Emotional punishment (2a, 3b)       126,658       0.854       (0.352)       0       1         Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2c, 2d, 2c, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d	Shook him/her $(2a)$	126 386	0 363	(0.481)	0	1
bottom with hand (2b)         End (2b)	Spanked, hit, slapped him on	126,514	0.472	(0.499)	0	1
Hit him with belt, stick, or other hard object (22)         126,564         0.305         (0.460)         0         1           Hit/slapped him on the face, head or cars (2d)         126,460         0.181         (0.385)         0         1           Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg (2e)         126,418         0.079         (0.270)         0         1           Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f)         126,647         0.218         (0.413)         0         1           Shouted, yelled, screamed at him/her (3a)         126,574         0.388         (0.487)         0         1           Treat him asidiot, lazy, or other names (3b)         126,556         0.766         (0.423)         0         1 <i>Eductional composition</i> -         -         -         -         -           Mean years of schooling, women Women (categories)         129,534         0.386         (0.452)         0         1           None         129,534         0.386         (0.452)         0         1           Primary         129,534         0.363         (0.461)         0         1           Primary         129,534         0.363         (0.475)         0         1           Becondary         129,534         0.	bottom with hand (2b)			(	-	-
hard object (2c)126,4600.181(0.385)01Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg (2c)126,1670.335(0.472)01Beat up, hit him over and over as hard as one could (2f)126,6180.079(0.270)01Physical punishment (2d, 2e, 2f)126,6580.717(0.450)01Severe physical punishment (2d, 2e, 2f)126,6470.218(0.413)01Shouted, yelled, screamed at mames (3b)126,6570.388(0.487)01Emotional punishment (3a, 3b) 2f, 3a, 3b)126,6560.766(0.423)01Educational composition	Hit him with belt, stick, or other	126,564	0.305	(0.460)	0	1
Hit/slapped him on the face, head or cars (2d)       126,460       0.181       (0.385)       0       1         Hit/slapped him on hand, arm or leg (2e)       126,418       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         Physical punishment (2d, 2b, 2c, 126,658       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         2d, 2e, 2f)       2       126,647       0.218       (0.413)       0       1         Severe physical punishment (2d, 2b, 2c, 126,658       0.717       (0.449)       0       1         him/her (3a)       126,657       0.388       (0.487)       0       1         Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,658       0.854       (0.352)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, women (129,534       0.469       (0.499)       0       1         Primary       129,534       0.286       (0.452)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, women (129,534       0.286       0.4469       0       1         Primary       129,534       0.286       0.4469       0       1         Secondary       129,534       0.271       0.446       0       1<	hard object (2c)					
head or ears (24)         Hit/slapped him on hand, arm         125,167         0.335         (0.472)         0         1           or leg (2e)         Beat up, hit him over and over as hard as one could (2f)         1         0         1           Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f)         126,647         0.218         (0.413)         0         1           Severe physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f)         126,647         0.218         (0.413)         0         1           Shouted, yelled, screamed at him asidiot, lazy, or other names (3b)         126,656         0.766         (0.423)         0         1           Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,658         0.766         (0.452)         0         1           Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,554         0.854         (0.352)         0         1           Mean years of schooling, women         129,534         3.830         (6.037)         0         30           Women (categories)         None         129,534         0.286         (0.452)         0         1           None         129,534         0.283         0.421         0         1           Primary         129,534         0.363         (0.481)         0         1           Secondary	Hit/slapped him on the face,	126,460	0.181	(0.385)	0	1
Hit/sapped him on hand, arm or leg (22)125,1670.335(0.472)01Beat up, hit him over and over as hard as one could (2f)126,6480.079(0.270)01Physical punishment (2d, 2e, 2f)126,6470.218(0.413)01Severe physical punishment (2d, 2e, 2f)126,6470.218(0.413)01Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b)126,6560.766(0.423)01Emotional punishment (3a, 3b)126,6580.854(0.352)01Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,658126,6580.854(0.352)01Mean years of schooling, women Women (categories)129,5343.830(6.037)030None129,5340.238(0.426)011Higher129,5340.238(0.426)011Hean years of schooling, men Mean years of schooling, men129,5340.363(0.441)01Mean years of schooling, men Primary129,5340.363(0.445)01Secondary129,5340.363(0.477)011Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.364(0.478)01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.064(0.478)01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.0640.074)1Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.0640.0710Educational	head or ears (2d)			(0.1=0)		
or reg (22)       126,418       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 7)       126,658       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         Severe physical punishment (2d, 2e, 2f)       126,647       0.218       (0.413)       0       1         Shouted, yelled, screamed at 126,484       0.719       (0.449)       0       1         him/her (3a)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Educational composition	Hit/slapped him on hand, arm	125,167	0.335	(0.472)	0	1
Bear up, int lim toyer and over       120,415       0.079       (0.270)       0       1         as hard as one could (2)       Physical punishment (2a, 2b, 2c, 126,658       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         2d, 2e, 2J       Shouted, Jazy, or other names (3b)       126,647       0.218       (0.413)       0       1         Shouted, Jazy, or other names (3b)       126,554       0.388       (0.487)       0       1         Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,658       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, women (2argories)       129,534       0.864       (0.352)       0       1         None       129,534       0.286       (0.452)       0       1       1         Mean years of schooling, women (2argories)       129,534       0.238       (0.426)       0       1         None       129,534       0.238       (0.426)       0       1       1         Mean years of schooling, men 129,534       0.238       (0.445)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, men 129,534       0.363       (0.471)       0       1         Secondary       129,534       0.363       (0.471)       0       1         Educational hypergamy	or leg (2e)	196 410	0.070	(0.270)	0	1
Barrier is of control (2), 2d, 2e, 2f)       126,658       0.717       (0.450)       0       1         Severe physical punishment       126,647       0.218       (0.413)       0       1         (2d, 2e, 2f)       Shouted, yelled, screamed at him/her (3a)       1       1       1       1         Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Emotional punishment (3a, 3b)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, women Vomen (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,658       0.854       (0.352)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, women 129,534       0.469       (0.499)       0       1         Primary       129,534       0.238       (0.426)       0       1         None       129,534       0.236       (0.481)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, men       129,534       0.236       (0.481)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, men       129,534       0.236       (0.481)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, men       129,534       0.246       (0.477)       0       1         Secondary       129,534       0.264 <td>as hard as one could (2f)</td> <td>120,418</td> <td>0.079</td> <td>(0.270)</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td>	as hard as one could (2f)	120,418	0.079	(0.270)	0	1
Any other priminity (or, 20, or, 20, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 1	Physical nunishment (2a, 2b, 2c	126 658	0 717	(0.450)	0	1
Severe physical punishment (2d, 2e, 2f)         126,647         0.218         (0.413)         0         1           Shouted, 2e, 2f)         Shouted, lazy, or other names (3b)         126,574         0.388         (0.449)         0         1           Emotional punishment (3a, 3b)         126,656         0.766         (0.423)         0         1           Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 3a, 3b)         126,658         0.854         (0.352)         0         1           Educational composition	2d. 2e. 2f)	120,000	0.717	(0.100)	Ū	1
$\begin{array}{c c} (2d, 2e, 2f) \\ Shouted, yelled, screamed at him/her (3a) \\ Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ \hline \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ \hline \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b) \\ Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names $	Severe physical punishment	126,647	0.218	(0.413)	0	1
Shouted, yelled, screamed at him/her (3a)126,4840.719(0.449)01Irreat him as idiot, lazy, or other names (3b)126,5560.766(0.423)01Emotional punishment (3a, 3b)126,6580.854(0.352)01 $Zf, 3a, 3b$ 126,6580.854(0.352)01Educational composition $$	(2d, 2e, 2f)					
him/her $(3a)$ Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other names $(3b)$ 126,5740.388(0.487)01Emotional punishment $(3a, 3b)$ Any violence $(2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2e, 2d, 3a, 3b)$ 126,6580.854(0.352)01Educational compositionIIIIIIIIIMean years of schooling, women 	Shouted, yelled, screamed at	126,484	0.719	(0.449)	0	1
Treat him as idito; lazy, or other names (3b)126,5740.388(0.487)01Emotional punishment (3a, 3b)126,6560.766(0.423)01Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, 3a, 3b)126,6580.854(0.352)01Educational composition	him/her (3a)					
names (3b)       126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Any violence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d	Treat him as idiot, lazy, or other	126,574	0.388	(0.487)	0	1
Emotional punishment $(3a, 3b)$ 126,656       0.766       (0.423)       0       1         Any violence $(2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 126,658       0.854       (0.352)       0       1         2f, 3a, 3b $	names (3b)					
Any volence (2a, 2b, 2c, 2a, 2e, 12b,658 $(0.352)$ 0       1 $2f, 3a, 3b$ )	Emotional punishment (3a, 3b)	126,656	0.766	(0.423)	0	1
2f, 3d, 30         Educational composition         Mean years of schooling, women         None         (categories)         None         129,534       0.469         (0.425)       0         Primary       129,534       0.238         (0.426)       0         Higher       129,534       0.238         Mean years of schooling, men       129,534       0.007         Men (categories)       0       1         None       129,534       0.007       (0.0481)       0         Primary       129,534       0.363       (0.481)       0       1         Mean years of schooling, men       129,534       0.361       (0.477)       0       1         Primary       129,534       0.363       (0.478)       0       1         Secondary       129,534       0.646       (0.478)       1       1         Educational homogamy (H=W)       129,534       0.646       (0.478)       1       1         Educational hypogamy (W > H)       129,534       0.644       (0.278)       0       1         Educational hypogamy (W > H)       129,534       0.684       (0.278)       0       1<	Any violence $(2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2b)$	126,658	0.854	(0.352)	0	1
Educational composition         129,534 $3.830$ $(6.037)$ $0$ $30$ Women (categories)         None         129,534 $0.469$ $(0.499)$ $0$ $1$ Primary         129,534 $0.286$ $(0.452)$ $0$ $1$ Secondary         129,534 $0.028$ $(0.426)$ $0$ $1$ Mean years of schooling, men         129,534 $0.007$ $(0.081)$ $0$ $1$ Men (categories)         None         129,534 $0.363$ $(0.441)$ $0$ $1$ Primary         129,534 $0.371$ $(0.443)$ $0$ $1$ Beducational homogamy (H=W)         129,534 $0.0477$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (H > W)         129,534 $0.646$ $(0.478)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamy (W > H)         129,534 $0.646$ $0.6444$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamy (W > H)         129,534 $0.646$ $0.4744$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamon (W > H)         129,534         <	2J, 30, 3D)					
$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Educational composition					
Intent years of schooling, worker129,534 $0.469$ $(0.499)$ $0$ $1$ None129,534 $0.286$ $(0.452)$ $0$ $1$ Primary129,534 $0.238$ $(0.426)$ $0$ $1$ Higher129,534 $0.007$ $(0.081)$ $0$ $1$ Mean years of schooling, men $129,534$ $0.038$ $(0.445)$ $0$ $1$ Mean (categories)None $129,534$ $0.271$ $(0.445)$ $0$ $1$ None $129,534$ $0.271$ $(0.445)$ $0$ $1$ Educational homogamy (H=W) $129,534$ $0.646$ $0.477)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (H > W) $129,534$ $0.646$ $0.478$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $0.478$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $0.478$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $0.278$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.644$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.644$ $0.643$ $3.20$ Rotio men 25-29/women $27$ $5.545$ $(1.474)$ $3.20$ $8.60$ marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA) $   -$ Human Development Index, $27$ $0.839$ $0.058$ $0.68$ $0.97$ $20-24$ (UN, WPP) $27$ $0.627$ $0.623$ $0.643$ $3.08$ Ratio men 25-	Mean years of schooling women	120 534	3 830	(6.037)	0	30
None129,5340.469(0.499)01Primary129,5340.286(0.452)01Secondary129,5340.238(0.426)01Higher129,5340.007(0.081)01Mean years of schooling, men129,5340.363(0.481)01Men (categories)129,5340.363(0.481)01None129,5340.363(0.477)01Higher129,5340.271(0.445)01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.269(0.477)01Educational hypergamy (H > W)129,5340.269(0.444)01Educational hypogamy (W > H)129,5340.084(0.278)01Country-level variables	Women (categories)	129,004	5.050	(0.037)	0	50
Primary129,5340.286(0.452)01Secondary129,5340.238(0.426)01Higher129,5340.007(0.081)01Mean years of schooling, men129,5344.814(6.507)00Men (categories)1111Primary129,5340.271(0.445)01Secondary129,5340.271(0.445)01Higher129,5340.017(0.128)01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.269(0.444)01Educational hypergamy (H > W)129,5340.269(0.444)01Educational hypogamy (W > H)129,5340.084(0.278)01Country-level variablesPemographyT5.545(1.474)3.208.60Marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)275.545(1.474)3.208.60H-W difference in age at first marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)271.588(0.643)0.643.30Women 25-29/women270.839(0.058)0.680.9720-24 (UN, WPP)272.302(1442)6178557Human Development270.438(0.071)0.300.60GINI coefficient (WB)2740.78(5.362)30.856.2Mean years of schooling, female (WB)270.627(0.056)0.510.75 <t< td=""><td>None</td><td>129.534</td><td>0.469</td><td>(0.499)</td><td>0</td><td>1</td></t<>	None	129.534	0.469	(0.499)	0	1
Secondary129,534 $0.238$ $(0.426)$ $0$ $1$ Higher129,534 $0.007$ $(0.081)$ $0$ $1$ Mean years of schooling, men $129,534$ $0.363$ $(0.481)$ $0$ $1$ Men (categories) $None$ $129,534$ $0.363$ $(0.481)$ $0$ $1$ None $129,534$ $0.363$ $(0.481)$ $0$ $1$ Primary $129,534$ $0.349$ $(0.477)$ $0$ $1$ Secondary $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.478)$ $0$ $1$ Educational homogamy (H=W) $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.478)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (H > W) $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.478)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogamy (W > H) $129,534$ $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypogame (DHS/ $27$ $5.545$ $(1.474)$ $3.20$ $8.60$ marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA) $H$	Primary	129,534	0.286	(0.452)	0	1
Higher129,534 $0.007$ $(0.081)$ $0$ $1$ Mean years of schooling, men129,534 $4.814$ $(6.507)$ $0$ $30$ Mone129,534 $0.363$ $(0.481)$ $0$ $1$ Primary129,534 $0.271$ $(0.445)$ $0$ $1$ Secondary129,534 $0.349$ $(0.477)$ $0$ $1$ Higher129,534 $0.646$ $(0.478)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (H=W)129,534 $0.646$ $(0.478)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (H>W)129,534 $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W>H)129,534 $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W>H)129,534 $0.646$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (M>H) $129,534$ $0.648$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ MrSSS $127$ $5.545$ $(1.474)$ $3.20$ $8.60$ MrSRatio men 25-29/women $27$ $0.839$ $(0.058)$ $0.64$	Secondary	129,534	0.238	(0.426)	0	1
Mean years of schooling, men Men (categories)129,5344.814(6.507)030Men (categories)129,5340.363(0.481)01Primary Secondary129,5340.271(0.445)01Higher129,5340.017(0.128)01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.646(0.478)01Educational hypergamy (H > W)129,5340.646(0.278)01Educational hypergamy (W > H)129,5340.084(0.278)01Educational hypogamy (W > H)129,5340.854(0.643)0.643.00MCS)Ratio end as a first marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)270.839(0.058)0.680.9720-24 (UN, WPP)Ratio enduc. men 30–34/educ. gDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)272.302(1442)6178557Human Development Index, (WB)27 <td>Higher</td> <td>129,534</td> <td>0.007</td> <td>(0.081)</td> <td>0</td> <td>1</td>	Higher	129,534	0.007	(0.081)	0	1
Men (categories)None129,5340.363(0.481)01Primary129,5340.271(0.445)01Secondary129,5340.349(0.477)01Higher129,5340.017(0.128)01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.646(0.478)01Educational hypergamy (H > W)129,5340.269(0.444)01Educational hypogamy (W > H)129,5340.084(0.278)01Country-level variables	Mean years of schooling, men	129,534	4.814	(6.507)	0	30
None129,5340.363 $(0.481)$ 01Primary129,5340.271 $(0.445)$ 01Secondary129,5340.349 $(0.477)$ 01Higher129,5340.646 $(0.478)$ 01Educational homogamy (H=W)129,5340.646 $(0.478)$ 01Educational hypergamy (H > W)129,5340.269 $(0.444)$ 01Educational hypergamy (W > H)129,5340.084 $(0.278)$ 01MifGSMifGeneter (MA)UN-DESA)	Men (categories)					
Primary129,534 $0.271$ $(0.445)$ $0$ $1$ Secondary129,534 $0.349$ $(0.477)$ $0$ $1$ Higher129,534 $0.017$ $(0.128)$ $0$ $1$ Educational homogamy (H=W)129,534 $0.269$ $(0.444)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (H > W)129,534 $0.084$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H)129,534 $0.084$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Country-level variablesDemographyM-F difference in age at first marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)H-W difference in age (DHS/27 $8.243$ $(2.335)$ $3.85$ $19.7$ MICS)Ratio men 25–29/women27 $0.839$ $(0.058)$ $0.68$ $0.97$ $20-24$ (UN, WPP)Ratio educ. men 30–34/educ. women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)27 $2.302$ $(1442)$ $617$ $8557$ Human Development Index, (WB)27 $2.302$ $(1442)$ $617$ $8557$ Human Development Index, (WB)27 $0.627$ $(0.056)$ $0.51$ $0.75$ Gender (WB)27 $0.627$ $(0.056)$ $0.51$ $0.75$ Gender Inequality Index (WB)27 $29.04$ $(11.20)$ $5.20$ $48.4$ winons (DHS/MICS)27 $35.52$ $(13.96)$ $7.60$ $75.2$ household purchases (DHS/ MICS) $K$ $K$ $K$ $K$ $K$	None	129,534	0.363	(0.481)	0	1
Secondary       129,534       0.349 $(0.477)$ 0       1         Higher       129,534       0.017 $(0.128)$ 0       1         Educational homogamy (H=W)       129,534       0.269 $(0.444)$ 0       1         Educational hypergamy (W > H)       129,534       0.269 $(0.444)$ 0       1         Educational hypergamy (W > H)       129,534       0.084 $(0.278)$ 0       1         Country-level variables	Primary	129,534	0.271	(0.445)	0	1
Higher       129,534       0.017       (0.128)       0       1         Educational homogamy (H=W)       129,534       0.646       (0.478)       0       1         Educational hypergamy (H > W)       129,534       0.269       (0.444)       0       1         Educational hypergamy (W > H)       129,534       0.084       (0.278)       0       1         Country-level variables	Secondary	129,534	0.349	(0.477)	0	1
Educational homoganity (H > W)       129,534       0.040 $(0.473)$ 0       1         Educational hypogamy (H > W)       129,534       0.269 $(0.444)$ 0       1         Educational hypogamy (W > H)       129,534       0.084 $(0.278)$ 0       1         Country-level variables	Higner	129,534	0.017	(0.128)	0	1
Educational hypergamy (ii > W)129,534 $0.084$ $(0.747)$ $0$ $1$ Educational hypergamy (W > H)129,534 $0.084$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Country-level variables $129,534$ $0.084$ $(0.278)$ $0$ $1$ Demography $$	Educational hypergamy $(H > W)$	129,534	0.040	(0.478) (0.444)	0	1
Country-level variables         Demography	Educational hypergamy $(H > W)$ Educational hypergamy $(W > H)$	129,534	0.209	(0.444) (0.278)	0	1
Country-level variables           Demography		123,001		(01270)		
Demography           M-F difference in age at first marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)         27         5.545         (1.474)         3.20         8.60           H-W difference in age (DHS/ MICS)         27         8.243         (2.335)         3.85         19.7           MICS)         Ratio men 25–29/women         27         0.839         (0.058)         0.68         0.97           20–24 (UN, WPP)         20–24 (UN, WPP)         0.64         3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)         0.64         3.30           Socioeconomic development         27         0.438         (0.071)         0.30         0.60           GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)         27         2.302         (1442)         617         8557           Human Development Index,         27         0.438         (0.071)         0.30         0.60           female (WB)         27         40.78         (5.362)         30.8         56.2           Mean years of schooling, female         27         3.439         (1.743)         0.85         8.30           (WB)         27         0.627         (0.056)         0.51         0.75           Gender         Gender Inequality Index         27         84.00         (10.37)         44.6         104	Country-level variables					
M-F difference in age at first marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)       27       5.545       (1.474)       3.20       8.60         marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)       27       8.243       (2.335)       3.85       19.7         MICS)       Ratio men 25–29/women       27       0.839       (0.058)       0.68       0.97         20–24 (UN, WPP)       20       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       27       2.302       (1442)       617       8557         GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2.302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         Gender       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (WDP)       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6 <td>Demography</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>	Demography					
marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)         H–W difference in age (DHS/       27       8.243       (2.335)       3.85       19.7         MICS)       Ratio men 25–29/women       27       0.839       (0.058)       0.68       0.97         20–24 (UN, WPP)       Ratio duc. men 30–34/educ.       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       V       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         Socioeconomic development       V       V       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       27       6.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       Female-to-male ratio of LFPR       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       V       V       V       5.20       48.4       uni	M-F difference in age at first	27	5.545	(1.474)	3.20	8.60
H–W difference in age (DHS/ MICS)       27       8.243       (2.335)       3.85       19.7         MICS)       Ratio men 25–29/women       27       0.839       (0.058)       0.68       0.97         20–24 (UN, WPP)       Ratio educ. men 30–34/educ.       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Socioeconomic development       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       Female-to-male ratio of LFPR       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       9       9       9       9       9       48.4       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       105       104       104       104       104       104       104       104       10	marriage (SMAM, UN-DESA)					
MICS)         Ratio men 25–29/women       27       0.839       (0.058)       0.68       0.97         20–24 (UN, WPP)       Ratio educ. men 30–34/educ.       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         Socioeconomic development         GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       Female-to-male ratio of LFPR       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       %       9       9       9       9       48.4       104         (%, WB)       27       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4       48.4       104         (%, WB)       9       10       12 <td< td=""><td>H–W difference in age (DHS/</td><td>27</td><td>8.243</td><td>(2.335)</td><td>3.85</td><td>19.7</td></td<>	H–W difference in age (DHS/	27	8.243	(2.335)	3.85	19.7
Ratio men 25–29/women       27       0.839       (0.058)       0.68       0.97         20–24 (UN, WPP)       Ratio educ. men 30–34/educ.       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       Socioeconomic development       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         Socioeconomic development       7       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       6       6       6       5       6       104         (%B)       7       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       7       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       27       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         winons (DHS/MICS)       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/MICS)       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2 </td <td>MICS)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>(0.0=0)</td> <td></td> <td></td>	MICS)			(0.0=0)		
20-24 (UN, WPP)         Ratio educ. men 30-34/educ.       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25-29 (DHS/MICS)         Socioeconomic development       500       617       8557         GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       6ender       6ender       6ender       7       6.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       7       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104       (%, WB)       7       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         % Joint decision-making on       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       55.20       55.20       55.20       55.20       55.20       55.20       55.20	Ratio men 25–29/women	27	0.839	(0.058)	0.68	0.97
Ratio educ. inen 30–34/educ.       27       1.588       (0.643)       0.64       3.30         women 25–29 (DHS/MICS)       Socioeconomic development       617       8557         GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       Gender	20–24 (UN, WPP)	07	1 500	(0 ( 4 2 )	0.64	2.20
Socioeconomic development         GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       6       7       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         Gender       6       6       6       6       6       6         Female-to-male ratio of LFPR       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       7       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       8       30       75.2       13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       5.52       13.96)       7.60       75.2	women 25-29 (DHS/MICS)	27	1.366	(0.043)	0.04	5.50
GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)       27       2302       (1442)       617       8557         Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       6       7       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         Gender       6       6       6       6       6       6         Gender       7       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       7       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       7       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       8       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       7       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2	Socioeconomic development					
Human Development Index,       27       0.438       (0.071)       0.30       0.60         female (WB)       GINI coefficient (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       Gender       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         Gender       Gender Inequality Index       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       7       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/MICS)       MICS)       7       7       7       7       7	GDP per capita (USD PPP, WB)	27	2302	(1442)	617	8557
female (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         Gender       6       6       7       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       7       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       8       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       7       7       7       7       7	Human Development Index,	27	0.438	(0.071)	0.30	0.60
GINI coefficient (WB)       27       40.78       (5.362)       30.8       56.2         Mean years of schooling, female       27       3.439       (1.743)       0.85       8.30         (WB)       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         Gender       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       7       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       7       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       7.60       75.2	female (WB)					
Mean years of schooling, female         27         3.439         (1.743)         0.85         8.30           (WB)         Gender         27         0.627         (0.056)         0.51         0.75           Gender Inequality Index         27         0.627         (0.056)         0.51         0.75           (UNDP)         Female-to-male ratio of LFPR         27         84.00         (10.37)         44.6         104           (%, WB)         27         29.04         (11.20)         5.20         48.4           unions (DHS/MICS)         27         35.52         (13.96)         7.60         75.2           household purchases (DHS/ MICS)         US         27         35.52         13.96         7.60         75.2	GINI coefficient (WB)	27	40.78	(5.362)	30.8	56.2
(WB)         Gender         Women in polygynous         27         29.04         (11.20)         5.20         48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)         % Joint decision-making on         27         35.52         (13.96)         7.60         75.2         household purchases (DHS/         MICS)	Mean years of schooling, female	27	3.439	(1.743)	0.85	8.30
Gender         27         0.627         (0.056)         0.51         0.75           (UNDP)         Pemale-to-male ratio of LFPR         27         84.00         (10.37)         44.6         104           (%, WB)         27         29.04         (11.20)         5.20         48.4           wions (DHS/MICS)         27         35.52         (13.96)         7.60         75.2           household purchases (DHS/         MICS)         45.2         45.2         45.2         45.2	(WB)					
Gender Inequality Index       27       0.627       (0.056)       0.51       0.75         (UNDP)       Female-to-male ratio of LFPR       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       %       Women in polygynous       27       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       %       9       Joint decision-making on       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       MICS       45.2       45.2       45.2       45.2	Gender					
(UNDP)         Female-to-male ratio of LFPR       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       %       Women in polygynous       27       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       %       Joint decision-making on       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       %       MICS       %       MICS       %	Gender Inequality Index	27	0.627	(0.056)	0.51	0.75
remate-to-mate ratio of LFPK       27       84.00       (10.37)       44.6       104         (%, WB)       %       Women in polygynous       27       29.04       (11.20)       5.20       48.4         unions (DHS/MICS)       %       Joint decision-making on       27       35.52       (13.96)       7.60       75.2         household purchases (DHS/       MICS)       MICS       MI	(UNDP)	07	04.00	(10.97)	44.5	104
(70, WD)         (70, WD)           % Women in polygynous         27         29.04         (11.20)         5.20         48.4           unions (DHS/MICS)         % Joint decision-making on         27         35.52         (13.96)         7.60         75.2           household purchases (DHS/         MICS)	remaie-to-maie ratio of LFPR	27	84.00	(10.37)	44.6	104
which in polygrous 27 29.04 (11.20) 3.20 48.4 unions (DHS/MICS) % Joint decision-making on 27 35.52 (13.96) 7.60 75.2 household purchases (DHS/ MICS)	(70, WD) % Women in polygynous	27	20.04	(11.20)	5 20	48 4
% Joint decision-making on 27 35.52 (13.96) 7.60 75.2 household purchases (DHS/ MICS)	unions (DHS/MICS)	41	27.04	(11.20)	5.20	40.4
household purchases (DHS/ MICS)	% Joint decision-making on	27	35.52	(13.96)	7.60	75.2
MICS)	household purchases (DHS/			,		
	MICS)					

*Notes*: Obs.: Number of observations; SD: Standard deviation; SMAM: Singulate Mean Age at Marriage; UN-DESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; MICS: Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys; DHS: Demographic and Health Surveys; UN WPP: United Nations World Population Prospects; WB: World Bank; UNDP: United Nations Development Programme; M-F: malefemale; H–W: husband-wife; LFPR: labor force participation rate. Analytical sample of couples with complete information on both partners' education and child discipline modules. Weighted estimates. For countries with multiple waves, the estimate provided is the average across waves. For country-level variables, the estimate is from the same year of the survey or, if unavailable, the closest available year.

#### alone or jointly with their partners on household purchases.

Figs. 1 and 2 provide a more nuanced picture of, respectively, child discipline and educational configurations of couples across countries in the analysis, with estimates limited to the most recent available year for each country. The map reveals that there is little variation in the adoption of non-violent practices, with estimates over 73% across all countries, but highest in Guinea Bissau (94%) and Madagascar (90%). Physical punishment and severe physical punishment tend to be highest in Central and West Africa, with particularly high estimates in the Democratic Republic of Congo (81% and 37%, respectively). Conversely, emotional punishment is less clustered by sub-region, with Guinea Bissau exhibiting lowest estimates (45%) and Benin and Ghana the highest ones (86%). As some families may adopt both non-violent and violent childrearing practices simultaneously, Fig. A1 provides alternative estimates on "exclusive" vs "concurrent" prevalence of different types of CD practices. Estimates reveal that, indeed, in every country over a half of all households adopt a combination of violent and non-violent ones.

As for assortative mating patterns, on the pooled sample we observe that 64.6% of couples are educationally homogamous - i.e., homogamy remains the normative couple configuration in SSA - followed by 26.9% that are hypergamous and 8.4% that are hypogamous (Table 1). Highest prevalence of homogamous couples is observed in West Africa, particularly in Burkina Faso (80%), Niger (79.6%), Mali (74%), and Mauritania (74%). Lowest prevalence is instead observed in Togo (45%), Lesotho (50%), and Liberia (51%). As for educational hypergamy, high prevalence is observed in Togo (49%), Central African Republic (47%), and Liberia (40%). Relatedly, countries with lowest prevalence of hypergamous couples tend to be the ones with highest prevalence of hypogamous ones, primarily in South SSA, namely Lesotho (49%) and Zimbabwe (38%). While hypogamy is on the rise globally due to massive female educational expansion (Esteve et al., 2012), such phenomenon is occurring more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa than in other LMICs, particularly in Central SSA (Pesando, 2021).

#### 5. Results

#### 5.1. Main associations

Fig. 3 shows estimated coefficients from full specifications across three panels, namely homogamy versus heterogamy (top panel), hypergamy versus remaining couples (middle panel), and hypogamy versus remaining couples (bottom panel). A first glance at the results reveals marked differences between the homogamy panel and both the hypergamy and hypogamy panels, which are rather alike. Specifically, the homogamy panel suggests that couples where partners hold similar levels of education are significantly less likely to adopt violent



Fig. 1. Prevalence of child discipline, by type of violence and country.



Fig. 2. Prevalence of specific couple partnership configurations by education.

childrearing practices relative to couples where partners hold different levels of education. This is particularly true for physical punishment, for which the estimated coefficient indicates that couples holding similar levels of education are 0.8 percentage points less likely to engage in physical punishment relative to heterogamous couples (corresponding to about a 1.2% decrease) - an estimate which drives the coefficient on the combined "any violent punishment" outcome. Except for non-violent practices, where the coefficient is virtually zero, coefficients on the remaining CD outcomes are also negative in sign, yet indistinguishable from zero at the 5% level. Evidence from the hypergamy (middle) and hypogamy (bottom) panels is almost specular - i.e., hypergamy and hypogamy are associated with a higher likelihood of adopting violent childrearing practices - suggesting that what matters for the adoption of specific childrearing practices is status consistency (homogamy) versus inconsistency (heterogamy), regardless of the direction of such inconsistency (H > W or W > H). Coefficients in the hypogamy panel are not statistically different from zero, most likely due to how uncommon this couple configuration still is, relative to the other two. Logit estimates are identical and reported in Fig. A2.

Estimates on all predictors are reported in Table A3. Positive predictors of child discipline robust across specifications include wife's education, child being male, age of the child, and number of children below five in the household. While the latter three are in line with UNICEF (2010), mother's education is not. While mother's education is negatively correlated with child discipline in a bivariate scenario, its sign switches once the joint parental educational variable is included, as done in this setting, suggesting that higher female education may threaten conventional norms leading to higher household instability and, ultimately, more violence (Behrman, 2019; Weitzman, 2014). Conversely, household wealth emerges as a strong negative predictor of violent punishment. Despite seemingly low (~1%), the estimated homogamy coefficient is close in magnitude to some of the strongest predictors of child discipline, such as child sex and child age. As the reference category in the middle and bottom panels includes all remaining couples - hence, it changes across the two panels - in Fig. A3 we run the same specification keeping only homogamous couples (instead of "residual") as reference category. Results are virtually unchanged (even stronger), suggesting that homogamy vs heterogamy provides the relevant comparison in this setting - hence our focus in the remainder of the paper.

#### 5.2. Variation within the homogamous group

While differences within the heterogamous group are negligible, i.e., whether the couple is hypergamous or hypogamous makes little difference for explaining CD outcomes, heterogeneity may exist within the group of homogamous couples. Fig. 4 presents results from a full specification where only the sample of homogamous couples is kept, and couples where both partners have the same *high* level of education (secondary or above) are compared to couples where both partners have the same *low* level of education (none or primary) – note that about 70% of the sample of homogamous couples falls into the latter group. Results reveal no real differences between high- and low-homogamy couples in terms of physical and emotional punishment. Nonetheless, highhomogamy couples are significantly more likely to adopt non-violent methods and significantly less likely to adopt severe physical punishment relative to low-homogamy couples. These findings further underscore the importance of female educational expansion provided status consistency within the couple is met.

To provide a full picture, we combine the above two sub-sections by providing in Fig. A4 yet another specification allowing us to compare couples where both partners have low education (i.e., *low* homogamy), with couples where one partner holds higher education than the other. To do so, we replace our main binary predictor with a categorical variable taking four values: homogamy low education (reference), hypergamy, hypogamy, and homogamy high education. Results confirm that most noticeable differences are in the high homogamy group (vis-à-vis the low homogamy one). Albeit not statistically significant, we also observe that hypergamous couples – and, to some extent, hypogamous couples – are more likely than low-homogamy couples to adopt physical punishment against children.

#### 5.3. Heterogeneity by individual and household characteristics

We next explore whether there is any heterogeneity in the estimates by individual- and household-level socioeconomic characteristics. To do so, we run full specifications interacting the homogamy dummy with mother's education, father's education, household wealth (in quintiles), and household location of residence, and we then plot the resulting linear combinations. Fig. 5 shows that homogamy is more strongly associated with a decrease in physical punishment among high-educated mothers and high-educated fathers, aligning with findings in Fig. 4. For fathers, this result also holds for emotional punishment. We observe something similar for household wealth: homogamy is more strongly associated with an increase in non-violent practices and a decrease in physical punishment among the wealthiest (Q5). Conversely, variation in estimates is negligible by household location of residence, although the magnitude of the coefficients in urban areas is stronger, i.e., more positive for non-violent practices and more negative for physical and emotional violence, suggesting that the association between homogamy and CD is stronger in urban areas, albeit not statistically significant.



Fig. 3. Estimated association between educational homogamy (top)/hypergamy (middle)/hypogamy (bottom) and child discipline outcomes *Notes*: Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. Reference category for middle and bottom panels include all residual couples – i.e., homogamous and hypogamous for middle panel and homogamous and hypergamous for bottom panel. Findings keeping only homogamous couples for each estimation in the reference category are virtually unchanged and provided in Appendix Fig. A3. Sampling weights used. Cluster-robust standard errors at the PSU level.

#### 5.4. Heterogeneity by child characteristics

In Fig. 6 we explore variation across groups of children, namely by sex, birth order, and age by plotting linear combinations from interactions terms between homogamy and these characteristics. Results are rather similar between boys and girls, with slightly stronger negative associations between homogamy and physical punishment for girls. Differences by birth order are also weak and not statistically different across groups, yet the positive association between homogamy and nonviolent practices is stronger among firstborns, as well as the negative association between homogamy and physical violence. Heterogeneity by age of the child is more noticeable, with stronger negative associations between homogamy and all types of violence among school-age kids. In other words, couples where partners hold similar levels of education are less likely to adopt violent parenting practices with school-age children relative to partners with different levels of education, while no significant differences are observed for preschool-age children. Related estimates, yet with analyses conducted separately by sub-group, are provided in Fig. A5.

#### 5.5. Potential micro-level mechanisms

Relying on comprehensive decision-making and IPV modules in the DHS subsample of countries, we assess whether our main finding supporting the homogamy-benefit hypothesis is consistent with more balanced decision-making and power dynamics within the couple – which we measure through DM and IPV outcomes. Contrary to expectations, Fig. A6 shows no significant associations between parental educational similarity and DM and IPV outcomes. While this may suggest that benefits accruing from homogamy are not driven by higher agreement within the household – lending, potentially, more support to the "stress" mechanisms, which we cannot test with the current data – we believe the weak estimates are also tied to far smaller samples and sample sizes by country.







Fig. 5. Heterogeneity in the estimates by individual- and household-level characteristics.

*Notes*: Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates obtained from interaction terms between homogamy and each of the variables, linear combinations provided. Sampling weights used. Cluster-robust standard errors at the PSU level.



Sex of the child

Fig. 6. Heterogeneity in the estimates by child-level characteristics.

*Notes*: Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. Estimates obtained from interaction terms, linear combinations provided. Sampling weights used. Cluster-robust standard errors at the PSU level.

#### 5.6. Heterogeneity by country

While the above estimates control for country fixed effects, results for specific countries are widely heterogeneous in terms of both sign and magnitude – see, for instance, Fig. A7 reporting country-specific estimates for physical and emotional punishment. As such, we attempt to explore whether a series of country-level variables – classified into demography, socioeconomic development, and gender – may help explain this cross-country heterogeneity. We do so in two ways: first, we run full-specification models interacting the homogamy dummy with the continuous country-level variable (Table A4). To assess the suitability of these predictors, Tables A5 and A6 provide raw estimates relating these country-level predictors with educational homogamy, hypergamy, and homogamy (Table A5) and CD outcomes (Table A6). Second, we categorize each country-level variable as above or below the median (p50) and produce a series of graphs plotting interaction coefficients between homogamy and these medians, with three subsequent panels, one for demography, one for socioeconomic development, and one for gender (Fig. 7). In Fig. A8 (demography), A9 (development), and A10 (gender) we implement yet another method that is discussed in the Appendix.

Despite the broad range of variables and domains considered, these country-level moderators explain surprisingly little heterogeneity. Leaving aside considerations of statistical significance, within the demography panel we observe that homogamy is more strongly associated with a reduction in physical and severe physical violence where the male-female difference in age at marriage is smaller; similarly, homogamy is more strongly associated with a reduction in emotional violence where the ratio of educated men to educated women is higher. Within the development panel, homogamy is more strongly associated with a reduction in severe physical punishment where GDP per capita and female HDI are higher. Two of the most robust results, however, pertain to the Gini coefficient and female education. For the former, associations with physical, severe physical, and emotional violence are more beneficial in contexts characterized by higher inequalities. For the latter, female education turns out to play a crucial role for the adoption of non-violent practices. Homogamy is more strongly (and significantly) associated with a higher likelihood of adopting non-violent practices in countries characterized by higher female education. The inequality aspect is further confirmed in the gender panel. Not only income inequality matters, but also gender inequality, as results show that homogamy is more strongly associated with reductions in physical, severe physical, and emotional violence in contexts characterized by higher gender inequalities. Conversely, results on female labor force, polygyny, and decision-making are inconsistent.

#### 6. Conclusions and discussion

Leveraging underutilized comparative information on violent parenting, this study has explored associations between parental educational (dis)similarity and parents' likelihood of adopting specific disciplinary practices with children. We have used data from MICS and DHS covering 27 sub-Saharan countries including information on both parents' education, as well as complete child-discipline modules. Descriptive figures reveal that violent disciplinary practices are extremely common in this sample of LMICs, with about 72% and 85% of caregivers reporting some sort of physical and emotional punishment, respectively, in response to child behavior – thus shedding light on this underexplored global social plague.

Associations between parental educational similarity and CD outcomes partially confirm some of the hypotheses outlined in the Background. In line with the *homogamy-benefit hypothesis*, whereby couples where both partners hold similar education tend to experience less conflict within the couple and higher agreement on parenting styles, thus creating a more frictionless context of within-family social capital, our results suggest that educationally similar couples are less likely to adopt violent childrearing practices relative to educationally dissimilar ones, with this result being particularly strong for physical punishment [*HP1*]. Conversely, status inconsistency in education, irrespective of which partner holds higher education, is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting violent childrearing practices. This is particularly the case among hypergamous couples, but it is also observed – albeit to a lesser extent, primarily due to the lower prevalence of this couple configuration – among hypogamous couples. In a context of massive



**Fig. 7.** Heterogeneity in the estimates by country-level characteristics, panel a (demography), panel b (socioeconomic development), and panel c (gender). *Notes*: Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. All country-level variables have been dichotomized as above or below the median (p50). Estimates obtained from interaction terms between homogamy and each of the country-level variables dichotomized as above or below the median (p50), linear combinations provided. Estimates with interactions with the respective continuous variables are reported in Table A4. Sampling weights used. Cluster-robust standard errors at the PSU level.

Human Development Index, female



Fig. 7. (continued).

female educational expansion and, as a result, an increasing share of homogamous and hypogamous couples being formed, this latter finding is concerning, as it suggests that higher relative status among women may not translate into better decision-making power within the household. In line with findings from Behrman (2019), Pesando (2022b), and Weitzman (2014), such outcome may have to do with the non-normativity of hypogamous couples in SSA and, as such, their somewhat stigmatized nature which may challenge rooted patriarchal norms and threaten the idea of male domination. These results are also aligned with status inconsistency theories (Hornung et al., 1981), suggesting that relatively more female resources could exacerbate stress induced by status inconsistencies, in turn leading to undesirable outcomes such as, for instance, more within-couple conflict, higher IPV, and more violent childrearing practices (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017). These are novel results as, to the best of our knowledge, no other study has explored the status inconsistency hypothesis in the realm of violence against children.

A note on the size of the estimated association: we found that couples holding similar levels of education are 0.84 percentage points less likely to engage in physical punishment relative to heterogamous couples (corresponding to about a 1.2% decrease), and couples holding similar levels of education are 0.96 percentage points less likely to engage in any type of violent punishment (corresponding to about a 1.1% decrease). A 1% change can be deemed negligible, and we recognize that more critical predictors of violent disciplining methods can be aspects such as social norms around parenting, gender norms, economic distress, etc. Small yet significant effect sizes on parental educational similarity are in line with existing literature (Rauscher, 2020; Rangel and Rauscher, 2024). In light of this, we also stress that this effect size is pretty much equivalent to estimated associations on some of the

strongest predictors of child discipline (UNICEF, 2010), such as child's sex and number of children in the household (Table A3). As such, rather than regarding this finding as negligible, the key question for further research relates to what else could explain variation in child discipline that scholars have currently not considered. On top of social and gender norms, we believe refined information on toxic stress and allostatic load would contribute to a better understanding of harsh parenting.

As a refinement to the homogamy-benefit hypothesis, we further found that, while there is little variation within the heterogamous group, variation within the homogamous group is substantial, depending on partners' level of education. Couples where both partners share high levels of education are less likely to adopt physically violent practices relative to couples with both partners having low levels of education, as well as more likely to adopt non-violent CD practices [HP2]. As such, our main result in this study underscores the key importance of female educational expansion provided status consistency within the couple is not transcended. We also believe there is reason to expect findings for hypogamous couples to change for the better in the future, provided that further female educational expansion brings along socio-cultural shifts in gender ideologies and social norms surrounding the role of the male breadwinner (Abufhele et al., 2022).

Looking at heterogeneity by individual-, household-, and child-level characteristics, we found that homogamy is more strongly associated with a reduction in violent childrearing and an increase in non-violent childrearing among higher-educated mothers and fathers, as well as among wealthier households, further corroborating HP2. As for child characteristics, our hypotheses were only partially confirmed. While we did find stronger associations among school-age children (vs preschoolers) and, qualitatively speaking, among firstborns (vs later-born), parental educational (dis)similarity is similarly associated with the



Gender Inequality Index (GII)

Female-to-male ratio in LFPR

#### Fig. 7. (continued).

adoption of violent parenting practices towards male and female children [*HP3*].

Lastly, despite the broad range of variables chosen, country-level predictors contributed little to explaining cross-country variability in estimated associations [*HP4*]. Further analyses are needed to better explore whether associations are stronger where socioeconomic development is higher and gender inequalities are lower, as hypothesized. While we did obtain weak evidence that the negative association between parental educational similarity and violent disciplinary practices is stronger where GDP per capita is higher and female education is higher, we also found the same result in contexts characterized by higher Gini coefficients and higher gender inequalities (as measured by GII). As such, findings related to gender are blurred, underscoring how complex and interlinked female educational expansion and changes in gender dynamics within and outside households are, especially in LMICs.

This latter finding showcasing higher benefits of parental educational homogamy for the adoption of specific parenting practices in contexts characterized by higher inequalities is novel in the literature. Albeit puzzling and counter to our hypotheses, it has important implications in that it characterizes status-consistent assortative mating patterns as a potential "compensatory mechanism" to correct existing socioeconomic inequalities by income, wealth, and gender.

As one of the main concerns behind parental educational similarity is its potential to widen disparities in the ability of families to invest in their children's development, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the inequality debate surrounding the intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage that may ensue from the adoption of specific parenting practices. Thinking about policies, early childhood interventions have shown some success in reducing violent parenting, particularly for low-income, first-time young mothers (Avellar and Supplee, 2013; Baker-Henningham et al., 2023). These interventions are usually home-visiting programmes that help parents develop sensitivity to their children via better parenting skills. Thinking about our specific research question, it would be interesting to explore whether they also help counterbalance, at least partly, the conflicts arising from parental dissimilarities in education.

This study has some limitations that lay the ground for subsequent research on the topic. First and foremost is the lack of causal identification. Throughout the manuscript we shied away from using the term "effect," and restate here that we documented associations that may be biased by endogeneity. Alternative strategies relying on potential sources of exogenous variation should be considered to minimize this bias, yet these are hard to implement with a research question of this kind, as well as in cross-country comparative scenarios. Country-specific studies might be better suited to address this specific concern. Second, weak effect sizes on the educational similarity coefficient might point to measurement error in the reporting of parenting practices. Third is the inability to identify clear mechanisms, primarily due to the comparative nature of the work and the lack of adequate mediators comparable across all these countries. We made a first attempt to focus on decisionmaking power within the household and IPV, yet findings are weak, perhaps due to the limited sample sizes. We believe that lower parental stress in homogamous couples may be a plausible mechanism underlying the applicability of the homogamy-benefit hypothesis and highlight this as a promising area for future research, incorporating a wide range of psychological traits and stressors. Fourth is the lack of explanatory power of many country-level moderators, which leaves some of the underlying drivers of cross-country heterogeneity in the estimates unexplained. While this is a finding in and of itself, open questions remain about what could explain such cross-country differences. Some recent

literature examining the effect of religiosity on parenting suggests that religious parents usually exhibit a more positive attitude towards corporal punishment (Doepke et al., 2019; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2019). As such, we believe a focus on religion may provide a promising direction to better explain cross-country variability. Other factors could be colonial institutional determinants or legacies, as well as specific cultural and folklore practices, alongside better proxies of gender inequalities in the SSA context (e.g., unpaid work and informality).

Despite the above limitations, this analysis is – to the best of our knowledge – unique in its attempt to bring the study of the intergenerational implications of parental educational assortative mating to a cross-country context, focusing on some of the poorest countries in the world as well as on an oft-neglected global social issue such as violent parenting, which affects most children in the world and has profound implications for children's health and wellbeing across the life course (Gershoff and Grogan-Kaylor, 2016; Norman et al., 2012). Future research may capitalize on this study and bring the analysis of this relationship to a truly global scale using pooled nationally representative surveys and a much wider array of micro-, meso-, and macro-level variables.

#### Ethics

Nothing to declare.

#### CRediT authorship contribution statement

Luca Maria Pesando: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Visualization, Project administration, Methodology, Funding acquisition, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. Elisabetta De Cao: Writing – review & editing, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization. Giulia La Mattina: Writing – review & editing, Data curation, Conceptualization. Alberto Ciancio: Writing – review & editing, Conceptualization.

#### Data availability

Data from the DHS and the MICS are publicly available. Additional data will be made available on request.

#### Acknowledgments

The authors are thankful to Bruno Fagnola for excellent research assistance. The authors are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions received at the Population Association of America (PAA) 2023 Annual Meeting in New Orleans. Pesando acknowledges financial support from the School of Arts at McGill University, the Division of Social Science at New York University (AD) (grant # 76-71240-ADHPG-AD405), and the Jacobs Foundation (grant # 2021-1417-00).

#### Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2024.116954.

#### References

- Abufhele, A., Pesando, L.M., Castro, T., A, F., 2022. Parental educational similarity and inequality implications for infant health in Chile: evidence from administrative Records, 1990–2015. Res. Soc. Stratif. Mobil. 82 (100736). Dec 2022.
- Ackerson, L.K., Kawachi, I., Barbeau, E.M., Subramanian, S.V., 2008. Effects of individual and Proximate educational context on intimate partner violence: a population-based study of women in India. Am. J. Publ. Health 98 (3), 507–514.
- Aizer, A., Stroud, L., Buka, S., 2016. Maternal stress and child outcomes: evidence from siblings. J. Hum. Resour. 51 (3), 523–555.
- Akmatov, M.K., 2011. Child Abuse in 28 developing and transitional countries: results from the multiple indicator cluster surveys. Int. J. Epidemiol. 40 (1), 219–227.

- Atkinson, M.P., Greenstein, T.N., Lang, M.M., 2005. For women, breadwinning can be Dangerous: Gendered resource theory and wife Abuse. J. Marriage Fam. 67 (5), 1137–1148.
- Avellar, S.A., Supplee, L.H., 2013. Effectiveness of home visiting in improving child health and reducing child maltreatment. Pediatrics 132 (Suppl. 1.), S90–S99.
- Backhaus, S., Leijten, P., Meinck, F., Gardner, F., 2022. Different instruments, same content? A systematic comparison of child maltreatment and harsh parenting instruments. Trauma Violence Abuse, 15248380221134290.
- Baker-Henningham, H., Bowers, M., Francis, T., 2023. The process of scaling early childhood violence prevention programs in Jamaica. Pediatrics 151 (Suppl. 2).
- Beck, A., González-Sancho, C., 2009. Educational Assortative Mating and Children's School Readiness. Center for Research on Child Wellbeing Working Paper.
- Behrman, J.A., 2019. Contextual declines in educational hypergamy and intimate partner violence. Soc. Forces 97 (3), 1257–1282.
- Behrman, J.A., 2020. Mother's relative educational status and early childhood heightfor-age z scores: a decomposition of change over time. Popul. Res. Pol. Rev. 39 (1), 147–173.
- Berger, L.M., 2004. Income, family structure, and child maltreatment risk. Child. Youth Serv. Rev. 26 (8), 725–748.
- Bertrand, M., Kamenica, E., Pan, J., 2015. Gender identity and relative income within households. Q. J. Econ. 130 (2), 571–614.
- Carmichael, S., 2011. Marriage and power: age at first marriage and spousal age gap in lesser developed countries. Hist. Fam. 16 (4), 416–436.
- Casterline, J.B., Williams, L., McDonald, P., 1986. The age difference between spouses: variations among developing countries. Popul. Stud. 40 (3), 353–374.
- Chen, Y., Li, H., 2009. Mother's education and child health: is there a Nurturing effect? J. Health Econ. 28 (2), 413–426.
- Chevalier, A., O'Sullivan, V., 2007. Mother's education and birth weight. IZA Discussion Paper Series (2640).
- Coleman, J.S., 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. Am. J. Sociol. 94, S95–S120, 1988.
- Cools, S., Kotsadam, A., 2017. Resources and intimate partner violence in sub-Saharan Africa. World Dev. 95, 211–230.
- Cuartas, J., 2022. Supplemental material for the effect of maternal education on parenting and early childhood development: an instrumental variables approach. J. Fam. Psychol. 36 (2), 280–290.
- Cuartas, J., McCoy, D.C., Rey-Guerra, C., Britto, P.R., Beatriz, E., Salhi, C., 2019. Early childhood exposure to non-violent discipline and physical and psychological aggression in low- and middle-income countries: National, regional, and global prevalence estimates. Child Abuse and Neglect 92 (March), 93–105.
- Cui, N., Xue, J., Connolly, C.A., Liu, J., 2016. Does the gender of parent or child matter in child maltreatment in China? Child Abuse and Neglect 54, 1–9.
- Currie, J., Moretti, E., 2003. Mother's education and the intergenerational transmission of human capital: evidence from college openings. Q. J. Econ. 118 (4), 1495–1532.
- Doepke, M., Sorrenti, G., Zilibotti, F., 2019. The economics of parenting. Annual Review of Economics 11, 55–84.
- Doepke, M., Zilibotti, F., 2019. Love, Money, and Parenting: How Economics Explains the Way We Raise Our Kids. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
- Edwards, R.D., Roff, J., 2016. What Mom and Dad's Match means for Junior: marital sorting and child outcomes. Lab. Econ. 40, 43–56.
- Eika, L., Mogstad, M., Zafar, B., 2019. Educational assortative mating and household income inequality. J. Polit. Econ. 127 (6), 2795–2835.
- Endendijk, J.J., Groeneveld, M.G., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M.J., Mesman, J., 2016. Gender-differentiated parenting Revisited : Meta-analysis reveals Very few differences in parental control of boys and girls. PLoS One 11 (7), 3–33.
- Esteve, A., García-Román, J., Permanyer, I., 2012. The gender-gap reversal in education and its effect on union formation: the end of hypergamy? Popul. Dev. Rev. 38 (3), 535–546.
- Flake, D.F., 2005. Individual, family, and community risk markers for domestic violence in Peru. Violence Against Women 11 (3), 353–373.
- Frye, M., Lopus, S., 2018. From privilege to prevalence: contextual effects of women's schooling on African marital timing. Demography 55 (6), 2371–2394.
- Furstenberg, F.F., 2005. Banking on families: how families generate and distribute social capital. J. Marriage Fam. 67 (4), 809–821.
- Gershoff, E.T., Grogan-Kaylor, A., 2016. Spanking and child outcomes: old controversies and new meta-analyses spanking and child outcomes: old controversies and new meta-analyses. J. Fam. Psychol. 30 (4), 453–469.
- Güneş, P.M., 2015. The role of maternal education in child health: evidence from a compulsory schooling law. Econ. Educ. Rev. 47, 1–16.
- Hao, L., Hotz, J.V., Jin, G.Z., 2008. Games parents and Adolescents play: Risky Behaviour, parental Reputation and strategic Transfers. Econ. J. 118 (528), 515–555.
- Hines, C.T., Kalil, A., Ryan, R.M., 2022. Differences in parents' attitudes toward spanking across socioeconomic status and region, 1986–2016. Soc. Indicat. Res. 160 (1), 133–158.
- Hornung, C.A., McCullough, B.C., Sugimoto, T., 1981. Status relationships in marriage: risk factors in spouse Abuse. J. Marriage Fam. 43 (3), 675.
- Klevens, J., Ports, K.A., 2017. Gender inequity associated with increased child physical Abuse and Neglect: a cross-country analysis of population-based surveys and country-level statistics. J. Fam. Violence 32 (8), 799–806.
- Klevens, J., Ports, K.A., Austin, C., Ludlow, I.J., Hurd, J., 2018. A cross-National Exploration of societal-level factors associated with child physical Abuse and Neglect. Global Publ. Health 13 (10), 1495–1506.
- Lewis, S.K., Oppenheimer, V.K., 2000. Educational assortative mating across marriage markets: non-Hispanic whites in the United States. Demography 37 (1), 29–40.
- Lopus, S., Frye, M., 2020. Intramarital status differences across Africa's educational expansion. J. Marriage Fam. 82 (2), 733–750.

Lynn Ng, W., Mofrad, S., Uba, I., 2014. Effect of birth order on the Differential parental Treatment of children. Asian Soc. Sci. 10 (14), 132–137.

Martin, A., Ryan, R.M., Brooks-Gunn, J., 2007. The joint influence of mother and father parenting on child cognitive outcomes at age 5. Early Child. Res. Q. 22 (4), 423–439.

- Moody, G., Cannings-John, R., Hood, K., Kemp, A., Robling, M., 2018. Establishing the international prevalence of self-reported child maltreatment: a systematic review by maltreatment type and gender. BMC Publ. Health 18 (1), 1–15.
- Negriff, S., 2020. ACEs are not equal: examining the relative Impact of household Dysfunction versus childhood maltreatment on mental health in adolescence. Soc. Sci. Med. 245, 112696.
- Norman, R.E., Byambaa, M., De, R., Butchart, A., Scott, J., Vos, T., 2012. The long-term health consequences of child physical Abuse, emotional Abuse, and Neglect: a systematic review and Meta-analysis. PLoS Med. 9 (11).
- Pesando, L.M., 2021. Educational assortative mating in sub-Saharan Africa: Compositional changes and implications for household wealth inequality. Demography 58 (2), 571–602.
- Pesando, L.M., 2022a. A four-country study on the relationship between parental educational homogamy and children's health from infancy to adolescence. Popul. Res. Pol. Rev. 41, 251–284.
- Pesando, L.M., 2022b. Safer if Connected? Mobile Technology and intimate partner violence. Demography 59 (2), 653–684.
- Pieterse, D., 2015. Childhood maltreatment and educational outcomes: evidence from South Africa. Health Econ. 24, 876–894.
- Rangel, D.E., Rauscher, E., 2021. Paternal education and infant health: variation by Race/Ethnicity. Journal of Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities 8 (6), 1406–1414.
- Rangel, D.E., Rauscher, E., 2024. Racial and ethnic variation in the relationship between parental educational similarity and infant health. Res. Soc. Stratif. Mobil. 89, 100887.
- Rauscher, E., 2020. Why who Marries Whom matters: effects of educational assortative mating on infant health in the United States 1969–1994. Soc. Forces 98 (3), 1143–1173.
- Reniers, G., 2003. Divorce and remarriage in rural Malawi. Demogr. Res. 9 (Suppl. 1), 175–206.

- Schneider, W., Schenck-Fontaine, A., 2022. Growing up unequal: objective and subjective economic disparities and Authoritarian parenting. Child Abuse and Neglect 130 (P4), 105332.
- Schofield, T.J., Conger, R.D., Gonzales, J.E., Merrick, M.T., 2016. Harsh parenting, physical health, and the protective role of positive parent-adolescent relationships. Soc. Sci. Med. 157, 18–26.
- Speyer, L.G., Hang, Y., Hall, H.A., Murray, A.L., 2022. The role of harsh parenting practices in early- to middle-childhood socioemotional development: an examination in the Millennium Cohort study. Child Dev. 93 (5), 1304–1317.
- Straus, M.A., Hamby, S.L., Finkelhor, D., Moore, D.W., Runyan, D., 1998. Identification of child maltreatment with the parent-child conflict Tactics scales: development and Psychometric data for a national sample of American parents. Child Abuse and Neglect 22 (4), 249–270.
- UNICEF, 2010. Child disciplinary practices at home. Unicef. Retrieved from. https://www.unicef.org/protection/Child\_Disciplinary\_Practices\_at\_Home.pdf.
- Wang, M., Deng, X., Du, X., 2018. Harsh parenting and academic achievement in Chinese adolescents: potential mediating roles of effortful control and classroom engagement. J. Sch. Psychol. 67 (November 2016), 16–30.
- WHO, 1999. Report of the Consultation on Child Abuse Prevention. World Health Organization, Geneva.
- WHO, 2020. Global Status Report on Preventing Violence against Children. World Health Organization. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO, Geneva.
- Weitzman, A., 2014. Women's and Men's relative status and intimate partner violence in India. Popul. Dev. Rev. 40 (1), 55–75.
- Wolf, J.P., Freisthler, B., McCarthy, K.S., 2021. Parenting in poor health: examining associations between parental health, Prescription Drug Use, and child maltreatment. Soc. Sci. Med. 277, 113887.
- Brown, D., De Cao, E., 2024. Unveiling shadows: The impact of unemployment on child maltreatment. IZA Discussion Paper No. 16799.
- Bratsberg, B., Markussen, S., Raaum, O., Røed, K., Røgeberg, O., 2023. Trends in assortative mating and offspring outcomes. Econ. J. 133 (651), 928–950.