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How do governments cope with austerity? The roles of accounting in shaping governmental financial resilience

Abstract

Purpose

Studies on how accounting is involved in financial crises and austerity are limited. The context of austerity provides an interesting opportunity to explore the role of accounting in shaping government financial resilience, i.e., the capacity of governments to cope with shocks affecting their financial conditions.

Design/methodology/approach

Based on a multiple-case analysis of eight Italian municipalities, this paper explores how accounting contributes to the government capacities which are used to anticipate and respond to shocks affecting public finances.

Findings

Municipalities cope with financial shocks differently; accounting can support self-regulation, and can affect internally-led or externally-led adaptation. Different combinations of anticipatory and coping capacities lead to different responses to shocks.

Practical implications

The findings can be useful for public managers, policymakers and oversight bodies for strengthening governmental financial resilience in the face of crises and austerity.

Originality/value

The results provide evidence of the conditions, contexts, processes under which accounting becomes a medium which can support both anticipation of and coping with financial shocks, supporting cuts in some cases, and resistance in the short run, or driving long-term changes intended to maintain public services as much intact as possible. This highlights the existence of different patterns of governmental financial resilience, and thus indicates ways of best preserving the service of the public interest.

Keywords: financial resilience; accounting; accounting roles; government; municipality; fiscal crisis; austerity.

1. Introduction

There has been a recent resurgence of interest in how governments, and organizations more generally, can enhance their responses to austerity, shocks, and economic crises (Hopwood, 2009; Van der Stede, 2011). Interestingly, in spite of claims that accounting research has much to learn from deeper observation of the functioning of accounting practices in contexts of crisis (Arnaboldi *et al.*, 2015; Miller and Power, 2013; Van der Stede, 2011), there is a surprising dearth of accounting research into reactions to the recent global financial crisis and austerity, especially in the public sector. (For notable exceptions, see Bracci *et al.*, 2015; Chabrak and Gendron, 2015; Hodges and Lapsley, 2016.)

In the face of the recent global financial crisis, austerity, and related financial shocks, the importance of governmental financial resilience, meaning the ability to face shocks affecting public finances, has been advocated by professional associations, such as CIMA-AICPA and CIPFA, and has been discussed at professional conferences. However, surprisingly, this has not yet been accompanied by a parallel scholarly elaboration on the concept and the factors affecting it, how accounting is implicated in sustaining or hampering governmental resilience, and the effect on the provision of public services in the short and long term.

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In trying to address this gap, the present article explores the role of accounting in affecting governmental financial resilience during the global financial crisis and austerity. The global financial crisis and subsequent period of austerity are considered as the contexts in which governmental responses to financial shocks act on, and in turn are affected by, organizational capacities and accounting systems.

In accordance with its exploratory aim, this article presents a multiple case study analysis of Italian municipalities. The municipality level of government is particularly relevant because it has been significantly impacted by fiscal austerity in many countries, in particular since the start of the global financial crisis in 2008. The Italian public sector also represents an interesting case because it was severely affected by the economic downturn and Italy's sovereign debt crisis, resulting in its public debt to GDP ratio being one of the highest in the world (132.6% at the end of 2016, according to Eurostat, 2017).

The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, it explores the different ways in which municipalities develop and deploy capacities in the struggle to be financially resilient, i.e., to cope with austerity and the recent crises. Second, it shows how accounting is involved in the ways in which municipalities try to maintain public services when coping with austerity. In so doing, this study not only deepens knowledge on how accounting helps anticipate shocks, but it also highlights how it contributes to coping with crises and, more specifically, how different ways of coping with crises are possible. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews extant accounting literature on the role of accounting in financial crises and austerity, and reviews resilience literature as a basis for exploring the concept of financial resilience. The third section focuses on the methods used in this study. The fourth section describes the context of analysis, i.e. Italian municipalities and austerity, and the fifth section presents the results of the study. The sixth section discusses the results and the seventh section presents conclusions, also pointing to implications for practice and research.

2. Accounting, crises, and austerity

The recent economic and fiscal crises have rekindled attention to private and public sector organizations' capacities to respond to shocks and disturbances (Boin *et al.*, 2010; Meier and O'Toole, 2009). Since the 2008 global financial crisis, several studies have been published that enhance our understanding of how governments respond to crises and austerity. Such studies have generally provided detailed accounts of the actions taken by countries or single public sector organizations to cope with financial difficulties, describing either (general) policies and administrative responses (Asenova *et al.*, 2013; Kickert, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; 2012d; 2013; Kickert and Ysa, 2014; Robbins and Lapsley, 2014) or organizational strategies adopted to cope with austerity (Cepiku *et al.*, 2016; Overmans and Noordegraaf, 2014; Raudla *et al.*, 2015; Scorsone and Plerhoples, 2010; West and Condrey, 2011). Such studies, however, do not generally look at how accounting is implicated in such processes. Indeed, accounting scholars, with a few notable exceptions, so far appear to have devoted limited attention to the role of accounting in responding to crises and austerity, especially in the public sector (Bracci *et al.*, 2015). These exceptions are primarily represented by the contributions published within the special issues "The Global Financial Crisis" (Chabrak and Gendron, 2015 – not specifically focused on the public sector), "Public sector accounting and accountability in an era of austerity: new directions, challenges and deficits" (Bracci *et al.*, 2015), and "A private sector failure, a public sector crisis - Reflections on Great Recession" (Hodges and Lapsley, 2016). A further contribution is that of Johansson and Siverbo (2014), which found that, in response to budget turbulence, public sector organizations use tight budgetary control to constrain budgets and budgeting behavior. However, this paper did not refer specifically to the global financial crisis and the related austerity measures.

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3 The journal special issues listed above, in particular, are central in assessing the status of
4 current accounting research on the role of accounting in addressing situations of crisis and
5 austerity. As Chabrak and Gendron (2015: p. 5) highlight, “accounting and auditing
6 technologies, as well as their underlying discourses, influenced field dynamics surrounding the
7 [2008 global financial] crisis, both before and after its emergence”. Several studies point out
8 that accounting contributed to the crisis (“culpability of accounting”) due to its role in
9 perpetuating the financial-economic rationales and neo-liberal principles that contributed to the
10 crisis (Cooper, 2015; Gårseth-Nesbakk and Kjærland, 2016; Richard, 2015), even after the
11 2007/08 Great Recession (Hodges and Lapsley, 2016), and in supporting inequitable
12 distribution of income and wealth (Sikka, 2015). Yet other studies have shown how accounting
13 is implicated, as a consequence of the crisis, in the processes of finding solutions and absorbing
14 the effect of or struggling with austerity, at different levels and viewed from different
15 perspectives. For example, Gendron and Smith-Lacroix (2015) reflect on how the global
16 financial crisis has brought about calls for substantive change in the political economy, leading
17 to the need to deepen knowledge on alternative paradigms in finance practice and research.
18 Heald and Hodges (2015) and Lapsley *et al.* (2015) highlight how the EU and supranational
19 institutions tend to increase their surveillance power in conditions of austerity, with (financial
20 reporting and statistical) accounting serving a role in justifying retrenchment policies. At the
21 same time, national governments are involved in accounting arbitrage and manipulation (in
22 terms of deployment of off-balance sheet mechanisms) and in planning and reporting for
23 financial goals in terms of retrenchment and debt consolidation. As such, the recent crisis and
24 austerity measures appear to have brought about greater reliance on the constraining aspects of
25 accounting (see also Van der Kolk *et al.*, 2015), a stronger attention to accountability to external
26 stakeholders (e.g., Ferry and Ahrens, 2015), as well as increased scope for seeking to attribute
27 blame, and “bricolage” approaches (see also Barbera *et al.*, 2016; Gårseth-Nesbakk and
28 Kjærland, 2016), i.e. short-term and façade solutions aimed at temporarily balancing the budget
29 on a day-by-day basis. Thus, different possible roles emerge for accounting in the contexts of
30 austerity and crises, although these are often examined in studies that focus primarily on
31 different aspects of the conditions of austerity and crises.

32 While not looking at the context of recent crises and austerity, Ezzamel and Bourn’s (1990)
33 contribution on the roles of accounting information systems in an organization experiencing
34 financial crisis is among the few (to the best of our knowledge) studies that comprehensively
35 address how accounting intervenes in anticipating and in coping with shocks. The study
36 examines the periods both before and after a crisis period. Based on earlier studies of Earl and
37 Hopwood (1980) and Burchell *et al.* (1980), and looking at the context of a university, Ezzamel
38 and Bourn (1990) propose that accounting systems should act as *answer and learning machines*
39 during the “pre-crisis period”, because they can support anticipation and prevention of crises
40 by helping to scan the environment and gathering early warning indicators. During “real time-
41 crisis management”, accounting systems can play an important role in facilitating crisis
42 management, enhancing “organizational abilities to buffer the impact of crises and to cope
43 effectively with them” (Smart *et al.*, 1978, quoted in Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990: p. 400), thereby
44 acting as *idea and dialogue machines*. During the “post-crisis period”, accounting systems
45 should again take on the role of *answer and learning machines*, due to the organizations’ need
46 to enhance their surveillance and planning capabilities, and thus their capacity to better respond
47 to future shocks. However, Ezzamel and Bourn’s analysis of a UK-based university facing new
48 financial constraints finds that accounting systems “lacked some of the requisite mechanisms
49 for proactive crisis management” (Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990: p. 422). Their study highlights
50 that, in the face of increased uncertainty, during the onset of the crisis, the accounting system
51 continued to operate as an answer machine or to justify decisions that had been taken in the
52 past.
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3 In summarizing the above literature, it could be concluded that one group of studies have
4 provided evidence of accounting's "culpability" in being among the factors which brought
5 about the crisis, or at least worsened or failed to prevent it. Another group of studies have shed
6 new light on how the crises and austerity have shaped accounting systems, often focusing on
7 single aspects of, or single effects on, such systems. A third group, which is less focused on
8 accounting, describes specific responses adopted by an organization to face crises (for example,
9 cutback management and contracting out). Thus far, little attention has been devoted to the
10 development of a comprehensive and dynamic view of how (public sector) organizations
11 deploy and develop the capacities that underlie the responses necessary to cope with difficult
12 economic conditions, how this brings about differentiated responses, and what roles accounting
13 plays in such processes. More specifically, while most studies tend to focus on a specific role
14 of accounting under austerity, Ezzamel and Bourn (1990) remind us that such roles may be
15 multifaceted, and may change over time. However, their focus on a single study does not allow
16 exploration of the diversity of roles across different contextual and organizational
17 circumstances. The present paper aims to address these gaps by exploring how organizational
18 capacities shape responses to financial shocks and austerity, and how accounting is shaped by,
19 and contributes to shape, such capacities.

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23 The topic is of considerable relevance, particularly for the public sector, and especially for
24 municipalities (i.e., the level of government closest to the citizens) that provide tangible
25 services to the community, and thus directly impact the quality of life of beneficiaries. The
26 recent financial shocks have emphasized the importance of governments' ability to tackle
27 resource retrenchment, as citizens' needs tend to be higher in times of crises (as the last
28 economic crisis has shown, effects on citizens include job losses and higher needs for social
29 services and housing) (Barbera *et al.*, 2017). This tension between potential demand and actual
30 ability to meet public needs is particularly critical as it may reduce the public support enjoyed
31 by the politicians in power, which is needed when financial cutbacks and service reductions
32 are to be decided upon and approved.

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34 In examining how organizational capacities shape responses to financial shocks and
35 austerity, and how accounting is shaped by, and contributes to shape, such capacities, we rely
36 on the concept of resilience (Barbera *et al.*, 2017; Steccolini *et al.*, 2017), which provides a
37 conceptual framework to understand the organizational capacities needed and deployed in
38 circumstances of crises. Resilience can be defined as both a capability for reaction to crises,
39 'bouncing back' to an original state and thus absorbing disturbances by undergoing first-order
40 change^[1] (Boin *et al.*, 2010: p. 8; Linnenluecke, 2017: p. 6; Meyer, 1982), and as the capacity
41 to anticipate and cope with the unexpected, progressing through the development of new
42 capabilities and the creation of new opportunities, and thus undergoing second-order change^[2]
43 (Meyer, 1982; Somers, 2009). While some authors (Wildavsky, 1988; Wukich, 2013) define
44 resilience as the "capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest"
45 (Wildavsky, 1988: p. 88), others highlight that resilience requires anticipation and awareness
46 of risks (Lengnick-Hall and Beck, 2005; Linnenluecke and Griffith, 2013; Somers, 2009). A
47 wider definition of resilience (Boin *et al.*, 2010) will encompass the abilities to prevent, to
48 anticipate, and to recover from shocks and crises. This suggests that resilient behaviors and
49 capacities are deployed before, during, and after the occurrence of crises and shocks.
50 Specifically, in order to anticipate shocks, resilient organizations are aware of the external
51 environment (McManus *et al.*, 2007), develop capacities to read signals that indicate shocks
52 (Boin and Van Eeten, 2013), and engage in risk mitigation activities (Linnenluecke and
53 Griffiths, 2013). To cope with shocks, organizations may rely on interactions among
54 organizational actors (Weick, 1993) and interorganizational actors (Linnenluecke and
55 Griffiths, 2013; Skertich *et al.*, 2013), information sharing (Hood, 1991; McManus *et al.*, 2007;
56 Skertich *et al.*, 2013; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003), effective communication (Kendra and
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3 Wachtendorf, 2003), decentralized decision-making (Boin and Van Eeten, 2013), and
4 loosening of control (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Slack resources are found to help in
5 absorbing the impacts of shocks (Hood, 1991; Meyer, 1982; Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003).
6 Similarly, questioning the status quo (Weick, 1993) and learning (Skertich *et al.*, 2013;
7 Wildavsky, 1988) improve adaptability.

9 A useful conceptualization and operationalization based on the above mentioned
10 contributions, and specifically focused on “financial” resilience, i.e., capacity to deal with
11 shocks affecting finances, is provided by Barbera *et al.* (2017). The authors develop a
12 framework in which four main dimensions of financial resilience are identified. These are
13 environmental conditions, perceived vulnerability, and two main categories of internal
14 capacities for facing with shocks: anticipatory capacities, and coping capacities. Anticipatory
15 capacities are defined as “the availability of tools and capabilities that enable [local
16 governments] to better identify and manage their vulnerabilities and recognize potential
17 financial shocks before they arise” (p. 675), and include planning, controlling, and monitoring
18 systems, as well as situation awareness, and sense-making. Coping capacities refer to
19 “resources and abilities that allow shocks to be faced and vulnerabilities to be managed” (p.
20 675). These capacities may play different roles: they may allow the organization to buffer (i.e.,
21 absorb) the impacts of shocks without changes in extant structures and functions (e.g., the use
22 of financial reserves, spending cuts, or deferring investment expenditure); to adapt through the
23 implementation of incremental changes (e.g., enhancing internal competencies, entering
24 partnerships with private developers, or increasing networking with external stakeholders to
25 support service provision); or even to transform extant structures, functions, goals, and values
26 through radical changes (e.g., identifying alternative income sources, achieving autonomy, or
27 achieving financial self-sufficiency). The study by Barbera *et al.* (2017) highlights that, by
28 relying too much on buffering capacities, organizations tend to ‘bounce back’, or maintain a
29 status quo, rather than develop the capacities needed to change and progress. This contributes
30 to higher vulnerability, i.e., reduced capacity to cope with emerging shocks. Building on this
31 conceptualization, and thus using a resilience perspective, can contribute to a better
32 understanding of the capacities underlying governmental responses to difficulties and shocks,
33 and their dynamics. Moreover, it allows a deeper exploration of how accounting is implicated
34 in nurturing, hampering, or enabling such capacities and responses. However, no extant study
35 exists which examines the role of accounting in shaping financial resilience. The present paper
36 contributes to the addressing of this gap.

3. Methods

45 Consistent with the exploratory aim of this paper, eight in-depth case studies (Eisenhardt,
46 1989; Yin, 2009) were conducted to explore governmental financial resilience. To compare
47 entities operating in similar institutional settings, the analysis was focused on Italian
48 municipalities that are province capital cities (117 out of 8,047 municipalities). The eight
49 selected municipalities were identified by ensuring coverage of cases with different financial
50 conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989) and coming from different geographical areas, as the
51 North/South divide has been already been identified as relevant in the Italian context (Anessi-
52 Pessina *et al.*, 2008; Putnam, 1993). To evaluate financial conditions, two key variables were
53 identified, i.e., the average municipal budgetary position and its volatility over the ten-years
54 2000-2009. The budgetary position (the year-end surplus or deficit) is considered the primary
55 financial performance measure used at the municipal level in Italy, and it is calculated as
56 follows:

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60 Deficit or surplus = cash + revenues to be recovered – commitments to be paid.

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3 While budgets are generally required to balance, there is not a universally agreed-upon
4 optimal budgetary position at the end of the fiscal year. However, there is an expectation that
5 neither deficits nor surpluses should exceed certain thresholds (Hendrick 2006; Rose and
6 Smith, 2011). The ratio of deficit or surplus to operating revenue is considered acceptable
7 within a -3% to $+5\%$ range, and this is taken to indicate a ‘balanced budget’ (Barbera *et al.*,
8 2016). The measure was normalized to the total operating revenues of municipalities studied.
9 To ensure a balanced representation of different financial conditions, combinations of high and
10 low average budgetary position and volatility were identified, and additionally, for each
11 combination, one municipality from the North and one from the South of Italy were chosen.
12 As a consequence, two municipalities with both low average budgetary position and low
13 volatility were identified (Modena and Salerno), two with low average budgetary position and
14 high volatility (Caserta and Forli), two with high average budgetary position and low volatility
15 (Napoli and Varese), and two with both high average budgetary position and high volatility.
16 Table 1 shows the selected municipalities, their relevant financial information, and their
17 geographical areas.
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21 [Table 1 here]

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23 Because this study seeks to understand how accounting contributes to public sector
24 organizations’ efforts in maintaining operations after shocks, the 2000-2009 ten-year period
25 was purposively identified in order to capture financial data encompassing an adequate period
26 of time before the shocks occurred. The interviews and the results section of this paper also
27 considers events taking place after 2009, up to 2013, in order to highlight what happened in the
28 years after the crisis, based on data available at the time this research was performed. Indeed,
29 past research on Italian municipalities affected by shocks has emphasized that in 2009 these
30 local governments were affected by the first consequences of the economic and financial crisis,
31 with larger impacts to come in the following years (Cepiku *et al.*, 2016; Guarini and Pattaro,
32 2016). The present study, drawing on Ezzamel and Bourn’s (1990) observation that accounting
33 appears to assume the same role during both the pre- and post-crisis phases, and recognizing
34 that it may be difficult to clearly separate the events and effects taking place during and after
35 the crisis, identifies and considers only two main time periods: the period before the onset of a
36 crisis and the post-crisis period³¹. This allows the study to consider how accounting contributes
37 to both anticipating and coping with crises and austerity, before and after their manifestation.
38 This is consistent with the “wider” conception of resilience within the literature advocated by
39 Boin *et al.* (2010), and highlights the dynamic nature of resilience, which, rather than being
40 observed at a specific point in time, develops over time. In contrast to past accounting research
41 (e.g., Johansson and Siverbo, 2014), our analysis jointly and collectively considers anticipation
42 and coping behaviors, and different types of accounting practices, from planning and control
43 to slack, and more creative practices.
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47 The selected cases were studied by analysis of relevant documents and financial data and
48 by face-to-face semi-structured interviews (Bailey, 2007) with key informants such as chief
49 financial officers (CFOs) and chief executive officers (CEOs)/general secretaries. The reason
50 why these roles were identified is that individuals in these roles are actively involved with, and
51 thus affect, the budgeting processes used by municipalities, and could help to retrospectively
52 construct a model of the main accounting mechanisms and events, and the relationships
53 between accounting tools and the responses to shocks within each municipality. For Barletta
54 and Lodi we were able to conduct interviews only with CFOs. For all other municipalities, we
55 were able to conduct interviews with both the CFO and the CEO/general secretary. This means
56 that a total of 14 interviews were conducted between October 2012 and February 2013. Each
57 interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and was recorded and transcribed. Transcripts were
58 returned to the interviewees for corrections and additional comments. For each interviewee,
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3 the following topics were addressed: their perceptions about the financial health of the
4 municipality, the municipality's main financial and non-financial goals and strategies, the main
5 shocks suffered over the ten year period studied, the kinds of responses that were made, and
6 the factors affecting the organizational capacity to respond to shocks (with a specific focus on
7 accounting mechanisms and tools). Given the limits of individuals' memories, during the
8 interviews we asked people to consider and describe their perceptions of the shocks and
9 experiences as they occurred over the whole time period of the study. It is recognized that the
10 reconstruction of events will also reflect interviewees' *ex post* rationalizations (Patton, 2002).
11 Because the study aims to investigate unexpected events which underwent successive
12 developments and to identify approaches to resilience, which are manifested in exceptional
13 circumstances like shocks (Linnenluecke, 2017), an *ex post* approach appears to be the most
14 suitable method of investigation.
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18 Triangulation of data sources (primarily through financial data, audit reports, and media
19 reports) was used to validate the information collected in the interviews (Bailey, 2007).
20 Financial data were downloaded from the Aida PA - Bureau van Dijk database that contains
21 economic and financial information on Italian local governments, including municipalities,
22 based on the year-end reports which are published each year on the Italian Ministry of Interior
23 website. Our elaboration of the selected municipalities, and specifically information on the
24 average budgetary position and volatility over the selected period, were shown to interviewees
25 after conducting each interview, in order not to affect the responses to the interviewees. This
26 allowed us to obtain confirmation and further explanations of the dynamic of the financial
27 condition over the identified time period, the underlying financial goals and strategies of the
28 municipality, as well as the accounting mechanisms and tools adopted also in response to
29 shocks. Media and audit reports (such as those published by Corte dei Conti, the supreme
30 Italian audit institution), were also particularly useful to reconstruct key events relating to
31 governmental laws and requirements and their overall impact on municipalities. In particular,
32 media were useful to deepen our knowledge about those municipalities that had received high
33 levels of media attention and debate in the past due to their particular situations, such as Caserta
34 and Napoli, that had undergone default. Again, this proved to be useful to triangulate
35 information emerging from financial data and interviews.
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40 By means of a manual coding process, the researchers classified the main themes emerging
41 from the interviews. The main themes identified were triangulated with empirical data and with
42 extant literature (Eisenhardt, 1989) and, through an iterative process, the final
43 operationalization of resilience and its inherent accounting practices were identified. Examples
44 are provided through interview quotations (see Appendix 1).
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46 **4. Italian municipalities and austerity**

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48 This section provides a short background to the subsequent analysis of the findings by
49 presenting the main features of the Italian municipal context. Italian municipalities, together
50 with provinces, represent the local level of government in Italy (the other levels being the
51 central and the regional levels). Municipalities are in charge of all administrative functions
52 concerning their local community, such as social services, public transportation, waste
53 collection, street lighting, road maintenance, and services related to land use and economic
54 development. Within specific legal ceilings set at the national level, they raise income from
55 local taxes (property tax represents the major source of revenue for Italian municipalities) and
56 fees for the services they provide. Italian municipalities' average ratio of own-revenue to total
57 current revenue (which includes funding from the central government and other sources)^[4] was
58 61% in 2013 (ANCI, 2015). However, municipalities lack any real power to regulate the most
59 important aspects of taxes, such as tax bases and rates, which are set by the central government
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(Corte dei Conti, 2015). The average per capita expenditure of Italian municipalities in 2013 was 995 Euros, of which 773 Euros related to current expenditure and 222 Euros related to capital expenditure (ANCI, 2015).

After the 2008 economic and financial crisis, centrally defined fiscal policies affecting municipal finances were changed repeatedly, due to the declared need for the central government to restore Italian public finances and reduce the public debt. In particular, municipalities suffered from cutbacks in the amounts of funding transfers from the central government and reduced autonomy over local taxes. Moreover, a series of austerity measures were taken, with fiscal and budgetary constraints being enacted at the local level. Also, since 2012, municipalities have been subject to significant delays in central government decisions over the amounts of funding transfers, which has increased the complexity of budgetary processes and the approval of balanced budgets. The revenue shortfall due to the wider economic downturn, a socio-economic context characterized by large-scale job losses^[5] and a crisis in the housing market^[6], further contributed to compounding the challenges arising from increased demand from citizens and the need to maintain a capacity to provide services and make investments under shrinking resources.

Another major constraint was related to the Italian Domestic Stability Pact (DSP), which was introduced in 1999 to involve local governments in the effort to reduce the national deficit and comply with EU fiscal rules. Under the DSP, each financial year municipalities are required to achieve specific fiscal targets, in terms of expenditure cutbacks or increases in cash surpluses (see also Barbera *et al.*, 2016). The DSP's requirements were made more stringent following the financial crisis. According to Corte dei Conti (2015), the Italian central government used these policies to increase its fiscal surveillance over local governments, who lost virtually all of their fiscal autonomy.

5. Findings: accounting practices before and after the crisis

The triangulation between interviews and the relevant literature allows this study to identify different approaches taken by municipalities in anticipating and coping with austerity. For each approach, partially differing roles of accounting emerge. The following subsections illustrate the different types of financial resilience behaviors (including self-regulation, and internally- and externally-led adaptation), and how accounting contributed to anticipate and cope with austerity within each group of municipalities. Table 2 summarizes the roles of accounting that allow organizations to anticipate and cope with shocks, possible municipal responses, as well as their financial performance.

[Table 2 here]

5.1 Accounting contributing to self-regulation

In Modena and Salerno, long-term planning and control, characteristic of the two municipalities before the shocks, appeared to be essential in affecting the municipalities' responses to the crisis, providing both organizations with the capacity to anticipate events. For Modena, the interviewees emphasized the importance of supporting planning by performing simulations to forecast and estimate future revenues and expenditures, as well as to identify possible areas of risk.

We do simulations based on the limited data we have, in order to keep the budget manageable. (Modena, CFO.)

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3 In Salerno, early budgetary approval was described as a relevant accounting practice, in a
4 context where budgetary approval was often and repeatedly postponed by legislation. The
5 timing of budgetary approval is relevant to the capacity to forecast and to prompt decision-
6 making:
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8 One of the points that [our Mayor] has always paid attention to [...] is
9 to approve the budget by 31st December. On January 1st we must start
10 to implement our programs, and this relies on the budget to be approved
11 on time. (Salerno, CFO.)
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13 In terms of control, the capacity for anticipation relies on continuous monitoring during the
14 year of revenues collected, expenditures, and the quantity and quality of services provided:
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16 We try to make good predictions, [...] through careful monitoring. The
17 budget is not written once and for all but is constantly reviewed during
18 the year. (Modena, CEO.)
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21 The described accounting practices still characterized the two municipalities during and
22 following the crisis, contributing to maintain a high capacity to anticipate shocks. This allowed
23 the minimization of the impact of cutbacks on provision of services by facilitating the use of
24 available resources. Data show that operating expenditure decreased by 4% in Modena and
25 increased by around 3% in Salerno, while capital expenditure decreased dramatically in
26 Modena (-54%) and at a lower rate in Salerno (-9%; see Appendix 2a, c). A more in-depth
27 analysis of operating expenditure and related changes after 2008 shows that, in both
28 municipalities, the overall variation between 2008 and 2012 does not appear to be particularly
29 large, but examining expenditure on specific service areas, it becomes evident that major cuts
30 affected operating expenditure for culture (-12% in Modena; -13.70% in Salerno), education (-
31 5.60% in Modena; -10% in Salerno), youth, sport and leisure (-14% in Modena), and local
32 police (-5.7% in Salerno). Both Modena and Salerno increased networking and partnerships
33 with external stakeholders and providers of services. Specifically, in Salerno, collaboration
34 with private enterprises and the creation of public-private partnerships (PPPs) were strongly
35 encouraged to finance investments, as PPPs were not counted in the fiscal balance. More
36 generally, the attraction of external resources was considered a major strength by interviewees,
37 both before and after the shocks.
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41 In our municipality, we have strongly considered investments to create
42 job opportunities and boost the economy. One of the alternatives we
43 found is to access private capital: we have mixed-finance projects, also
44 of considerable magnitude. (...) For example, we use project finance
45 initiatives. A photovoltaic park has been built on 40 hectares of land:
46 the leasehold has been transferred to private individuals who pay a
47 royalty (about 1,200,000 Euro a year) and the repayment of the
48 investment is based on the revenues that the Municipality runs with the
49 sale of energy and the contribution to energy production. Private
50 businesses also create public works that are transferred under the
51 ownership of the Municipality (e.g., restructuring, the creation of an
52 educational center). (Salerno, CFO.)
53
54
55

56 In Modena, the interviewees pointed out that the decline in financial resources gave rise to
57 higher inclusion of associations and citizens' representatives in order to better prioritize
58 services, particularly in social services. This led to at least 100 local associations taking part in
59 the discussion and approval of a three-year social plan and the related allocation of resources.
60

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3 The plan is to be revised or confirmed every year, based on emerging needs and available
4 resources. According to the interviewees, this helped the municipality to better allocate
5 budgetary resources based on citizens' needs, and at the same time represented a way for
6 politicians to raise public consensus on difficult decisions. In this perspective, in a context of
7 fiscal retrenchment, accounting was instrumental to the adoption of inclusive solutions in
8 budget decisions.
9

10 The municipality of Modena developed with the aim to provide
11 responses to citizens' needs. It interprets its budgetary policies as a
12 means to provide services to citizens. (Modena, CFO.)
13

14 Shared decision-making was also considered important for *strengthening internal*
15 *collaboration and cohesion*, which included improving internal communication and
16 information flow.
17

18 There are regular meetings among the different directors of the
19 Departments [...], then there are almost daily discussions with the
20 Financial Department on how resources should be used. [...] Each
21 Department [...] must align its strategy to the overall Municipal
22 strategy. (Modena, CFO.)
23

24 The budget formulation is a shared process. In the first stage, budget
25 proposals from departments are collected, then a final meeting is held
26 to take into consideration the Mayor's strategy and the financial
27 sustainability of proposals... The Mayor has a strong team. (Salerno,
28 CFO.)
29

30 In addition, Modena's accounting practices were characterized by a prudent approach to
31 expenditure forecasting, allowing the Municipality, both before and after the shocks, to better
32 cope with unexpected events due to the creation of budgetary reserves (i.e., when forecasting
33 future expenditure, a certain amount of resources were not allocated towards specific items of
34 expenditure, and became available only if unexpected expenditures arose, giving a buffer to
35 help avoid financial imbalances).
36

37 According to the interviewees, reliance on a combination of actions allowed Modena and
38 Salerno to be able to self-regulate (in a timely manner) their responses to shocks. These
39 responses predominantly consisted of selectively reducing expenditure (i.e., no across the
40 board cuts and maintaining funding for priority needs), increasing control over subsidiaries,
41 increasing revenues, and the continuous adoption of virtuous behaviors (e.g., ensuring balanced
42 budgets, a high rate of revenue collection). For example, between 2008 and 2012, expenditure
43 on personnel decreased by almost 15% in Modena and 18% in Salerno, and expenditure on
44 equipment decreased by 15% and 7%, respectively. In the same period, revenues (specifically
45 from taxes) almost doubled in Modena and more than doubled in Salerno, also due to efforts
46 to combat tax evasion.
47

48 We are now self-regulating in terms of personnel management: we are
49 blocking turnover far more than the law requires, we avoid replacing
50 turnover of positions that are not essential for guaranteeing the survival
51 of fundamental services. (Modena, CEO.)
52

53 We also implemented actions to fight against tax evasion, this is
54 something we have been taking for many years and which we have
55 certainly increased, in particular, the recovery of local taxes (e.g.,
56 property tax, the tax for the occupation of spaces and public areas, the
57 advertising tax, fare evasion)... (Modena, CFO.)
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3 We have been trying to recover structural revenues to meet the
4 Municipality commitments. We are working a lot on tax evasion [...],
5 we revised the tax rates of the local property tax to increase revenues.
6 (Salerno, CFO.)
7

8 In these cases, accounting tools represented a medium for anticipation, playing an early-
9 warning role and allowing the situation to be kept constantly under control. The mix of
10 solutions identified led to a reduction of operating expenditures in some services (as mentioned
11 above, mainly in culture and education). However, social services did not show substantial
12 modification (+3.70% in Modena, +1.60% in Salerno), although these data should be read in
13 the light of the increasing needs brought about by the economic crisis. Overall, the efforts made
14 by these two municipalities were driven by the desire to maintain past levels of services:
15
16

17 In this difficult situation, we are trying to understand what we should
18 do with some services [...] how can we achieve budgetary goals while
19 maintaining the current level of services, in a context of increasing
20 demand for services (particularly, social services) and a dramatic
21 decrease of resources. (Modena, CEO.)
22
23

24 *5.2 Accounting contributing to internally-led adaptation*

25 Some of the municipalities we analyzed highlighted stronger difficulties in managing the
26 crisis, but also appeared to have embarked on a path of internally-led adaptation (Barletta, Forlì,
27 Lodi, and Varese). Before the crisis, most of these municipalities adopted a ‘day-by-day’
28 management facilitated by accounting tools and mechanisms used to increase budget flexibility
29 (Barletta, Forlì, and Lodi).
30
31

32 Barletta, Lodi, and Varese described a context before the crisis characterized by the absence
33 or the limited development of management control systems.
34

35 We do not have [...] an office for management control; however, we
36 will have to create it as a result of the new Decree. The problem is staff
37 availability. (Lodi, CFO.)
38

39 According to the interviewees, the above-mentioned shortcomings in planning and control
40 practices hampered their municipalities’ capacities to anticipate shocks, bringing about a focus
41 on reacting ex post to shocks, rather than adopting actions to avoid their possible negative
42 consequences in advance.

43 When the crisis and related shocks struck municipalities, this lack of anticipatory capacities,
44 combined with centrally imposed cuts and constraints on local revenues (as described above),
45 generally led to important impacts on the development of public expenditure (see Appendix
46 2a,b,c). Operating expenditure trends between 2008 and 2012 remained stable only in Forlì
47 (+0.40%), increased in Barletta (+5%) and Varese (+18%), but decreased in Lodi (-7%).
48 Capital expenditure, during the same period, decreased in the four municipalities (around 64%
49 in Varese, 70% in Barletta, 73% in Lodi, and 76% in Forlì). A deeper examination of the impact
50 on services shows that major cuts for operating expenditure, between 2008 and 2012, were
51 made to culture (Varese, Forlì), education (-2.47% in Barletta), youth, and sport and leisure
52 (all municipalities). In Lodi, major cuts were made also for social services (-13%). Varese even
53 created a spending review unit to reduce expenditure.
54

55 Interestingly, in all the municipalities, improvements in planning and control mechanisms
56 started to take place following the financial crisis, although at different times and in different
57 ways. In particular, in Varese goal setting and evaluation started to be developed after 2012:
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3 We did not have, in the past, a sound management control system. [...]
4 We are changing our performance evaluation system [...] to assess each
5 manager on a few strategic goals. (Varese, General Secretary.)
6

7 In Barletta (after 2013), Forlì (after 2008), and Lodi (after 2011), management control
8 systems were put in place to improve revenue collection. Barletta also strengthened cross-unit
9 collaboration. From examination of revenue data, it can be observed that this led to some
10 improvements in Forlì, with the collection rate for taxes increasing from 69.5% to 82.5%
11 between 2008 and 2009, and to 93% in 2012, and the collection rate for revenue from service
12 fees increasing from around 51% to 67% between 2008 and 2012. Between 2008 and 2012, in
13 Lodi, the collection rate for taxes increased from 65% to 83%. Data available for Barletta,
14 however, do not show similar improvements. In managing capital revenue, Forlì resorted to
15 equity divestment.
16

17
18 (We resorted) to asset and equity disposal. (Forlì, CEO.)
19

20 Coping with unexpected events required municipalities to rely on different accounting
21 practices, and sometimes to resort to opportunistic behaviors. In some cases, financial slack
22 resources (i.e., reserves available in the budget, often contributing to the surplus) were
23 important in enabling the absorption of shocks (Barletta, Varese), although in certain cases
24 such reserves were the result of opportunistic exploitation of accounting policies, rather than
25 of behaviors aimed primarily at setting aside financial resources. Indeed, some municipalities
26 relied on opportunistic behaviors (or “bricolage”, see also Weick, 1993) based on capturing
27 emerging solutions aimed at balancing the budget on a day-by-day basis (Barletta, Lodi), or on
28 networking and partnerships with external stakeholders and providers of services (Forlì). In
29 contrast, reliance on external funding (i.e., use of resources as they become available, Forlì)
30 resulted in a limited capacity to cope with emerging difficulties. These practices are discussed
31 further below.
32

33 The creation and use of reserves was particularly intense in Barletta and Varese. This
34 practice consisted of the creation of budgetary surpluses through the overestimation of
35 revenues (e.g., from fines, waste tax), allowing higher spending flexibility. Surplus, as
36 calculated in the commitment-based budgetary system in use in Italian municipalities (before
37 the country’s 2011 accounting reform), includes not only cash, but also revenues to be collected
38 and expenditure to be paid. The use of the accumulated surplus allowed spending and provision
39 of services to citizens during financially difficult times. However, this represented a risky
40 behavior that resulted in the collection of very low levels of actual revenues compared to the
41 estimated amounts, indicating that the surplus was overestimated and leading to very large
42 deficits.
43

44
45 Every year we certainly tend to drag on past situations (with respect to
46 revenues to be collected). The law specifies that each municipality must
47 certify the need to maintain in the budgetary position either the revenues
48 to be collected or the expenditures to be paid, for which we hope to
49 “tidy up our budget” based on this assessment. The problem, which is
50 common to many other municipalities, is how to revise and eventually
51 reduce the amount of these revenues to be collected according to the
52 real chance to get cash inflows. The common problem for all
53 municipalities is that basically, no one takes the responsibility to cancel
54 these amounts (and rebalance the budget), it is easier to maintain them
55 in... (Varese, CFO.)
56

57
58 Actually, we act on our revenues to be recovered (Varese, General
59 Secretary.)
60

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4 After the crisis, reliance on the use of such “reserves” remained in place in Varese. In
5 contrast, it became increasingly unsustainable in Barletta.
6

7 [...] the surplus is affected by important amounts of capital revenues to
8 be recovered due to pending legal disputes and for [...] the lack of
9 recovery of taxes on building permits due to the crisis. (Barletta, CFO.)

10 Before and after the shocks, Barletta and Lodi were characterized by opportunistic
11 behaviors, based on the continuous identification of new solutions to address emerging
12 problems, with the tendency of the latter municipality to face little disturbances that arose year
13 by year:
14

15 [...] there is no medium-term planning but, conversely, we play it by
16 ear. [...] priority is given to catching opportunities to obtain immediate
17 advantages within the political mandate. (Barletta, CFO.)

18 In recent years, we tried to live year by year not to say almost day by
19 day. (Lodi, CFO.)
20
21

22 In Barletta, this opportunistic behavior included the use of an important receivable balance
23 of 45 million Euros, a very large government transfer receivable that was carried over in the
24 accumulated budget surplus for many years and used to create flexibility in spending decisions.
25

26 In Lodi, this opportunistic approach translated into increasing their reported surplus by
27 means of a one-off financial transaction with a subsidiary company in 2008 that created
28 additional budgetary leeway (exploiting the fact that consolidation of accounts for budgetary
29 purposes was not mandatory at that time):
30

31 What determines recent years’ surpluses is the presence of a very large
32 surplus, which is around €10 million, established in 2008. It comes from
33 a granting credit made to a subsidiary for the purchase of some
34 municipal buildings. [This subsidiary had insufficient liquidity to meet
35 the liability created.] It returned 2 million in 2010 (out of 12 million to
36 be recovered). (Lodi, CFO.)
37

38 Behaviors based on the opportunistic exploitation of accounting rules and practices allowed
39 municipalities to ensure the provision of services, which also affects political consensus,
40 according to the interviewees.
41

42 Similar to the cases of Modena and Salerno, networking with external stakeholders was
43 identified by Forlì as essential for responding to external shocks and the creation of PPPs was
44 considered a ‘new’ solution to finance investments without impacting the fiscal deficit.
45

46 As illustrated above, in all these cases, in contrast to Modena and Salerno, accounting
47 represented mainly a means of adaptation, i.e., a tool for enhancing budgetary flexibility,
48 substantially relying on coping behaviors rather than on the ability to anticipate shocks through
49 the creation of strong planning and control mechanisms. What all the interviewees agreed on
50 was that the solutions identified were generally aimed at maintaining the municipalities’
51 service levels, and thus responding to citizens’ needs for public services:
52

53 The municipality tries to keep fiscal pressure low while following the
54 citizens’ needs. (Barletta, CFO.)

55 What do we first cut? In the case of a lack of resources, new public
56 works are postponed. We try to maintain at least the operations (e.g.,
57 schools). (Forlì, CEO.)
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3 Regarding operating expenditure, Lodi may only now make hard
4 choices. We have already cut, in the last 2-3 years, contributions to local
5 associations, we tried to reduce supplies, we constantly monitor phone
6 expenditure and thanks to a tender for electricity supply, we reduced
7 our expenditure. We try to cut everything, but at the core, there is
8 expenditure for services [...] the only thing we can do now is to not
9 provide any more certain services. (Lodi, CFO.)
10

11 We are trying to identify new solutions to the problem of professional
12 positions that we are going to lose [...] at the same time we are trying
13 to maintain the same level of services, but this is not easy. (Varese,
14 General Secretary.)
15
16

17 To maintain a certain quantity and quality of public services, while adapting to shocks,
18 Barletta, Forlì, Lodi, and Varese demonstrated a proactive, or internally-led, approach.
19 Compared to Modena and Salerno, in this second group of municipalities accounting did not
20 support high anticipatory capacities before shocks; indeed, this group of municipalities was
21 characterized by weak planning and control processes. However, efforts were made after the
22 shocks to strengthen the internal anticipatory capacities. In these municipalities, coping
23 capacities, although offhand and based mainly on creative and opportunistic behaviors,
24 appeared to be effective substitutes for dealing with shocks. These behaviors did not appear to
25 be aimed at building the internal conditions for the prudent management of resources. On the
26 contrary, they were mainly inspired by a short-term focus on finding solutions to face emerging
27 needs. However, even in municipalities where coping capacities were not particularly
28 developed, such as in Forlì, improvements were made to enhance resource collection or
29 attraction. More generally, accounting mechanisms contributed inventively to allow these
30 municipalities to cope with shocks.
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34 *5.3 Accounting contributing to externally-led adaptation*

35 The last two municipalities analyzed, Caserta and Napoli, were those that showed the
36 strongest difficulties in managing the crisis. Before the crisis, similarly to municipalities in the
37 second group, 'day-by-day' management supported by accounting tools and mechanisms was
38 used to increase budget flexibility, and this was even encouraged by the continuous
39 postponements of budget approval deadlines by the central government:
40
41

42 The fact that we know that the deadline for the budget approval will be
43 deferred entails, like in all organizations where planning capacity is
44 weak, an increasingly lax behavior. (Napoli, CEO.)
45

46 Management control systems also appeared to be particularly weak:

47 The main reason for our financial situation was the absence of the
48 needed controls by the financial department. (Caserta, CFO.)
49

50 After being hit by shocks, this lack of anticipatory capacities, combined with requirements
51 from the central government to cut expenditure and the constraints on local revenues described
52 above, contributed to a decrease in operating expenditures between 2008 and 2012, both in
53 Caserta (around -7%) and Napoli (almost -14%). Capital expenditure, during the same period,
54 decreased by 87% in Caserta and 13% in Napoli. A more detailed examination of expenditure
55 across services shows extensive cuts for cultural activities (as much as -74.5% in Caserta and
56 -45% in Napoli), education (-21% in Caserta and -38% in Napoli), youth, sport and leisure (-
57 14% in Caserta and -25% in Napoli), and transportation and mobility (almost -16% in Napoli).
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3 Major expenditure cuts were made also for social services (Caserta -33%, Napoli -22%) and
4 local police (see Appendix 2a,b,c).
5

6 Like the municipalities in the second group (Section 4.2), an enhancement of accounting
7 mechanisms contributing to anticipatory capacity was observed in Caserta and Napoli,
8 although in the former this was predominantly a consequence of a financial bailout procedure
9 adopted by central government in 2008, as required by law in case of the inability to fulfill
10 financial obligations (the same procedure was adopted in 2012 in Napoli), in which the
11 municipality was forced to strengthen planning and monitoring systems. Italian municipalities
12 are subject to the bailout procedure when their financial conditions are particularly serious.
13 Municipalities subject to a bailout are placed under special scrutiny and control by the Italian
14 Ministry of the Interior and are forced to implement measures aimed at re-balancing their
15 budget, such as increasing the tax rates to the highest level, adopting a debt repayment plan,
16 rationalizing expenditure, and re-organizing some internal procedures including tax-collection.
17 In particular, as a consequence of the bailout, Caserta created an office in charge of strategic
18 management and performance evaluation, and introduced management control systems to
19 support decision-making; the municipality also centralized the collection of revenues in one
20 office to improve the revenue collection rate, and specifically that for taxes, which increased
21 from 56% to 88% between 2008 and 2012. In Napoli, after 2011 these systems were put in
22 place mainly to improve revenue collection. This may have contributed to increasing the
23 revenue collection rate for taxes between 2008 and 2012 from 60% to 73%.
24
25
26

27 Similar to the municipalities described in the previous section, in order to cope with shocks,
28 particular accounting practices proved essential. In Napoli the use of slack resources, and
29 specifically the creation and *use of reserves*, allowed the municipality to purposively benefit
30 from higher spending flexibility, but, as mentioned above, this behavior proved risky, and
31 indeed, in Napoli the revenue collection rate for fees and tariffs was below 40% before 2008,
32 and did not improve visibly after 2008.
33

34 In our budget there has been a recurrence of overestimated revenues,
35 mainly relating to fines and local taxes. (Napoli, CFO.)
36

37 After the crisis, as in Barletta, the reliance on such reserves became increasingly
38 unsustainable. Whereas in Barletta the opportunistic exploitation of accounting rules and
39 practices allowed the creation of budgetary flexibility for expenditure, the municipality of
40 Napoli proved to be less able to cope with shocks after the crisis, mainly relying on external
41 help and funding. It may be for this reason that Napoli also moved towards the production of
42 consolidated financial statements ^[7] with subsidiaries to have a clearer picture of the whole
43 financial condition. In Caserta, the situation appeared to be even more complex, as even before
44 the crisis, there were major cash flow difficulties due to high levels of revenues to be recovered
45 and commitments to be paid. Cash strains affected budgetary balance and sustainability,
46 thereby limited the municipality's capacity to cope with emerging difficulties. After the crisis,
47 the municipality suffered further liquidity constraints and mainly relied on external funding.
48
49

50 Our short-term objectives are substantially driven by external financing
51 opportunities, especially from the European Union (EU). The
52 municipality is currently engaged in the "PIU Europa" program, which
53 foresees a commitment of some tens of millions: this is the only EU
54 program that we will be able to implement in next three years, as the
55 co-funding required from the municipality is minimal and compatible
56 with very limited resources. Apart from this, we have no other concrete
57 forms of planning due to our financial distress... (Napoli, General
58 Secretary.)
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3 The analyses of the cases of Caserta and Napoli show that, in these contexts, internal
4 weaknesses – which become particularly visible after being affected by shocks – and the
5 inability to rely on the traditional coping capacities, made external help the only viable solution.
6 This, however, also brought constraints (i.e., compulsory measures such as the increase of
7 taxes, and changes to accounting practices that led to an enhancement of the ability to anticipate
8 shocks, as mentioned above). In sum, adaptation in these cases was mainly externally-led, i.e.,
9 municipalities were subject to external constraining forces. These externally-led approaches
10 consisted in the adoption of the above mentioned bailout procedure (in 2008 in Caserta, and
11 2012 in Napoli). Because reactions were mainly motivated by the requirements of the bailout
12 procedure, these reactions are classified as the results of *external constraints and pressures*. It
13 was as a consequence of the bailout that the municipality started to improve its financial
14 management:
15

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17 Another relevant reason that led us to the financial collapse is the very
18 strong amount of revenues to be recovered and liabilities that the
19 municipality had (over 160 million Euro, a great amount for the size of
20 our town). Therefore, the main objective, even if not formalized, is to
21 improve our capacity to recover revenues and to minimize the time
22 between revenues' assessment and recovery phases. (Caserta, General
23 Secretary.)
24
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26 27 **6. Discussion**

28
29 Compared to Ezzamel and Bourn's (1990) study that found that during a time of crisis
30 accounting was still used as an "answering machine", rather than a learning tool, our analysis
31 provides a nuanced view of the multiple practical ways in which accounting helped (or
32 hampered) anticipation of emerging shocks, as well as coping with them, ultimately shaping
33 different forms of and paths towards local government resilience. In particular, with reference
34 to anticipation, Ezzamel and Bourn (1990) found that accounting systems can act as "early
35 warning systems", providing information about the economic and social environment, and
36 increasing the "organization's decision readiness", and gain new relevance in the face of shocks
37 (see also Johansson and Siverbo, 2014; Van Der Kolk *et al.*, 2015). We show that where
38 effectively used, accounting contributed to anticipation of shocks in terms of the availability
39 and deployment of planning and control systems which ensured municipalities were in a
40 position to react promptly. Accounting emerged as central in ensuring an *ex ante* as well as a
41 continuous appraisal of potential risks and budget conditions. More detailed accounting
42 practices appeared to support anticipatory capacities by the performance of simulations to
43 forecast future revenues and expenditure; facilitating early budgetary approval; and providing
44 continuous monitoring of revenues collected, expenditure, and quantity and quality of services
45 provided. In some cases these accounting practices were accompanied by organizational
46 changes indicating new organizational arrangements, such as the centralization in one office of
47 the collection of revenues (i.e., creating a new internal unit), the creation of a spending review
48 unit, the creation of a strategic management and performance evaluation body, as well as new
49 organizational processes, such as the increased control of subsidiaries^[8]. In other cases, the
50 absence of developed monitoring and planning systems made anticipation more difficult and
51 required municipalities to resort more widely to coping mechanisms.
52
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54
55 With reference to coping with shocks, building on Barbera et al. (2017), we add to extant
56 literature that discusses notions of "coping" (Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011), "adaptation"
57 or "adaptive capacity" (Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990; Martin-Breen and Anderies, 2011;
58 McManus et al., 2007) in that our analysis allowed identification of how accounting provided
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3 municipalities with the capacity to cope with potential and actual financial shocks. Accounting
4 proved useful to coping with shocks via a mixture of short-term responses (e.g., the creation of
5 budgetary reserves, including in the budget amounts of resources to be carried over to increase
6 municipal “flexibility” on the expenditure side, or the “artificial” increase of the surplus, such
7 as one-off transactions with a subsidiary in the absence of consolidation of accounts), as well
8 as long-term responses (e.g., budget formulation as a shared process, or the improvement of
9 internal communication and information flows).
10

11 While accounting contributed to shaping anticipation and coping with shocks, the shocks
12 provided opportunities for investment in accounting systems, either strengthening or starting
13 to develop new anticipatory and coping capacities.
14

15 Our findings also show the inherent tradeoffs faced by organizations in coping with shocks.
16 On the one hand, accounting has not always warned municipalities of the potential negative
17 long-term implications of short-term choices. On the other hand, the emphasis on a narrowly
18 defined “financial resilience” (guaranteeing a balanced budget) would not necessarily imply
19 the achievement of a wider and longer-term organizational resilience (i.e., the maintenance of
20 existing quantitative and qualitative standards of services). The latter would at times be
21 guaranteed in the short term, with uncertainties regarding future sustainability.
22

23 Finally, our study shows how the paths to ensuring financial resilience were in some cases
24 the result of internal forces and stimuli, with municipalities autonomously improving their
25 accounting and control systems, whereas in other cases external pressures were needed to bring
26 about changes in accounting tools and routines in order to remedy critical budget situations. As
27 observed above, in some municipalities self-regulating capacities were already developed
28 before shocks, and were further enhanced after. In other cases, in which a re-orientation of
29 actions was necessary, some municipalities appeared more able to proactively embark on the
30 process of change than others, autonomously enhancing their capacities to anticipate and cope
31 with shocks. This was the case for internally-led adaptation in Barletta, Forlì, Lodi, and Varese,
32 mainly based on the adoption of opportunistic behaviors, external networking for the provision
33 of public services, financial slack resources, and use of budgetary reserves. Yet other
34 municipalities were found to be “awaiting” external pressures to impose a change in their
35 actions and processes from outside. Externally-led adaptation manifested in this manner in
36 Caserta and Napoli, both of which incurred bailout procedures, and so were forced to reduce
37 their use of budgetary reserves and increase their reliance on funding, and were subjected to
38 external conditions and restrictions. In these cases, where both anticipatory capacity and coping
39 capacity were low prior to shocks, dependence on external support became essential in ensuring
40 continuity in the provision of services and organizational survival, and was translated into
41 pressure to implement stronger and improved accounting systems.
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47 **7. Conclusions**

48 Responding to calls to develop a better understanding of the role of accounting under
49 conditions of austerity and crisis, this paper aimed to explore how accounting contributes to
50 the governmental capacities which are used to respond to shocks affecting public finances, and
51 more specifically to municipalities’ financial resilience. Our results show that municipalities
52 cope with financial shocks differently. Indeed, accounting can be a medium that supports self-
53 regulation, adaptation, and change in some cases, potentially ensuring maintenance of service
54 levels in the medium term. In other cases, accounting is found to be implicated in short-termism
55 or even un-resilient behaviors, with such behaviors putting at risk the long term maintenance
56 and continuity of services.
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These findings suggest a richer understanding of the roles of accounting before and after financial crises, enriching what is known from extant studies. First, we highlight that, when experiencing conditions of financial crisis, organizational responses are not uniform. Accounting may play roles that differ not only before and after shocks, but also in different contexts, depending on the extent to which an organization has, in the past, developed its capacities for anticipation and coping. In particular, we show that it may be limiting to interpret accounting under austerity as merely a constraining tool, or a tool “culpable” for bringing about cutbacks and service reductions, or, on the contrary, only as a tool which supports change and adaptation. The results provide evidence of the conditions, contexts, and processes under which accounting becomes a medium capable of supporting both anticipation and coping, being a driver of cuts in some cases, but also of long-term transformations aimed at keeping the level of public services as intact as possible. It must also be pointed out that in several cases accounting was central in processes of resisting change and transformation, aimed at keeping services intact in the short term, but with more uncertain future outcomes. This highlights the existence of different patterns of governmental financial resilience, and thus of different ways of preserving the provision of public services. Second, although we recognize that accounting may act as an answering and learning (i.e., anticipation) machine, and as an idea and dialogue machine (i.e., allowing organizations to develop the capacity to cope), we emphasize that such capacities translate differently in each organization. We identify the various ways in which organizations may cope with shocks. In addition, different tensions emerge with reference to the tradeoffs between the accounting consequences of a focus on the short and long term, and between the consequences of a focus on balancing the books and on the societal implications of service provision. Third, we highlight that crises may lead to either a reinforcement or modification of past behaviors and accounting practices; it is therefore relevant to understand the factors influencing these different outcomes.

In general terms, the study confirms that in periods of higher uncertainty, cutbacks or crisis, accounting can contribute to absorption of uncertainty and anticipation of shocks; in turn, organizations tend to improve planning (and control) mechanisms to better prepare to future unexpected events (Ezzamel and Bourn, 1990), or are forced to do so. These conclusions are also partially in line with past accounting research highlighting that budget control becomes tighter in times of turbulence or financial crisis (Johansson and Siverbo, 2014; Van Der Kolk et al., 2015), and emphasizing its constraining power (Heald and Hodges, 2015; Lapsley et al., 2015; Van der Kolk et al., 2015).

Finally, differing from extant resilience literature (for example, Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003), that tends to interpret resilience as a self-organizing capacity, the present study shows that public organizations do not necessarily respond to shocks by self-organizing, yet they may be forced to adapt by other governmental organizations, in an externally-driven process. Non-resilient behaviors can be found in the government sector, but they attract external intervention. Recent bailouts of banks have shown that this principle can be observed even in the private sector, and the principle may deserve further scholarly attention. Future research should also explore further the relationships between the financial and societal dimensions of resilience.

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Notes

¹ First-order change is labeled, in Meyer's (1982) study, as "resiliency" and implies single-loop learning. According to Meyer, adaptation involves "selective responses to feedback (Metcalf 1981) that map environmental attributes into systems capable of learning (Hedberg 1981)". Responses are based on external stimuli that are interpreted by organizations based on prevailing strategies and ideologies. An organizational response defined as first-order change, or resiliency, "occurs when responses create negative feedback loops that absorb jolts' impacts and loosen couplings between organizations and their environment" (p. 520). It is defined as "deviation-reducing" and is influenced by an organization's strategy and its slack resources.

² Second-order change defined also as "retention", "occurs when responses expose new causal relationships that then modify theories of action, augment behavioral repertoires, and alter structural configurations and slack resource stockpiles" (Meyer 1982: 520). It implies "double-loop learning" and is "deviation-amplifying" (p. 520)". According to Meyer (1982), retention is shaped by an organization's ideologies and constrained by organizational structures.

³ It is assumed, indeed, that the post-crisis period includes what Ezzamel and Bourn define as real-time, as well as post-crisis, or at least a "first time-lag" of the post-crisis period (i.e., the set of practices adopted in order to face a shock and restore, as well as to eventually build new capacities in the face of future crises). According to this interpretation, a "second time-lag" of the post-crisis period overlaps with a "new" pre-crisis phase.

⁴ The own-revenue ratio is calculated as (Tax revenues + Revenues from service fees and tariffs) / Current revenues. Current revenues consist of tax revenues, revenues from service fees and tariffs, and current grants and transfers from other public sector sources such as the central government.

⁵ Italy's unemployment rate was 12.7% in 2014, compared to an average of 7.4% across OECD countries (OECD 2015).

⁶ Building permit fees for construction of new housing are one of the largest sources of revenue for municipalities, and are used to finance investment.

⁷ In Italy, consolidation of accounts by local governments (including municipalities) and subsidiaries was not mandatory until the 2011 Italian accounting reform, which aimed to harmonize Italian government accounts. Before the consolidation requirement, the creation of subsidiaries could be considered a consequence of increasing constraints on local governments' budgets and powers, such as new borrowing ceilings and hiring freezes. The creation of subsidiaries allowed local governments to provide services through these subsidiaries, which could access new debt and employ new personnel, instead of the local government. While the latter (including municipalities) tended to display positive financial results, many of these subsidiaries were found to be particularly indebted. In 2012, the Report on the Financial Management of Local Governments produced by Corte dei Conti showed that the 7,200 municipalities analyzed owned about 5,000 subsidiaries (including enterprises, consortia, and foundations) between 2008 and 2010, of which more than one third were in deficit.

⁸ We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for allowing us to better emphasize how new organizational configurations and processes, in support for specific accounting mechanisms and tools, contributed to shape anticipatory capacities, thereby enhancing the value of our evidences.

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Tables

TABLE 1 *Municipalities' financial performance between 2000 and 2009*

Municipality	Population	Density (pop/Km ²)	Geographical position	Financial performance* (%)										Mean (%)	Volatility (Std Dev) (%)
				2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2000- 2009	2000- 2009
Barletta	94,693	645	South	28.73	5.27	12.14	27.02	9.33	17.24	19.77	19.08	43.08	39.78	22.14	12.49
Caserta	74,268	139	South	1.19	0.51	1.90	15.90	9.65	0.63	6.10	6.06	-18.74	0.09	2.33	8.96
Forli	116,029	509	North	-24.29	15.85	0.11	0.27	1.47	0.16	0.68	5.68	3.20	3.58	0.67	9.97
Lodi	43,465	1,049	North	3.92	n.a.	3.30	5.06	7.70	8.40	5.83	9.15	29.92	30.92	11.58	10.86
Modena	179,353	983	North	0.05	0.06	0.15	0.19	0.12	0.77	0.14	0.99	0.07	0.01	0.26	0.34
Napoli	959,052	8,178	South	12.99	16.70	9.33	13.53	16.58	15.99	18.20	14.11	13.27	12.09	14.28	2.62
Salerno	131,925	2,238	South	0.51	2.70	2.48	2.19	2.34	2.53	2.12	2.51	2.65	2.07	2.21	0.64
Varese	79,733	1,444	North	8.44	5.93	8.25	8.13	11.25	11.79	15.72	14.32	15.16	17.57	11.66	3.92

* Financial performance refers to the budgetary position, i.e. the normalized year-end surplus/deficit = Surplus or Deficit/ total operating revenues, with surplus/deficit = (cash + revenues to be recovered-commitments to be paid). "Acceptable" range: -3% and + 5% (see method section for further details).

TABLE 2 *The contribution of accounting to the deployment and development of organizational capacities, responses to shocks and financial performance*

Municipality	Accounting contribution to shaping pre-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Accounting contribution to shaping post-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Responses and financial performance
Barletta	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		<p style="text-align: center;">Internally driven re-orientation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absorbing shocks through the use of slacks (initially) • Decision to create a new internal structure in charge of revenues recovery • Increasing cross-unit collaboration and information exchange <p style="text-align: center;">Financial performance Average high surplus High variability over time</p>
	Low	Increasing (after 2013)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak planning and monitoring processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening of monitoring of revenues collection 	
	COPING CAPACITY		
High	High	<p style="text-align: center;">Financial performance Average high surplus High variability over time</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunistic behaviors • Use of budgetary “reserves” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunistic behaviors • Decreasing budgetary “reserves” as a consequence of increasing constraints on use of financial resources 		
ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY			
Low	Increasing (after 2010)		
Caserta	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of a long-term planning and monitoring 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Externally-driven) strengthening of planning and monitoring 	<p style="text-align: center;">Externally driven re-orientation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bailout procedure (2008) • Re-organization and creation of a special unit for the recovery of revenues • Creation of an internal body in charge of strategic management and performance evaluation • Costs reduction • Payment of debts and salaries • Rent increase • Disposal of assets • Implementation of programs funded by the EU <p style="text-align: center;">Financial performance Average low surplus High variability over time</p>
	COPING CAPACITY		
	Low	Low (after 2008)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash tensions deriving from high revenues to be recovered and high commitments to be paid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liquidity constraints • Use of external resources as they become available, e.g. European funds (but subjected to external constraints) 	
Forlì	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		Internally driven re-orientation

Municipality	Accounting contribution to shaping pre-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Accounting contribution to shaping post-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Responses and financial performance
	<p style="text-align: center;">Low</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak planning • Rhetoric of control 	<p style="text-align: center;">Increasing (after 2008)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening of control of revenues collection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvement of revenues recovery • Equity divestment • End of borrowing and identification of external resources in order to finance investments • Decision to create PPPs <p style="text-align: center;">Financial performance Average low surplus High variability over time</p>
	COPING CAPACITY		
	<p style="text-align: center;">Low</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reliance on external conditions and funding (i.e., use of external resources as they become available) 	<p style="text-align: center;">Increasing (after 2012)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater emphasis on the relevance of external relationships (networking with external stakeholders seen as a solution to gain access to alternative resources) 	
Lodi	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		<p style="text-align: center;">Internally driven re-orientation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of slack resources (one-off transactions with the subsidiary company) • Reduction of operating costs (e.g., decrease of transfers to nonprofits, of stationery costs, of electricity costs) • Investments' reduction • Decision to create PPPs to gain access to alternative and new resources <p style="text-align: center;">Financial performance Average high surplus High variability over time</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;">Low</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak planning and control processes 	<p style="text-align: center;">Increasing (after 2011)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening of control of revenues collection and of balanced budget 	
	COPING CAPACITY		
<p style="text-align: center;">High</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunistic behaviors 	<p style="text-align: center;">High</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opportunistic behaviors • Financial slack resources • Greater emphasis on the relevance of external relationships (networking with external stakeholders) 		
Modena	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		<p style="text-align: center;">Consolidation of extant behaviors</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Priorities identification • Cuts and expenditure rationalization • Increasing control on subsidiaries • Increase of revenues (e.g., fees, rents, fight against tax
	<p style="text-align: center;">High</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early identification of risks • Strong planning, monitoring and control processes (e.g., simulations, re-budgeting) 	<p style="text-align: center;">High</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Early identification of risks • Strong planning and control processes (e.g., simulations, re-budgeting) 	

Municipality	Accounting contribution to shaping pre-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Accounting contribution to shaping post-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Responses and financial performance
	COPING CAPACITY		evasion) • Investments reduction (expenditures mainly oriented towards maintenance) • Continuous adoption of virtuous behaviors (e.g., ensuring balanced budgets, high degree of revenues collection) Financial performance Average low surplus Low variability over time
	High • Creation of “reserves” through a prudent approach to expenditure forecast • External networking (stakeholder’s inclusion) • Internal cohesion and collaboration	High • Creation of “reserves” through a prudent approach to expenditure forecast • External networking (stakeholder’s inclusion) • Internal cohesion and collaboration	
Napoli	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		Externally driven re-orientation • Bailout procedure adopted in 2012 • Absorbing shocks through the use of slacks (initially) • Improving the capacity to collect revenues • Increasing revenues (e.g., from fees and tariffs) • Spending review • Moving towards a consolidated financial statement with subsidiaries • Disposal of assets and improving management of heritage Financial performance Average high surplus Low variability over time
	Low • Weak planning and monitoring processes	Increasing (after 2011) • Stronger awareness about the relevance of planning • Strengthening of control processes and revenues collection	
	COPING CAPACITY		
	High • Use of budgetary “reserves”	Decreasing (after 2011) • Reducing budgetary “reserves” • Reliance on external conditions and funding	
Salerno	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		Consolidation of extant behaviors • Increase of revenues (e.g., fight against tax evasion) • Equity divestment Disposal of assets Financial performance Average low surplus
	High • Strong planning, monitoring and control processes	High • Strong planning, monitoring and control processes	
	COPING CAPACITY		
	High • Attraction of third parties’ resources	High • Attraction of third parties’ resources	

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Municipality	Accounting contribution to shaping pre-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Accounting contribution to shaping post-shock organizational capacities and conditions	Responses and financial performance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External networking (PPPs) Internal cohesion and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External networking (PPPs) Internal cohesion and collaboration 	Low variability over time
Varese	ANTICIPATORY CAPACITY		<p style="text-align: center;">Internally driven re-orientation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Freezing of expenditures Improvement of management control systems (e.g., through the creation of a spending review unit) Internal re-organization (e.g., merge of units) Disposal of assets <p style="text-align: center;">Financial performance Average high surplus Low variability over time</p>
	Low	Increasing (after 2012)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak planning and control processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthening of monitoring and control 	
	COPING CAPACITY		
High	High		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of budgetary “reserves” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use of budgetary “reserves” 		

APPENDIX 1 *The role of accounting in shaping anticipatory and coping capacities to respond to shocks*

Dimension	Operationalization in terms of accounting practices	Examples of interview quotes
Anticipatory capacity	Long-term planning and control	<p><i>“We do simulations based on the limited data we have, in order to keep the budget manageable.”</i> (Modena)</p> <p><i>“We do not have [...] an office for management control; however, we will have to create it as a result of the new Decree. The problem is staff availability.”</i> (Lodi)</p>
Coping capacity	Use of budgetary “reserves”	<p><i>“No one takes the responsibility to cancel from the accounts those revenues that definitely the Municipality will not be able to recover. It is easier to leave them within the budget.”</i> (Varese)</p> <p><i>“The budget surplus target imposed by the central government is a likely reason [for high performance volatility], in particular the impossibility of using the surplus, which in our case is high, to pay for public works. Besides, [...] the surplus is affected by important amounts of capital revenues to be recovered due to pending legal disputes and for [...] the lack of recovery of taxes on building permits due to the crisis.”</i> (Barletta)</p>
	Opportunistic behaviors based on catching emerging solutions aimed at balancing the budget on a day-by-day basis	<p><i>“Currently it is difficult to have long-term goals. The economic aspects, the legislation, the limits imposed [on Municipalities] hardly allow [them] to make long-term projections.”</i> (Lodi)</p> <p><i>“[...] there is no medium-term planning but, conversely, we play it by ear. [...] priority is given to catching opportunities, in order to get immediate advantages within the political mandate.”</i> (Barletta)</p>
	Networking and partnership with external stakeholders to attract external resources	<p><i>“Our idea is to create public-private partnerships.”</i> (Forli)</p> <p><i>“One of the alternatives we found is to access to private capital: we have mixed finance projects, also of considerable magnitude.”</i> (Salerno)</p>
	Strengthening of internal cohesion (increase of internal communication and information flow)	<p><i>“We try to (...) ensure that everyone plays his or her role. (...) the cohesion of the Board is relevant, and it is oriented towards achieving goals.”</i> (Modena)</p> <p><i>“The role of the Mayor is essential, he is a particularly dynamic person and he instils passion to his team, while sharing responsibilities with them.”</i> (Salerno)</p>

APPENDIX 2 Trends of operating and capital expenditure¹

2a – Per-capita operating expenditure trend (commitment basis, 2001-2012)*

Municipality	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008-2012
VARESE	890	911	954	970	875	857	950	969	966	1,172	1,178	1,141	17.74%
MODENA	1,123	1,010	1,071	1,139	1,168	1,034	1,081	1,131	1,155	1,159	1,145	1,088	-3.83%
FORLÌ	705	718	730	755	774	701	758	758	795	785	769	761	0.40%
CASERTA	749	858	848	870	912	923	1,026	1,012	965	931	970	937	-7.32%
NAPOLI	1,180	1,162	1,125	1,204	1,291	1,248	1,480	1,390	1,446	1,340	1,252	1,198	-13.76%
SALERNO	935	970	961	1,014	1,053	1,054	1,133	1,259	1,332	1,387	1,307	1,294	2.75%
LODI	731	738	805	834	845	992	962	1,077	1,038	1,072	1,042	1,002	-7.00%
BARLETTA	483	522	487	518	559	500	570	526	610	618	595	554	5.38%

2b – Variation of operating expenditure across main municipal services (commitment basis, 2008-2012)

Municipality	LOCAL POLICE	EDUCATION	CULTURE	YOUTH, SPORT AND LEISURE	TRANSPORT AND MOBILITY	SOCIAL SERVICES
VARESE	11.70%	5.58%	-4.69%	-3.19%	14.68%	-0.48%
MODENA	5.81%	-5.67%	-12.07%	-13.96%	3.59%	3.71%
FORLÌ	19.36%	4.45%	-19.08%	-26.59%	29.52%	4.66%
CASERTA	-9.88%	-21.17%	-74.48%	-14.15%	8.38%	-33.42%
NAPOLI	-5.05%	-38.14%	-45.20%	-24.86%	-15.71%	-21.62%
SALERNO	-5.72%	-10.01%	-13.69%	10.03%	35.65%	1.62%
LODI	18.87%	4.23%	2.33%	-29.29%	11.65%	-12.69%
BARLETTA	2.52%	-2.47%	7.23%	-21.89%	39.00%	40.70%

¹ Data were retrieved from Aida PA database and elaborated by the authors. Accessed between April and May 2018, when data were only available since 2001.

2c – *Per-capita capital expenditure trend (cash basis, 2001-2012)*

Municipality	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2008-2012
VARESE	222	175	214	171	166	152	115	303	104	80	94	109	-64%
MODENA	211	246	494	528	516	381	337	335	379	228	148	154	-54%
FORLÌ	495	380	432	709	913	917	1,187	1,526	1,782	724	435	369	-76%
CASERTA	326	385	306	319	411	448	534	511	535	157	158	68	-87%
NAPOLI	327	193	441	419	334	408	507	376	427	364	307	327	-13%
SALERNO	326	282	264	278	344	287	320	542	419	449	523	495	-9%
LODI	138	188	200	246	233	190	245	620	211	315	207	165	-73%
BARLETTA	110	122	100	192	115	160	258	314	266	165	106	94	-70%

2d – Composition of fiscal adjustment related to the Domestic Stability Pact (2008-2012)

	Composition of fiscal adjustment								
	Year	Fiscal deficit	Variation	Current revenue	Variation	Current expenditure	Variation	Capital expenditure	Variation
VARESE	2008	-279	-69%	993	+17%	969	+18%	303	-64%
	2012	-88		1,162		1,141		109	
	Var.	-191		+170		+172		-193	
MODENA	2008	-344	-82%	1,122	+5%	1,131	-4%	335	-54%
	2012	-62		1,180		1,088		154	
	Var.	-282		+58		-43		-181	
FORLI	2008	-1,407	-81%	877	-2%	758	0%	1,526	-76%
	2012	-267		862		761		369	
	Var.	-1,140		-14		+3		-1,157	
CASERTA	2008	-446	-130%	1,077	+6%	1,012	-7%	511	-87%
	2012	133		1,138		937		68	
	Var.	-578		+61		-74		-443	
NAPOLI	2008	-303	-32%	1,462	-10%	1,390	-14%	376	-13%
	2012	-207		1,318		1,198		327	
	Var.	-96		-144		-191		-49	
SALERNO	2008	-558	-45%	1,243	+19%	1,259	+3%	542	-9%
	2012	-305		1,485		1,294		495	
	Var.	-253		+241		+35		-47	
LODI	2008	-666	-80%	1,031	0%	1,077	-7%	620	-73%
	2012	-131		1,036		1,002		165	
	Var.	-534		+5		-75		-454	
BARLETTA	2008	-248	-71%	592	-3%	526	+5%	314	-70%
	2012	-72		576		554		94	
	Var.	-176		-16		+28		-220	

Note: According to Italian DSP budget rules, the fiscal deficit is calculated as: current revenue – current expenditure – capital expenditure