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Welfare and social protection: What is the link with secondary migration? Evidence from the 2014-crisis hit Italian region of Lombardy

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Abstract

Evidence on the relationship between secondary international migration and welfare state (or formal protection) support is currently limited. Also, the experience of financial support from semiformal and informal social protection networks has seen limited inclusion in current reflections on secondary mobility patterns such as onward and return migration. Our study analyses the relationship between support from formal, informal and semiformal social protection and short-term secondary migration intentions. The study uses open-access data from the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multiethnicity of Lombardy (Italy) and adopts a competing-risk framework through multinomial logistic regression. Our data do not support the hypothesis of an ex-post "magnetic effect" of the Italian formal social protection on its beneficiaries: individuals on formal welfare are more prone to onward and return migration. However, the positive relationship observed between welfare entitlements and onward migration intentions cannot rule out any effect of welfare magnetism from more generous welfare systems. Monetary aid received from Italian friends is negatively related to return intention. At the same time, economic support from foreign-born friends is correlated to return migration. We interpret results according to social network theory. Economic support and social capital from bridging networks can act as an ex-post integration-driven magnet. Bonding social capital from ties with migrants in Italy cannot secure the migrants' stay in Italy. However, it can support return migration. Networks providing bonding transnational social capital, and expressed in the form of financial support from relatives living abroad, are instead positively correlated to both forms of secondary migration.

KEYWORDS
Italy, onward migration, return migration, social networks, welfare

1 | INTRODUCTION

In a seminal paper published in 1999 referring to the US context, George Borjas suggested that welfare generosity could act as a "magnet" for migration, influencing the intensity and composition of flows, and immigrants' residential choices (Borjas, 1999; Razin & Wahba, 2015). After more than two decades and extensive research in different contexts, the empirical evidence on the "welfare magnet

hypothesis" is somewhat mixed. Some studies reject this hypothesis; others, however, document the existence of a moderate welfare magnet effect for selected subpopulations of immigrants (see Barret & McCarthy, 2008; Brueckner, 2000; Jakubiak, 2017, 2019, for detailed discussions of the state of the art over the years). Moreover, research suggests a distinction between the ex-ante (i.e., before migration) and ex-post (i.e., after migration) effect of social protection on mobility (Andersen & Migali, 2016). De Jong and de Valk (2020) have recently highlighted that the welfare state's relevance to migrants changes after migration and may play a more critical role in the secondary migration decision-making compared with the first migration. Accordingly, after the migration, the destination context can be perceived—and should be analysed—as a new potential origin context.

Ex-post welfare magnetism becomes potentially relevant in the context of growing complexity of contemporary mobility patterns and increasing relevance of return and onward migration (Bonifazi & Paparusso, 2018; Castles et al., 2014; Jeffery & Murison, 2011; Monti, 2019). However, limited research exists on the relationship between these forms of secondary migration and social protection systems in migrants' first settlement countries.

Italy is a relevant case study in terms of ex-post social protection magnetism given its relatively recent experience as an immigration country (Colombo & Dalla Zuanna, 2019) and its familistic welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1999). As in other Mediterranean countries, the Italian welfare protection system relies strongly on families, with most support being provided in the form of income transfers (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Social expenditure is heavily concentrated on old-age pensions, a type of benefit that is minimally redistributive (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002) and absorbs nearly 60% of the total resources (Barrett et al., 2013). Italy allocates only a small share of its gross domestic product (GDP) to provision valuable and attractive to young migrant populations, such as social insurance support (e.g., cash transfers, food aid, housing subsidies, education fee waivers) or social assistance schemes (e.g., contributions-based unemployment or maternity benefits). It does not qualify, as a consequence, as an ex-ante welfare magnet to international migrants. However, due to labour market openings to unskilled workers (Colombo & Dalla Zuanna, 2019), a sizable number of migrants have settled permanently in Italy, formed new families or applied for family reunification (Ambrosini, 2013). The concentration of migrants in low-paid and low-skilled jobs has resulted in an overrepresentation of foreign-born individuals among the population below the poverty line (ISTAT, 2020) and a growing number of migrants eligible for the (limited) Italian welfare benefits. The recent 2008 economic crisis increased the need for welfare support. High rates of unemployment led to a growing number of migrants qualifying for social protection. At the same time, many migrants opted for onward or return migration as a coping strategy to deal with financial difficulties (Dubow et al., 2019; Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018), a trend also observed in other Southern European countries (Mas Giralt, 2017; Prieto-Rosas et al., 2019; Ramos, 2018).

In this framework, forms of ex-post welfare magnetism towards beneficiaries of formal social protection may arise. Despite limited

provision, are individuals on welfare more inclined to remain in Italy compared with other migrants? This issue is by no means trivial, given that recently some anti-immigration rhetoric has also been built on the competition with low-income native Italians over the limited social protection resources (e.g., social housing).

Formal social protection in Italy is heavily bound to eligibility (European Commission, 2018). Among eligible migrants, long-term stayers with children are overrepresented whereas some individuals in the most vulnerable categories are excluded (e.g., irregular migrants; Giulietti, 2014). The mismatch between eligible and vulnerable individuals in modern societies is a complex phenomenon that arises from the growing discrepancy between new social risks and welfare states designed after World War II to address risks primarily related to the male breadwinner's unemployment (Zimmermann, 2017). The mismatch between eligibility and vulnerability is even more relevant for migrants who may, as a coping strategy, rely on alternative—and less studied—forms of support.

The focus on the destination countries' national welfare systems as the predominant social protection provider to migrants has repeatedly missed the role of other forms of protection (Godin, 2020) provided from faith-based or nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and informal social networks. The latter cannot be overlooked in a comprehensive reflection about the relationship between social protection and secondary migration being highly relevant to migrants and closely intertwined with formal welfare protection (Sabates-Wheeler & Waite, 2003; Serra-Mingot & Mazzucato, 2017).

Given this framework, we focus on ex-post social protection magnetism on foreign-born migrants[1] living in Lombardy (Italy). More in detail, we discuss the relationship between the experience of social protection support and short-term (i.e., in the 12 months following the interview) onward (international migration to a third country different from the country of birth) and return (to the country of birth) migration intentions. We consider social protection support received in the year before the survey from the welfare state (formal social protection), NGOs or similar organisations (semiformal social protection), and social networks of native and foreign-born friends and acquaintances (informal social protection). Although being aware that informal social protection provides much larger support than merely filling gaps in formal social protection schemes (Serra-Mingot & Mazzucato, 2019), we address informal social protection from a financial perspective.[2] Moreover, as suggested by theoretical considerations from Bilecen and Barglowski (2015) and Serra-Mingot and Mazzucato (2017), we consider the transnational dimension of migrants' informal support networks.

Our paper addresses the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1) *Formal welfare magnetism*: *deterrence against secondary movements*—Are formal social protection recipients less likely to declare short-term onward or return migration intention than other migrants? RQ2) *Informal and semiformal social protection network magnetism*— (a) Are recipients of financial support from semiformal and informal social protection networks less likely to declare short-term onward or return migration intention than other migrants? (b) Are there

differences according to the type of informal network (foreign, native and transnational providers) providing support?

To answer these RQs, we build on data collected by the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multiethnicity in the Northern Italian region of Lombardy (ORIM). Researchers repeatedly used ORIM surveys to provide ground-breaking evidence on migration when nationwide survey data were unavailable (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2017; Fasani, 2015). For our analysis, we use the 2014 survey that involved 4000 individuals with a migrant background and collected information on formal protection benefits and economic support from semiformal and informal networks.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents previous studies that analysed the welfare magnetism effect on migrants' secondary migration movements; Section 3 expands the discussion to the role of financial support from semiformal and informal social protection networks, formulating some hypotheses when previous studies are not available. Section 4 provides evidence on the rising importance of secondary migration among migrants in Italy and Lombardy, and background information about the region. Section 5 describes the data and methods. Finally, we present the results in Section 6 and discuss them in Section 7. Additional details about ORIM survey data and control variables are provided in Appendix A.

2 | WELFARE MAGNETISM AND SECONDARY MIGRATION

The "welfare magnet hypothesis" postulates that individuals make migration choices based on formal social protection available in the destination area to insure themselves against unemployment and financial difficulties.[3] Immigrants are expected cluster in countries and regions within countries where welfare provision is most generous and accessible (Borjas, 1999). Therefore, an open and generous welfare system could boost immigration and, at the same time, disproportionately attract migrants with limited expected income.

Welfare magnetism may also affect secondary migration by deterring the mobility of individuals who, without social protection, might be more inclined to return to their country of origin or migrate onward.[4] Moreover, the relevance of welfare to migrants is expected to change over the life course (e.g., after childbirth or regularisation) and could factor differently into the first and secondary migration decision making (De Jong & de Valk, 2020). While the link between openness and generosity of welfare states and first migration has been repeatedly investigated, research on the relationship with secondary international migration is scarce and mostly based on observed migration rather than intentions.

2.1 | Welfare magnetism and return migration

Reagan and Olsen (2000), using US longitudinal data on residential histories and focusing on generation 1.5 immigrants (i.e., individuals who immigrate to a new country before or during their early teens), found that welfare programme participation negatively impacted on the immigrants' likelihood of returning. Giulietti, in his 2014 review of evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis, observed that "there is virtually no evidence on the interactions between return migration and welfare dependency," and he acknowledged that this relationship "represents a potential avenue for future research" (Giulietti, 2014, p. 9).

Most evidence in the European context analyses patterns of EU citizens. Bratsberg et al.'s (2014) study on individual longitudinal data of post-EU accession Eastern European labour migrants to Norway found that the 2008 financial crisis increased return migration. However, the majority of labour migrants remained in Norway claiming unemployment benefits. Andersen and Migali (2016) focused on the link between unemployment benefits and return migration. Their analysis of EU28 migrants living in former EU15 member states, Norway and Switzerland, concluded that the stay or return migration decision is more sensitive to welfare generosity than the first migration decision. Accordingly, relatively "low"[5] unemployment benefits in the country of settlement do not curb return migration, and most migrants return home if they become unemployed. "Sufficiently high benefit levels" result in return migration only for migrants with low migration costs, whereas others tend to stay. More recently, Dubow et al. (2019) studied EU migrants settled in Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, combining in-depth focus groups, interviews and survey data within the H2020 Reminder project framework. Their research confirmed previous evidence that higher quality social security and public services in the origin country is an essential determinant of return movements for migrants from Sweden and Germany. This finding is consistent with De Jong and de Valk's (2020) claim that the welfare system of the country of origin is also crucial in shaping migrants' return decisions.

2.2 | Welfare magnetism and onward migration

Social provision and openness to migrants vary significantly from country to country, even among developed countries where welfare programmes are well established (Giulietti, 2014). Therefore, better social protection or easier access may act as attraction factors for would-be onward migrants located in first immigration countries characterised by limited welfare provision such as Southern European countries. Migrants who have already borne the "fixed cost" of leaving their home country may be more likely than natives to relocate to states where they may receive more and better benefits or qualify as beneficiaries while currently excluded. Existing studies suggested that generosity, and especially openness, of the welfare states factor into the decision-making of migrants at the extreme end of the social ladder, potentially attracting both the most vulnerable and the most privileged. Research has recurrently underlined the relevance of welfare state generosity to asylum seekers and refugees (Long & Sabates-Wheeler, 2017). Brekke and Brochmann (2014) found that Eritrean asylum seekers in Italy aspired to migrate onwards to Norway or

Sweden because of more generous reception and welfare standards. Dubow et al. (2019), in the previously mentioned study, found that more favourable welfare entitlements were the main reason for the intra-EU onward movement of refugees mainly from Greece to Germany. At the same time, welfare generosity also attracted highly skilled migrants whose international work opportunities provide them with the possibility to choose carefully between different potential destination countries (Dubow et al., 2019).

In the European context, the right to free movement granted by naturalisation, EU citizenship and denizenship/long-term migrant status (Zhang, 2014) may enhance welfare magnetism-driven onward migration. The currently available evidence is mixed, suggesting the existence of group-specific patterns. According to Della Puppa and King (2019), an idealised representation of the British welfare state, reproduced through migratory networks, was a concrete guide for onward mobility trajectories to the United Kingdom of naturalised Italian families with a Bangladeshi background. Serra-Mingot and Mazzucato (2019), drawing on the life stories of members of Sudanese transnational families in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sudan, suggest that migrants based their remigration choices on the availability and quality of selected resources (e.g., healthcare, education or specific medical treatments) rather than on overall welfare generosity. De Hoon et al. (2020) found that receiving social protection is generally negatively associated with the onward migration of asylum seekers based in the Netherlands. However, once Dutch citizenship is acquired, former asylum seekers on welfare capitalise their newly acquired right to mobility, to migrate again more often than their counterparts within the Dutch labour market. Re-emigration of former refugees from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom after naturalisation is a common outcome that seems to contradict ex-post welfare magnetism. According to Serra-Mignot and Mazzuccato, (2019, p. 140), this choice, "from a social protection perspective […] seems to be paradoxical at best."

3 | FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM FORMAL, INFORMAL AND SEMIFORMAL SOCIAL PROTECTION: WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ONWARD AND RETURN MIGRATION?

3.1 | Defining formal, informal and semiformal social protection

According to Serra-Mingot and Mazzucato (2017), social protection can be distinguished as formal, informal and semiformal provision. Formal social protection is provided according to the eligibility criteria of public institutes and entities. By definition, eligibility criteria exclude part of the population, especially newly arrived and undocumented migrants (Fernandes, 2016; IDOS, 2014) who are potentially among the most vulnerable. Due to the mismatch between eligibility and vulnerability among migrants, other forms of support fill the protection gap by providing aid without requirements.

A relevant form of assistance is the semiformal social protection, usually provided by faith-based organisations, NGOs and private institutions to meet specific needs, vulnerabilities and risks. Examples of services more commonly provided include occasional monetary aid, food parcels, clothes, blankets, medicine, free medical care, legal and social advice (Serra-Mingot & Mazzucato, 2017).

Although receiving financial support from semiformal entities, such as private institutions or NGOs, is not an expression of belonging to networks, we can make different considerations for financial support from social networks (or informal social protection). Informal social protection is a vital form of support to migrants provided by family, community or social networks based on collective norms and belonging. It includes a complexity of factors such as financial support, care relations, exchange of information, interpersonal and transnational ties involving family, kinship, friendship and community as actors providing social support (Bilecen & Sienkiewicz, 2015; Serra-Mingot & Mazzucato, 2017). As well-established, social networks provide access to different resources depending on the network type (for detailed discussions of the state of the art, see Bankston, 2014). The family and community are closed networks with dense ties and deep trust based on solidarity, usually defined as "bonding social capital"; an ambivalent cohesive mechanism providing help to co-ethnics but sometimes preventing access to the host country resources (Bankston, 2014; Lancee, 2012). Monetary aid received from foreign-born friends and acquaintances is a strong expression of bonding social capital.[6]

Networks established with natives are instead considered "bridging social capital" because they grant access to new and valuable social capital that extends beyond the community, thus connecting migrants with natives (e.g., Bankston, 2014; McLellan, 2009). Financial support from Italian friends and acquaintances is a strong expression of access to bridging social capital and ties to the country of immigration.

3.2 | Financial support from semiformal and informal social protection and secondary migration. An underresearched link

There is scant evidence on the relationship between financial support from semiformal and informal social protection and secondary migration. Few recent studies focus on the role of occasional financial help from the transnational family network and friends in curbing economic hardship driving return migration. This form of support usually aims to assist migrants at the beginning of their stay or address unexpected financial needs reflecting reciprocal provision and the actors' interdependence (Palash & Baby-Collin, 2019; Singh & Gatina, 2015).

The relationship between secondary migration and financial support from informal social protection networks is particularly interesting due to their bridging and bonding nature. The bridging social capital, like formal and semiformal social protection, is highly location specific and minimally transferrable; it is expected to act (mostly) as a magnet by deterring emigration due to its positive impact on

integration. The transnational structure of networks providing bonding social capital entails a more complex relationship with secondary mobility. Transnational networks may potentially offer support in the country of origin, destination and in third countries where members are settled, and also before, during and after migration (Godin, 2020). Recent research showed how, during the 2008 financial crisis, long-settled economic migrants from Ecuador living in Spain and United Kingdom relied on financial support from their relatives in their origin country to avoid return migration, a scenario "barely imaginable a few years ago" (Palash & Baby-Collin, 2019, p. 3). Reversing the traditional remittances flows, support from families in the origin country became an insurance policy to avoid secondary migration. At the same time, monetary support from transnational networks helps (especially vulnerable) individuals to relocate where members live (Łukaszewska-Bezulska, 2020) possibly resulting in either a magnetic effect or secondary migration in the form of onward or return migration.

4 | ITALY, LOMBARDY AND SECONDARY MIGRATION: RECENT TRENDS

The Italian migrant population recently entered a new phase characterised by the prevalence of long-term migrants and growing naturalisations (Blangiardo, 2018). These legal statuses grant broader mobility rights, driving secondary migration (Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018). The number of foreign-born individuals who have left Italy has recently increased, and their emigration rate rose by 53% between 2009 and 2018 (Figure 1).

Our study focuses on Lombardy (NUTS 32 code ITC4). This region, especially the area of Milan, is one of the wealthiest in Europe (Eurostat, 2020b). It is the most densely populated area and hosts about a quarter of Italy's foreign-born population. Within the framework of substantial territorial differences and fragmentation of the Italian welfare provision (Barrett et al., 2013), Lombardy has one of

the most comprehensive and generous welfare provision compared to other Italian regions (Carradore, 2014). These elements, and the availability of updated and detailed survey data on welfare provision—currently unavailable at the national level—make Lombardy a relevant case study. ORIM surveys provide the possibility to analyse a 10-year set of cross-sectional data on self-declared short-term emigration intentions, distinguishing between the intention of onward migration and return to the country of birth. Short-term secondary migration intentions among foreign-born migrants reached the highest level in 2014 (17.1%) and reduced in the following years (Figure 2). Our analysis is based on the 2014 data, therefore referring to the moment when secondary migration intentions among first-generation migrants peaked in Lombardy due to the crisis. We discuss the implications of this period's effects in the concluding section.

The global economic crisis played an essential role in shaping national and regional emigration trends. In Italy, GDP fell dramatically between 2008 and 2013, and the economy subsequently struggled to recover fully (Colombo & Dalla Zuanna, 2019). In Northern Italy, the employment rate for foreign-born men declined by 14 percentage points, whereas the unemployment rate increased by 10 percentage points between 2008 and 2013. The situation was similar for foreign-born women but less critical (Dalla Zuanna & Giraldo, 2017). Recent literature suggests that secondary migration in southern European countries, and especially onward migration, was a coping strategy to deal with the effects of the crisis (Mas Giralt, 2017; Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2012). This led to a worsening of the migrants' situation, increasing both need and dependence on the various types of formal, informal and semiformal social protection.

5 | DATA AND METHODS

Since 2001, the Regional Observatory for Integration and Multiethnicity (ORIM) has carried out annual, cross-sectional, face-to-face

FIGURE 1 Foreign-born emigrants and foreign-born emigration rates from Italy 2009–2018

Source: authors' elaboration of Eurostat (2020a) data online. Data code: migr_pop4ctb & and migr_emi4ctb.

Note: foreign-born emigration rate is the number of foreign-born emigrants per 1,000 foreign-born residents (average population over the year).

FIGURE 2 Short-term secondary migration intentions among the first-generation migrant population (percentages). Lombardy (Italy) 2010–2019

Source: authors' elaboration of ORIM data for 2010-2019.

retrospective multipurpose surveys on international migrants living in the region of Lombardy. ORIM surveys collect information on demographic, social, and economic events, as well as interviewees' opinions, values and attitudes (Open Data Regione Lombardia, 2014).[7] All ORIM surveys use the Centre Sampling technique (Baio et al., 2011; see Appendix A for more details) to guarantee representativeness at the regional level and the inclusion of undocumented and naturalised migrants. Interviews are performed face-to-face (PAPI) by interviewers with a foreign background, most of them cultural-linguistic mediators, who have undergone specific training. The target population of ORIM surveys—hereafter "primary originating countries"—includes all migrants except citizens from high-income countries (i.e., EFTA and former EU15 countries, Malta, Cyprus, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan). The full list of target countries is given in Appendix A.3. From 2021, all ORIM survey metadata in English will be accessible through the Ethnic and Migrant Minorities (EMM) Survey Registry, the database of European quantitative surveys on migrants developed within the framework of the ETHMIGSURVEYDATA COST action project (Morales et al., 2020; see Appendix A for documentation).

Our study analysed the 2014 survey due to its specific focus on formal, semiformal and informal social protection. Data, questionnaires and metadata are available in Italian through the Lombardy Open Data site (Open Data Regione Lombardia, 2020). The 2014 survey involved 4000 migrants. Our analysis excluded interviewees still living with their parents and second-generation migrants from the original sample. The final subsample was composed of 3568 subjects: 91.5% of the original sample. Henceforth, the analyses and results relate only to this subsample.

5.1 | Variables

Table 1 describes the variables used in the model. Following the literature previously discussed, we considered support from formal, semiformal and informal social protection.

The dependent variable, expressing self-reported mobility intentions for the 12 months following the survey, has three categories: "Intention to remain in Italy" (reference category), "Intention to return to the country of origin" and "Intention to migrate onward to a third country."[8] The assumption that the respondent's intention to leave Italy in the 12 months following the survey is a reliable proxy of re-emigration is crucial in order to analyse the relationship with onward and return migration. There is broad agreement about the value of intentions to study re-emigration,[9] although they may overestimate the scale of mobility (Boeri et al., 2002). Carling and Pettersen (2014) argued against scepticism in using future relocation intentions, emphasising that these are a necessary—but not sufficient—criterion for action, implying that actual movers will be among the people who intend to return or to re-emigrate.

Moreover, the use of a short, well-defined, fixed term to define the timing of mobility reduces the discrepancy between intention and behaviour, helping us to identify real future emigrants and freeing intentions from other normative dimensions such as the sense of belonging or the myth of return (Carling, 2015).

5.2 | Methods

We used multinomial stepwise logistic regression (Long & Freese, 2014) to model migration intention[10] (see Appendix A to see partial models and covariates) due to our dependent variable having three categories and the need, unanimously recognised by scholars, to analyse onward and return migration data in a competing-risk framework (Barbiano di Belgiojoso & Ortensi, 2013; DaVanzo, 1976; Toma & Castagnone, 2015).

To implement the competing-risk framework, we tested the independence of the irrelevant alternatives assumption that allows us to check that the introduction of another alternative does not change the preferred option.[11] For example, if "Stay" is preferred to "Onward" in the choice between "Stay" and "Onward," introducing the alternative "Return" must not make "Onward" preferable to

TABLE 1 Description of all variables used in the analysis

Type of variable	Label of the variable	Measure	Category (reference)
Dependent	Short-term migration intention	Short-term (i.e., the 12 months after the survey) migration intention	Stay (reference); Onward (migration to a third country); Return to the country of birth
Independent	Formal social provision	Monetary aid received from semiformal organisations includes: - Provision for low-income families provided by public institutions such as municipality and region; - Job-related provision (unemployment and illness); - Housing subsidies and access to public housing	No (reference); Yes
	Semiformal social provision	Monetary aid received by faith-based organisations, private institutions, or the social-private sector in the 12 months before the interview	No (reference); Yes
	Informal provision from transnational bonding social networks (TBO)	Monetary aid received from relatives who live abroad	No (reference); Yes
	Informal provision from bonding social networks (BO)	Monetary aid received from foreign-born friends and acquaintances	No (reference); Yes
	Informal provision from bridging social capital (BR)	Monetary aid received from Italian friends and acquaintances	No (reference); Yes
Socio-demographic Control	Gender	Gender	Male (reference); Female
	Educational level	Educational level	None or elementary (reference); Secondary and tertiary
	Cohabitant children	Presence of cohabitant children	No (reference); Yes
	Currently in a relationship with a partner living in Italy	The migrant has a partner in Italy	No (reference); Yes
	Country or area of origin[a]	Country or area of origin	Albania; Romania; Other East European countries; North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan; China; Other Asian countries; Latin America
Economic condition of the family Control	Employment condition of the family	Employment condition of the family	[If the respondent is single] Stable employment (reference); Precarious or irregular employment; No-income [If the respondent lives in a couple] Both partners stable employment (reference); One stable employment and one precarious/irregular employment/inactive; One-income couple with stable employment; Precarious or irregular employment (both partners); One-income couple with precarious employment; No-income (both partners).
	Remittances	The family sent remittances to the home country in the previous 12 months	No (reference); Yes
Migration-related characteristics Control	Length of stay in Italy	(in single years)	
	Legal status	Legal status	Dual citizenship, EU citizenship or EC residence permit for long-term residents (reference); Limited residence permit or waiting for a

(Continues)

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Type of variable	Label of the variable	Measure	Category (reference)
			decision concerning asylum or regularisation; Undocumented; Does not answer
	Previous migration	Previous internal mobility in Italy	No (reference); Yes

[a]In Table 4, only we used a more detailed classification of the area of origin to provide a more thorough descriptive analysis: Albania, Romania, Ukraine, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, Latin American countries, Other East European countries, Other African countries, Other Asian countries.

TABLE 2 Sample characteristics by social provision received in the 12 months before the survey

variable	Categories	Type of welfare provisions					
		None	Only formal	Only informal	Only semiformal	All provision	Total sample
Sex	Male	55.0	46.2	48.2	52.0	37.0	52.3
	Female	45.0	53.8	51.9	48.0	63.0	47.7
Previous internal mobility	No	79.1	76.7	77.1	76.4	58.8	77.9
	Yes	20.9	23.3	22.9	23.6	41.2	22.1
Cohabitant children	No	51.9	18.9	57.4	42.8	24.6	45.9
	Yes	48.1	81.1	42.6	57.2	75.4	54.1
Currently in a relationship with a partner living in Italy	Yes	71.6	71.6	81.7	60.8	75.2	85.4
	No	28.4	28.4	18.3	39.2	24.8	14.6
Educational level	None or elementary	11.8	11.7	19.2	21.0	27.5	13.6
	Secondary and Tertiary	87.5	88.2	80.2	73.9	72.5	85,78
Remittances	No	43.3	59.1	67.2	59.5	77.4	49.6
	Yes	41.8	36.8	20.1	26.2	19.2	37.8
	Do not know	14.9	4.1	12.7	14.4	3.5	12.6
Legal status	Dual citizenship, EU citizenship and EC residence permit for long-term residents	61.1	68.5	49.6	72.6	75.2	61.6
	Limited residence permit and waiting for the response for asylum or regularisation	34.3	30.9	41.7	19.7	22.3	33.9
	Undocumented	4.0	0.6	6.7	7.7	2.6	3.9
	Do not declare	0.6	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Employment condition of the family	Stable employment/both partners stable employment	38.7	24.1	20.3	30.1	13.2	33.5
	Precarious or irregular employment/one stable employment and one precarious/irregular employment/inactive[a]	8.6	10.4	6.6	12.5	6.5	8.6
	One-income couple with stable employment[a]	27.7	35.3	17.4	19.0	26.4	27.7
	Precarious or irregular employment/both partners with precarious or irregular employment	7.3	5.9	8.7	7.4	10.0	7.4
	One-income couple with precarious employment[a]	5.2	11.5	7.8	5.9	13.8	7.0
	No-income family	7.0	9.6	28.4	20.6	27.5	10.4
Short-term migration intention	Stay	86.6	82.4	69.9	88.9	54.6	83.3
	Onward	6.5	10.1	20.6	5.0	32.5	9.0
	Return	6.9	7.5	9.6	6.2	12.9	7.8
N		2,577	422	217	64	114	3,630

Source: Authors' elaborations of ORIM data 2014.
[a]Only for couples.

"Stay." We verified all the alternatives. The test results indicated that we could not reject the equality of the coefficients across the models; therefore, we could use a multinomial logistic regression.

To better substantiate and describe the results, we also estimated the probability of short-term onward and return migration intention according to the types of support received.

TABLE 3 Formal, semiformal and informal social protection received in the 12 months before the survey (percentages) by foreign-born migrants in Lombardy (Italy), 2014

Type of welfare provision	Percentage	N
Formal welfare provision	19.4%	776
Semiformal welfare provision	9.1%	364
Informal welfare provision	13.2%	528
Only formal welfare	*11.6%*	*464*
Only semiformal welfare	*1.8%*	*72*
Only informal welfare	*6.0%*	*240*
Formal and semiformal welfare	*2.4%*	*96*
Formal and informal welfare	*2.0%*	*80*
Semiformal and informal welfare	*1.8%*	*72*
Formal, semiformal and informal welfare	*3.1%*	*124*
None	71.0%	2.840

Note: The first three rows explain the prevalence of each type irrespective of how they are combined; the rows in italics are how these types of provision are combined.
Source: Authors' elaborations of ORIM data 2014.

TABLE 5 Relative risk ratios and significance of the multinomial logistic regression model with dependent variable short-term migration intention (reference category "Stay in Italy")

Source providing economic support	Return migration intention	Onward migration intention
Formal social protection (ref. no)	1.50 *	1.60 ***
Semiformal social protection (ref. no)	1.04	1.25
Informal social protection: transnational bonding social networks - relatives living abroad (ref. no) TBO	2.46 ***	1.86 **
Informal social protection: bridging social networks—Italian friends and acquaintances (ref. no) BR	0.35 **	1.31
Informal social protection: bonding social networks—foreign-born friends and acquaintances (ref. no) BO	2.02 **	1.18
McFadden's pseudo R^2	0.1267	0.1267

Note: The model controls for all other variables described in the Method section. The complete model, labelled as Model 4, is available in Appendix A.
Source: authors' elaboration of ORIM data 2014.
*$p < 0.05$. **$p < 0.01$. ***$p < 0.001$.

TABLE 4 Formal, semiformal and informal social protection received in the 12 months before the survey (row percentages) by foreign-born migrants in Lombardy (Italy) by country or area of origin, 2014

Area of origin	Forms of welfare provision					None	Total	N
	Only formal	Only informal	Only semiformal	All forms	Other combinations			
Albania	20.3	4.1	1.0	2.5	5.0	67.2	100	365
Romania	7.7	7.8	2.5	6.4	6.2	69.5	100	429
Ukraine	6.0	3.5	1.6	2.2	2.9	83.8	100	169
Other East European countries	9.2	8.4	0.9	1.7	4.0	75.9	100	266
Egypt	9.1	1.0	0.5	0.8	7.8	80.8	100	253
Morocco	16.6	5.8	2.1	3.3	8.5	63.7	100	444
Senegal	10.6	13.5	2.6	1.9	12.1	59.4	100	152
Tunisia	14.4	4.3	5.5	7.1	11.2	57.5	100	92
Other African countries	9.9	6.9	3.6	8.2	15.1	56.3	100	350
Bangladesh	18.3	3.3	2.5	0.9	3.1	71.8	100	123
China	2.6	11.7	0.0	0.0	0.7	85.0	100	190
India	11.8	4.7	0.7	1.7	6.9	74.3	100	185
Pakistan	15.5	9.6	2.4	6.8	8.0	57.9	100	159
Other Asian countries	8.3	3.8	0.2	2.0	2.9	82.8	100	314
Latin American countries	12.7	4.8	2.1	1.4	5.1	73.9	100	509
Total	11.6	6.0	1.8	3.2	6.5	71.0	100	4000

Source: Authors' elaborations of ORIM data 2014.

6 | RESULTS

6.1 | Sample description

As shown by Table 2, overall, women account for 47.7% of our sample.[12] If we restrict the analysis to individuals who received at least one form of support, however, we observe a proportion of women as high as 63%. The family composition impacts the likelihood of receiving any form of support and the type of support received: 81.1% of respondents on formal welfare live in families with children.

We observe a similar composition among individuals who received provision from multiple sources in the 12 months before the survey (75.4% are in families with children). Unsurprisingly, the family members' job status is relevant: unemployed and precariously employed are more represented among those who received social protection from one or multiple sources.

There is considerable variability in short-term migration intentions according to patterns of social protection provision received in the 12 months before the survey. Among migrants who received only informal provision or received multiple forms of support, short-term onward migration intention is twice as high as for the overall subsample, and three times as high compared with those who did not receive any welfare benefits.

6.2 | Descriptive findings

As shown in Table 3, nearly one migrant in three received at least one form of social provision in the 12 months before the survey. Formal social protection is the most frequent (19.4%) followed respectively by informal (13.2%) and semiformal social protection (9.1%). A total of 11.6% of the migrants received only formal social provision, 6.0% only

Note: each bar indicates the difference between the probability of onward migration for a profile and the reference profile 'no social protection'; an empty bar indicates no significant difference between the two probabilities (p≥0.05). TBO= transnational bonding social capital; BO= bonding social capital; BR= bridging social capital.

Source: authors' elaboration of ORIM data for 2014.

FIGURE 3 Predicted probability of return migration intention: differences compared to the reference profile "no social provision received in the last 12 months"

informal and a negligible proportion received only semiformal provision (1.8%). In some cases (6.5%), migrants benefited from two types of social provision. A considerably smaller group received all forms of provision (3.1%).

This overall picture masks significant differences among countries or areas of origin in terms of both percentages of beneficiaries and type of welfare received (Table 4). Migrants from Pakistan and Tunisia are the most represented among beneficiaries of at least one source of support and more frequently received all forms of provision: nearly four out of 10 received at least one form of provision, 6%–8% received all forms of welfare provision. On the contrary, migrants from China and Ukraine show the lowest proportion of recipients (about 15%). Migrants from Albania and Bangladesh are more frequently on formal welfare (respectively, 20.3% and 18.3%), whereas those from Senegal show the highest reliance on informal social protection (13.5%). Support from formal channels among the Chinese is

very low (2.6%). Such findings are entirely in line with a previous mixed-method study on expectations regarding public welfare support in case of need during the life course among migrants in Italy that found migrants from the Maghreb more likely to evoke public institutions as a source of support than Chinese migrants (Albertini & Semprebon, 2018).

6.3 | Multivariate analysis

Model results[13] (Table 5) highlight that having received formal social protection from the Italian welfare state positively correlates to both return (1.50*) and onward re-emigration intention (1.60***) (RQ1).

The relationship between secondary migration intention and other sources of economic support is differentiated according to both the type of source (informal or semiformal social protection; RQ2a)

Note: each bar indicates the difference between the probability of onward migration for a profile and the reference profile 'no social protection'; an empty bar indicates no significant difference between the two probabilities (p≥0.05). TBO= transnational bonding social capital; BO= bonding social capital; BR= bridging social capital.

Source: authors' elaboration of ORIM data 2014.

FIGURE 4   Predicted probability of onward migration intention: differences compared with the reference profile "no social provision received in the last 12 months"

and, in the case of informal social protection, the bonding or bridging nature of the network (RQ2b). We find no relationship between secondary migration intentions and recent support from semiformal social protection. The relative risk ratios are slightly positive but not significant (1.04 and 1.25 for return and onward migration, respectively).

Migrants who received monetary aid from relatives living abroad (transnational bonding networks, TBO) are more likely to declare their intention to leave Italy, to return to the country of origin (2.46***), or move to a third country (1.86***). As a limitation, the data do not permit us to distinguish whether relatives providing support live in the country of origin or the next destination country.

Economic aid received from friends and acquaintances has a different effect depending on their nationality, a proxy for the networks' bridging or bonding nature. Help from Italian friends and acquaintances (bridging networks) is negatively related to return intention (0.35***), whereas support from foreign-born friends and acquaintances shows a positive relationship with return migration (2.02**).

To better substantiate the results, we estimated the probability of short-term onward and return migration intention based on the multinomial logistic regression according to the types of support received (henceforth "profile"). We compared each profile's probability of onward and return migration intention with the probability estimated for the reference profile "no social provision received in the last 12 months."[14]

Despite the likely economic vulnerability of migrants who received financial support from informal networks compared with migrants not receiving any form of support, we observe that individuals supported by networks providing bridging social capital (i.e., by Italian natives) have systematically lower probabilities of return migration intention compared with migrants who did not receive any help (Figure 3). The negative relationship with return migration intention also holds when support through bridging networks is combined with help from networks providing bonding social capital that is, instead, per se positively related to return migration (e.g., formal social protection and relatives who live abroad). Indeed, we observe that migrants who received money from relatives who live abroad (TBO) and foreign-born friends or acquaintances (BO) are significantly more likely to declare return migration intention than migrants who were not supported by any source of social protection.

Moving on to onward migration intentions, we observe that individuals who received at least one form of support are more likely to declare onward migration intention (Figure 4).

Migrants who have received formal social protection are always more likely to intend to migrate onward than migrants who have not received any form of support. Indeed, we do not observe any form of welfare magnetism among receivers of formal social protection in the form of secondary migration deterrence. Moreover, we also observe an interaction between support sources: if a migrant receives support from many different sources, the probability of onward migration intention is higher. Networks providing bridging social capital are the only source whose support is correlated to a deterrent effect on return migration that can be interpreted as magnetism. We do not observe a similar relationship with bridging social capital when short-term onward migration intentions are analysed.

7 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the last few decades, scholars have dedicated much effort to testing the ex-ante formal welfare magnetism hypothesis in different European countries. The relationship between ex-post welfare magnetism and secondary migration is, conversely, currently underresearched. Even less evidence exists on the relationship between semiformal and informal social protection and secondary migration. The focus on semiformal and informal social protection is crucial. These sources of support are essential to vulnerable individuals not eligible for formal social protection.

We based our analysis on cross-sectional data collected in 2014 in Lombardy (Italy), a region characterised by high-level social provision within the heavily pension-oriented Italian social protection system framework.

Our study provides descriptive evidence of differentiated patterns of access to formal, semiformal and informal social protection across groups. These patterns might reflect differences in expectations in terms of public welfare support (Albertini & Semprebon, 2018), the strength of informal ethnic networks and compositional differences in terms of the incidence of poverty, presence of children, proportion of single low-income families and undocumented migrants across groups.

We analyse the relationship between the experience of social protection support and short-term secondary migration intentions. First, we observe that secondary migration intentions are higher among migrants on formal welfare compared with other migrants (RQ1). Our data, therefore, do not support the hypothesis of an ex-post "magnetic effect" of the Italian formal social protection on its beneficiaries. At the same time, the positive relationship observed between welfare entitlements and onward migration intentions cannot rule out any effect of welfare magnetism from other, more generous welfare systems, especially for EU citizens, naturalised Italians and long-term migrants whose status enables legal mobility and work in another EU country. Migrants on welfare in Italy might expect to qualify as welfare recipients in other countries, too. Therefore, they could be more interested in relocation than other migrants, as suggested by some qualitative studies (Della Puppa & King, 2019). As our data do not provide any information about the next destination country, we cannot verify this hypothesis. More research is needed to test the possible welfare magnetism of wealthier welfare states on secondary migrants from Italy and explore country-specific patterns along with the relationship with life-course events. Recent research underlined that the welfare state's relevance to migrants changes over their life course (e.g., after the birth of children) and after migration, potentially impacting secondary migration decision making (De Jong & de Valk, 2020).

The relationship with return migration intention is also interesting: migrants on welfare are more likely to declare return migration intention. Even the relatively generous support provided by Lombardy's formal social protection system is not enough to deter migrants from returning to their countries of origin.

The analysis of the relationship between short-term secondary migration intentions and semiformal and informal social protection underlines the different role of these forms of support (RQ2a). We do not observe any significant relationship between support from semiformal social protection and secondary migration. In analysing informal social protection, the network's bridging or bonding nature providing support is crucial (RQ2b). The theory of bridging and bonding human capital (Lancee, 2012) according to which the possibilities offered by strong ties with Italian natives differ from those provided by ethnic networks is crucial to understanding these results. Strong and family-like ties with bonding networks of Italian friends and acquaintances, or even employers (Micheli, 2017), are already recognised as a proxy for better integration and access to other resources (McLellan, 2009). Our results further suggest that economic support and social capital from bridging networks can significantly act as an ex-post integration-driven magnet, providing valuable support to vulnerable migrants and resulting in a negative relationship with return migration. Financial support, that is, strong ties, with bridging social networks seems to prevent return migration much more than formal welfare. On the contrary, financial aid received from other foreign-born migrants is strongly correlated to return migration. Our results suggest that "local" bonding social capital from ties with migrants in Italy cannot secure the migrants' stay in Italy. However, it can support relocation to the origin country. Networks providing bonding transnational social capital, and expressed in the form of financial support from relatives living abroad, are instead positively correlated to both forms of secondary migration. Migrants who received monetary aid from relatives living abroad are more likely to declare their intention to return to the country of origin or move to a third country, suggesting access to a broader range of resources and possibilities of choice compared to "local" bonding social capital. Financial aid is, indeed, a proxy for other forms of support with positive effects on mobility, as stated by previous studies (Bilecen & Sienkiewicz, 2015; Serra-Mingot & Mazzucato, 2017).

Despite these promising findings, our paper has limitations that we hope will be overcome by future studies. First and foremost, our data are representative only of the Italian region of Lombardy. On the positive side, Lombardy is one of Italy's wealthiest areas, offering migrants some of the most developed welfare provision in the country. Therefore, it is particularly suitable to study the nexus between secondary international migration and social protection. On the negative side, results cannot be representative of Italy. Especially in southern areas, where weaker formal welfare provision is available, different relationships might exist between informal and formal social protection and mobility. Second, as already noted, there is no information about the destination of would-be onward migrants in order to assess potential welfare magnetism between Italy and the other countries. Third, as we adopted a competing-risk framework (DaVanzo, 1976), we did not explicitly consider the role of the welfare state in the country of origin, which could foster migrants' intention of returning home. Recent evidence has pointed out the relevance of the welfare state in the countries of origin in shaping return migration (De Jong & de Valk, 2020), a relationship that needs to be studied further in the Italian context. However, in our analysis, most migrants originate from less developed countries, whose welfare is usually even less generous than that of Italy.

Another critical limitation regards missing detailed information about the structure and location of migrants' transnational networks and the amount of aid received from each source. The latter set of information would be crucial in order to discuss how magnetism from formal welfare relates to magnetism from bridging social networks, and if these effects can be compared. We are also lacking information on the reasons driving the first migration to Italy. Better data at the national level focusing on migrants' social protection experience during their life course is needed to advance the theoretical reflection on the link with secondary migration.

Finally, our data are impacted by localised effects relating to the economic crisis, as they refer to the year when short-term secondary migration intentions peaked in Lombardy. Migrants in Lombardy (and in general in the centre-north of Italy) were particularly badly hit by the crisis due to their concentration in factories, small business and building and manufacturing industries (Zanfrini, 2014). Our data refer to a year when job opportunities in Italy were particularly scarce. What was initially a limitation might become a point of strength, as the crisis driven by the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to lead to a probably worse situation when compared to 2014. Formal welfare states, semiformal and informal networks are already under intense pressure from rising unemployment, poverty and increasing inequality. Our findings may contribute to future debates on migrants by rejecting the Italian formal welfare magnetism hypothesis during economic crises.

To conclude, in a context of recurring economic crises, complex migration trajectories and increased legal mobility across Europe (EU citizens, naturalised and denizens/long-term migrants), new data are needed to understand the interactions between forms of social protection and secondary mobility.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available through the Lombardy Open Data site at https://www.dati.lombardia.it/Statistica/Indagine-campionaria-immigrazione-in-Lombardia-201/wydi-3adf.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Internal migration is not addressed in this paper. Consistently, we use the term "migrant" to refer to a foreign-born individual who migrated internationally and is currently living in Italy. We also use the terms "foreign-born" and "migrant" as synonyms. The same goes for the terms "migration" and "international migration."

[2] Formal welfare also provides other nonmonetary forms of support (e.g., social services, employment centres, education and health services).

[3] The complexity of migration decision-making is beyond the focus of this study. As an introduction to the literature, see, for example, Castles et al. (2014) and Dubow et al. (2019).

[4] For a recent review of the literature on factors driving return and onward migration, see Monti (2019) and Constant (2019).

[5] Andersen and Migali (2016) adopted a complex definition of welfare regime generosity and migration costs. In this paper, we report their main results. A more detailed description of measures and methods is available in their open access paper.

[6] Remittances are also an expression of bonding capital, although expressed in terms of support given rather than provided. As our studies focus on receivers of financial support, we consider sending remittances a control variable.

[7] For further details about the survey in English, see Morales et al. (2020)

[8] The original formulation is '*Ha intenzione di trasferirsi altrove entro i prossimi 12 mesi?*' that translates as 'Do you intend to move elsewhere within the next 12 months?'

[9] See Ortensi and Barbiano di Belgiojoso (2018) for a wider discussion on the topic.

[10] We used the software STATA 16.

[11] We tested the independence of the irrelevant alternative assumption (Hausman & McFadden, 1984) using the seemingly unrelated estimation version of the Hausman test (suest STATA command).

[12] Additional details of the sample composition are reported in Appendix A.3.

[13] Readers interested in characteristics driving onward and return migration intentions, as shown by control variables, can find more details in Appendix A.

[14] Following Long and Long and Freese (2014), we estimated, using the *mtable* command with the option *atmeans*, the probability for all the combinations of welfare provision and we compared each probability with the probability of the profile "no social provision received in the last 12 months."

[15] See Allen (2017) for a definition of control variable.

[16] In Model 2, we added internal mobility and family occupational status; in Model 3, we added socio-demographic characteristics, and finally in Model 4, length of stay and legal status.

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APPENDIX A

A.1 | Additional details on centre sampling

The Centre Sampling Method is a technique for carrying out sample surveys on hard-to-reach populations. According to McKenzie and Mistiaen (2009), Centre Sampling provides a statistically sound method requiring less time and costs than a census-based screening and listing exercise. This approach has been successfully used in both Italian and European projects. It is specifically designed to collect information on a representative sample of immigrants in a context where sampling frames to cover the whole population (including irregular and naturalised migrants) are inadequate or unavailable. The underlying hypothesis is that in everyday life, migrants frequent a range of "aggregation centres" (such as immigrant-specific services, phone centres, church, markets, places of worship and ethnic shops). The information about the number of centres attended and the frequency of visits can be used to correct the sample, giving each interviewee a different weight according to how likely they were to be found by interviewers. The Centre Sampling Technique provides "the same representativeness as a hypothetical simple random sample stratified with respect to the distribution of the profiles of attendance at the centres" (Baio et al., 2011, p. 454).

A.2 | Metadata on ORIM 2014 from the The EMM (Ethnic and Migrant Minorities) Survey Registry (Morales et al., 2020)

1. General Identification Information about the Survey	
1.0. Country	Italy
1.1. ID number (leave blank)	
1.2. Acronym	ORIM 2014
1.3. Survey Name Eng.	ORIM 2014
1.4. Survey Name Nat.	Osservatorio Regionale per l'integrazione e la multietnicità (ORIM 2014)
1.5. Scope of survey	2. Subnational
1.6. Which subnational level	Regional
1.7. Name of region(s) Eng.	Lombardy
1.8. Name of region(s) Nat.	Lombardia
1.9. Representative of the population	1. Yes
1.10. Type of survey	2. Repeated cross-section (multiple waves with different samples)
1.10a. If "other" in 1.10. specify	
1.11. Starting date of survey	
1.12. End date of survey	
1.13. Main topic(s) in the survey [Choose yes/no for each topic below]	
1.13.1 Consumption and/or leisure	1. Yes
1.13.2. Demographic characteristics/behaviours	1. Yes
1.13.3. Discrimination	0. No
1.13.4. Educational attainment/trajectory	1. Yes
1.13.5. Family reunification	0. No
1.13.6. Housing/housing access	1. Yes
1.13.7. Health/health access	1. Yes
1.13.8. Identity (ethnic, national, religious)	0. No
1.13.9. Labour market integration	1. Yes
1.13.10. Language skills/training	0. No
1.13.11. Legal status/administrative situation	1. Yes
1.13.12. Migration trajectory (past/future)	1. Yes
1.13.13. Political inclusion and participation, and social/political attitudes	0. No
1.13.14. Poverty/income	1. Yes
1.13.15. Social cohesion and/or civic engagement	0. No
1.13.16. Time use	0. No
1.13.17. Transnational patterns	0. No
1.13.18. Religion	1. Yes
1.14. Main purpose of the survey	1. Research/academic
1.14a. If "other" in 1.14, specify	
1.15. Additional comments to section 1	
2. Information about the inclusion of the survey in the larger study	
2.1. ID number larger study (leave blank)	
2.2. Study Acronym	ORIM
2.3. Name of the larger study Eng.	ORIM
2.4. Name of the larger study Nat.	ORIM
2.5. Name of other countries/regions/cities Eng.	Lombardy

In case of repeated/longitudinal surveys:

(Continues)

1. General Identification Information about the Survey	
2.6. Date of the first survey	2001
2.7. Frequency of waves/panels	yearly
2.8. Wave number	14
In the case of surveys that are a part of an international survey programme	
2.9. Date when the survey first became a part	
2.10. Frequency of waves since then	
If the sample is pooled:	
2.11. How many surveys pooled	
2.12. Which other surveys pooled	
2.13. Any qualitative studies linked to survey	0. No
2.14. If "Yes", describe the studies	
2.15. Additional comments to section 2	
3.Ethnic and Migrant Target Population	
3.1. Target minority group(s)	Population with a foreign background
3.2 Was the EMM target population	3. All residents who are 1st or 2nd generation migrants in the city/region/country
3.2a. If "other" in 3.2., describe which	
3.3. Operationalisation of the target population [Choose yes/no for each variable below]	
3.3.1. Country of birth of the respondent	1. Yes
3.3.2. Country of birth of parents/grandparents	0. No
3.3.3. Citizenship/nationality of respondent (current)	1. Yes
3.3.4. Citizenship/nationality of the respondent (at birth)	1. Yes
3.3.5. Citizenship/nationality of parents/grandparents (current)	0. No
3.3.6. Citizenship/nationality of parents/grandparents (at birth)	0. No
3.3.7. Ethnic self-identification of the respondent (one response allowed)	0. No
3.3.8. Ethnic self-identification of the respondent (multiple responses allowed)	0. No
3.3.9. Ethnic self-identification of parents/grandparents	0. No
3.3.10. Mother tongue/language-related question	0. No
3.3.11. Classification by interviewer	0. No
3.3.12. Classification by third agent/by proxy (e.g., by a government authority, NGO, a social/cultural mediator, etc.)	0. No
3.3.13. Classification by geographical location	0. No
3.3.14. Through other means/characteristics	0. No
3.3.15. Information not available	0. No
3.3a. If "other means" in 3.3., describe which	
3.4. Migrant/minority-related questions [Choose yes/no for each variable below]	
3.4.1. Country of birth of the respondent	1. Yes
3.4.2. Country of birth of parents	0. No
3.4.3. Country of birth of grandparents	0. No
3.4.4. Nationality of respondent (current)	1. Yes
3.4.5. Nationality of the respondent (at birth)	1. Yes
3.4.6. Nationality of parents (current)	0. No
3.4.7. Nationality of grandparents (current)	0. No
3.4.8. Nationality of parents (at birth)	0. No
3.4.9. Nationality of grandparents (at birth)	0. No

1. General Identification Information about the Survey	
3.4.10. Ethnic self-identification of the respondent (one response allowed)	0. No
13.4.1. Ethnic self-identification of the respondent (multiple responses allowed)	0. No
3.4.12. Ethnic self-identification of parents	0. No
3.4.13. Ethnic self-identification of grandparents	0. No
3.4.14. Mother tongue/language-related question	0. No
3.4.15. Classification by interviewer	0. No
3.4.16. Information not available	0. No
3.5. Size of the EMM target pop. as a whole	
3.6. Survey includes a subgroup of majority pop.	0. No
3.7. Additional comments to section 3	
4. Sampling Method	
4.1. Sampling strategy - closed	1.Random sampling/selection (i.e., probability sampling, of some kind)
4.2. Sampling strategy - open	Centre sampling
4.3. Sample design - full information	Centre sampling
4.4. Sampling frame(s)	No
4.5. Sampling units	Respondent
4.6. Comments on sampling methods	
5. Sample Size for the overall survey	
5.1. Total gross/issued sample	4000
5.2. Total net/achieved sample	4000
5.3. Overall response rate	99
5.4. Overall response rate calculated	8.Information not available
5.5. If "other" in 5.4., describe	
5.6. Comment on any known issues	
5.7. Are weights provided	1.Yes
5.8. If weights: Please describe	Regional weights; province weights
5.9. Additional comments to section 5	
6. Sample Sizes for any subgroups in which the survey is partitioned	
6.8. Additional comments to section 6	The dataset is not partitioned, the number of citizenships involved is not determined a priori
7. Data collection information	
7.1. Name of person/institution/institute that undertook fieldwork	ISMU Foundation
7.2. Data collection mode	1. Face to face (PAPI)
For personal interviews:	
7.3. Who interviewed	2. Cultural mediator only
7.4. Interviewers spoke migrant languages	1. Yes
7.5. If "yes", which	Mother tongue (foreign interviewers)
7.6. Questionnaire in migrant language	0. No
7.7. If "yes", which	
7.8. Average duration of the interview	15
7.9. Number of questions	34
7.10. Additional comments to Section 7	
8. Availability	
8.1. Availability of the survey dataset	Yes
8.2. If available, where is the dataset stored	Open Data Archive Regione Lombardia

(Continues)

1. General Identification Information about the Survey	
8.3. ID number of archive where dataset stored	
8.4. DOI for the dataset	
8.5. Access to complete dataset	4. Yes
8.6. Access to portions of dataset	0. No
8.7. Access to aggregate data results	1. Yes
8.8. Restrictions for data access, describe which	No
8.9. Dataset language(s) available	Italian
8.10. Availability of survey doc. & q'aire	1. Yes, publicly available
8.11. If available, where is the survey doc. stored	https://dati.lombardia.it/
8.12. ID number of archive where survey doc. stored	
8.13. DOI for the documentation	
8.14. If doc. available, standard used for the doc.	
8.15. Doc. language(s) available	Italian
8.16. Additional comments to section 8	
9. Data producers, owners, distributors and citations	
9.1. Institution/team responsible for data production	Region of Lombardy
9.2. Institution/team that owns the data	Regional Observatory for Integration and Multietnicity (ORIM)
9.3. Institution/team distributing the dataset	Regional Observatory for Integration and Multietnicity (ORIM)
9.4. Contact details for queries/request	a.menonna@ismu.org
9.5. Citation for dataset	Open Data Regione Lombardia. Indagine campionaria immigrazione in Lombardia 2014.
9.6. Citation for technical documentation	Gian Carlo Blangiardo (2015) L'immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. La quattordicesima indagine regionale. Milano: Osservatorio Regionale per l'Integrazione e la Multietnicità.
9.7. Citation(s) for any other publications	Gian Carlo Blangiardo (2015) L'immigrazione straniera in Lombardia. La quattordicesima indagine regionale. Milano: Osservatorio Regionale per l'Integrazione e la Multietnicità.
9.8. Comments:	
10. Additional Information	
10.1 Data quality	9
10.2. Add.info. Data quality	
10.3. Sources of information	Core Research Group/Research Reports
10.4. Any other comments about the survey	

A.3 | ORIM 2014 target countries of birth, citizenship or foreign background

The sample is very heterogeneous in terms of composition. The three most significant groups in the subsample under analysis are Romania (11.4), Morocco (11.0%) and Albania (8.9%). Time since migration in Italy is less than 2 years for 4.4% of the sample, between 2 and 4 years for 6.2%, between 5 and 10 years for 38.5% and more than 10 years for 50.9% of the migrants in the subsample under analysis.

Cod	EUROPA		Cod	AFRICA		Cod	ASIA	
201	[ ]	Albania	401	[ ]	Algeria	301	[ ]	Afghanistan
256	[ ]	Belarus	402	[ ]	Angola	302	[ ]	Saudi Arabia
252	[ ]	Bosnia-Herzegovina	406	[ ]	Benin	358	[ ]	Armenia
209	[ ]	Bulgaria	408	[ ]	Botswana	359	[ ]	Azerbaijan
257	[ ]	Czech Republic	409	[ ]	Burkina Faso	304	[ ]	Bahrain
250	[ ]	Croatia	410	[ ]	Burundi	305	[ ]	Bangladesh
247	[ ]	Estonia	411	[ ]	Cameroon	306	[ ]	Bhutan
270	[ ]	Montenegro	413	[ ]	Cape Verde	309	[ ]	Brunei
248	[ ]	Latvia	414	[ ]	Central African Rep.	310	[ ]	Cambodia
249	[ ]	Lithuania	415	[ ]	Chad	314	[ ]	China
253	[ ]	Macedonia	417	[ ]	Comoro	319	[ ]	North Korea
254	[ ]	Moldova	418	[ ]	Congo	320	[ ]	South Korea
233	[ ]	Poland	463	[ ]	Congo, Dem. Rep.	322	[ ]	United Arab Emirates
235	[ ]	Romania	404	[ ]	Cote d'Ivoire	323	[ ]	Philippines
245	[ ]	Russia	419	[ ]	Egypt	360	[ ]	Georgia
255	[ ]	Slovakia	466	[ ]	Eritrea	327	[ ]	Jordan
251	[ ]	Slovenia	420	[ ]	Ethiopia	330	[ ]	India
243	[ ]	Ukraine	421	[ ]	Gabon	331	[ ]	Indonesia
244	[ ]	Hungary	422	[ ]	Gambia	332	[ ]	Iran
271	[ ]	Serbia	423	[ ]	Ghana	333	[ ]	Iraq
272	[ ]	Kosovo	424	[ ]	Djibouti	356	[ ]	Kazakhstan
			425	[ ]	Guinea	361	[ ]	Kyrgyzstan
			426	[ ]	Guinea Bissau	335	[ ]	Kuwait
Cod	AMERICA		427	[ ]	Equatorial Guinea	336	[ ]	Laos
503	[ ]	Antigua and Barbuda	428	[ ]	Kenya	337	[ ]	Lebanon
602	[ ]	Argentina	429	[ ]	Lesotho	339	[ ]	Maldives
505	[ ]	Bahamas	430	[ ]	Liberia	340	[ ]	Malaysia
506	[ ]	Barbados	431	[ ]	Libya	341	[ ]	Mongolia
507	[ ]	Belize	432	[ ]	Madagascar	307	[ ]	Myanmar
604	[ ]	Bolivia	434	[ ]	Malawi	342	[ ]	Nepal
605	[ ]	Brazil	435	[ ]	Mali	343	[ ]	Oman
606	[ ]	Chile	436	[ ]	Morocco	344	[ ]	Pakistan
608	[ ]	Colombia	437	[ ]	Mauritania	324	[ ]	Palestinian Authority territories
513	[ ]	Costa Rica	438	[ ]	Mauritius	345	[ ]	Qatar
514	[ ]	Cuba	440	[ ]	Mozambique	346	[ ]	Singapore
515	[ ]	Dominica	441	[ ]	Namibia	348	[ ]	Syria
516	[ ]	Dominican Rep.	442	[ ]	Niger	311	[ ]	Sri Lanka
609	[ ]	Ecuador	443	[ ]	Nigeria	362	[ ]	Tajikistan
517	[ ]	El Salvador	446	[ ]	Rwanda	363	[ ]	Taiwan
518	[ ]	Jamaica	448	[ ]	Sao Tome and Principe	349	[ ]	Thailand
519	[ ]	Grenada	449	[ ]	Seychelles	338	[ ]	East Timor

(Continues)

Cod	EUROPA		Cod	AFRICA		Cod	ASIA	
523	[ ]	Guatemala	450	[ ]	Senegal	351	[ ]	Turkey
612	[ ]	Guyana	451	[ ]	Sierra Leone	364	[ ]	Turkmenistan
524	[ ]	Haiti	453	[ ]	Somalia	357	[ ]	Uzbekistan
525	[ ]	Honduras	454	[ ]	South African Republic	353	[ ]	Vietnam
527	[ ]	Mexico	455	[ ]	Sudan	354	[ ]	Yemen
529	[ ]	Nicaragua	456	[ ]	Swaziland			
530	[ ]	Panama	457	[ ]	Tanzania	999	[ ]	Stateless person
614	[ ]	Paraguay	458	[ ]	Togo			
615	[ ]	Peru	460	[ ]	Tunisia			
532	[ ]	Saint Lucia	461	[ ]	Uganda			
534	[ ]	Saint Kitts and Nevis	464	[ ]	Zambia			
533	[ ]	Saint Vincent and Grenad.	465	[ ]	Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)			
616	[ ]	Suriname	467	[ ]	South Sudan			
617	[ ]	Trinidad and Tobago						
618	[ ]	Uruguay						
619	[ ]	Venezuela						

A.4 | Full model

We started out from a model with only the variable referring to different forms of welfare provision (independent variables Model 1), adding all other variables, which we considered control variables,[15] step by step, up to the completed model (Model 4).[16] As shown in Table A1, the resulting estimates were stable both in terms of significance and values across the four models, with an increasing value of pseudo R^2 from Model 1 to 4.

A.5 | Characteristics relating to return and onward migration intentions (control variables)

Control variables provide a more in-depth insight into the characteristics of migrants with the intention to re-emigrate. As already shown in previous papers about Lombardy (Barbiano di Belgiojoso & Ortensi, 2013; Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018), return migration frequently represents a failure in the migration project. Migrants' onward migration intention is both a strategy to cope with unemployment and instability, or to seek possibilities to improve the family's financial situation elsewhere. Previous internal mobility along the Italian peninsula fosters the goal of returning home, while the effect is not significant for onward migration.

As for the demographic characteristics of the migrants, due to the higher—monetary and nonmonetary—costs of family migration (Finney & Simpson, 2008; Silvestre & Reher, 2014), the presence of the family (children and/or partner) when emigrating considerably reduces the intention to leave Italy. Furthermore, onward migrants are more likely to be men, as found by the vast majority of studies on onward migrations (e.g., Haandrikman & Hassanen, 2014; Monti, 2019; Nekby, 2006; Ortensi & Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2018; Schroll, 2009; Toma & Castagnone, 2015). As the length of stay in Italy increases, the likelihood of a second migration decreases: along with their permanence in Italy, migrants acquire capital specific to the location and, as the time passes, the cost of a new emigration becomes higher (DaVanzo, 1976; Rashid, 2009). This relationship might disclose and control for a selection effect due to the cross-sectional nature of our survey. Among older cohorts of migrants, a nonnegligible percentage might have already left Italy.

Confirming previous results (Ahrens et al., 2016; Della Puppa, 2016), fixed-term residence permits and pending asylum or regularisation applications sharply reduce the likelihood of onward migration intention compared to statuses entitled to legal mobility (dual citizens, EU citizens and migrants with EC residence permit for long-term residents).

TABLE A1 Relative risk ratios and significance of the multinomial logistic regression model with dependent variable short-term migration intention (reference category 'Stay in Italy')

	Return migration intention				Onward migration intention			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Semiformal protection (ref. no)	1.24	1.07	1.05	1.04	1.59*	1.31	1.29	1.25
Transnational bonding provision (ref. no)	2.46***	2.27***	2.53***	2.46***	1.98***	1.64*	1.93**	1.86**
Bridging social provision (ref. no)	0.33**	0.35**	0.35**	0.35**	1.27	1.4	1.29	1.31
Bonding social provision (ref. no)	2.37***	2.00**	1.99**	2.02**	1.60*	1.33	1.1	1.18
Formal provision (ref. no)	1.35	1.22	1.45*	1.50*	1.33	1.25	1.54**	1.60***
Remittances (ref. no remittances)								
remittances	1.00	1.11	0.95	0.98	0.49***	0.57***	0.46***	0.46***
do not know	0.71	0.84	0.72	0.73	0.80	0.93	0.73	0.72
Previous internal mobility (ref. no)		1.71***	1.69***	1.76***		1.37*	1.23	1.26
Family occupational status (ref. Stable employment/both partners stable employment)								
Precarious or irregular employment/one stable employment and one precarious/irregular employment/inactive[a]		1.62*	1.46	1.45		1.43	1.89*	1.99*
One-income couple with stable employment[a]		1.37	1.10	1.11		1.34	1.71*	1.7*
Precarious or irregular employment/both partners with precarious or irregular employment		1.13	0.96	0.83		4.04***	2.89***	2.78***
One-income couple with precarious employment[a]		2.42***	1.67	1.70*		4.21***	4.54***	4.81***
No-income family		3.24***	2.54***	2.43***		4.31***	3.24***	3.26***
Female (ref. Male)			1.00	0.95			0.52***	0.50***
Educational level: None or elementary (ref. secondary or tertiary)			1.56*	1.56**			1.13	1.12
Cohabitant children in Italy (ref. no)			0.52***	0.52***			0.70*	0.70*
Currently in a relationship with a partner living in Italy (ref. yes)			0.68**	0.70**			1.74**	1.78**
Area of origin (ref. Albania)								
Romania			0.35**	0.32**			0.80	0.59
North Africa			0.88	0.88			0.44***	0.45**
Sub-Saharan Africa			0.71	0.70			1.54	1.57
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan			0.94	0.93			0.61	0.60
China			0.55	0.59			0.05**	0.05**
Latin America			0.75	0.80			0.35***	0.36***
Other East European			0.82	0.80			0.63	0.62
Other Asian			0.49*	0.50*			0.45*	0.46*
Years since migration				1.01				0.98
Years since migration (squared)				0.91*				0.95
Legal status (ref. Dual citizenship, EU citizenship and EC residence permit for long-term residents)								
Limited residence permit and waiting for the decision about asylum or regularisation				0.71				0.55**
Undocumented				1.3				0.67
Constant	0.08***	0.07***	0.13***	0.24***	0.11***	0.07***	0.19***	0.44*
McFadden's pseudo R^2	0.0364	0.0711	0.1206	0.1267	0.0364	0.0711	0.1206	0.1267

Note: Stepwise Models 1–4. Model 4 is the final model discussed in the paper.

Source: Authors' elaboration of ORIM data 2014.

[a]Only for couples.

*$p < 0.05$. **$p < 0.01$. ***$p < 0.001$.