



Young Generations' Activism in Italy: Comparing Political Engagement and Participation of Native Youths and Youths from a Migrant Background

Veronica Riniolo¹ · Livia Elisa Ortensi²

Accepted: 17 June 2020
© The Author(s) 2020

Abstract

Focusing on individuals aged 14–35 still living with their family of origin, we compare the political activism of Italian natives with their first and second-generation migrant peers. We based our analysis on two different national household surveys, carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2011–2012: the survey 'Condizione e integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri' [Condition and Social Integration of Foreign Citizens] and 'Aspetti della vita quotidiana' [Multipurpose Survey on the Aspects of Everyday Life]. Our results revealed that natives are more likely to be involved in politics compared to their migrant peers. However, the migrant background is not a factor negatively affecting youth participation or involvement in politics in itself. The gap with native is fully explained by differences in socio-economic background and family political socialisation. When these aspects are controlled, data suggest that no differences exist in participation to most time-consuming acts (such as taking part in political meetings, demonstrations, participation in a political association, etc.). More of it, young people with migrant backgrounds are more likely to be engaged in activities that reflect a general interest in politics, such as discussing politics, seeking information on Italian politics, and listening to political debates, compared to their native counterparts.

Keywords Political activism · Young generations · Second generations · Immigrant youths · Family political socialisation · Migrant background

✉ Livia Elisa Ortensi
livia.ortensi@unibo.it

¹ Department of Sociology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy

² Department of Statistical Sciences "Paolo Fortunati" (STAT), Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna, Via delle Belle Arti, 41 40126 Bologna, Italy

1 Introduction

Involvement in politics¹ is a crucial aspect of subjective well-being and a vital characteristic of a cohesive society (CMEPSP 2009; Frey and Stutzer 2000; Putnam 2000; Pácek and Radcliff 2008; Pacheco and Lange 2010; Eurofound 2018). Equal representation and inclusion through political participation or engagement of all groups of citizens youths, ethnic minorities and all different groups of citizens are crucial for the proper functioning of democracy (Verba and Nie 1972; Putnam 1993; Lijphart 1997; Dahl 2006; Kaldur et al. 2012; Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012). For these reasons, the supposed 'eclipse' of young generations from the political scene (Ricolfi 2002) is a matter of concern and a subject of intense academic and public debate. Despite the rhetoric of an increasing disenchantment of young people from politics, young generations have found new ways to make their voice heard in the process of the 'reinvention' of politics (Beck 1997). Indeed, youngsters are increasingly engaged in new practices of political participation that configure themselves as informal, non-hierarchical and non-institutionalized (Juris and Pleyers 2009; Alteri et al. 2016; Genova 2018; Pitti 2018).

The overall aim of this study is to analyse the political participation and engagement of youths aged 14–35 years old. After discussing the theoretical framework and the methods implemented, including definitions and measures, we will focus on two crucial aspects affecting political involvement: the migratory background and the effect of family political socialisation.

To tackle these issues, we relied on three bodies of literature: studies on political participation to analytically define the object of our paper, studies on youths to focus on the subjects of our analysis, and research on migrant political integration to analyse the role of the migrant background. To carry out the analysis, we combined data from two nationally representative household surveys carried out by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in 2011–2012.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first quantitative study that focuses on youths' political involvement in Italy, comparing natives and first and second generations based on representative data at the national level.

Italy is a privileged case for the analysis of the political involvement of native youths and youths of migrant origin for several reasons. First, the situation of young people in Italy is critical: while their number is shrinking, they are experiencing a weakening in their political, social, and economic relevance. In particular, young people of migrant origin face the double burden of being young and having a foreign background in a 'young-unfriendly' country (Ambrosi and Rosina 2009), where diffusion of anti-immigrant rhetoric is widespread (Martinelli 2013). Second, Italy is characterised by a closed political opportunity structure (POS), with strict norms regulating the acquisition of citizenship (Huddleston et al. 2011; Boccagni 2012). Third, despite this unfavourable context, the visibility of youths with an immigrant background is increasing (Zinn 2011; Riniolo 2019).

¹ In our article we use the term political involvement to refer both to *political engagement*, i.e. having an interest, paying attention to, or having opinions on political matters, and *political participation*, i.e. "activity that has the intent or the effect of influencing either regional, national, or supranational governance, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of individuals who make that policy" (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014, p. 6). For more details see Sect.2.1

2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Political Involvement and Young People

A broad and long-standing debate regards the conceptualisation of political participation. It is hard to find a consensus on its meaning, and the task is even harder when the focus is on young people, the subjects of our analysis. If on the one hand, the traditional definition of political participation by Verba and Nie (1972) may not adequately illustrate the various range of possible acts of citizens in the public sphere, on the other hand, the risk is to attain a definition that is too large and vague and that involves all human activities. According to the classical definition of Verba and Nie (ibidem), political participation is the kind of behaviour designed to influence the choice of government personnel and/or policies. Nevertheless, this definition excludes a broad spectrum of political activities that increasingly emerged in the light of recent social and technological changes (Norris 2002; Fox 2014). Many scholars have highlighted that the new generations have moved from the traditional forms of political participation to a series of unconventional, destructured, horizontal and unprecedented actions (Beck 1997; Juris and Pleyers 2009; Harris et al. 2010; Loader et al. 2014; Roberts 2015; Batsleer et al. 2017; Briggs 2017; Pickard and Bessant 2018; Pirni and Raffini 2018; Pitti 2018). In particular, the Processes Influencing Democratic Ownership and Participation (PIDOP) Project² shows that younger people and ethnic minority individuals are more likely to be involved in non-conventional forms of political activities (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014). In the same lines, recent data highlight that younger people are more actively involved than the elderly in the political field, with the exception of voting turnout, for which the percentage is higher amongst the elderly (Eurofound 2018, p. 36). This 'metamorphosis' of youths' political practices is linked to changes occurring in several other domains of our lives (Beck 2016).

One of the most relevant and comprehensive theoretical reflection on political and civic participation and engagement which largely contributed to the debate on participation emerged from the already mentioned PIDOP Project. This research project offers an analytical clarification of the concepts at stake which are at the basis of our study distinguishing between 2 forms of political involvement: participation and engagement. *Political participation* is used to refer to an "activity that has the intent or the effect of influencing either regional, national, or supranational governance, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of individuals who make that policy" (Barrett and Brunton-Smith 2014, p. 6). These participatory behaviours are distinguished from having an interest in, paying attention to, or having knowledge, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, or feeling about political matters. Indeed, this is referred to as *political engagement* (Ibidem).

Based on this analytical distinction, in our analysis we distinguish among:

- (1) *Political engagement* (discussing politics, seeking information on Italian politics, listening to political debate)
- (2) *Conventional political participation* (volunteering for a political party; taking part in political meetings, giving money to a political party)
- (3) *Non-conventional political participation* (taking part in political demonstrations, participation to a political association/organisation)

² <https://pidop.surrey.ac.uk/>

Moreover, we decided to include participation/membership to trade union and volunteering for a trade union as indicators of conventional political participation. Indeed the Italian context is characterised by a central role of trade unions for migrants, not limited to rights in workplaces (Ambrosini et al. 2016). Trade unions play a pivotal role in promoting migrant social and political inclusion through several local and national activities.

For the purposes of our study, we decided to circumscribe the object of our analysis, focusing on engagement and activities with a political focus. As already mentioned, the political involvement of youths with a migrant background is currently underresearched in Italy where research on second generations focused mainly on identities and belongings (Andall 2002; Colombo et al. 2009), educational paths (Gilardoni 2008; Santagati and Colussi 2019; Santagati 2019), religious radicalisation (Valtolina 2017); the contrapositions between familiar and societal claims (Valtolina and Marazzi 2006), and youth gangs (Queirolo and Torre 2005).

2.2 Multiple Drivers of Political Participation: The Role of Migrant Background and the Influence of the Family of Origin

Several studies show that, despite being a consistent component of the population, migrants are less likely to participate in politics than natives (Penninx et al. 2004; Morales and Giugni 2011; Kaldur et al. 2012; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013). In the specific, even controlling for socio-economic and demographic variables, research highlights the existence of a significant gap between migrants and natives' political participation in Europe, in terms of voter turnout, representativeness, and non-conventional activities (van Londen et al. 2007; de Rooij 2012; Schulze 2014; Pilati 2018; Ortensi and Riniolo 2020). Do immigrants' descendants face the same disadvantages of their parents in the political field? The question is crucial because the number of immigrants and their offspring in Europe as well as in Italy is expected to grow (OECD 2017). According to the latest figures, Italy's population of second-generation youths aged 0–35 who were born in Italy or arrived in Italy before 18 years old with at least one foreign parent reached 2.8 million at the beginning of 2019, and currently represent 13% of the overall resident population aged 0–35 (Riniolo 2020).

A first crucial observation is that the paths of integration of first-generation migrants differ significantly from those of descendants. While the former socialised in their origin country and probably faced downward mobility after migration, the latter grew up in the educational system of their destination country, possibly speaking the new language fluently and sharing aspirations with their native peers (Ambrosini 2005; Heath 2014; Zanfrini 2016). Second-generation youths have been socialised in the same context of their native peers (e.g. school and voluntary associations) and exposed to similar opportunities (Quintelier 2009). All these factors influence their chances to be politically active. In line with the positive trend characterising second-generation attainments in different domains, such as education, work, and social and cultural integration in Europe (Heath 2014; Crul et al. 2017; Kalter 2018), empirical research shows that the gap in political participation between second generations and natives tends to be less marked in comparison to the gap between natives and first-generation migrants (Sanders et al. 2014). Nonetheless, second generations “inherited” some criticalities from their parents, such as discrimination on ethnic-racial grounds, in particular when accessing the job world and the career-making processes (Wihtol de Wenden 2015; Crul et al. 2017).

In line with these findings, we expect to observe different levels of political participation among native youths, immigrant youths, and second-generation youths, with the latter scoring similar results to natives (Hypothesis H1).

The realities of the second generations are extremely variegated and diversified (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Ambrosini and Molina 2004) according to their place of birth or age at migration. Consequently, it is crucial to distinguish among different groups. According to Rumbaut's specification, it is possible to differentiate between generations: 2.0 (those who were born in the country of destination of their parents from at least one foreign parent); 1.75 (arrived at pre-scholar age); 1.5 (arrived between 7 and 12 years) and the 1.25 generation (migrated between the age of 13 and 17 years). There is consensus that the time of arrival in destination country greatly influences children and youth's inclusion path. Accordingly, we decided to study these groups separately (see Sect. 3.4).

In addition to the migrant background, the explanatory factors of political participation are multiple and interrelated. One of the most comprehensive theoretical explanations of drivers of political participation is the one proposed by Barrett and Brunton-Smith (2014). These authors suggest considering four levels of factors: macro,³ demographic, social and psychological factors (Ibidem). For the purposes of our study, we focused on individual-level characteristics (demographic factors), and family-related characteristics (social factors) with specific attention to family political socialisation.

2.2.1 Individual-Level Characteristics

At the individual level, the explanatory factors of political integration (or exclusion) are multiple. Some of these factors, such as socio-economic conditions, affect both migrants and natives, while others are specifically referred to migrants, such as language knowledge or naturalisation. As an extensive and sound literature on political participation has underlined, socio-economic conditions are key determinants of the level of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; de Rooij 2012). Recent research conducted in 9 European cities shows that education is a strong individual predictor of protest gaps between individuals of migrant origin and natives (Pilati 2018). Other migrant-related characteristics variables play a crucial role. An example is their level of integration in the destination country that can be measured through language proficiency or naturalisation. Literature shows that both contribute to a higher level of migrant political activism. Concerning the former language proficiency is a precondition for full participation in the society of destination in terms of access to school, job and services (Morales and Giugni 2011; Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009). Language knowledge is also among the so-called civic requirements in many European countries (Goodman 2010). Concerning naturalisation, there is evidence from Europe and beyond (United States, Canada) that the acquisition of citizenship in the country of settlement is a significant predictor of political involvement (Bloemraad 2006; Hainmueller et al. 2015; Ortensi and Riniolo 2020; Anderson 2012).

In addition to these variables, other relevant factors such as a high level of social trust and sense of belonging to the destination country positively influence political integration (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Bauböck et al. 2006; Bloemraad 2006; Gallego 2008; Morales and Giugni 2011; Zapata-Barrero and Gropas 2012; Zapata-Barrero et al. 2013).

³ Literature has largely acknowledged the role of macro contextual factors. As extensively studied, the political participation of migrants and their descendants is widely influenced by the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) (Penninx and Martiniello 2007; Morales and Giugni 2011; Cinalli and Giugni 2011; Alba and Foner 2015; Cinalli and Giugni 2016; Pilati 2018).

2.2.2 Social Factors: Family Characteristics

Another crucial aspect influencing the level of youth political involvement, as previously mentioned, is the role of family political socialisation. As political socialisation takes place at a young age, parents are crucial agents of political socialisation together with peers, schools, voluntary associations, and social media (Ventura 2001; Quintelier 2015). The family often represents a 'powerful incubator of citizenship' (McDevitt and Chaffee 2002, p. 282), in which children of more politically active parents are more likely to be interested and involved in politics themselves (Cicognani et al. 2012). However, scholars have recently critiqued the supposed top-down process of a simple reproduction over generations of beliefs and attitudes, underlining the active role of children and adolescents. Political socialisation is not a unidirectional process (from parents to children and adolescents). The latter may also have the power to influence family attitude, orientations, and beliefs (Ibidem). Despite engaging in possibly new and original forms of political involvement, the family of origin still plays a crucial role in shaping the political maturation of children and youths, significantly driving their interest and involvement in politics (Cicognani et al. 2012; Forbrig 2005). As an incubator for political socialisation, we hypothesise that the family can replicate and reinforce disparities in political participation across generations (Hypothesis H2). In line with the literature, our analysis included the cohabitation with at least a family member engaged in the political sphere to test its possible influence on the political participation of cohabitant children or nephews and interaction with the migration background.

3 Data and Methods

3.1 Data

To compare the political involvement of young people with a foreign background with their native peers, we pooled data from two national household surveys carried out by ISTAT. The first source of data was the survey *Condizione e integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri* [Condition and Social Integration of Foreign Citizens] (CIFC) carried out in 2011–2012.⁴ The CIFC sample is composed of men and women with a foreign background (including European and non-European citizens from all countries) living in the 12,000 families randomly sampled from the civil registry (ISTAT 2014). The second source was the Multipurpose Survey on the *'Aspetti della vita quotidiana'* [Aspects of Everyday Life] (AVQ), carried out in 2012. The AVQ sample is composed of 46,464 individuals and 19,313 households randomly sampled from the civil registry.

We selected individuals from the original sample aged 14 to 35 living in families as children, nieces, or nephews of the head of the household. The final weighted sample was composed of 13,254 individuals: 8,378 from AVQ (63.2%) and 4,876 (36.8%) from CIFC.

⁴ Our data refer to 2012, which corresponds to one of the central periods of *'L'Italia sono anch'io'* [I'm Italy too], a campaign aiming to reform the modalities by which citizenship can be acquired (Law 91 1992) carried out by several players (second-generation activists, trade unions, organizations from the third sector, etc.). Mobilisation for the acquisition of citizenship dates back to 2004 with *«Bambini d'Italia»* promoted by *Comunità Sant'Egidio*, one of the first campaigns for the citizenship rights of the children of immigrants. Since the Italian Citizenship Law has not been reformed yet, many initiatives are still promoted nowadays by several actors (such as the online movement *#italianisenzacittadinanza* composed mainly by youths with a migrant background).

Table 1 Variables used to define political participation

<i>Discussing politics more than once a week in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Seeking information on Italian politics at least once a week in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Listening to political debates in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Volunteering for a political party in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Volunteering for a trade union in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Taking part in political meetings in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Giving money to a political party in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Participation/Membership in a trade union association/organisation in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Taking part in political demonstrations in the last 12 months</i>
<i>Participation in a political association/organisation in the last 12 months</i>

3.2 The Operationalisation of the Concept of Political Participation

Based on recent efforts of operationalisation of the concept at stake (Ivaldi et al. 2017; Ortensi and Riniolo 2020), we selected variables in the CIFIC and AVQ surveys that are relevant to the study of youth political participation and engagement (see Table 1). The attempt was to include both formal and informal political activities also feasible for non-citizens (for this reason, we excluded voting). In the specific based on our previous analytical distinction (cfr. 2.1), we selected 10 variables (Table 1) which refer to:

- (1) Political engagement (from variable 1 to 3)
- (2) Political participation (from variable 4 to 10).

Moreover, we further distinguished between conventional (from variable 4 to 8) and non-conventional political participation (variables 9 and 10).

Despite the effort of covering a wide range of political activities, the operationalisation has some limitations. The 10 indicators do not include the phenomenology of all the political repertoires, especially the most recent and unconventional ones (e.g. new internet-based activism), which would require a dedicated survey. However, the indicators available in the two analysed datasets may offer a relevant picture of youth involvement in a series of different political channels (trade unions, parties, political organisations) accessible to both native and migrant youths still lacking political rights.

To perform our analysis, we considered individuals declaring to have carried out at least one activity from 1 to 3 as 'soft political participants' (political engagement). These activities, which suggest general interest in politics, should be connected to the so-called 'low-cost activities' (de Rooij 2012). Individuals declaring to have carried out at least one activity from points 4 to 10, which are considered the most time-consuming acts, are defined as 'strong political participants' (political participation).

3.3 Methods

To analyse differences in political involvement between youths of foreign origin and natives, we ran three nested probit regression models for both types of political

involvement considered, i.e. political engagement and political participation. Our final dataset contained information on 13,254 individuals aged 14–35. The 2 constrained models (M1a and M1b) account for only the covariates regarding the migrant generation. The second models (M2a and M2b) add personal characteristics to the analysis. Finally, the third models (M3a and M3b) include household characteristics. To investigate the role of family political socialisation, we added two dummy variables accounting for the presence of at least a household member actively involved in political engagement or participation. As the latter variables are endogenous for interviewees' political involvement, Models M3a and M3b are probit regression models with two endogenous covariates. To control for the hierarchical structure of the dataset⁵ while accounting for endogeneity, we applied the Huber and White, or sandwich estimator of variance to all probit regression models to allow for intragroup correlation among individuals living in the same family, relaxing the usual requirement of independence between observations (Rogers 1993).

To make results more tangible, we will discuss our findings in the form of predicted probabilities (Williams 2012). When useful, we will show pairwise comparisons of regression coefficients to consider the effect of generation and country of birth. Interested readers will find the full models in the appendix.

3.4 Measures

We included the following variables:

Model 1a and 1b

1. *Migration background*: Native (reference); Generation 2 or 1.75 (respectively born in Italy from foreign-born parents or who migrated before the age of 6); Generation 1.5 or 1.25 (migrated at the age of 6–12 or 13–17, respectively); first-generation (migrated aged 18 or over).

We built on the classic criteria offered by Rumbaut (1997). We grouped Generations 2.0 and 1.75 together because both generations had socialised in the Italian context since early childhood. Generations 1.5 and 1.25 were also grouped together, as they were brought up in the Italian educational system, probably speak fluent Italian, and share the same expectations of their Italian peers (Heath 2014). We then accounted for those who migrated after 18 years old. Newly arrived migrants indeed socialised in their origin country, and probably are less proficient in the destination country's language. In addition to this, they presumably do not hold Italian citizenship (Ibidem).

Models 2a and 2b add the following respondent's characteristics:

1. Gender: male and female (reference)
2. Age: in completed years, with a squared term when needed (numeric)
3. Education: no title, primary school, junior high school, high school, university graduated (reference)
4. Job position: Employed (reference), unemployed, inactive (full-time student, home-maker, neither in employment nor education or training [NEET]), other condition
5. Education in Italy. The interviewee carried out part of his or her educational background in Italy: yes or no (reference)

⁵ Interviewees aged 14–35 are grouped into 6,562 families whose number of members varies from 1 to 11 with an average size of 1.8.

6. Communication skills: Difficulty in understanding native Italian speakers: high (reference), moderate, limited, and no difficulty or native speaker
7. Cultural consumptions. The interviewee read at least one book (any type) in the last 12 months: yes or no (reference)
8. Italian citizenship: yes or no (reference)

Models 3a and 3b add the following household's characteristics:

1. Number of household members (in units)
2. Household type: Couple with children (reference), male single parent, or female single parent
3. Household residence: Northern Italy (reference), Central Italy, or Southern Italy and islands
4. Homeownership: yes or no (reference)
5. Poor housing conditions or overcrowding (subjective evaluation): yes or no (reference)
6. Presence of at least a household member involved in political participation: yes or no (reference).
7. Presence of at least a household member involved in political engagement: yes or no (reference).

The last 2 variables are endogenous for the respondent's political involvement. The dependent variables for the endogenous covariate regressions are homeownership, poor housing conditions or overcrowding, household type, and number of household members. We used the cohabitation with at least an elder family member born in Italy and the Human Development Index (HDI) of the country of origin of the head of the family as instrumental variables, using a similar approach and reasoning of Just and Anderson (2012). To assess the validity of our instruments, we relied on appropriate test statistics and sensitivity checks.

4 Results

4.1 Descriptive Results

According to our definition, 51.3% of the young natives living with their family of origin are involved in political engagement activities, e.g. discussing politics, seeking information on Italian politics or listening to political debates. In contrast, this proportion is only 30.3% among their peers with a foreign background, with virtually no differences across generations (first-generation and second-generation immigrant youths).

Political participation, i.e. the most time-consuming acts (such as taking part in political meetings, demonstrations, participation in a political association etc.), is less diffused in both groups: 14.5% of youths with native background, and 1.5% of youths with foreign background were involved in these political activities in the 12 months before the survey. The proportion of political participation is slightly higher among first-generation migrants (4.7%), but lower among Generations 1.75 and 2 (1.3%), and Generations 1.50 and 1.25 (1.0%). Readers interested in sample characteristics by type of participation and migrant background will find specification in Table 7 in the appendix.

When we analysed the two forms of political involvement, we observed that 69.2% of youths with a foreign background (considering both first and second generations) were politically inactive (i.e., neither in political engagement nor in political participation). In contrast, this proportion was only 45.8% among young natives. At the same time, 11.6% of

Table 2 Political participation and political engagement by migration background

	Native background			Foreign background		
	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
<i>Political engagement</i>						
<i>Political participation</i>	No	46.4%	100.0%	No	29.7%	100.0%
	Yes	79.8%	100.0%	Yes	66.2%	100.0%
	Total	51.3%	100.0%	Total	30.3%	100.0%
Column percentages						
<i>Political participation</i>	No	77.4%	85.5%	No	96.7%	98.5%
	Yes	22.6%	14.5%	Yes	3.3%	1.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	Total	100.0%	100.0%
Total percentages						
<i>Political participation</i>	No	39.7%	85.5%	No	29.3%	98.5%
	Yes	11.6%	14.5%	Yes	1.0%	1.5%
	Total	51.3%	100.0%	Total	30.0%	100.0%

young natives were involved in both political participation and engagement activities, whereas the corresponding proportion was only 1.0% among peers with a foreign background. Data show that we cannot consider the two forms of political involvement as a continuum. In fact, in both subsamples, some individuals involved in political participation are not engaged in politics and vice versa (Table 2).

Among native soft political participants (political engagement), 22.6% were also involved in political participation. At the same time, 79.8% of young natives involved in political participation were also engaged in politics. The corresponding proportions observed among young peers with a foreign background were 3.3 and 66.2%, respectively.

4.2 Multivariate Results

In this section, we focus on differences in political involvement for young men and women aged 14–35 living with their family of origin by migrant generation (natives, first, and second-generation individuals). We will present and comment on the variation in the coefficient and the predicted probabilities of the covariate controlling for the migrant generation between nested models and briefly comment on selected household and migration-related covariates. As differences according to the migrant background are our primary dimension of interest, we will not specifically address or discuss control variables. As expected, the lower socio-economic background of youths of migrant origin (lower education, higher level of poor housing conditions and lower level of house ownership of immigrant parents in comparison to native parents) negatively affects their political involvement. Interested readers will find the full models in Tables 8 and 9 in the appendix.

4.2.1 Political Engagement

Results from the constrained model (M1a) confirm the result of descriptive analysis by showing that the gap in political engagement between natives aged 14 and 35 living with their families of origin and their migrant peers is statistically significant, with no differences across to the generation of birth for migrants (Table 3). However, differences

Table 3 Political engagement: pairwise comparisons of estimated coefficients by migration background, net of control variables for Models M1a, M2a, M3a

	Model M1a		Model M2a		Model M3a	
	Contrast	Std. Err	Contrast	Std. Err	Contrast	Std. Err
Generation 1.50/1.25 versus Generation 1.75/2	– 0.016	0.114	– 0.018	0.151	– 0.041	0.189
Generation 1 versus Generation 1.75/2	– 0.035	0.143	– 0.063	0.209	– 0.100	0.221
Generation 1.75/2 versus Natives	– 0.534***	0.099	– 0.164	0.152	0.610***	0.169
Generation 1 versus Generation 1.50/1.25	– 0.019	0.121	– 0.045	0.149	– 0.059	0.127
Generation 1.50/1.25 versus Natives	– 0.549***	0.065	– 0.182	0.208	0.569*	0.231
Generation 1 versus Natives	– 0.568***	0.108	– 0.227	0.250	0.510*	0.257

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

See Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables and Table 8 in the appendix to see full models




Fig. 1 Predicted probabilities of political engagement by migration background, net of control variables for Models M1a, M2a, M3a. *Note:* see Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables

compared to natives are fully explained by respondent characteristics. Coefficients for model M2a shows that, after controlling for respondents' features, differences by generation are no more significant. Model M3a brings additional explanation in the analysis of the gaps in political engagement between natives and their migrant peers. After controlling for family characteristics, particularly for the number of family members involved in political engagement and participation (family political socialisation), we observe that engagement is significantly higher for young migrants compared to their native peers.

The predicted probabilities of political engagement change accordingly: after controlling for personal (M2a) and household characteristics (M3a), the predicted probabilities of being politically engaged reduce for natives from 0.5 to 0.4. Still, they rise from 0.3 to over 0.5 for young migrants (Fig. 1).

Differences in political engagement by country of births are scarcely significant with very marginal participation levels for the youths born in Northern America and Oceania (Table 4). We also observed that naturalisation does not significantly impact on political participation. The predicted probability of naturalised Italian citizens being engaged in politics was 0.358*** (IC 0.259–0.457), and 0.450*** (IC 0.423–0.477) for both Italian natives and foreign citizens. This finding can be explained considering, on the one hand, the scarce presence of naturalised citizens in our sample (4.4%). On the other hand, as research suggests, the citizenship regime plays a central role in influencing the level of migrant political participation (Huddleston et al. 2011). As mentioned before the Italian context with its strict norms regulating the acquisition of citizenship (Boccagni 2012) does not favour migrant political participation.

Language proficiency, as already shown by literature (Cesareo and Blangiardo 2009), is a crucial factor for migrant inclusion. The predicted probability of political engagement for individuals with no difficulties in understanding Italian was 0.451*** (IC 0.424–0.477), but values for lower levels of proficiency were below 0.38.

Although personal characteristics primarily explain differences in political engagement by background, our model further suggests that family political socialisation is highly relevant. We also observed that the effects of political involvement of the other members of the household work differently according to the type of political involvement considered (Fig. 2). Living with at least one politically engaged household member has a massive impact on personal engagement. In this study, the effect was higher for the youths with a foreign background (+ 0.57) compared to their native counterparts (+ 0.51). We also observed a similar result for political participation, but with a much smaller variation

Table 4 Political engagement: pairwise comparisons of estimated coefficients by country of birth, net of control variables for model M3a

Row versus column	Italy	EU	Other European countries	Northern Africa	Sub-Saharan countries	Other Asian countries	Eastern Asia	Northern America / Oceania
EU	- 0.246							
Other European countries	- 0.029	0.217						
Northern Africa	0.175	0.421*	0.204					
Sub-Saharan countries	- 0.335	- 0.087	- 0.305	- 0.508				
Other Asian countries	- 0.015	0.231	0.014	- 0.189	0.319			
Eastern Asia	- 0.210	0.037	- 0.180	- 0.384	0.125	- 0.194		
Norther America / Oceania	- 4.201***	- 3.954***	- 4.172***	4.376***	- 3.867***	- 4.186***	- 3.991***	
Latin America	- 0.427	- 0.181	- 0.398*	- 0.602*	- 0.094	- 0.412	- 0.218	3.773***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

See Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables and Table 8 in the appendix to see full models




Fig. 2 Predicted probabilities of political engagement by migration background and presence of at least one household member involved in **a** political engagement, or **b** political participation (interactions), net of control variables for Model M3a. *Note:* see Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables

between individuals living in households with or without members involved in political participation.

4.2.2 Political Participation

The pairwise comparisons of coefficients for the migrant generation of origin (native youths, first and second-generation youths) in the constrained model M1b show statistically significant differences between all migrant generations and natives, as well as across migrant generations (Table 5). Natives are significantly more involved in political participation compared to their migrant peers. However, first-generation migrant youths participate more than their native-born peers, or those who migrated to Italy at a younger age.

Model M2b clarifies that differences in political participation between first-generation migrant youths and native youths are fully explained by the respondent's characteristics. Once we controlled for these covariates, the coefficient for first-generation against native youths remains negative but is no longer significant. We also observed that the differences

Table 5 Political participation: pairwise comparisons of estimated coefficient according to migration background, net of control variables

	Model M1b		Model M2b		Model M3b	
	Contrast	Std. Err	Contrast	Std. Err	Contrast	Std. Err
Generation 1.50/1.25 versus Generation 1.75/2	- 0.106	0.245	- 0.171	0.308	- 0.176	0.271
Generation 1 versus Generation 1.75/2	0.555*	0.275	0.497	0.370	0.304	0.324
Generation 1.75/2 versus Natives	- 1.169***	0.218	- 1.069***	0.209	- 0.235	0.209
Generation 1 versus Generation 1.50/1.25	0.661**	0.203	0.670**	0.240	0.480*	0.230
Generation 1.50/1.25 versus Natives	- 1.275***	0.117	- 1.242***	0.350	- 0.411	0.335
Generation 1 versus Natives	- 0.614***	0.172	- 0.572	0.404	0.068	0.367

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

See Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables and Table9 in the appendix to see full models

between natives and other migrant peers, as well as those between first-generation migrants and Generations 1.50 and 1.25 remain substantial.

Models M3b completes the analysis by showing that the remaining differences in political participation are explained by household characteristics, except in the case of the gap between first-generation immigrants and Generations 1.50 and 1.25.

Predicted probabilities of political participation changed accordingly from model M1b to M3b: we observed positive changes for migrants (+ 0.066 for Generation 1.75 and 2; + 0.047 for Generations 1.25 and 1.50; and + 0.067 for first-generation), and a negative variation for natives (- 0.042) (Fig. 3).

Apart from other covariates, political participation is systematically lower for youths born in Asia and North America or Oceania compared to peers born in other countries (Table 6). We also observed that, again, naturalisation does not significantly impact on political participation. The predicted probability of being involved in political participation




Fig. 3 Predicted probabilities of political participation by migration background, net of control variables for Models M1b, M2b, M3b. Note: see Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables

Table 6 Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions of political participation by country of birth, net of control variables for model M3b

Row vs column	Italy	EU	Other European countries	Northern Africa	Sub-Saharan countries	Other Asian countries	Eastern Asia	Northern America and Oceania
EU	- 0.051							
Other European countries	0.064	0.115						
Northern Africa	0.275	0.327	0.211					
Sub-Saharan countries	- 0.171	- 0.120	- 0.235	- 0.446				
Other Asian countries	- 4.335***	- 4.284***	- 4.399***	- 4.610***	- 4.164***			
Eastern Asia	- 4.358***	- 4.306***	- 4.421***	- 4.634***	- 4.187***	- 0.023		
Northern America and Oceania	- 4.493***	- 4.442***	- 4.557***	- 4.769***	- 4.322***	- 0.158	- 0.136	
Latin America	- 0.013	0.039	- 0.076	- 0.289	0.158	4.322***	4.345***	4.481***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

See Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables and Table 9 in the appendix to see full models




Fig. 4 Predicted probabilities of political participation amongst youths from migrant backgrounds and presence of at least one household member involved in **a** political engagement, or **b** political participation, net of control variables for Model M3b. *Note:* See Sect. 3.4 for the specification of control variables

of naturalised Italian citizens was 0.054* (IC 0.008–0.102), whereas it was 0.099*** (IC 0.065–0.134) for either Italian natives or foreign citizens.

According to our results, language proficiency also positively affects the predicted probability of political participation, irrespective of other variables. The predicted probability of political participation was 0.099*** (IC 0.065–0.132) for native speakers of Italian or those with high Italian language proficiency, and 0.102* (IC 0.018–0.186) for those with limited difficulties. Other values were lower but not significant.

Finally, we observed that the effect of political socialisation in the family follows a similar pattern observed for political engagement. Both types of household members' involvement (political engagement and political participation) impacted on the political involvement of young cohabitant. Still, the intergenerational effect is by far higher for the same kind of political involvement (Fig. 4).

The effect of the presence of at least one household member involved in political participation on political participation was the highest among natives (+ 0.482) and the lowest among Generations 1.25 and 1.50 (+ 0.354). The effect of at least one member involved in political engagement was the highest among first-generation immigrants (+ 0.019) and, again, the lowest among Generations 1.25 and 1.50 (+ 0.006). Given the restricted proportion of individuals involved in political participation, predicted probabilities' confidence intervals are wider but still significant.

5 Discussion and Conclusion

Our analysis within the Italian context discussed the existence of differences in the political involvement of youths according to their migrant background. Our descriptive analysis revealed that youths with a migrant background are more politically inactive than their native peers (69.2 vs 45.8%, respectively), and as, a consequence, less active in terms of political engagement (30.3% among youths of foreign origin vs 51.3% among natives) and political participation (1.5 vs 14.5%).

Nonetheless, the multivariate analysis brought some unexpected elements into our reflection. Building on the discussion of the literature, we expected to observe a critical role of the migrant generation in explaining the gap with natives in political involvement (Hypothesis H1). On the contrary, models analysing political engagement show no differences among youths with a foreign background according to their age at the arrival or place of birth (generation). Moreover, personal characteristics fully explain the gap in political involvement between youths with a migrant background and natives. Among the most relevant and innovative results of our analysis, it emerges that, when controlling for personal and family characteristics, youths with a migrant background show higher political engagement than natives. We, therefore, did not observe a simple convergence to the natives' level of involvement: what we saw is an overtaking by youths with a migrant background.

When dealing with the most time-consuming acts (such as taking part in political meetings, demonstrations, participation in a political association, etc.) labelled as political participation, we observe a more complicated situation. A wide gap is observed with natives but also across generations. First-generation unexpectedly showed higher levels of activism compared to other youths with a migrants background. Again, after controlling for the variables included in the model, immigrant youths and second-generation youths displayed similar levels of political participation compared to natives, with little differences based on the migrant generation. In other words, when the gap in socio-economic characteristics and family political background was controlled, our data highlight that immigrant youths and second-generation youths participate in the political field as much as their native peers. Our analysis confirms, instead, the crucial role of the political socialisation within the family (H2). Living in a family with at least a member engaged in politics has a more substantial effect on personal political engagement than having a family member involved in political participation. On that same note, having at least one family member involved in political participation reveal a more substantial impact on political participation than having a politically engaged family member.

The migrant background, therefore, is not a factor negatively affecting youth participation or involvement in politics in itself. On the contrary, it is positively related to political engagement. The main driver of the low involvement in politics of youngsters with a foreign background is the transmission of socio-economic disadvantages from immigrants to their descendants, which still largely penalises youths of migrant origin (OECD 2017). In particular, the lower presence of immigrant parents involved in politics negatively affects the political engagement of their children. All of these aspects prevent youths with a migrant background from bringing their unique perspective to the public sphere (Humphries et al. 2013), even if an increasing protagonism of second-generation youths is emerging in Italy.

Overall, our analysis confirms the role of classical determinants (socio-economic status, education, family political socialisation) in influencing youth political involvement and the crucial role of language proficiency for those with a migrant origin. In the Italian context, naturalisation is not, per se, a strong driver of political activism, as argued in a previous study on immigrant youth political involvement in Belgium (Quintelier 2009). In Italy, the

acquisition of Italian citizenship emerges as an identity and symbolic goal, rather than a precondition for political activism. This is particularly true for those who are born and raised in Italy (Colombo et al. 2009). Moreover, not having Italian citizenship may represent a reason to be more politically active and to claim for political rights. In addition to this, it is worth noting that, in our sample, very few of the individuals were naturalised (4.4% of our sample), and the 10 selected indicators were not sensitive to naturalisation.

Finally, due to the centrality of political participation for healthy democratic societies, the opportunity to be active in the political sphere should be offered to all young people, including those with a migrant background. As such, particular attention should be devoted to education, which has a positive effect on youths' political involvement. Furthermore, policies promoting the intergenerational mobility of immigrant descendants by addressing their socio-economic disadvantages are expected to have a positive impact on subjective well-being through the enhancement of political involvement.

Acknowledgements We are grateful to participants to the parallel session "Society" held during the LVI Scientific Meeting of the Italian Society for Economy, Demography and Statistics (SIEDS) in Ascoli Piceno on May 24th 2019 for their valuable suggestions and insights that contributed to the improvement of our paper.

Funding Open access funding provided by Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna within the CRUI-CARE Agreement.

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.

Appendix

See Tables 7, 8 and 9

Table 7 Sample characteristics by migrant background and political involvement

	<i>Native background sample</i>			<i>Migrant background sample</i>		
	<i>All sample</i>	<i>Political engagement</i>	<i>Political participation</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Political engagement</i>	<i>Political participation</i>
% Males	55.5	58.5	54.0	56.8	59.7	65.5
% First generation	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.1	11.8	23.4
% Generation 1.25/1.50	0.0	0.0	0.0	60.5	60.3	39.0
% Generation 1.75/2	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.4	27.9	37.6
Mean age	22.4	23.7	22.8	19.4	20.7	23.1
% Employed	31.1	35.1	29.9	25.5	33.2	48.3
% Unemployed	20.0	17.6	14.2	12.2	13.7	11.5
% Inactive	47.7	46.3	55.5	52.9	49.8	40.2
% Received part of his/her education in Italy	100.0	100.0	100.0	72.6	80.5	58.0
% Read at least a book in the last 12 months	56.8	66.6	70.9	49.1	65.9	50.5

Table 7 continued

	<i>Native background sample</i>			<i>Migrant background sample</i>		
	<i>All sample</i>	<i>Political engagement</i>	<i>Political participation</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>Political engagement</i>	<i>Political participation</i>
No education	0.2	0.0	0.0	2.1	1.4	0.0
Primary education	2.9	1.0	0.5	13.0	4.8	0.3
Junior high school education	41.5	30.6	38.5	51.6	44.3	24.1
High school education	43.5	51.2	45.8	30.9	44.7	59.7
University education	11.8	17.2	15.2	2.4	4.8	15.8
% Italian citizen	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.0	15.8	4.4
% Difficulty in understanding native Italian speakers: Not at all	100.0	100.0	100.0	81.9	91.8	87.9
Place of birth: Italy	100.0	100.0	100.0	12.0	11.7	7.5
Place of birth: European Union	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.8	20.6	28.0
Place of birth: Other European Countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.2	31.4	36.9
Place of birth: Northern Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.4	13.2	14.6
Place of birth: Sub-Saharan Africa	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	2.6	3.3
Place of birth: Eastern Asia	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.0	5.9	0.0
Place of birth: Other Asian Countries	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.7	5.1	0.0
Place of birth: North America and Oceania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0
Place of birth: Latin America	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.1	9.6	9.8
% Living in a house owned by the family	76.1	79.8.7	81.9	31.4	37.2	30.7
% Living in poor housing conditions or overcrowding	17.4	15.2	14.5	33.7	29.7	51.6
% Living in a family with both parents	79.4	80.2	80.7	78.5	79.2	80.4
% Living in a single mother household	16.3	16.1	15.0	16.6	17.4	10.3
Mean size of the household	3.7	4.3	3.7	4.4	3.6	3.4
% Living in Northern Italy	45.2	48.8	44.1	63.3	65.2	50.2
% Living with an Italian Native	100.0	100.0	100.0	13.9	21.5	17.7
% Living with a person involved in political engagement	66.8	94.0	85.4	37.1	81.8	38.8
% Living with a person involved in political participation	13.4	19.3	57.6	0.5	1.0	18.7

Table 8 Coefficient and robust standard error from nested models (M1a, M2a, M3a) on political engagement of youths aged 14–35 living in their family of origin

Main equation: political engagement	Model M1a		Model M2a		Model M3a	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
Generation: 1.75/2	-0.534***	(0.0993)	-0.164	(0.152)	0.610***	(0.169)
Generation: 1.25/1.50	-0.549***	(0.0648)	-0.182	(0.208)	0.569*	(0.231)
Generation: 1	-0.568***	(0.108)	-0.227	(0.250)	0.510*	(0.257)
Generation: Native	Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Age			0.196***	(0.0384)	0.106**	(0.0394)
Age squared term			-0.00322***	(0.000763)	-0.00149	(0.000786)
Gender: Male			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Gender: Female			-0.322***	(0.0435)	-0.255***	(0.0518)
Job Position: Employed			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Job Position: Unemployed			-0.148*	(0.0627)	-0.0679	(0.0648)
Job Position: Inactive			0.103	(0.0670)	0.0363	(0.0801)
Job Position: Other			-0.126	(0.140)	-0.326*	(0.143)
Education received part of his/her education in Italy: No			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Education received part of his/her education in Italy: Yes			0.243	(0.130)	0.0759	(0.109)
Cultural consumptions—read at least a book in the last 12 months: No			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Cultural consumptions—read at least a book in the last 12 months: Yes			0.586***	(0.0452)	0.372***	(0.0502)
Education: No education			-0.454	(0.349)	-0.429	(0.305)
Education: Primary			-0.850***	(0.151)	-0.609***	(0.158)
Education: Junior high school			-0.481***	(0.0835)	-0.261**	(0.0919)
Education: High school			-0.196**	(0.0695)	-0.0278	(0.0679)
Education: University graduated			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Citizenship: Foreign Citizenship			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)

Table 8 continued

Main equation: political engagement	Model M1a		Model M2a		Model M3a	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
Citizenship: Italian citizenship (native or naturalised)						
Place of birth: Italy	Ref	(.)	0.0165	(0.181)	- 0.345	(0.182)
Place of birth: European Union	- 0.0737	(0.212)	Ref	(.)		
Place of birth: Other European Countries	0.106	(0.209)	- 0.246	(0.241)		
Place of birth: Northern Africa	0.159	(0.226)	- 0.0290	(0.249)		
Place of birth: Sub-Saharan Africa	- 0.507	(0.284)	0.175	(0.235)		
Place of birth: Eastern Asia	- 0.0452	(0.252)	- 0.333	(0.332)		
Place of birth: Other Asian Countries	- 0.127	(0.315)	- 0.0148	(0.282)		
Place of birth: North America and Oceania	- 4.430***	(0.209)	- 0.209	(0.302)		
Place of birth: Latin America	- 0.103	(0.239)	- 4.201***	(0.309)		
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: High	- 0.813*	(0.349)	- 0.427	(0.268)		
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Moderate	- 0.886**	(0.296)	- 0.266	(0.489)		
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Limited	- 0.533**	(0.188)	- 0.440	(0.321)		
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Not at all	Ref	(.)	- 0.443**	(0.163)		
Residence in a house owned by the family: No			Ref	(.)		
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes			Ref	(.)		
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No			- 0.143*	(0.0606)		
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes			Ref	(.)		
Household type: Two parents with children			0.165**	(0.0622)		
Household type: Male single parent with children			Ref	(.)		
Household type: female single parent with children			0.262*	(0.114)		
Size of the household			0.480***	(0.0671)		
Household residence: Northern Italy			- 0.0718*	(0.0282)		
Household residence: Central Italy			Ref	(.)		
			0.0419	(0.0611)		

Table 8 continued

	Model M1a		Model M2a		Model M3a	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
Main equation: political engagement						
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.0769	(0.0544)
At least a member of the household involved in political engagement: No	Ref	(.)				
At least a member of the household involved in political engagement: Yes	2.566***	(0.183)				
At least a member of the household involved in political participation: No	Ref	(.)				
At least a member of the household involved in political participation: Yes	0.912***	(0.267)				
Constant	0.0314	(0.201)	- 2.765***	(0.515)	- 3.252***	(0.522)
<i>Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household involved in political engagement</i>						
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					Ref	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.306***	(0.0596)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					Ref	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					- 0.226***	(0.0647)
Household type: Two parents with children					Ref	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					- 0.592***	(0.111)
Household type: female single parent with children					- 0.456***	(0.0782)
Size of the household					- 0.0277	(0.0279)
Household residence: Northern Italy					Ref	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					- 0.118	(0.0672)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					- 0.285***	(0.0503)
At least an elder member of the household is born in Italy: Yes					0.305**	(0.094)
At least an elder member of the household is born in Italy: No					Ref	(.)
HDI of the country of origin of the head of the family					2.071***	(0.517)
Constant					- 0.0351	(0.129)

Table 8 continued

	Model M1a		Model M2a		Model M3a	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
Main equation: political engagement						
N	13,254		12,917		12,917	
AIC	17,597.5		14,985.4		32,995.4	

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 9 Coefficient and robust standard error from nested models (M1b, M2b, M3b) on political participation of youths aged 14–35 living in their family of origin Italy 2012

Main equation: political participation	Model M1b		Model M2b		Model M3b	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
<i>Generation: 1.75/2</i>	– 1.169***	(0.218)	– 1.069***	(0.209)	– 0.235	(0.209)
<i>Generation: 1.25/1.50</i>	– 1.275***	(0.117)	– 1.242***	(0.350)	– 0.411	(0.335)
<i>Generation: 1</i>	– 0.614***	(0.172)	– 0.572	(0.404)	0.0689	(0.367)
<i>Generation: native</i>	<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)
Age			0.0126*	(0.00604)	0.0143*	(0.00604)
Gender: male			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	0	(.)
Gender: female			– 0.0608	(0.0510)	– 0.0429	(0.0530)
Job position: employed			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	0	(.)
Job position: unemployed			– 0.135	(0.0728)	– 0.156*	(0.0738)
Job position: inactive			0.180**	(0.0692)	0.0697	(0.0629)
Job position: other			– 0.531*	(0.210)	– 0.527**	(0.184)
Education received part of his/her education in Italy: No			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)
Education received part of his/her education in Italy: Yes			– 0.0246	(0.244)	0.0149	(0.227)
Cultural consumptions read at least a book in the last 12 months: No			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)
Cultural consumptions read at least a book in the last 12 months: Yes			0.307***	(0.0538)	0.239***	(0.0503)
Education: No education			– 4.635***	(0.106)	– 5.521***	(0.775)
Education: primary			– 0.799***	(0.235)	– 0.608**	(0.201)
Education: junior high school			– 0.141	(0.0895)	0.0408	(0.0850)
Education: high school			– 0.0713	(0.0764)	– 0.0164	(0.0729)
Education: university graduated			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)
Citizenship: native/foreign			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)
Citizenship: naturalised Italian citizen			– 0.500	(0.332)	– 0.419	(0.286)
Place of birth: Italy			<i>Ref</i>	(.)	<i>Ref</i>	(.)
Place of birth: European Union			0.0728	(0.363)	– 0.0512	(0.314)
Place of birth: Other European Countries			0.177	(0.312)	0.0639	(0.280)
Place of birth: Northern Africa			0.350	(0.555)	0.275	(0.501)
Place of birth: Sub-Saharan Africa			– 0.0245	(0.464)	– 0.171	(0.455)
Place of birth: Eastern Asia			– 4.128***	(0.379)	– 4.335***	(0.327)
Place of birth: Other Asian Countries			– 3.988***	(0.356)	– 4.358***	(0.346)
Place of birth: North America and Oceania			– 3.892***	(0.418)	– 4.493***	(0.429)
Place of birth: Latin America			0.107	(0.393)	– 0.0126	(0.346)

Table 9 continued

Main equation: political participation	Model M1b		Model M2b		Model M3b	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: High			- 4.378***	(0.261)	- 4.410***	(0.263)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Moderate			- -0.425	(0.453)	- 0.181	(0.409)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Limited			- 0.0815	(0.334)	0.0250	(0.295)
Difficulty in understanding an Italian talking: Not at all			Ref	(.)	Ref	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					Ref	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					- 0.0792	(0.0752)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					Ref	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					0.198**	(0.0692)
Household type: Two parents with children					Ref	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					0.327*	(0.129)
Household type: female single parent with children					0.193	(0.0989)
Size of the household					- 0.0792*	(0.0376)
Household residence: Northern Italy					Ref	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					0.0335	(0.0756)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.147*	(0.0700)
At least a member of the household involved in Political engagement: No					Ref	(.)
At least a member of the household involved in Political engagement: Yes					1.296***	(0.308)
At least an elder member of the household involved in political participation: No					Ref	(.)
At least an elder member of the household involved in political participation: Yes					1.503***	(0.398)
Constant	- 1.058***	(0.0251)	- 1.425***	(0.327)	- 2.358***	(0.379)
<i>Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household involved in Political engagement</i>						
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					Ref	(.)

Table 9 continued

Main equation: political participation	Model M1b		Model M2b		Model M3b	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.312***	(0.0590)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					Ref	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					- 0.230***	(0.0645)
Household type: Two parents with children					Ref	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					- 0.597***	(0.110)
Household type: female single parent with children					- 0.458***	(0.0786)
Size of the household					- 0.0269*	(0.0282)
Household residence: Northern Italy					Ref	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					- 0.123**	(0.0674)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					- 0.280***	(0.00501)
At least an elder member of the household is born in Italy: No					Ref	(.)
At least an elder member of the household is born in Italy: Yes					0.537***	(0.0691)
HDI of the country of origin of the head of the family					2.217***	(0.528)
Constant					- 0.0309	(0.0131)
<i>Endogenous variable equation: At least a member of the household involved in political participation</i>						
Residence in a house owned by the family: No					Ref	(.)
Residence in a house owned by the family: Yes					0.241**	(0.0795)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: No					Ref	(.)
Poor housing conditions or overcrowding: Yes					- 0.117*	(0.0823)
Household type: Two parents with children					Ref	(.)
Household type: Male single parent with children					- 0.201	(0.0795)
Household type: female single parent with children					- 0.291**	(0.102)
Size of the household					0.0591**	(0.0339)
Household residence: Northern Italy					Ref	(.)
Household residence: Central Italy					0.0878	(0.0842)
Household residence: Southern Italy and Islands					0.270***	(0.0629)
At least an elder member of the household is born in Italy: No					Ref	(.)

Table 9 continued

Main equation: political participation	Model M1b		Model M2b		Model M3b	
	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err	Coef	Robust Std. Err
At least an elder member of the household is born in Italy: Yes					0.406*	(0.164)
HDI of the country of origin of the head of the family					7.487***	(1.460)
Constant					- 2.838***	(0.240)
<i>Corr (error. At least a member of the household involved in political engagement; error. Political engagement)</i>					- 0.666***	(0.165)
<i>Corr (error. At least a member of the household involved in political participation; error. Political engagement)</i>					- 0.169	(0.189)
<i>Corr (error. At least a member of the household involved in political participation; error. At least a member of the household involved in political engagement)</i>					0.502***	(0.0375)
N	13,254		12,917			12,917
AIC	7679.1		7,215.7			27,809.5

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

References

- Alba, R., & Foner, N. (2015). *Strangers no more: Immigration and the challenges of integration in North America and Western Europe*. New Jersey: Princetown university press.
- Alteri, L., Leccardi, C., & Raffini, L. (2016). Youth and the reinvention of politics: New forms of participation in the age of individualization and presentification. *PACO*, 9(3), 717–747.
- Ambrosi, E., & Rosina, A. (2009). *Non è un paese per giovani: L'anomalia italiana: Una generazione senza voce*. Venice: Marsilio Editori.
- Ambrosini, M., & Molina, S. (Eds.). (2004). *Seconde generazioni: Un'introduzione al futuro dell'immigrazione in Italia*. Turin: Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli.
- Ambrosini, M. (2005). Tra problemi sociali e nuove identità: I figli dell'immigrazione. In R. Billi (Ed.), *Integrazione e Cittadinanza* (pp. 37–100). Bologna: Italian Team Edizioni.
- Ambrosini, M., De Luca, D., & Pozzi, S. (2016). *Sindacati multietnici: I diversi volti di un cammino in divenire*. Parma: Spaggiari edizioni.
- Andall, J. (2002). Second-generation attitude? African-Italians in Milan. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(3), 389–407.
- Barnes, & Kaase, (1979). *Political action: Mass participation in five Western democracies*. Beverly Hills/London: Sage publications.
- Barrett, M., & Brunton-Smith, I. (2014). Political and civic engagement and participation: Towards and integrative perspective. *Journal of Civil Society*, 10(1), 5–28.
- Batsleer, J., Ehrensperger, K., Lüküslü, F., Osmanoğlu, B., Pais, A., Reutlinger, C., et al. (2017). Claiming spaces and struggling for recognition. *Comparative Case Study Report PARTISPACE Deliverable*, 4, 3.
- Bauböck, R., Kraler, A., Martiniello, M., & Perchinig, B. (2006). Migrants' citizenship: Legal status, rights and political participation. In R. Penninx, M. Berger, & K. Kraal (Eds.), *The dynamics of international migration and settlement in Europe: A state of art* (pp. 65–98). Amsterdam: Amsterdam university press.
- Beck, U. (1997). *The reinvention of politics: Rethinking modernity in the global social order*. Boston: Polity.
- Beck, U. (2016). *La metamorfosi del mondo*. Bari: Laterza.

- Bello, B. G., & Cuzzocrea, V. (2018). Introducing the need to study young people in contemporary Italy. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 23(1), 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2017.1409501>.
- Bichi R. (2013). La partecipazione politica. In Istituto Giuseppe Toniolo di Studi Superiori (Ed.), *La condizione giovanile in Italia: Rapporto Giovani 2013* (pp. 157–173). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Bloemraad, I. (2006). Becoming a citizen in the United States and Canada: Structured mobilisation and immigrant political incorporation. *Social Forces*, 85(2), 667–695.
- Boccagni, P. (2012). La partecipazione politica degli immigrati: Dal dibattito internazionale al caso italiano. In M. Ambrosini (Ed.), *Governare città plurali: Politiche locali di integrazione per gli immigrati in Europa* (pp. 69–97). Milan: FrancoAngeli.
- Bonanomi, A., Migliavacca, M., Rosina, A. (2018). Domanda di rappresentanza e orientamento politico. In Istituto Giuseppe Toniolo (Ed.). *La condizione giovanile in Italia: Rapporto giovani 2018*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Briggs, J. (2017). *Young people and political participation*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Caltabiano, M., & Rosina, A. (2018). The dejuvenation of the Italian population. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 23(1), 24–40.
- Cesareo, V., & Blangiardo, G. C. (2009). *Integration Indexes: Quaderni Ismu 2/2011*. Milan: ISMU.
- Cicognani, E., Zani, B., Fournier, B., Gavray, C., & Born, M. (2012). Gender differences in youths' political engagement and participation. The role of parents and of adolescents' social and civic participation. *Journal of Adolescence*, 35, 561–576.
- Cinalli, M., & Giugni, M. (2011). Institutional opportunities, discursive opportunities and the political participation of migrants in European cities. In L. Morales & M. Giugni (Eds.), *Social capital, political participation and migration in Europe: Making multicultural democracy work?* (pp. 43–62). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cinalli, M., & Giugni, M. (2016). Electoral participation of Muslim in Europe: Assessing the impact of institutional and discursive opportunities. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42, 309–324.
- Colombo, E., Domaneschi, L., & Marchetti, C. (2009). *Una nuova generazione di italiani: L'idea di cittadinanza tra i giovani figli di immigrati*. Milan: FrancoAngeli.
- CMEPSP. (2009). Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. Report by the commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress. Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report>.
- Congee, P. J. (1988). The concept of political participation: Toward a definition. *Comparative Politics*, 20, 241–249.
- Crul, M., & Mollenkopf, J. (Eds.). (2012). *The changing face of world cities. Young adult children of immigrants in Europe and the United States*. New York: Russel Sage foundation.
- Crul, M., Schneider, J., Keskiner, E., & Lelie, F. (2017). The multiplier effect: How the accumulation of cultural and social capital explains steep upward social mobility of children of low-educated immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40(2), 321–338.
- Dahl, R. A. (2006). *On political equality*. New Haven: Yale university press.
- de Rooij, E. (2012). Patterns of immigrant political participation: Explaining differences in types of political participation between immigrants and the majority population in Western Europe. *European Sociological Review*, 28(4), 455–481.
- Eurobarometer. (2011). *Youth on the move: Flash eurobarometer*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_319b_en.pdf.
- Eurobarometer. (2018). Report European Youth, flash eurobarometer 455. Retrieved from https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2163_455_ENG.
- Eurobarometer. (2019). Public opinion in the European Union, first results. Eurobarometer Standard 91. Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2253>.
- Eurofound, (2018). *Social cohesion and well-being in Europe*. Luxembourg: Publications office of the European Union.
- Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (1999). Political participation and political trust in Amsterdam: Civic communities and ethnic networks. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 25(4), 703–726.
- Flavin, P., & Keane, M. J. (2012). Life satisfaction and political participation: Evidence from the United States. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 13, 63–78.
- Forbrig, J. (Ed.). (2005). *Revisiting youth political participation: Challenges for research and democratic practice in Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe publishing.
- Fox, S. (2014). Is it time to update the definition of political participation? Political participation in Britain: The decline and revival of civic culture. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67(2), 495–505.
- Frey, B., & Stutzer, A. (2000). Happiness prospers in democracy. *Journal of Happiness Studies*, 1(1), 79–102.

- Gallego, A. (2008). Unequal political participation in Europe. *International Journal of Sociology*, 37(4), 10–25.
- Genova, C. (2018). Social practices and lifestyles in Italian youth cultures. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 23(1), 75–92.
- Gilardoni, G. (2008). *Somiglianze e differenze. L'integrazione delle nuove generazioni nella società multi-etnica*. Milan: FrancoAngeli.
- Goodman, S. W. (2010). Integration requirements for integration's sake? Identifying, categorising and comparing civic integration policies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5), 753–772.
- Gozzo, S., & Sampugnaro, R. (2016). What happens? Changes in European youth participation. *PACO*, 9(3), 748–776.
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Pietrantuono, G. (2015). Naturalisation fosters the long term political integration of migrants. *PNAS*, 112(41), 12651–12656.
- Harris, A., Wyn, J., & Younes, S. (2010). Beyond apathetic or activist youth: 'Ordinary' young people and contemporary forms of participation. *Young Nordic Journal of Youth Research*, 18(1), 9–32.
- Heath, A. (2014). Introduction: Patterns of generational change—Convergent, reactive or emergent? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(1), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2014.844845>.
- Helliwell, J. F., & Putnam, R. D. (2004). The social context of well-being. *The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, 359, 1435–1446.
- Henn, M., & Foard, N. (2014). Social differentiation in young people's political participation: The impact of social and educational factors on youth political engagement in Britain. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 17(3), 360–380. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.830704>.
- Hope, E. C., & Jagers, R. J. (2014). The Role of sociopolitical attitudes and civic education in the civic engagement of black youth. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 24(3), 460–470.
- Huddleston, T., Niessen, J., Chaoimh E. N., White, E. (2011). *Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)*, Brussels.
- Humphries, M., Muller, C., & Schiller, K. (2013). The political socialization of adolescent children of immigrants. *Social Science Quarterly*, 94(5), 1261–1282.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton university press.
- ISTAT. (2014). *Condizione e integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri: informazioni sulla rilevazione*. Retrieved from <https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/10825>.
- ISTAT. (2018). Report. La povertà in Italia. Retrieved from <https://www.istat.it/it/files/2018/06/La-povert%C3%A0-in-Italia-2017.pdf>.
- ISTAT (2019). Rapporto SDGS 2019. *Informazioni statistiche per l'agenda 2030 in Italia*. Retrived from <https://www.istat.it/it/files/2019/04/Nota-stampa-SDGs-edizione-2019.pdf>.
- Ivaldi, E., Bonatti, G., & Soliani, R. (2017). An Indicator for the measurement of political participation: The case of Italy. *Social Indicators Research*, 132, 605–620.
- Juris, J. S., & Pleyers, H. G. (2009). Alter-activism: Emerging cultures of participation among young global justice activists. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 12(1), 57–75.
- Just, A., & Anderson, C. J. (2012). Immigrants, citizenship and political action in Europe. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 481–509.
- Kaldur, K., Fangen, K. & Sarin, T. (2012). *Political inclusion and participation*. Policy brief EUMARGIN no. 6. Retrieved from https://www.ibs.ee/wp-content/uploads/6th_policy_brief_political_participation.pdf.
- Kalter, F. (2018). Setting “Spanish Legacies” into further context: Some findings and thoughts from CILS4EU. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41(3), 500–508.
- Lijphart, A. (1997). Unequal participation: Democracy's unresolved dilemma. *American Political Science Review*, 91(1), 1–14.
- Loader, B. D., Vromen, A., & Xenos, M. A. (2014). The networked young citizen: Social media, political participation and civic engagement. *Information, Communication and Society*, 17(2), 143–150.
- Martinelli, A. (2013). *Mal di nazione*. Contro la deriva populista: Università Bocconi Editore, Milan.
- Maxwell, R. (2010). Evaluating migrant integration: Political attitudes across generations in Europe. *International Migration Review*, 44(1), 25–52.
- McDevitt, M., & Chaffee, S. (2002). From top-down to trickle-up influence: Revisiting assumptions about the family in political socialization. *Political Communication*, 19(3), 281–301. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01957470290055501>.
- Morales, L., & Giugni, M. (Eds.). (2011). *Social capital, political participation and migration in Europe*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nelson, J. M. (1979). *Access to power: Politics and urban poor in developing nations*. New Jersey: Princeton university press.

- Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic phoenix: Reinventing political activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
- OECD. (2017). *Catching Up? Country studies on intergenerational mobility and children of immigrants*. Paris: Oecd Publishing, testo disponibile in <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301030-en>.
- Ortensi, L., & Riniolo, V. (2020). Do migrants get involved in politics? Level, forms and drivers of migrant political participation in Italy. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 21(1), 133–153.
- Pacek, A., & Radcliff, B. (2008). Assessing the welfare state: The politics of happiness. *Perspectives on Politics*, 6(2), 267–277.
- Pacheco, G., & Lange, T. (2010). Political participation and life satisfaction: a cross-European analysis. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 37, 686–702. <https://doi.org/10.1108/03068291011062489>.
- Penninx, R., Kraal, K., Martiniello, M., & Vertovec, S. (2004). *Citizenship in European cities: Immigrants, local politics and integration policies*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Penninx, R., & Martiniello, M. (2007). Processi di integrazione e politiche (locali): stato dell'arte e lezioni. *Mondi Migranti*, 1(3), 31–60.
- Pickard, S., & Bessant, J. (Eds.). (2018). *Young people re-generating politics in time of crises*. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Pilati, K. (2018). Gaps in protest activities between natives and individuals of migrant origin in Europe. *Acta Sociologica*, 61(2), 105–125.
- Pirni, A., & Raffini, L. (2018). I giovani e la re-invenzione del sociale per una prospettiva di ricerca sulle nuove generazioni. *Studi di Sociologia*, 1, 1–22.
- Pitti, I. (2018). *Youth and unconventional political engagement*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2001). *Legacies: The story of the immigrant second generation*. Berkeley: University of California press.
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic tradition in modern Italy*. Princeton NJ: Princetown university press.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and survival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Queirolo, P. L., & Torre, A. (Eds.). (2005). *Il fantasma delle bande. Giovani latino-americani a Ge-nova*. Genoa: Fratelli Frilli.
- Quintelier, E. (2009). The political participation of immigrant youth in Belgium. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35(6), 919–937. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830902957700>.
- Quintelier, E. (2015). Engaging adolescents in politics: The longitudinal effect of political socialization agents. *Youth and Society*, 47(1), 51–69.
- Raniolo, F. (2002). *La partecipazione politica*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Ricolfi, L. (2002). L'eclisse della politica. In C. Buzzi, A. Cavalli, & A. de Lillo (Eds.), *Giovani del nuovo secolo Quinto rapporto IARD sulla condizione giovanile in Italia* (pp. 259–282). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Riniolo, V. (2019). Second-generation youths: Experiences of political participation in Italy. *Studi di Sociologia*, 2, 187–196.
- Riniolo V. (2020). *The New faces of change: The second generation in Italy, in The Twenty-fifth Italian report on migrations 2019*. Milan: Fondazione ISMU, pp. 103–114 <https://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/XXV-report-on-migrations-2019.pdf.pdf>.
- Roberts, K. (2015). Youth mobilisations and political generations: Young activists in political change movements during and since the twentieth century. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 18(8), 950–966.
- Rogers, W. H. (1993). Regression standard errors in clustered samples. *Stata technical bulletin*, 13, 9–23. *Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints*, 3, 88–94.
- Rumbaut, R. (1997). Ties that bind: Immigration and immigrant families in the United States. In A. Booth, A. Crouter, & N. Landale (Eds.), *Immigration and the Family* (pp. 3–45). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- SandersFishers, D. S., Heath, A., et al. (2014). The democratic engagement of Britain's ethnic minorities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(1), 120–139.
- Santagati, M. (2019). *Autobiografie di una generazione Su.Per. Il successo degli studenti di origine immigrata*. Milan: Vita e Pensiero.
- Santagati M., Colussi E. (eds) (2019). *Alunni con background migratorio in Italia. Emergenze e traguardi. Rapporto nazionale*, Report ISMU, 1, <https://www.ismu.org/alunni-con-background-migratorio-in-italia-emergenze-e-traguardi/>.
- Schulze, J. L. (2014). The ethnic participation gap: Comparing second generation Russian youth and Estonian youth. *Journal on Ethno politics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 13(1), 19–56.
- Sloam, J. (2016). Diversity and voice: The political participation of young people in the European Union. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 18(3), 521–537.
- Valtolina G.G. (2017). *I processi di radicalizzazione religiosa nelle seconde generazioni*, Paper ISMU.

- Valtolina, G. G., & Marazzi, A. (Eds.). (2006). *Appartenenze multiple. L'esperienza dell'immigrazione nelle nuove generazioni*. Milan: FrancoAngeli.
- van Londen, M., Phalet, K., & Hagendoorn, L. (2007). Civic engagement and voter participation among Turkish and Moroccan minorities in Rotterdam. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33(8), 1201–1226.
- Ventura, R. (2001). Family political socialization in multiparty systems. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(6), 666–691.
- Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1972). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York, NY: Harper and row.
- Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2015). Second generations: Citizenship and transnationalism. *Mondi Migranti*, 2, 7–31.
- Williams, R. (2012). Using the margins command to estimate and interpret adjusted predictions and marginal effects. *Stata Journal*, 12(2), 308–331.
- Zanfrini, L. (2016). *Introduzione alla sociologia delle migrazioni*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., & Gropas, R. (2012). Active immigrants in multicultural contexts: Democratic challenges in Europe. In A. Triandafyllidou, T. Modood, & N. Meer (Eds.), *European multiculturalisms: Cultural, religious and ethnic challenges* (pp. 167–191). Edinburgh: Edinburgh university press.
- Zapata-Barrero, R., Gabrielli, L., Sánchez-Montijano, E., & Jaulin, T. (2013). *The political participation of immigrants in host countries: An interpretative framework from the perspective of origin countries and societies*, INTERACT RR 2013/07. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), European University Institute.
- Zinn, D. L. (2011). Loud and clear: The G2 second generations network in Italy. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 16(3), 377–385.

Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Affiliations

Veronica Riniolo¹  · Livia Elisa Ortensi² 

✉ Livia Elisa Ortensi
livia.ortensi@unibo.it

¹ Department of Sociology, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy

² Department of Statistical Sciences “Paolo Fortunati” (STAT), Alma Mater Studiorum University of Bologna, Via delle Belle Arti, 41 40126 Bologna, Italy