

Web Appendix

Limiting Accessibility:

How Targeting Consumers with Disabilities  
Constrains Acceptable Prices for Innovations

Musa Essa

Johannes Boegershausen

Gabriele Paolacci

## Web Appendix – Table of Contents

<b>WEB APPENDIX A: SUBSAMPLE ANALYSES.....</b>	<b>3</b>
STUDY 1A .....	3
STUDY 1B .....	3
STUDY 1C .....	3
STUDY 1D .....	4
STUDY 2 .....	4
STUDY 3A .....	4
STUDY 3B .....	5
STUDY 4A .....	5
STUDY 4B .....	7
<b>WEB APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDIES .....</b>	<b>9</b>
WEB APPENDIX B1: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 1 .....	9
WEB APPENDIX B2: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 2 .....	12
WEB APPENDIX B3: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 3 .....	37
WEB APPENDIX B4: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 4 .....	41
WEB APPENDIX B5: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 5 .....	44
WEB APPENDIX B6: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDY 6 .....	46
<b>WEB APPENDIX C: STIMULUS PLOT .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>50</b>

## WEB APPENDIX A: SUBSAMPLE ANALYSES

### Study 1A

Of 801 participants, 743 (92.8%) responded correctly to the attention check question. As in the full sample, a two-way ANOVA produced a significant main effect of the target market. Specifically, the company's pricing strategy was significantly less fair when the product was targeted at people with disabilities ( $M = 3.10$ ,  $SD = 1.58$ ) than the mass market ( $M = 4.12$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ,  $F(1, 735) = 86.96$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .11$ ). Importantly, this effect emerged across categories as the interaction between the target market and product replicates was not significant ( $F(3, 735) = .72$ ,  $p > .54$ ).

### Study 1B

Out of 601 participants, 455 (75.7%) correctly responded to the attention check question. We found that customers with disabilities were expected to pay marginally significantly lower prices ( $M = 7.34\%$ ,  $SD = 12.11\%$ ) than mass-market customers ( $M = 9.36\%$ ,  $SD = 9.95\%$ ,  $t(453) = 1.79$ ,  $p = .074$ ,  $d = .18$ ).

### Study 1C

Of 995 participants, 963 (96.8%) responded correctly to the attention check question. As in the full sample, participants rated the acceptability of the company's pricing strategy significantly lower when the target market was consumers with disabilities ( $M = 3.20$ ,  $SD = 1.44$ ) compared to when it was consumers with different heights and weights ( $M = 3.93$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ,  $t(961) = 8.19$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .53$ ). The target market manipulation significantly affected the choice of the gift card as the focal brand (Pottery Barn) gift card was significantly chosen less when the target market was consumers with disabilities compared to the control (44.19% vs. 51.77%  $\chi^2(1) = 5.54$ ,  $p = .019$ , *Cramér's V* = .08). We used 10,000 bootstrap replications to explore whether

acceptability judgments mediated the effect of the target market (0 = mass market, 1 = consumers with disabilities) on choice. We found that the indirect effect was significant ( $a \times b = -.05$ ,  $SE = .01$ ,  $95\% CI: -.07$  to  $-.03$ ).

### Study 1D

Out of 606 participants, 584 (96.4%) correctly responded to the attention check question. Participants clicked on the petition link almost twice as much when the target market was hardcore gamers with disabilities (26.9%) compared to when the target market was hardcore gamers (13.9%  $\chi^2(1) = 15.11$ ,  $p < .001$ , *Cramér's V* = .16).

### Study 2

Out of 601 participants, 554 (92.1%) correctly responded to the attention check question. A two-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects of the target market ( $F(1, 550) = 5.89$ ,  $p = .016$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .01$ ) and pricing strategy ( $F(1, 550) = 473.04$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .46$ ). Importantly, these main effects were qualified by the predicted target market  $\times$  pricing strategy interaction ( $F(1, 550) = 31.97$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ ). Replicating our previous studies, we found that in the price premium condition, participants rated the company's strategy as significantly less acceptable when it targeted consumers with disabilities ( $M = 3.75$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ ) than when it targeted the mass market ( $M = 4.57$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ,  $t(291) = 5.10$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .60$ ). In contrast, in the no price premium condition, the acceptability of the company's pricing strategy was significantly *higher* when it targeted consumers with disabilities ( $M = 6.51$ ,  $SD = .70$ ) than when it targeted the mass market ( $M = 6.19$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ,  $t(259) = 2.81$ ,  $p = .005$ ,  $d = .35$ ).

### Study 3A

Out of 399 participants, 394 (98.7%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As preregistered, we also report the analysis of the subsample. An independent t-test showed that

the firm's pricing strategy was rated as less acceptable when it targeted people with disabilities ( $M = 3.52$ ,  $SD = 1.58$ ) than when it targeted the mass market ( $M = 4.66$ ,  $SD = 1.34$ ,  $t(392) = 7.71$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 0.78$ ). Next, we tested whether pity mediated the effect of the target market on acceptability judgments. Targeting consumers with disabilities (vs. the mass market) evoked pity  $b = 1.31$ ,  $SE = .16$ ,  $t(392) = 8.23$ ,  $p < .001$ . Pity, in turn, had a significant negative effect on acceptability judgments  $b = -.28$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(391) = 6.29$ ,  $p < .001$ . Our estimation of the indirect effect using 10,000 bootstrap replications produced a significant indirect effect of target market on acceptability judgments via pity ( $a \times b = -.37$ ,  $SE = .08$ , 95% CI:  $-.54$  to  $-.22$ ). Importantly, this indirect effect remained significant when we controlled for wealth inferences ( $a \times b = -.34$ ,  $SE = .08$ , 95% CI:  $-.51$  to  $-.19$ ). Wealth also mediated the effect of target market on acceptability judgments ( $a \times b = -.21$ ,  $SE = .07$ , 95% CI:  $-.35$  to  $-.08$ ) as consumers with disabilities were perceived to be significantly poorer ( $M = 3.51$ ,  $SD = 1.24$ ) than mass market consumers ( $M = 4.43$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ,  $t(392) = 7.76$ ,  $d = .78$ ) and these wealth inferences in turn predicted acceptability judgments ( $b = .22$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $t(390) = 3.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

### Study 3B

Not applicable.

### Study 4A

Out of 802 participants, 773 (96.4%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As preregistered, we also report the analysis of the subsample. As in the full sample, a two-way ANOVA only showed a significant effect of the cost justification manipulation ( $F(1, 769) = 22.74$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ ), neither the effect of target market nor the interaction was significant (both  $ps > .15$ ). Participants perceived the costs of the new product as higher when the cost

justifications were provided ( $M = 1.52, SD = 0.77$ ) than when they were not ( $M = 1.24, SD = 0.85, t(771) = 4.75, p < .001, d = .34$ ).

A two-way ANOVA showed significant main effects of the target market ( $F(1, 769) = 32.08, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .04$ ) and cost justifications ( $F(1, 769) = 62.88, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .08$ ).

Replicating previous studies, acceptability was lower when the target market was consumers with disabilities ( $M = 4.21, SD = 1.61$ ) than when it was mass-market consumers ( $M = 4.76, SD = 1.26, t(771) = 5.32, p < .001, d = .38$ ). In line with past research, acceptability was also higher when the cost justifications were present ( $M = 4.87, SD = 1.36$ ) than when they were not ( $M = 4.09, SD = 1.48, t(771) = 7.69, p < .001, d = .55$ ). However, the interaction between target market and cost justifications was not significant ( $F(1, 769) = 0.93, p > .33, \eta_p^2 = .001$ ).

Next, we tested for mediation: target market ( $-.5 =$  mass market,  $.5 =$  consumers with disabilities) was a significant predictor of pity ( $b = 1.06, SE = .11, t(769) = 9.58, p < .001$ ), which, in turn, was a significant predictor of acceptability judgments ( $b = -.24, SE = .03, t(770) = 7.31, p < .001$ ). Our estimation of the indirect effect using 10,000 bootstrap replications produced a significant indirect effect of target market on acceptability judgments via pity both when cost justifications were present ( $a \times b = -.29, SE = .06, 95\% CI: -.41$  to  $-.18$ ) and they were absent ( $a \times b = -.22, SE = .05, 95\% CI: -.33$  to  $-.13$ ). Consequently, also a moderated mediation analysis did not find significance ( $IMM = -.06, SE = .05, 95\% CI: -.18$  to  $.04$ ). Controlling for wealth inferences did not alter the significance of these patterns (i.e., cost justifications present:  $a \times b = -.26, SE = .06, 95\% CI: -.38$  to  $-.16$  vs. absent:  $a \times b = -.20, SE = .05, 95\% CI: -.31$  to  $-.11$ ). Wealth also mediated the effect of target market on acceptability judgments. Consumers with disabilities were perceived to be significantly poorer ( $M = 3.65, SD = 1.29$ ) than mass market consumers ( $M = 4.56, SD = 1.15, t(771) = 10.34, d = .74, p < .001$ ), and these wealth inferences

in turn predicted acceptability judgments ( $b = .13$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(769) = 3.19$ ,  $p = .002$ ). However, contrary to our results for pity, the index of moderated mediation was significant for wealth ( $IMM = -.08$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $95\% CI: -.15$  to  $-.02$ ). Specifically, we found that when cost justifications were present, the indirect effect via wealth was significantly more negative ( $a \times b = -.16$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $95\% CI: -.28$  to  $-.04$ ), than when the cost justifications were absent ( $a \times b = -.08$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $95\% CI: -.16$  to  $-.02$ ).

### Study 4B

Out of 602 participants, 512 (85%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As preregistered, we also report the analysis of the subsample. As in the full sample, a two-way ANOVA produced the predicted significant interaction between the target market and pricing strategy ( $F(1, 508) = 65.66$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .11$ ). Neither main effect was significant; target market ( $F(1, 508) = 0.54$ ,  $p > .46$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .001$ ) and pricing strategy ( $F(1, 508) = 0.20$ ,  $p > .65$ ,  $\eta_p^2 < .001$ ) were not significant. Replicating previous studies, when the target segment of the innovation alone paid a price premium, acceptability was lower when the target market was hardcore gamers with physical disabilities ( $M = 4.13$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ ) than when it was hardcore gamers ( $M = 5.06$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ,  $t(285) = 5.65$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .67$ ). In contrast, the pattern was reversed when the costs of the innovations were socialized (i.e., *all* consumers paid 10% more). Specifically, we found that acceptability was higher when the target market was hardcore gamers with physical disabilities ( $M = 5.21$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ) than when it was hardcore gamers ( $M = 4.09$ ,  $SD = 1.57$ ,  $t(223) = 5.78$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .77$ ).

Put differently, these patterns suggest that while socializing the extra costs for the innovation *increased* the acceptability of the firm's pricing strategy when targeting consumers *with* disabilities ( $M = 5.21$ ,  $SD = 1.33$  vs.  $M = 4.13$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ ,  $t(256) = 6.11$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .76$ ),

it *decreased* the acceptability of the firm's pricing strategy when targeting consumers *without* disabilities ( $M = 4.09, SD = 1.57$  vs.  $M = 5.06, SD = 1.31, t(252) = 5.35, p < .001, d = .68$ ).

## WEB APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY STUDIES

### WEB APPENDIX B1: Supplementary Study 1

Supplementary Study 1 is an exact replication of Study 3A, with one key change: we used a different measure of perceived wealth. This study was preregistered:

<https://aspredicted.org/gxfg-fxzc.pdf>.

#### Method

We recruited 402 US-based participants from Prolific (52.2% female,  $M_{age} = 33.5$ ). We used the same between-subjects design (consumers with disabilities vs. mass market), scenario, and acceptability measure ( $\alpha = 0.94$ ) as Study 2. Additionally, participants indicated how much pity they felt toward the target segment on three items (pity/sorrow/sympathy, 1 = not at all; 7 = a lot;  $\alpha = 0.91$ ) adapted from Lyons et al. (2017). We also measured participants' inferences about the perceived wealth of the targeted customers on a single item: "*How much disposable income do consumers that Atoms is targeting have, compared to the average person?*" (-3 = much less than average; 0 = average; +3 = much more than average). Finally, participants reported their age and gender and answered an attention check about the brand's pricing strategy.

#### Results and Discussion

Replicating our main Study 3A, the firm's pricing strategy was rated as less acceptable when the firm targeted people with disabilities ( $M = 4.61$ ,  $SD = 1.53$ ) than when it targeted the mass market ( $M = 5.01$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ,  $t(400) = 2.70$ ,  $p = .007$ ,  $d = .27$ ). Next, we tested for mediation: target market (0 = mass market, 1 = consumers with disabilities) was a significant predictor of pity ( $b = .88$ ,  $SE = .17$ ,  $t(400) = 5.31$ ,  $p < .001$ ), which, in turn, was a significant predictor of acceptability judgments ( $b = -.27$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(399) = 6.61$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Our estimation

of the indirect effect using 10,000 bootstrap replications produced a significant indirect effect of target market on acceptability judgments via pity ( $a \times b = -.24$ ,  $SE = .07$ , 95%  $CI$ : -.38 to -.12). Importantly, this indirect effect remained significant when we controlled for wealth inferences ( $a \times b = -.22$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95%  $CI$ : -.35 to -.11). These results suggest that pity is an important factor explaining people's aversion to price premiums for innovations addressing the needs of people with disabilities. We also found that wealth mediated the effect of target market on acceptability judgments as well ( $a \times b = -.19$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95%  $CI$ : -.31 to -.08) as consumers with disabilities were perceived to be significantly poorer ( $M = 4.16$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ) than mass market consumers ( $M = 4.90$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ,  $t(400) = 4.84$ ,  $d = .48$ ) and these wealth inferences in turn predicted acceptability judgments ( $b = .25$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(398) = 5.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

### Subsample analysis

Of 402 participants, 387 (96.27%) correctly responded to the attention check question. Like in the full sample, the firm's pricing strategy was rated as less acceptable when the firm targeted people with disabilities ( $M = 4.62$ ,  $SD = 1.53$ ) than when it targeted the mass market ( $M = 5.01$ ,  $SD = 1.37$ ,  $t(385) = 2.63$ ,  $p = .009$ ,  $d = .27$ ). Next, we tested for mediation: target market (0 = mass market, 1 = consumers with disabilities) was a significant predictor of pity ( $b = .90$ ,  $SE = .17$ ,  $t(385) = 5.37$ ,  $p < .001$ ), which, in turn, was a significant predictor of acceptability judgments ( $b = -.29$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(384) = 6.83$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Our estimation of the indirect effect using 10,000 bootstrap replications produced a significant indirect effect of target market on acceptability judgments via pity ( $a \times b = -.26$ ,  $SE = .07$ , 95% CI: -.41 to -.13). Importantly, this indirect effect remained significant when we controlled for wealth inferences ( $a \times b = -.23$ ,  $SE = .07$ , 95% CI: -.38 to -.11). These results suggest that pity is an important factor explaining people's aversion to price premiums for innovations addressing the needs of people with disabilities. We also found that wealth mediated the effect of the target market on acceptability judgments as well ( $a \times b = -.19$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95% CI: -.33 to -.09) as consumers with disabilities were perceived to be significantly poorer ( $M = 4.10$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ) than mass market consumers ( $M = 4.91$ ,  $SD = 1.32$ ,  $t(385) = 5.29$ ,  $d = .54$ ) and these wealth inferences in turn predicted acceptability judgments ( $b = .24$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $t(383) = 5.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

## WEB APPENDIX B2: Supplementary Study 2

Supplementary Study 2 used a moderation-of-process design to provide further evidence for our pity process. Unlike our main studies, this study focuses on a *single* consumer. This focus on an individual (vs. a segment of consumers) allowed us to experimentally fix the wealth of the targeted consumer while also introducing a new experimental factor related to our focal pity process. Specifically, we manipulated the presence of information about the target being particularly low in warmth, which has been linked to reducing pity for social targets (Dijker 2014; Fiske et al. 2002). We expect that learning that a consumer is low on warmth should reduce the pity people feel for a disabled consumer, but not for non-disabled consumers, as those do not evoke much pity in the first place. Thus, providing low warmth information should reduce the indirect effect of disability status on acceptability judgments via pity, but not wealth.

### Method

We recruited 302 UK-based participants from Prolific (49.0% female,  $M_{age} = 40.4$ ). This study used a 2 (disability status: disabled vs. non-disabled)  $\times$  2 (low warmth information: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. The scenario provided general information about a software engineer called Jake. To reduce the influence of our manipulations on how wealthy participants perceived Jake to be, we experimentally fixed wealth perceptions by stating that Jake's annual income was "about average for an American adult (\$66,000)." Similar to our manipulations of the targeted consumer segments in our main studies, we also manipulated Jake's disability status. Specifically, the scenario in the disabled condition stated that "Jake has a physical disability. He uses a wheelchair for mobility." This sentence was omitted in the non-disabled condition.

Next, we manipulated our moderator, the presence of low warmth information, designed to test our pity process. Specifically, participants in the low warmth information present condition were provided with an additional paragraph describing that Jake was generally considered to be unfriendly and not warm (i.e., “Jake’s character makes it difficult for others to spend time with him. Many of his colleagues and family members describe him as a psychopath, noting his manipulative and cold behavior. He has a reputation for being self-centered and arrogant, always putting his own interests ahead of everyone else’s. He lies easily and without guilt, and he often flatters people to get what he wants before discarding them once they’re no longer useful.”). This paragraph was omitted in the low warmth information absent condition, closely resembling the scenarios in our main studies.

Subsequently, all participants learned that Jake considered purchasing a pair of hands-free slip-in sneakers and that the price of these sneakers was \$130 compared to \$89 for the standard version without the hands-free slip-in technology. For our dependent variable, participants rated the acceptability of the price Jake has to pay for the sneakers with the innovative technology ( $\alpha = .94$ ); “How fair/acceptable/ethical is it that to buy these hands-free slip-in sneakers, Jake has to pay \$130 (\$41 more than the standard version)?”; 1 = Extremely unfair/unacceptable/ unethical; 7 = Extremely fair/acceptable/ethical). Subsequently, we measured our process variable: pity ( $\alpha = .86$ ; using the same scale as in Study 3A) and perceived wealth (using the same item as in Supplementary Study 1). Finally, after our dependent and process measures, we collected a manipulation check for warmth ( $\alpha = .97$ ; “How much do you think of Jake as...? Easygoing/Sociable/Friendly/Warm”; 1 = Not at all; 7 = Very much so). After these measures, participants also reported their attitudes toward Jake ( $\alpha = .98$ ; “Considering what you read about Jake earlier, what do you think of Jake?”; 1 = Negative/Bad/Dislike/Unfavorable; 7 =

Positive/Good/Like/Favorable).<sup>1</sup> Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and an attention check question about the price of the sneaker with the innovative technology.

## Results and discussion

We first tested whether the provision of the negative information about his warmth reduced perceptions of Jake's warmth. A two-way ANOVA produced only a significant main effect of the low warmth information ( $F(1, 298) = 518.17, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .63$ ). Neither the main effect of the disability status nor the interaction were significant (both  $ps > .11$ ). Participants perceived Jake to be significantly less warm when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 1.79, SD = 1.10$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 4.46, SD = 0.93, t(300) = 22.69, p < .001, d = 2.61$ ).

For acceptability, as shown in Panel A of Figure W1, a two-way ANOVA produced significant main effects of disability status ( $F(1, 298) = 28.16, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .09$ ) and low warmth information ( $F(1, 298) = 16.03, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .05$ ). The interaction between disability status and low warmth information was not significant ( $F(1, 298) = 0.03, p > .86, \eta_p^2 < .001$ ). Replicating our main studies, acceptability was lower when Jake had a disability ( $M = 2.98, SD = 1.42$ ) than when he did not ( $M = 3.83, SD = 1.44, t(300) = 5.16, p < .001, d = .59$ ). Acceptability was also higher when low warmth information was present ( $M = 3.71, SD = 1.52$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 3.07, SD = 1.39, t(300) = 3.81, p < .001, d = .44$ ).

Next, we tested for moderated mediation, such that the presence of low warmth information would attenuate the indirect effect of disability status via pity on acceptability judgments. Thus, we first regressed pity on disability status ( $-.5 =$  no disability,  $.5 =$  physical

---

<sup>1</sup> We report the results for this attitude measure in a separate section of Web Appendix C2.

disabilities), low warmth information ( $-0.5 = \text{absent}$ ,  $0.5 = \text{present}$ ), and their interaction. Most importantly, the disability status  $\times$  warmth information interaction was negative and significant ( $b = -1.14$ ,  $SE = .31$ ,  $t(298) = 3.63$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The main effects for disability status ( $b = 1.21$ ,  $SE = .16$ ,  $t(298) = 7.71$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and low warmth information ( $b = -0.52$ ,  $SE = .16$ ,  $t(298) = 3.34$ ,  $p < .001$ ) were also significant. To decompose this interaction, we examined the effect of providing the low warmth information at both levels of the disability status factor (see also Figure W1, Panel B). When Jake was disabled, participants felt significantly less pity toward him when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 2.93$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 4.02$ ,  $SD = 1.31$ ,  $t(150) = 5.04$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .82$ ). In contrast, when Jake was not disabled, participants felt similar (and low) levels of pity toward him regardless of whether the warmth information was present ( $M = 2.29$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ) or absent ( $M = 2.25$ ,  $SD = 1.38$ ,  $t(148) = .20$ ,  $p > .83$ ,  $d = .03$ ).

To formally test for (moderated) mediation, we next regressed acceptability judgments on disability status, low warmth information, their interaction, and both our process variables (i.e., pity and perceived wealth). As expected, we found that both pity ( $b = -0.24$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $t(296) = 4.21$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and wealth ( $b = .33$ ,  $SE = .10$ ,  $t(296) = 3.31$ ,  $p = .001$ ) were significant predictors of acceptability judgments. Using 10,000 bootstrap replications, we found that the index of moderated mediation for pity was significant ( $IMM = 0.28$ ,  $SE = 0.10$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI: } 0.11 \text{ to } 0.50$ ). Specifically, we found the indirect effect of disability status via pity on acceptability judgments was significantly smaller when the low warmth information was present ( $a \times b = -0.15$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI: } -0.30 \text{ to } -0.04$ ) than when it was absent ( $a \times b = -0.43$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI: } -0.67 \text{ to } -0.23$ ). These results are qualitatively similar if we only include pity as a mediator.


As in other studies, wealth also mediated the effect of disability status on acceptability judgments. More importantly, the index of moderated mediation for wealth was not significant

( $IMM = 0.09$ ,  $SE = 0.06$ ,  $95\% CI: -0.03$  to  $.23$ ). Thus, the indirect effect of disability status via wealth was similar regardless of whether the low warmth information was present ( $a \times b = -.08$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $95\% CI: -.19$  to  $.001$ ) or absent ( $a \times b = -.17$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $95\% CI: -.31$  to  $-.06$ ). Crucially and as shown in Panel C of Figure W1, providing the low warmth information did not significantly affect perceived wealth when Jake was disabled. Participants perceived disabled Jake to be equally wealthy regardless of whether the low warmth information was present ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = .72$ ) or absent ( $M = 4.09$ ,  $SD = .86$ ,  $t(150) = .07$ ,  $p > .94$ ,  $d = .01$ ). We also observed that when Jake was not disabled, he was perceived to be less wealthy in the presence of the low warmth information ( $M = 4.33$ ,  $SD = .70$ ) than its absence ( $M = 4.59$ ,  $SD = .84$ ,  $t(148) = 2.10$ ,  $p = .037$ ,  $d = .34$ ). Possibly, this unexpected pattern might have contributed to our failure to detect a significant disability status  $\times$  low warmth information interaction on acceptability judgments.

Taken together, Supplementary Study 2 provides additional process evidence for the importance of pity in shaping the acceptability of premium prices for adaptive (vs. non-adaptive) products. Using a moderation-of-process design, we demonstrate that encountering information about the lack of warmth of a consumer undermined the pity they felt for disabled, but not non-disabled, consumers. Importantly, we found that this information significantly reduced the effect of disability status on acceptability judgments via pity, but not wealth. Another insight from the control condition (i.e., when no further information was provided about Jake) is that we also replicated our focal effect when focusing on an *individual* consumer rather than entire consumer segments as in our main studies (e.g., consumers with physical disabilities or hardcore gamers with physical disabilities).

FIGURE W1

## MODERATION-OF-PROCESS EVIDENCE FOR PITY



Note:  $N = 302$ . The graph displays the means and the 95% confidence interval as error bars.

### Attitudes toward the consumer

A two-way ANOVA on the attitude measure produced significant main effects of the disability status ( $F(1, 298) = 6.09, p = .014, \eta_p^2 = .02$ ) and the low warmth information ( $F(1, 298) = 435.01, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .59$ ). The interaction between disability status and low warmth information was not significant ( $F(1, 298) = 2.38, p > .12, \eta_p^2 = .008$ ). When Jake was disabled, participants' attitudes toward him were significantly less favorable when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 2.26, SD = 1.17$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 5.20, SD = 1.12, t(150) = 15.80, p < .001, d = 2.57$ ). Also, when Jake was not disabled, attitudes toward him were significantly less favorable when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 2.13, SD = 1.30$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 4.67, SD = .94, t(148) = 13.69, p < .001, d = 2.24$ ).

### Subsample analysis

Of 302 participants, 271 (89.7%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As in the full sample, we first tested whether the provision of the negative information about his warmth reduced perceptions of Jake's warmth. A two-way ANOVA produced a significant main effect of the low warmth information ( $F(1, 267) = 517.07, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .66$ ). Unlike in the full sample, the main effect of the disability status was also significant ( $F(1, 267) = 4.71, p = .031, \eta_p^2 = .02$ ). The interaction was not significant ( $p > .09$ ). Participants perceived Jake to be significantly less warm when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 1.75, SD = 1.09$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 4.51, SD = 0.91, t(269) = 22.46, p < .001, d = 2.73$ ).

For acceptability, a two-way ANOVA produced significant main effects of the disability status ( $F(1, 267) = 29.69, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$ ) and the low warmth information ( $F(1, 267) = 16.36, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .06$ ). The interaction between disability status and low warmth information was not significant ( $F(1, 267) = 0.01, p > .92, \eta_p^2 < .001$ ). Like in the full sample, acceptability was lower when Jake had a disability ( $M = 2.97, SD = 1.42$ ) than when he did not ( $M = 3.88, SD = 1.45, t(269) = 5.24, p < .001, d = .64$ ). Acceptability was also higher when low warmth information was present ( $M = 3.75, SD = 1.55$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 3.09, SD = 1.38, t(269) = 3.76, p < .001, d = .46$ ).

Next, we tested for moderated mediation, such that the presence of low warmth information would attenuate the indirect effect of disability status via pity on acceptability judgments. Thus, we first regressed pity on disability status (-.5 = no disability, .5 = physical disabilities), low warmth information (-.5 = absent, .5 = present), and their interaction. Most importantly, the disability status  $\times$  warmth information interaction was negative and significant ( $b = -1.12, SE = .33, t(267) = 3.38, p = .001$ ). This analysis also produced significant main effects

for disability status ( $b = 1.25$ ,  $SE = .17$ ,  $t(267) = 7.51$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and low warmth information ( $b = -.53$ ,  $SE = .17$ ,  $t(267) = 3.19$ ,  $p = .002$ ). To decompose this interaction, we examined the effect of providing the low warmth information at both levels of the disability status factor. When Jake was disabled, participants felt significantly less pity toward him when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 2.92$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 4.01$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ,  $t(131) = 4.63$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .80$ ). In contrast, when Jake was not disabled, participants felt similar (and low) levels of pity toward him regardless of whether the warmth information was present ( $M = 2.23$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ) or absent ( $M = 2.20$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ,  $t(136) = .14$ ,  $p > .89$ ,  $d = .02$ ).

To formally test for (moderated) mediation, we next regressed acceptability judgments on disability status, low warmth information, their interaction, and both our process variables (i.e., pity and perceived wealth). As expected, we found that both pity ( $b = -.26$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $t(265) = 4.31$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and wealth ( $b = .36$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $t(265) = 3.42$ ,  $p = .001$ ) were significant predictors of acceptability judgments. Using 10,000 bootstrap replications, we found that the index of moderated mediation for pity was significant ( $IMM = 0.29$ ,  $SE = 0.11$ ,  $95\% CI: 0.11$  to  $0.53$ ). Specifically, we found the indirect effect of disability status via pity on acceptability judgments was significantly smaller when the low warmth information was present ( $a \times b = -.18$ ,  $SE = .07$ ,  $95\% CI: -.33$  to  $-.05$ ) than when it was absent ( $a \times b = -.47$ ,  $SE = .12$ ,  $95\% CI: -.71$  to  $-.25$ ). These results are qualitatively similar if we only include pity as a mediator.

Wealth also mediated the effect of disability status on acceptability judgments. Like in the full sample, the index of moderated mediation for wealth was not significant ( $IMM = 0.08$ ,  $SE = 0.07$ ,  $95\% CI: -0.05$  to  $.23$ ). Thus, the indirect effect of disability status via wealth was similar regardless of whether the low warmth information was present ( $a \times b = -.10$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $95\% CI: -.22$  to  $-.004$ ) or absent ( $a \times b = -.18$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $95\% CI: -.32$  to  $-.07$ ). Crucially,

providing the low warmth information did not significantly affect perceived wealth when Jake was disabled. Participants perceived disabled Jake to be equally wealthy regardless of whether the low warmth information was present ( $M = 4.09$ ,  $SD = .88$ ) or absent ( $M = 4.14$ ,  $SD = .72$ ,  $t(131) = .41$ ,  $p > .68$ ,  $d = .07$ ). We also observed that when Jake was not disabled, he was perceived to be less wealthy in the presence of the low warmth information ( $M = 4.36$ ,  $SD = .70$ ) than its absence ( $M = 4.54$ ,  $SD = .79$ ,  $t(136) = 2.28$ ,  $p = .024$ ,  $d = .39$ ).

A two-way ANOVA on the attitude measure produced significant main effects of the disability status ( $F(1, 267) = 6.74$ ,  $p = .01$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .02$ ) and the low warmth information ( $F(1, 267) = 428.98$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .62$ ). The interaction between disability status and low warmth information was not significant ( $F(1, 267) = 2.23$ ,  $p > .13$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .008$ ). When Jake was disabled, participants' attitudes toward him were significantly less favorable when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 2.24$ ,  $SD = 1.20$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 5.26$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ,  $t(131) = 15.20$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.64$ ). Also, when Jake was not disabled, attitudes toward him were significantly less favorable when the low warmth information was present ( $M = 2.09$ ,  $SD = 1.26$ ) than when it was absent ( $M = 4.70$ ,  $SD = .88$ ,  $t(136) = 14.04$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = 2.39$ ).

### WEB APPENDIX B3: Supplementary Study 3

Supplementary Study 3 aims to test whether an alternative operationalization of cost justifications would produce a significant interaction between target market and cost justifications. Specifically, we test an intervention highlighting the importance of charging a price premium to guarantee the continued and long-term production of adaptive offerings might attenuate the negative reactions to the firm's pricing strategy. We used the same sneakers scenario and acceptability measure as in Study 4A. We changed the target market in the mass market condition (i.e., busy professionals instead of consumers) and the justification the company provides for charging a price premium on the adaptive product. This study was preregistered: <https://aspredicted.org/h9nz-vbmj.pdf>.

#### Method

We recruited 1004 US-based participants from Prolific (50.1% female,  $M_{age} = 42.2$ ). This study used a 2 (target market: consumers with physical disabilities vs. busy professionals)  $\times$  2 (cost justifications: present vs. absent) between-subjects design. In the cost justification present condition, participants were told that the company explains its pricing strategy (i.e., charging a 30% price premium) by the fact that the new product demanded a substantial investment in advanced materials and development and that this pricing strategy allows the company to continue offering this product and to offer other products in the future. Next, participants answered the acceptability measure ( $\alpha = 0.93$ ) and reported their age, gender, and an attention check question about the brand's pricing strategy.

#### Results and discussion


As shown in Figure W2, a two-way ANOVA showed significant main effects of the target market ( $F(1, 1000) = 8.82, p = .003, \eta_p^2 = .009$ ) and cost justifications ( $F(1, 1000) = 29.81, p <$

.001,  $\eta_p^2 = .03$ ). Replicating previous studies, acceptability was lower when the target market was consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 4.06$ ,  $SD = 1.57$ ) than when it was busy professionals ( $M = 4.33$ ,  $SD = 1.40$ ,  $t(1002) = 2.90$ ,  $p = .004$ ,  $d = .18$ ). Acceptability was also higher when the cost justifications were present ( $M = 4.45$ ,  $SD = 1.39$ ) than when they were not ( $M = 3.95$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ,  $t(1002) = 5.42$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .34$ ). Importantly, the interaction between target market and cost justifications was not significant ( $F(1, 1000) = 0.02$ ,  $p > .89$ ,  $\eta_p^2 < .001$ ). More specifically, contrasts show that when the cost justifications were absent, acceptability was marginally lower when the target market was consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 3.82$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ) than when it was busy professionals ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ,  $t(502) = 1.90$ ,  $p = .057$ ,  $d = .17$ ). The same results were replicated when the cost justifications were present. Acceptability was significantly lower when the target market was consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 4.31$ ,  $SD = 1.48$ ) than when it was busy professionals ( $M = 4.60$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ,  $t(498) = 2.33$ ,  $p = .02$ ,  $d = .21$ ).

## FIGURE W2

### PROVIDING COST JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PREMIUM PRICING

#### DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE EFFECT



Note:  $N = 1004$ . The graph displays the means and the 95% confidence interval as error bars.

### Subsample analysis

Of 1004 participants, 977 (97.3%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As preregistered, we also report the analysis of the subsample. As in the full sample, a two-way ANOVA showed significant main effects of the target market ( $F(1, 973) = 8.2, p = .004, \eta_p^2 = .008$ ) and cost justifications ( $F(1, 973) = 29.4, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .03$ ). Replicating previous studies, acceptability was lower when the target market was consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 4.05, SD = 1.57$ ) than when it was busy professionals ( $M = 4.31, SD = 1.40, t(975) = 2.81, p = .005, d = .18$ ). Acceptability was also higher when the cost justifications were present ( $M = 4.43, SD = 1.39$ ) than when they were not ( $M = 3.93, SD = 1.55, t(975) = 5.40, p < .001, d = .35$ ). Importantly, the interaction between target market and cost justifications was not significant ( $F(1, 973) = 0.00, p > .94, \eta_p^2 < .001$ ). More specifically, contrasts show that when the cost

justifications were absent, acceptability was significantly lower when the target market was consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 3.79$ ,  $SD = 1.61$ ) than when it was busy professionals ( $M = 4.07$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ,  $t(493) = 1.98$ ,  $p = .048$ ,  $d = .18$ ). The same results were replicated when the cost justifications were present. Acceptability was significantly lower when the target market was consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 4.31$ ,  $SD = 1.5$ ) than when it was busy professionals ( $M = 4.57$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ,  $t(480) = 2.08$ ,  $p = .04$ ,  $d = .19$ ).

## WEB APPENDIX B4: Supplementary Study 4

Supplementary Study 4 (referenced in the general discussion section) explores whether other marketing practices that might be perceived to limit the universal market to adaptive innovations might evoke similar moral scrutiny as premium pricing, as demonstrated in studies 1A-4B. Building on the outrage about the initial launch of Nike's Go FlyEase sneaker in 2021, we examined whether targeting consumers with disabilities (vs. sneakerheads) shaped the acceptability of scarcity marketing tactics (see also McGraw, Schwartz, and Tetlock 2012). This study was preregistered: <https://aspredicted.org/9rhj-cbmj.pdf>.

### Method

804 UK-based participants recruited from Prolific (49.9% female,  $M_{age} = 39.2$ ) participated in the supplementary Study 3. All participants learned about a brand that launched their new sneaker model with the EasyEntry™ technology as a special limited edition (1,000 pairs of sneakers) despite having 10,000 consumers sign up on a waitlist before the launch. Mirroring Study 2, we manipulated the target market between subjects (i.e., consumers with disabilities vs. sneakerheads).

Our central dependent variable was the acceptability of the firm's distribution strategy ( $\alpha = 0.94$ ; "How fair/acceptable/ethical is Atoms' strategy for launching the sneakers with the EasyEntry™ technology? 1 = extremely unfair/unacceptable/unethical, 7 = extremely fair/acceptable/ethical"). We also measured pity ( $\alpha = 0.88$ ) and wealth in the same fashion as in Study 2.

### Results and discussion

Like in our studies focusing on price premiums, we found that the firm's limited distribution strategy was rated as less acceptable when it targeted people with disabilities ( $M = 4.56$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ) than when it targeted sneakerheads ( $M = 5.20$ ,  $SD = 1.29$ ,  $t(802) = 6.06$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .43$ ). We next explored whether pity and perceived wealth mediated the effect of target market on acceptability. Target market (0 = sneakerheads, 1 = consumers with disabilities) was a significant predictor of pity ( $b = 1.22$ ,  $SE = .10$ ,  $t(802) = 11.66$ ,  $p < .001$ ), which, in turn, was a significant predictor of acceptability judgments ( $b = -.30$ ,  $SE = .03$ ,  $t(801) = 8.88$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Our estimation of the indirect effect using 10,000 bootstrap replications produced a significant indirect effect of target market on acceptability judgments via pity ( $a \times b = -.37$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95%  $CI: -.49$  to  $-.26$ ). Importantly, this indirect effect remained significant when we controlled for wealth inferences ( $a \times b = -.34$ ,  $SE = .05$ , 95%  $CI: -.46$  to  $-.24$ ). Target market predicted wealth inferences ( $b = -1.30$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $t(802) = 14.69$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and these inferences predicted acceptability judgments in the context of distribution strategies ( $b = .20$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(800) = 4.90$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Thus, perceived wealth also mediated the effect of the target market on acceptability ( $a \times b = -.25$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95%  $CI: -.37$  to  $-.14$ ).

The results of Supplementary Study 4 suggest that other access-limiting strategies besides premium pricing, like launching a product as a limited edition, evoke similar levels of moral scrutiny among mass-market consumers.

### Subsample analysis

Of 804 participants, 748 (93.03%) correctly responded to the attention check question. Like in the full sample, the firm's limited distribution strategy was rated as less acceptable when it targeted people with disabilities ( $M = 4.46$ ,  $SD = 1.67$ ) than when it targeted sneakerheads ( $M = 5.20$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ,  $t(746) = 6.74$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $d = .49$ ). We next explored whether pity and perceived wealth mediated the effect of target market on acceptability. Target market (0 = sneakerheads, 1 = consumers with disabilities) was a significant predictor of pity ( $b = 1.34$ ,  $SE = .11$ ,  $t(746) = 12.52$ ,  $p < .001$ ), which, in turn, was a significant predictor of acceptability judgments ( $b = -.28$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(745) = 7.81$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Our estimation of the indirect effect using 10,000 bootstrap replications produced a significant indirect effect of target market on acceptability judgments via pity ( $a \times b = -.38$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95% CI:  $-.51$  to  $-.26$ ). Importantly, this indirect effect remained significant when we controlled for wealth inferences ( $a \times b = -.35$ ,  $SE = .06$ , 95% CI:  $-.47$  to  $-.24$ ). Target market predicted wealth inferences ( $b = -1.40$ ,  $SE = .09$ ,  $t(746) = 15.39$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and these inferences predicted acceptability judgments in the context of distribution strategies ( $b = .20$ ,  $SE = .04$ ,  $t(744) = 4.65$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Thus, perceived wealth also mediated the effect of target market on acceptability ( $a \times b = -.27$ ,  $SE = .07$ , 95% CI:  $-.41$  to  $-.15$ ).

## WEB APPENDIX B5: Supplementary Study 5

Supplementary Study 5 explores whether people show similar reactions if they learn about the prices of different products alongside information about other product features (e.g., available colors, product pictures). Whereas participants in our main studies learn about the premium prices in percentage form (e.g., “Atoms decided to charge *30% more* for the sneakers with EasyEntry™”), we presented participants with the absolute prices of different products from an assortment in Supplementary Study 5 to test whether our effect also emerges in a more information-rich environment without providing the price premium charged by the company as a percentage change.

### Method

We recruited 199 US-based participants from Prolific (50.8% female,  $M_{age} = 41.5$ ). In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to one of two target market conditions (consumers with physical disabilities vs. sneakerheads) in an assortment browsing task. Specifically, we presented participants with an assortment of four shoes from a brand that varied in price, type, name, and color options. The first three shoes had a price range from \$75 to \$99, while the last shoe had a higher price (i.e., \$140). The first three shoes were identical across target market conditions. Before presenting the last focal, innovative product, we presented participants with a brief promotional text about a new model designed by the brand for sneakerheads or consumers with physical disabilities with hands-free technology. Across conditions, the product picture featured a “Hands-free” label. In the disability condition, it also featured a second label (i.e., “Disability-friendly”). After finishing the assortment browsing task, participants responded to the same measure of acceptability of the company’s pricing strategy as

in previous studies ( $\alpha = .96$ ). Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and filled out an attention check asking about the price of the innovative product.

### **Results and discussion**

Like in our main studies, the acceptability of the pricing strategy was lower when the firm targeted consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 3.64, SD = 1.73$ ) compared to when it targeted sneakerheads ( $M = 4.23, SD = 1.46; t(197) = 2.57, p = .01, d = .36$ ).

These results suggest that the negative reactions to charging price premiums for adaptive (vs. non-adaptive) innovations might also emerge in more information-rich environments where information about price premiums is not presented as a percentage change.

### **Subsample analysis**

Of 199 participants, 189 (95%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As in the full sample, the acceptability of the pricing strategy was lower when the firm targeted consumers with physical disabilities ( $M = 3.54, SD = 1.69$ ) compared to sneakerheads ( $M = 4.16, SD = 1.45; t(187) = 2.70, p = .008, d = .39$ ).

## WEB APPENDIX B6: Supplementary Study 6

Supplementary Study 6 explores an intervention that might attenuate the distaste for the price premium charged to consumers with disabilities for innovative products. We used a novel product (Sony's Project Leonardo, not yet launched at the time we ran the study) developed for gamers with disabilities and tested whether considering the perspective of people in the target market who are interested in the product despite the price premium makes a firm's pricing strategy more acceptable. This study holds the target market constant (i.e., gamers with disability), and we test whether the aversion towards a price premium for an adaptive controller (relative to no price premium) was attenuated by the intervention (i.e., spotlighting the perspective of a gamer with a disability). In addition to acceptability judgments, we also measured brand attitudes towards the brand. This study was preregistered:

<https://aspredicted.org/2jpf-nn4s.pdf>.

### Method

We recruited 599 US-based participants from Prolific (48.1% female,  $M_{age} = 36.1$ ). Participants read an article about Sony's new accessible PlayStation controller called Project Leonardo and its benefits to gamers with disabilities who struggle to use the standard Dual Sense PlayStation controller. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: price premium, no price premium, or price premium plus a customer's quote.

In the price premium (no price premium) condition, participants were told that the new accessible controller was 50% more expensive than (the same price as) the standard PlayStation controller. In the price premium plus quote condition, we added an additional paragraph inspired by an actual quote from a feature article in the *Hollywood Reporter* (Shanley 2019): "*To be honest, this price for the Sony Adaptive Controller is pretty fair to me, if not generous,*" says

*Rocky Stout, a paraplegic gamer and streamer. “If you look at prices for good arcade sticks that do not even have the ability to plug in switches or buttons, it is a deal, especially considering the Adaptive Controller is not a highly sought-after device that Sony is selling out on.”* This quote displays the perspective of a gamer with a disability who appreciates the option of having an expensive option for gaming rather than no option for gaming at all.

After learning about the controller, participants responded to the same measure of acceptability of the company’s pricing strategy as in previous studies ( $\alpha = .97$ ). Additionally, we also measured how reading the news article impacted their brand attitudes toward Sony on four items measured on seven-point bipolar scales “After reading the article about the new PlayStation controller “Project Leonardo,” what do you think about Sony as a brand?” ( -3 = “much worse/more negative/more uninteresting/much more unattractive” to +3 = much better/more positive/more interesting/much more attractive”,  $\alpha = .96$ ).

## **Results and discussion**

*Acceptability.* A one-way ANOVA showed that acceptability varied significantly across conditions ( $F(2, 596) = 188.62, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .39$ ). Acceptability was lower in the price premium condition ( $M = 3.35, SD = 1.67$ ) compared to the same price condition ( $M = 6.14, SD = 1.19; t(399) = 19.28, p < .001, d = 1.93$ ). Importantly, providing the quote of the gamer with a disability significantly improved the acceptability of the price premium compared to the regular price premium condition ( $M = 4.30, SD = 1.49; t(398) = 6.00, p < .001, d = .60$ ).

*Brand attitudes.* Brand attitudes also varied significantly across conditions ( $F(2, 596) = 62.23, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .17$ ). Similar to acceptability, brand attitudes were worse in the price premium condition ( $M = 0.31, SD = 1.52$ ) compared to the same price condition ( $M = 1.74, SD =$

1.02;  $t(399) = 11.10, p < .001, d = 1.11$ ), and considering the quote significantly improved them ( $M = 0.88, SD = 1.30; t(398) = 4.06, p < .001, d = .41$ ).

These findings suggest that when considering the dearth of alternatives often faced by consumers with disabilities, people appreciate innovations that address this segment's needs despite the price premium that innovations typically come with. Firms might thus use real reviews or quotes from consumers with disabilities that highlight their lack of alternatives to improve both the acceptability of their pricing strategies and the resulting brand attitudes.

### **Subsample analysis**

Of 599 participants, 582 (97.2%) correctly responded to the attention check question. As preregistered, we also report the analysis of the subsample. As in the full sample, a one-way ANOVA showed significant differences between conditions for both acceptability ( $F(2, 579) = 207.58, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .42$ ) and brand attitude ( $F(2, 579) = 64.01, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .18$ ). Using follow-up contrasts in the acceptability dependent variable, we found that the price increase condition ( $M = 3.32, SD = 1.66$ ) and the same price condition ( $M = 6.25, SD = 1.11$ ) were significantly different from each other ( $t(386) = 20.30, p < .001, d = 2.06$ ). Importantly, the intervention condition ( $M = 4.26, SD = 1.48$ ) was rated significantly higher compared to the price increase condition ( $t(391) = 5.93, p < .001, d = .60$ ). Follow-up contrasts for the brand attitude variable showed the same results where the price increase condition ( $M = .29, SD = 1.51$ ) was rated significantly lower than the same price condition ( $M = 1.77, SD = 1.02, t(386) = 11.22, p < .001, d = 1.14$ ). Importantly, the intervention condition ( $M = .85, SD = 1.29$ ) was rated significantly higher than the price increase condition ( $t(391) = 3.94, p < .001, d = .40$ ).

**WEB APPENDIX C: STIMULUS PLOT**  
**(JUDGMENTS OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE PRICING STRATEGY)**



\* The price premium in the socialized cost condition in Study 4B, compared to the mass market, is 0%. Yet, prices for all consumers are 10% higher than before the innovation was launched. Web Appendix C is based on data from all studies that measured the acceptability of the firm's pricing strategy.

## REFERENCES

- Dijker, Anton J. (2014), "A Theory of Vulnerability-Based Morality," *Emotion Review*, 6 (2), 175–83.
- Fiske, Susan T., Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick, and Jun Xu (2002), "A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82 (6), 878–902.
- Lyons, Brent J., Sabrina D. Volpone, Jennifer L. Wessel, and Natalya M. Alonso (2017), "Disclosing a Disability: Do Strategy Type and Onset Controllability Make a Difference?," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 102 (9), 1375–83.
- McGraw, A. Peter, Janet A. Schwartz, and Philip E. Tetlock (2012), "From the Commercial to the Communal: Reframing Taboo Trade-Offs in Religious and Pharmaceutical Marketing," *Journal of Consumer Research*, 39 (1), 157–73.
- Shanley, Patrick (2019), "Priced to Play? Hardware Cost for Disabled Gamers a Barrier for Some Users," <https://perma.cc/4VF5-RXT9>.