Elisabetta Magni* and Ottavia Cepraga

The synchrony and diachrony of example markers in Latin

Abstract: This article aims to fill a gap in the current literature on the pragmatics of Latin by proposing a corpus-based analysis of the different words (e.g., *ut, uelut, sicut*), phrases (e.g., *exempli gratia, uerbi causa*), and constructions (e.g., *ut puta, si dicas*) exploited to signal the process of exemplification. The structures and devices that perform this discursive operation are essentially neglected in Latin handbooks of syntax and stylistics, and only sparse comments on individual forms can be found in the lexica and in recent literature. To investigate these understudied issues, we have devised a functional taxonomy centred around the notions of meta-exemplification, canonical exemplification, and para-exemplification. The analysis of the data illustrating the different strategies and signals of exemplification is based on the tenets of historical pragmatics. The discussion focuses on the multiple roles and emergence of example markers in different textual genres, with special attention to technical prose and grammatical treatises, where examples are crucial in describing natural categories and explaining linguistic phenomena. The significance of the results extends beyond the Latin language and sheds light on the origin and development of example markers in general.

Keywords: ancient grammarians; example markers; exemplification; historical pragmatics; Latin

1 Introduction

1.1 A glance at the literature

In the history of Western culture, exemplification has been seen first and foremost as an argumentative device, and since Aristotle's classification of the various types of παραδείγματα (*Rhetorica* 2.1393a), it has featured prominently in many treatises and works on rhetoric (Demoen 1997; Lyons 1989; Price 1975; Spina 2008). This

*Corresponding author: Elisabetta Magni, Dipartimento di Lingue, Letterature e Culture Moderne, Università di Bologna, Via Cartoleria 5, 40124 Bologna, Italy, E-mail: elisabetta.magni@unibo.it
Ottavia Cepraga, Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Università per Stranieri di Siena, Piazza C. Rosselli 27/28, 53100 Siena, Italy, E-mail: o.cepraga@dottorandi.unistrasi.it

operation has its place in almost any argued discourse or text because it helps speakers and writers to convey their intended message, easing the hearers' and readers' effort of understanding and remembering information (Manzotti 1995). Due to the pervasiveness of examples in formal and informal registers, scholars have investigated their role in scientific papers of various disciplines (Triki 2021) but also in learners' writings (Delcambre 1997; Paquot 2008) and in news reports (Arpan 2009; Zillmann 1999; Zillmann and Brosius 2000). Moreover, exemplification has been described under different theoretical angles and in relationship with other textual operations, such as paraphrasing (Fuchs 1982), reformulating (Cuenca 2001; Gülich and Kotschi 1987), and code glossing (Hyland 2007). Research has also been devoted to the semantic and syntactic aspects of the exemplifying structure, which some scholars view as a non-prototypical apposition (Meyer 1992; Quirk et al. 1985) and others as a concatenation (Fernández-Bernárdez 1994–1995; Manzotti 1995). More recently, a growing body of literature has explored the pragmatic aspects of exemplification in speech corpora and its relation to various discursive and cognitive operations, such as hedging and mitigating (Barotto 2018; Mihatsch 2010), constructing lists and building categories (Barotto and Lo Baido 2021; Barotto and Mauri 2018; Chauveau-Thoumelin 2018). While some studies adopt a comparative perspective (Cuenca 2001; Eggs and McElholm 2013), the majority focus on exemplification strategies in a specific language (see also Barotto 2021; Landolsi 2018; Lo Baido 2018), but very few deal with their diachronic aspects (Rodríguez-Abruñeiras 2017, 2021).[1]

From this point of view, the investigation of Latin example markers reveals some unexpected facts: while only a few of them survive as archaic or formal expressions, such as It. *verbigrazia*, *verbicausa*, *esemp(l)igratia*, Sp. *verbigracia*, Eng. *e.g.*, more common adverbials such as It. *per esempio*, Fr. *par exemple*, Sp. *por ejemplo*, Rom. *de exemplu*, Eng. *for example*, do not find a direct antecedent in Classical and Late Latin texts. Although all the markers containing epigones of the noun *exemplum* develop their function relatively late (see Section 7 *infra*), it is precisely the semantic richness of this Latin word that shapes the different modes of exemplification from the very beginning.

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1 The terms *example markers*, *exemplification markers*, *exemplifying markers*, or *exemplifiers* are quite common in the literature on exemplification, while Eggs and McElholm (2013: 10) also use the term *example connectors*.

1.2 Two kinds of exemplification: the *exemplum* and the example

The noun *exemplum*, which literally means 'what is taken out as a sample', is related to the verb *ex-ĭmo* 'to take out, take away, remove', a derivative from *ĕmo* 'to take, buy, purchase', and develops from the form **ex-em-lom* by the insertion of an epenthetic *p* (Leumann 1977 [1963]: 165). The wide range of meanings and multiple connotations of this term are discussed in detail by Kornhardt (1936), who organizes the *ThLL* lemma into four major sections with several subtypes, while the *OLD* provides nine separate definitions.[2]

The phrase *per exempla* 'through examples' occurs only twice in Classical Latin, and its use reveals two meanings relevant to exemplification. In (1) Seneca employs this expression to represent a mode of learning: Lucilius' path to wisdom will be facilitated by personal observation of authoritative models for moral instruction and imitation, while in (2) Pliny summarizes the content of a chapter on celestial portents, whose variety is illustrated by several facts and precedents:[3]

(1)   (Sen. *epist*. 6.1.1)
        *longum iter est per praecepta, breue et efficax **per exempla***.
        'long is the way through precepts, but short and helpful if one follows patterns.'

(2)   (Plin. *nat*. 1.2a.1)
        *De caelestibus prodigiis **per exempla** historica: lampades, bolides, trabes caelestes, chasma caeli.*
        'Sky portents through recorded instances: torches, shafts, sky-beams, sky-yawning.'

In rhetorical, philosophical, and legal writings, the *exemplum* is what we might call a "good example", that is, an exemplary story, anecdote, or fact from history, literature, jurisprudence, etc., that serves an edifying or persuasive function. In scientific, technical or grammatical treatises, on the other hand, we often find "canonical examples", that is, demonstrative cases or representative items of the observed phenomenon, rule, or category.

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2 *ThLL* (s.v. *exemplum*): i) *quod ex copia rerum aequalium eximitur*; ii) *quod proponitur ad illustrandum, demonstrandum, confirmandum*; iii) *praevalet ratio praestantiae per se digna, quam imiteris*; iv) *quod deducitur ex exemplo aliquo, ita ut par uel simile fiat.*
3 The translations of the Latin examples follow those in the *Loeb Classical Library* editions, with slight modifications where necessary. In the Latin examples, the notation of <u> and <v> is standardized to <u>, regardless of the choice in the Loeb edition. The abbreviations of the Latin texts cited in this article are those of the *ThLL*.

This article cannot do justice to the extensive literature on the rhetorical *exempla* and will therefore only present the ideas and works on which it draws the most, with particular attention to the comparison with canonical examples, whose linguistic aspects are the true focus of research.

1.3 Research objectives and methods

Canonical exemplification typically entails an asymmetrical relation between two formal and logical units: an exemplified unit (the *illustrandum*) with a generic referent and an exemplifying unit (the *illustrans*) consisting of one or more elements that clarify, illustrate, or specify the first unit.[4] In Latin, as in other languages, this relation is signalled by various devices, called *example markers*, i.e., different words (e.g., *ut, uelut, sicut, tamquam*), phrases (e.g., *exempli gratia, exempli causa, uerbi gratia, uerbi causa*), and constructions (e.g., *ut puta, si dicas*, etc.), which usually precede the exemplifying sequence, as shown in (3):[5]

(3)　　(Sen. *epist.* 66.5)
　　　　Quaedam, […] [*prima bona sunt*]$_E$, [***tamquam***]$_{ExM}$ [*gaudium*]$_e$, [*pax*]$_e$, [*salus patriae*]$_e$
　　　　'Some of them […] are primary goods, such as joy, peace, and the welfare of one's country.'

In handbooks of Latin syntax and stylistics, the structures and means of exemplification are essentially neglected, and only sparse remarks on some individual expressions can be found in the literature. Therefore, the first objective of our research is to provide an inventory of the various linguistic markers and to study their use in different contexts and literary genres. To this end, we have carried out a qualitative and partially quantitative analysis of the data collected through the *Library of Latin Texts* and *PHI 5 Latin Texts* corpora.[6] In order to categorize and discuss the Latin materials, we have devised a functional taxonomy of the linguistic

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4 We adopt the terms *illustrandum* and *illustrans* from Price, who explains: "the *illustrans* helps embellish, prove, clarify, etc. the *illustrandum*" (Price 1975: 219 n. 1).

5 The capital letter *E* signifies the superior hierarchical importance and autonomous existence of the exemplified unit, while the small letter *e* marks the subordinate character and subsidiary role of the exemplifying element(s); *ExM* stands for example marker.

6 In the *LLT-A* database (*Library of Latin Texts*, ca. 153 million words spread over 11,614 works), we searched the period *Antiquitas* (<ca. 200 AD) and both sections *Aetas Patrum* (ca. 200–735 AD). When comparing the sections of the *LLT-A* database, the frequency scores are normalized per million words.

signals of exemplification that has the potential for cross-linguistic applicability and is also inherently dynamic.

In fact, the second goal concerns the diachronic dimension of exemplification and the investigation of the specific sources and paths that lead to the emergence of dedicated markers: their frequency and their fate over time will not only reveal some unexpected facts, but also shed a different light on the expressions used today in many modern languages. Indeed, up to now, research has privileged the synchronic dimension of exemplification and its role in well-established textual and communicative domains. The novelty of our approach is that Latin can show how the use of examples reflects the needs of nascent genres, which gradually shape their own specific strategies and markers for this discursive operation. In a broader epistemological perspective, the investigation of classical languages, repositories of a culture in which texts were intended to be read aloud, also helps to understand the illustrative and demonstrative nature of the example, and the cognitive processes (e.g., comparison, cooperation with the interlocutors) that, still today, underlie its linguistic expression.[7]

The paper is structured as follows: after a brief illustration of the rhetorical *exemplum*, Section 2 discusses the textual and cognitive dimensions of exemplification, and then its syntactic and semantic aspects. Section 3 offers a classification of the linguistic signals that introduce the example and an overview of their discursive and pragmatic functions. The following part illustrates the multiple ways in which exemplification is carried out in Latin, with a focus on the diachronic sources and paths that lead to the emergence of dedicated markers: Sections 4 and 5 deal with those developing from meta-exemplification, while Section 6 is devoted to those connected to para-exemplification. Section 7 summarizes the main findings and outlines their possible implications at the cross-linguistic level.

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7 For a discussion of reading practices in antiquity, see Knox (1968). Regarding the relationship between writing and orality in the ancient world, Pontani (2007) points out that "Il testo, composto a voce e trascritto sotto dettatura, nasce orale e continua a vivere nella dimensione dell'oralità: la sua circolazione e spesso legata alla lettura e alla recitazione in pubblico e, del resto, la stessa lettura individuale è comunemente effettuata ad alta voce" [The text, composed orally and transcribed under dictation, is oral in origin and continues to live in the dimension of orality: its circulation is often linked to reading and recitation in public and, moreover, individual reading itself is commonly done aloud] (Pontani 2007: 206).

2 Dimensions of exemplification

2.1 Rhetorical and argumentative aspects

According to Lyons, given the etymological connection between the noun *exemplum* and the verb *eximere*, "the example is something cut out and removed from some whole. In this sense, example is synonymous with a modern term that appears very different: *detail*. The detail is also removed, cut out (*dé + tailler* in French, *de + tagliare* in Italian). […] *exemplum* concerns a distinction between a prior whole and a resultant fragment" (Lyons 1989: 9). But perhaps more convincing is the parallel in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which equates the example with a sample of goods to be shown to the buyer:

(4)   (*Rhet. Her.* 4.6.9)
        Nunc omnino aliunde sumenda non fuisse sic intellegemus. Primum omnium;
        quod ab artis scriptore adfertur exemplum id eius artificii debet esse. Ut si quis
        purpuram aut aliud quippiam vendens dicat: "Sume a me, sed huius exemplum
        aliunde rogabo tibi quod ostendam", sic mercem ipsi qui venditant aliunde
        exemplum quaeritant aliquod mercis;
        'Now we shall learn from the following that they [*sc. exempla*] should not
        have been borrowed at all. Above all, an example which is cited by a writer
        on an art should be proof of his own skill in that art. It is as if a merchant
        selling purple or some other commodity should say: "Buy of me, but I shall
        borrow from someone else a sample of this to show you". So do these very
        people who offer merchandise for sale go in search of a sample of it
        elsewhere.'

Moreover, rhetoricians and grammarians used the term *exemplum* to translate the Greek παράδειγμα, which is "related to *paradeiknumi* ('to exhibit side by side to make comparisons, to indicate or point out') and to *deiknumi* ('to bring to light, to show forth'). The Greek term is therefore always associated with light, showing, seeing, and pointing" (Lyons 1989: 10).[8] This explains why, since antiquity, the Latin term could denote both what is chosen as an 'exemplar' and what is shown as 'exemplary'.

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8 The *LSJ* lexicon glosses παράδειγμα as follows: 1. pattern, model (of a manmade object, artifact), 2. precedent, example, b. sample, 3. lesson, warning, 4. argument, proof from example, 5. in law, leading case, precedent. On the function of the παράδειγμα as a model or evidence in rhetorical theory, see Demoen (1997: 130).

The visual nature of the *exemplum* (David 1980: 73) is made clear by another passage, which states that it places the past (*facti aut dicti praeteriti*) before the audience's eyes (*ante oculos*):[9]

(5) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.49.62)
Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio. Id sumitur isdem de causis quibus similitudo. Rem ornatiorem facit cum nullius rei nisi dignitatis causa sumitur; apertiorem, cum id quod sit obscurius magis dilucidum reddit; probabiliorem, cum magis ueri similem facit; ante oculos ponit, cum exprimit omnia perspicue ut res prope dicam manu temptari possit.
'The example is something done or said in the past, along with the definite naming of the doer or author. It is used with the same motives as a Comparison. It renders a thought more brilliant when used for no other purpose than beauty; clearer, when throwing more light upon what was somewhat obscure; more plausible, when giving the thought greater verisimilitude; more vivid, when expressing everything so lucidly that the matter can, I may almost say, be touched by the hand.'

The point is further developed by Gazich (1990: 79–82 and 121–122), who discusses the metaphor of sight also in relation to the concepts of *similitudo*, *demonstratio*, and *imago*. In particular, he focuses on Quintilian's chapter that treats the *exemplum* as a species of comparison:

(6) (Quint. *inst.* 5.11.1–2)
Tertium genus, ex iis quae extrinsecus adducuntur in causam, Graeci uocant παράδειγμα, *quo nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium adpositione et specialiter in iis quae rerum gestarum auctoritate nituntur. Nostri fere similitudinem uocare maluerunt quod ab illis parabole dicitur, hoc alterum exemplum, quamquam et hoc simile est, illud exemplum. Nos, quo facilius propositum explicemus, utrumque* παράδειγμα *esse credamus et ipsi appellemus exemplum.*

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9 From the earliest times, rhetorical theory instructed orators to cite 'parallel cases' from the past (the πράγματα προγεγενημένα mentioned by Aristotle in *Rhetorica* 2.1393a), but although the *res gestae* of famous personalities and legal precedents constitute a prominent element of Roman exemplarity, such narratives of the *mos maiorum* do not exhaust the range of material used as vehicles of rhetorical persuasion. In general, effective *exempla* evoke facts that are meaningful and familiar to the audience, such as myths, fables, and a variety of social, intellectual, artistic, and linguistic phenomena.

'The Greeks call the third sort [*sc.* of Technical Proof], out of those things that are introduced into a case from outside, *paradeigma* παράδειγμα. They use this name both generally for every comparison of similar things and particularly for those things that rely on the authority of *res gestae*. Our authors typically prefer to name the former type, which is labeled *parabolē* by the Greeks, *similitudo*, the latter *exemplum*, although the latter also is a simile, the former an exemplum. So that we may more easily explain the subject, let us understand that each type is a *paradeigma* παράδειγμα and let us use the term *exemplum*.'[10]

In this passage the *exemplum* is not simply the citation of an ancient fact, but also the argumentative proof that compares, on the basis of a similarity, the particular fact under examination and the exemplary one (Gazich 1990: 107). These observations confirm that the *exemplum* is first and foremost a comparison ("est d'abord une comparaison", David 1980: 81) and "is in actuality simply a special case of the broader *similitudo*" (Lausberg 1998 [1960]: 196), but also highlight the centrality of comparison and analogy to the Roman conception and use of examples in social and legal discourse: "analogical reflection through examples leaks into and saturates every stream and current of thought. […] At its source exemplary thought functions by the process of comparison" (Urban 2011: 32). As we will see in Section 6.2, the tradition of exemplarity not only builds a mode of moral and practical reasoning based on analogical thinking and rhetorical induction, but also contributes to shaping the way exemplification is conceived and expressed linguistically in Latin texts.

2.2 Textual and cognitive aspects

According to Manzotti (1995: 2–3), exemplifying is a particular "linguistic action" which pertains to textual organization or constitution and by which the writer progressively shapes the overall architecture of the text.[11] The textual forms by which exemplification integrates into this architecture may depend on the nature and functions of the exemplifying sequence. In principle, the exemplary example can stand alone and provide a reduced model of the matter, which is metaphorical in nature, since the cited case shows a concrete image of the abstract notion or theoretical proposition under consideration.[12] On the contrary, the proper example

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10 The translation is taken from Urban (2011: 38).

11 On the textual forms of exemplification, see also Delcambre (1997: Ch. 3).

12 Cf. also Klein (1996, s.v. *exemplum*). Following Ouellet (1989), we can also mention the examples that become the "title" of a problem (such as *Sorites paradox* or *Schrodinger's cat*) and allow one to imagine thoughts and ideas.

cannot appear in isolation, but presupposes an accumulation of related exemplars, which is metonymic in nature, since the cited items are representative cases or parts of a phenomenon or category.

Depending on whether it is condensed into a single case or expanded into an indefinite list, the exemplifying sequence can assume the textual forms of the narrative or enumeration, respectively.[13] In fact, Gazich (1990: 131–132) remarks on the close similarity between Quintilian's definitions of *exemplum*, in (7), and *narratio*, in (8):[14]

(7)   (Quint. *inst*. 5.11.6)
        exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod
        intenderis commemoratio
        '*exemplum*, that is to say the mention of an event which either took place or is
        treated as having taken place, in order to make your point convincing.'

(8)   (Quint. *inst*. 4.2.31)
        narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio
        'A narrative is an exposition, designed to be persuasive, of an action done or
        deemed to be done.'

On the other hand, an exemplification presented in the form of an enumeration, or a virtually open list, can be compared to a descriptive sequence (Gülich and Kotschi 1987: 40); however, while a description typically starts from an object and moves towards its decomposition/recomposition into different parts, exemplification usually starts from a set and moves towards the accumulation of its different members.

In any case, neither the narrative nor the enumerative example should be as extensive as a digression, firstly because exemplification is a way of filling

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13 The use of *exempla* is strongly recommended by all Roman rhetorical texts (Lyons 1989: 8), which however do not define their appropriate number; the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (3.5.9) suggests that, especially in Conclusions, the guiding principle should be 'the more, the better' (Demoen 1997: 147): *maxime conducit quam plurima rerum ante gestarum exempla proferre* 'here especially it is useful to present examples from the past in the greatest possible number'. In canonical examples, however, the *illustrantia* are usually limited in number (*unum* in Varro *rust*. 2.4.21; *duo* in Cels. 5.19.11a, *pauca* in Quint. *inst*. 6.5.6), so as not to "bore the reader" (Nep. *Lys*. 2.1.3).

14 "The process of comparison between two narrative instances constitutes the primary engine of exemplarity in Roman legal and social discourse" (Urban 2011: 37). Lyons (1989) notes that the *exemplum* "frequently concerns, or is even equated with, narration (one medieval glossary equates the terms by sticking them together, *exemplare narrare*)" (Lyons 1989: 11). Interestingly, Germ. *Beispiel* comes from Middle High Germ. *bīspil* (juxtaposed by popular etymology with *Spiel* 'game, play'), and from Old High Germ. *bīspel* 'instructive tale, parable, proverb', which combines *bī* 'by, at' and *spel* 'meaningful speech'; therefore, the original meaning of *Beispiel* is 'incidental, additional narration' (cf. Kluge 2011 [1883], s.v. *Beispiel*).

'physiological' pauses in communication that serve to minimize the flow of infor-
mation and reasoning, allowing the reader to ease the effort of understanding and
remembering (Manzotti 1995: 8). Secondly, because exemplification, which is typi-
cally turned backwards, opens a space in which to justify, point out, consolidate what
precedes, descending from the previous level of abstraction to a degree of greater
concreteness and, therefore, greater ease of control (Manzotti 1995: 8).[15] Manzotti
also observes that effective exemplification works as a strategy of 'copying', which,
starting from the reassuring basis of the already said, helps to discover and order
relevant cases, and to bring out specific problems, with the retroactive effect of
specifying and articulating general statements, concepts, or categories.

This view of exemplification as a means for 'retro-interpretation' partially aligns
with earlier analyses, which construed this textual operation as a sub-type of
paraphrase (Fuchs 1982) or reformulation (Gülich and Kotschi 1987). According
to Fuchs (1982), the activity of paraphrasing consists in establishing a subjective
relation of identity between utterances, which also occurs when the sequence Y that
reformulates the sequence X "se présente comme une sorte de cas particulier,
d'exemple illustratif de X" [appears as a sort of specific case, an illustrative example
of X] (Fuchs 1982: 107–108). However, as Cuenca (2001: 50) notes, reformulation
generally elaborates a concept by intension, whereas exemplification is a mecha-
nism of definition by extension, so that, in the first case, a total referential corre-
spondence between X and Y is possible, though not necessary, whereas, in the second
case, this correspondence is not possible since Y is often a subset of X. On the same
line, Landolsi (2018: 49) remarks that exemplification does not necessarily presup-
pose the preservation of meaning and implies a certain hierarchy between its two
units.[16] Rather than a meta-predication of equivalence, exemplification can thus be
viewed as a meta-predication of similarity, relevance or inclusion depending on the
varying nature of the *illustrandum* and the functions of the *illustrans* in different
textual genres. As explained by Ouellet (1989),

> [l]'exemple, comme le 'type' dans les procédures de catégorisation, est une 'entité' qui se situe à
> mi-chemin entre la définition intensionnelle d'un concept et sa définition extensionnelle par
> une classe d'objets. Son rôle est d'extraire de cette dernière un ou plusieurs objets, tombant sous
> le concept, non pas pour donner une référence à celui-ci, mais pour servir d'image [ou] de
> modèle […] pour toutes ses références possibles [the example, like the 'type' in categorization

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15 According to Hyland (2007), "examples not only function to elaborate statements. In all academic
disciplines they serve to interrupt and break up generalised and conceptual passages with solid
references to real life, or at least to more accessible phenomena, allowing readers to use their senses
as well as their minds" (Hyland 2007: 282).

16 Also, Hyland (2007) includes exemplification and reformulation in the category of *code glosses*,
i.e., strategies of textual elaboration aimed at clarifying the writer's communicative purpose, but
Landolsi (2018: 56) rightly notes that gloss is synonymic while exemplification is metonymic.

procedures, is an 'entity' that lies halfway between the intensional definition of a concept and its extensional definition by a class of objects. Its role is to extract from the latter one or more objects that fall under the concept, not to give a reference to it, but to serve as an image or a model […] for all its possible references]. (Ouellet 1989: 113)

Concerning this operation of "extraction", Manzotti (1998: 121) refers to the interchangeability of the cases mentioned as examples, which Mihatsch (2010) qualifies as "arbitrary choices, since the selected item is just one of a number of possible other examples" (Mihatsch 2010: 108). Nonetheless, the choice of an example is never aleatory, since the individuation of a model case must take into account the *tertium comparationis* on which the comparison is based, while an illustrative case must be relevant to the phenomenon or included in the category to which the exemplified refers.

On the other hand, both a model and an illustration are at the centre of attention ("au centre des regards", Herman 2011: 117), because, as argued by Rossari and Jayez (1999: 463), the various strategies of exemplification share the same textual function, that is, focalization. Indeed, such a procedure presents a segment of the sentence as the result of a selection aimed at conveying new or conflicting information, and the same effect occurs in the shift from the abstract to the concrete or from the general to the particular proper to exemplification.

Although an overtly mentioned general unit is not necessarily required (cf. Eggs and McElholm [2013] and Section 3.1 *infra*), the twofold structure and the operation of inclusion are key points in the description of exemplification, not only at the textual and cognitive levels but also at the syntactic and semantic levels.

2.3 Syntactic and semantic aspects

Focusing on the presence of two juxtaposed units, some scholars regard exemplifying constructions as non-prototypical appositions. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 1308), "most appositive" structures imply semantic equivalence between the juxtaposed elements and convey appellation, identification, or reformulation, while "least appositive" ones display unequal relationships between their units and convey particularization or exemplification.[17] In such cases, the second appositive has a relation of inclusion with the term in the first appositive because it is more specific

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17 In Latin, as in other languages, the notion of appositive phrase refers to a wide range of constructions. For Pinkster (2015: 1054), two (or more) constituents form a nominal apposition if they (a) fulfil the same syntactic function; (b) are coreferential; (c) agree in case (and often in number); (d) either of them is omissible. On the phenomenon of asymmetry in Latin close appositions, see Gianollo and Magni (2019).

(Meyer 1992: 74; Quirk et al. 1985: 1315).[18] More precisely, particularizing appositions featuring a hypernym and a hyponym imply "meaning inclusion" and "kind of" relations. Those with markers that focus on a referent of the first unit (e.g., *particularly* or *including*) imply "referential inclusion" and "part/whole" relations. Both are thus similar to exemplifying appositions, which are normally distinguished by explicit marking (Meyer 1992: 71–77). For Quirk et al. (1985: 1315), exemplification markers are not mandatory, but their absence can lead to ambiguities with structures conveying identification and, we add, also with hyponymous appositions, especially when the second unit contains an asyndetically coordinated series, as in ex. (2). In general, the distinction between particularization and exemplification seems quite problematic, especially considering that forms like Eng. *including* or Fr. *notamment* are also used to introduce examples (cf. Landolsi 2018; Rodríguez-Abruñeiras 2019a, 2019b).

Moreover, since exemplifying structures connect not only noun phrases, but also larger segments of discourse, such as sentences or groups of sentences, the term "apposition" does not seem fully appropriate to denote the syntactic relation under study. For Fernández-Bernárdez (1994–1995: 115–116), the markers of exemplification, like those of explanation and specification, concatenate parenthetical units to other segments within the spoken chain (cf. also Manzotti 1995: 14).

As we will see, parentheticality also plays a role in the evolution of example markers, which, in addition to serving as linking devices, are also used to convey pragmatic functions. The discussion of their procedural functions will complete the description of the linguistic aspects of exemplification, which indeed implies syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic relations between utterances or text segments.

3 Signals of exemplification

3.1 Classification

The relationship between the two units of an exemplifying structure can be implicit or explicitly marked. For Manzotti (1995: 14), it is reasonable to assume that the 'action of exemplification' occurs only in the presence of a signal that enriches the concatenation beyond simple juxtaposition. In this regard, he makes a distinction between *underdetermined exemplification*, which occurs when the signals are

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18 Mentioning the omissibility of the examples, Eggs and McElholm (2013) define exemplification "as an *apposition* which is distinguished from other forms of apposition by the fact that it is enumerative and specificational, i.e. that it consists of a list of examples each of which stands in a relation of inclusion to a prior anchor" (Eggs and McElholm 2013: 15).

paralinguistic (i.e., pauses, interjections, gestures) or, in writing, graphic (e.g., brackets, dashes, colons), and *linguistically determined exemplification*, which can be indicated by various means.[19]

We set out to classify the strategies that guide the hearer/reader's interpretive tasks into three main types: (i) meta-exemplifiers, i.e., meta-discursive speech acts or utterances that denote the pragmatic awareness of the speaker/writer (e.g., *I will give an example*, or *an example is the following*); (ii) canonical example markers, i.e., dedicated adverbials and locutions that overtly mark an element or segment of discourse as an example (e.g., *for example* or *for instance*); (iii) para-exemplifiers, i.e., linguistic items that originally and primarily have other functions, such as comparison and equation (e.g., Eng. *like*, Fr. *comme*, It. *come*), focalization and particularization (e.g., Eng. *in particular, including,* Fr. *notamment*, It. *in particolare*), reformulation and hedging (e.g., Eng. *say, let's say*, Fr. *disons, genre*, It. *diciamo, metti, tipo*), consequence and conclusion (e.g., Fr. *ainsi*, It. *così*).[20]

As we will see in Sections 5 and 6, the development of example markers in Latin proceeds both from strategies of meta-exemplification and from expressions performing para-exemplification. Not surprisingly, in the synchrony of many languages, the boundaries between para-exemplifiers and canonical example markers are often blurred, because these expressions converge in the category of functional markers, that is, communicative devices that have limited or no effect on propositional meaning but serve multiple procedural functions at both the discourse and pragmatic levels.

3.2 Discursive and pragmatic functions

More precisely, functional markers serve primarily as discourse markers that index the structure of the discourse, by providing textual cohesion and specifying how the message and its content are to be interpreted. In addition, they can serve as pragmatic markers that index the framework of the interaction, by expressing the speakers/writers' subjective stance in relation to the content of their utterance, or

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19 Chevillard et al. (2007: 13) distinguish between *marquage typographique* and *marquage robuste*, i. e., through linguistic tools.

20 Manzotti (1995) uses the term *paraesemplificazione* to analyse It. *come, così* 'as', *magari* 'perhaps', and *del tipo/genere* 'kind, kinda'; on It. *tipo* see also Voghera (2013). On Fr. *comme* 'as' and *notamment* 'in particular' see Landolsi (2018), on *ainsi* 'as' see Karssenberg and Lahousse (2018), on *genre* 'kinda' see Chauveau-Thoumelin (2018).

by negotiating prior assertions and viewpoints at the intersubjective level (Ghezzi 2014: 15).[21]

The basic function of example markers and para-exemplifiers is to guide the interlocutor in recognizing the role of the utterance in which they occur and to signal an element or segment of discourse as an example. As such, they typically have metatextual functions (Bazzanella 1995) but can acquire further discourse and pragmatic values depending on the context and the intentions of the speaker/writer. This explains why these functional markers can also perform reformulating, focalizing, or quotational functions at the metatextual level, convey epistemic hedging, politeness, or shared knowledge at the interactional level (Barotto 2018; Barotto and Mauri 2018; Lo Baido 2018), or even denote approximation at the propositional level (Mihatsch 2010).

To this end, speakers/writers can either use example markers as flexible pragmatic devices that serve multiple functions in the same context, or recruit para-exemplifiers. In Manzotti (1995) the term *paraesemplificazione* applies to forms that serve operations similar or close to exemplification and that, as in metaphor and metonymy, obtain a "figurative" exemplification based on contiguity which combines the properties of the two operations involved (Manzotti 1998: 114). However, in our view, the prefix *para-* also captures the "parasitic" nature of these exemplifiers, as their function is often inferred by adjacency when they precede a list of items or when they combine in syntagmatic chains, as in *like for example* (Eggs and McElholm 2013: 81–82). We can finally add that pragmatic devices are polyfunctional also at the paradigmatic level, so that the same marker can display different functions depending on the context or the position in which it occurs. The mitigating role of *par exemple* and *for example* at the end of the utterance confirms that, while linguistic items in the left periphery typically serve discourse coherence and textual organization, those in the right periphery perform interactional uses before the turn shifts: anticipating the upcoming discourse, reformulating the message, fine-tuning illocutionary force or epistemic stance, conveying intersubjective meanings (Beeching and Detges 2014: 11; Degand 2014: 158).[22]

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21 The labels *discourse markers* and *pragmatic markers* are often used as synonyms and, since Schiffrin's (1987) influential work, the former is preferred in literature focusing on spoken interaction in contemporary languages, but the distinction adopted here is more suitable for a corpus language such as Latin.

22 For Herman (2011), the speaker who uses postposed *par exemple* "s'oblige à atténuer le caractère définitif de l'assertion en précisant que ce n'est qu'un exemple parmi d'autres [obliges themselves to mitigate the definitive nature of the assertion by pointing out that this is just one example among many]" (Herman 2011: 99). In final position, the marker also emphasizes the arbitrariness and non-exhaustiveness of the items mentioned (Landolsi 2018: 180). Analogous considerations apply to *for example* and *for instance* (Rodríguez-Abruñeiras 2019a: 164–169).

As the above considerations show, categorizing exemplification signals according to their functions is a difficult task, but alternative classifications are no less problematic. In their monograph on English and German example markers, Eggs and McElholm (2013: 12–13) posit a distinction between *descriptive uses* at the sentence level, where the example is to be understood as a complete communicative unit, and *argumentative uses* at the transphrastic level, where the connectors link whole chunks of discourse. Then, considering structures, Eggs and McElholm label examples with an explicit general unit as *argumentations* when their twofold structure consists of full sentences, and as *exemplifications* when smaller units such as phrases or clauses are correlated; instead, examples without an explicit general unit (or *anchor*) are called *selections*. Although focused on the use of example markers, this taxonomy actually defines (and definitely narrows) the domain of exemplification; moreover, it does so through a controversial terminology vis-à-vis the current debate, in which the concept of selection is a defining feature of the canonical example.

Rodríguez-Abruñeiras (2017: 89), on the other hand, proposes to classify English example markers based on two parameters: the degree of emphasis conveyed on the example they introduce and their position in the exemplifying sequence. Her investigation, however, starts from a "semantic classification" that identifies four types of markers: neutral, i.e., non emphatic (e.g., *for example, for instance*), comparative (e.g., *like, such as*), focalizing, i.e., slightly emphatic (e.g., *in particular, including*), and hypothetical (e.g., *say, let's say*). This hybrid and somewhat sketchy categorization, however, does not seem suitable for analysing the data of Latin, where emphasis is difficult to measure and example markers are still developing.

In the following, we will therefore present the strategies for exemplification in Latin by referring to the notions of meta-exemplification, canonical exemplification, and para-exemplification mentioned above (Section 3.1). This simple and inherently dynamic taxonomy will allow us to discuss the data from both a synchronic and diachronic perspective.

4 Strategies of exemplification

4.1 Underdetermined exemplification

Before illustrating the linguistic means used to signal, and/or comment on, the operation of exemplification, it is worth briefly mentioning asyndetic sequences that can be construed as underdetermined exemplifications. In modern editions of

Latin texts, editors and translators can highlight these interpretations by adding appropriate punctuation or explicit example markers.

   This is illustrated in (9), where a quotation from Vergil (*georg*. 3.243) follows a statement about the influence of metrical norms on accentuation, to show how lengthening by position works. In the Latin text of the Loeb edition, the inserted colon, like other punctuation marks, serves to reduce the kind of relations that can hold between the two juxtaposed propositions, which in the translation are explicitly linked by *as in*:

(9)   (Quint. *inst*. 1.5.28)
        Euenit ut metri quoque condicio mutet accentum: pecudes pictaeque uolucres.
        Nam 'uolucres' media acuta legam, quia, etsi natura breuis, tamen positione
        longa est
        'Metrical circumstances may also affect the accent, as in *pecudes pictaeque*
        uolucres. Here, I read *uolúcres* with an acute on the middle syllable, which,
        though short by nature, is long by position.'

In (10) the category of perennial rivers is illustrated by three representative items: the Nile, the Danube, and the Rhine, which Seneca introduces with the two deictics *hinc*, to suggest gestures pointing in different directions, and which the translator of the Loeb edition, renders with *for example*:

(10)   (Sen. *nat.* 6.7.1)
        Aliubi perpetui amnes, quorum nauigabilis etiam sine adiutorio imbrium
        magnitudo est; **hinc** *Nilus per aestatem ingentes aquas inuehit;* **hinc***, qui*
        medius inter pacata et hostilia fluit, Danuuius ac Rhenus, alter Sarmaticos
        impetus cohibens et Europam Asiamque disterminans, alter Germanos,
        auidam belli gentem, repellens.
        'In some places there are perpetual rivers large enough to be navigable,
        even without the help of rains. For example, there is the Nile, which carries
        great quantities of water all summer. Elsewhere, rivers flow midway
        between the pacified and the hostile; for example, the Danube or the Rhine,
        one checking the attacks of Sarmatians and marking a boundary between
        Europe and Asia, the other keeping back the Germans, a nation eager for
        war.'

In both cases, translations amount to interpretations that exploit the co-text to bridge the asyndetic gap between the juxtaposed units and to bring out relations of exemplification.

4.2 Meta-exemplification

More interesting for our investigation is the wide range of meta-exemplifiers, i.e., non-formulaic expressions containing verbs or nouns that refer to the communicative process (e.g., *say, explain, understand, term, example*, etc.) and indirectly announce an operation of exemplification (cf. Fernández-Bernárdez 1994–1995: 104–106).[23] In most cases, these kinds of metacommunicative utterances and speech acts, which denote the author's pragmatic awareness, contribute to integrating the example into the flow of discourse. In early grammatical and rhetorical texts, as Vainio (2000) observes, "the example tends to conform to the syntax of the sentence whenever possible. Quintilian likes to form the sentence with verbs such as *dicere* or *legere* in order to include the example in its syntactic environment" (Vainio 2000: 33). This is shown by the following passages, where materials for metalinguistic reflection are presented as fragments of spoken language:[24]

(11)   (Quint. *inst*. 1.4.26)
         *Nam cum **dico** 'hasta percussi', non utor ablatiui natura, nec si idem Graece dicam, datiui.*
         'When I say *hasta percussi*, I do not use the natural sense of the ablative; nor, if I say the same in Greek, do I use the natural sense of the dative.'

(12)   (Quint. *inst*. 1.5.20)
         *Parcissime ea ueteres usi etiam in uocalibus, cum 'aedos' 'ircos'que **dicebant**.*
         'Early writers used it [*sc.* H letter] rarely even with vowels, and said *aedus* and *ircus*.'

The use of the verb *dicō*, which frequently occurs in formulas like *si dicam* 'if I say', etc. (see Section 6.3.2 *infra*), shows the proximity between the operations of exemplification and quotation. Grammatical examples may cite words and structures from real speech, occasionally mentioning an enunciative source, such as the Ancients in (12).[25]

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23 According to Hyland (2007), "metadiscourse is self-reflective matter which makes reference to the evolving text or to the writer and imagined reader of that text" (Hyland 2007: 268).
24 For Chevillard et al. (2007: 6), a grammatical example is "tout objet linguistique, quelle que soit sa structure, issu de la langue objet: tout fragment de la langue objet inséré dans le discours grammatical. […] Par ailleurs, un exemple n'est pas *n'importe quel* fragment de la langue, il correspond plutôt à un *échantillon représentatif* de cette dernière" [any linguistic object, whatever its structure, derived from the target language: any fragment of the target language inserted into the grammatical discourse. (…) Moreover, an example is not just any fragment of the language, but rather a representative sample of it].
25 Cf. also Quint. *inst*. 1.6.19. Chevillard et al. (2007: 13): "*on, je, les paysans*, ou tout autre groupe de locuteurs dont le grammairien allègue la façon de parler, et dont la mention contribue à attester que

On the other hand, the expression *hoc ut scias* 'so that you know', which in (13) is freely rendered by the translator, suggests some proximity between exemplification and explanation:

(13) (Sen. *nat.* 2.28.3)
[…] *nisi uniuersus erumpit, non crepat.* **Hoc ut scias**, *uentus qui circa arborem finditur sibilat, non tonat*
'Yet the air does not make a sound unless it all bursts out at once. Here is an understandable example: the wind which is parted around a tree only whispers; it does not make the sound of thunder.'

This locution is a stylistic feature peculiar to Seneca that is destined for oblivion; still, it is relevant to note how verbs of knowledge grammaticalize into Fr. *à savoir* and Sp. *a saber* 'that is to say, namely', which mainly serve the functions of explanation and reformulation but in specific contexts can also perform exemplification (Fernández-Bernárdez 1994–1995: 104).

An interesting metacommunicative speech act is found in (14), where Cicero uses the verb *ponō* to suggest a non-exhaustive list of pleasant activities and situations:

(14) (Cic. *Fin.* 2.107.7)
haec leuiora **ponam**: *poema, orationem cum aut scribis aut legis, cum omnium factorum, cum regionum conquiris historiam, signum, tabula, locus amoenus, ludi, uenatio, uilla Luculli.*
'I will suggest less serious matters: reading or writing a poem or a speech, the study of history or geography, statues, pictures, scenery, the games and wild beast shows, Lucullus's country house.'

The verb *ponō*, as we will see in a moment, often performs meta-exemplification in combination with the noun *exemplum*.

4.2.1 Locutions with the noun *exemplum*

The noun *exemplum* frequently combines with various verbs (such as *sumō*, *capiō* 'to take into one's hand', *ostendō*, *proferō* 'to show, display') that testify to its original concrete meaning of specimen, sample. Sometimes, the *exemplum* proposes (*proponō*) a model of virtue to be emulated, as in (15), or presents (*ponō*) a way of reasoning to be avoided, as in (16):

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l'exemple constitue une donnée prélevée" [*on, je, les paysans*, or any other group of speakers whose way of speaking the grammarian alleges, and whose mention attests the example as a retrieved datum]; see also Spina (2008: 11).

(15)   (Cic. *Phil.* 10.5)
         […] **propones** illi **exempla** *ad imitandum*.
         '[…] you will set before him examples for imitation.'

(16)   (Cic. *inv.* 1.88)
         Ac nunc quidem, quo facilius res cognosceretur, perspicuo et grandi uitio
         praeditum **posuimus exemplum***.*
         'In this case, in order to make the subject plainer we have given an example
         containing an obvious and monstrous fallacy.'

In other cases, the collocation with the noun *exemplum* announces a forthcoming
exemplification even before the intervention of co-text and context, because the
textual operation is lexically embedded in the propositional semantics of the utter-
ance. In (17) Quintilian says that he will offer some examples (of *exempla*!) taken from
Cicero:

(17)   (Quint. *inst.* 5.11.11)
         Singula igitur horum generum ex Cicerone (nam unde potius?) **exempla**
         ponamus*.*
         'Let us set out some individual examples of these kinds from Cicero (where
         could we find better?).'

Other (non-fixed) locutions sound like stylistic traits of a specific author, such as
those with the verb *pateō* in Quintilian:

(18)   (Quint. *inst.* 3.6.10)
         Quod ut breuissimo pateat exemplo*, cum dicit reus: 'etiam si feci, recte*
         feci' qualitatis utitur statu
         'To show this by a brief example: when a defendant says: "Even if I did it,
         I was right to do it," he is using the Issue of Quality.'

(19)   (Quint. *inst.* 3.5.8)
         Quod ut exemplo pateat*, infinita est 'an uxor ducenda', finita 'an Catoni*
         ducenda', ideoque esse suasoria potest.
         'Let me illustrate this by an example. "Should one take a wife?" is an
         indefinite question; "Should Cato take a wife?" is definite, and so can form a
         suasoria.'

Those with the verb *sum* in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* confirm the proximity
between exemplification and quotation:

(20)   (*Rhet. Her.* 4.8.11)
         In hoc genere figurae **erit hoc exemplum***: "Nam quis est uestrum, iudices,*
         […]
         'The following will be an example of this type of style: "Who of you, pray,
         men of the jury, […]"'

(21) (*Rhet. Her.* 4.37.49)
      *Posterioris licentiae **hoc erit exemplum**: "Mihi cum isto, iudices, fuit amicitia*, […]
      'Of the latter kind of Frank Speech the following will be an example: "I enjoyed a friendship with this person, […]"'

The distinction between the two operations is clearer in the use of the formula *exemplum hoc est* (3× in Gellius), where *exemplum* always means 'copy, transcript':

(22) (Gell. 15.7.3)
      eiusque epistula exemplum hoc est: "IX. Kal. Octobris. Aue, mi Gai, […]
      'I give a copy of the letter: "The ninth day before the Kalends of October. Greeting, my dear Gaius, […]"'

Dictionaries often mention the phrases *exempli gratia, exempli causa*, and *exempli loco* as equivalents of 'for example, by way of an example', but their predominant use is as meta-exemplifiers. In particular, the variant *exempli loco* remains very rare and confined to the meta-discursive dimension (it is found twice, with *ponō* in Cic. *Inv.* 2.118.7 and with *proferō* in *Rhet. Her.* 2.26.41). On the other hand, *exempli causa* is employed more frequently, and occasionally even as a true example marker (see Section 5.2).

4.2.2 Locutions with the phrase *exempli causa*

According to Menge (2009 [1873]: 233), *exempli causa* is found almost exclusively after verbs such as *proferre, ponere, nominare,* etc., when a real example, a historical case is cited. However, in half of the 22 occurrences found in the *Antiquitas* section of the *LLT* database, the phrase is a simple adjunct, as in (23), which is an interesting metalinguistic reflection about limiting the number of examples to one or two:[26]

(23) (*Rhet. Her.* 3.23.39)
      *Postremo, praeceptoris est docere quemadmodum quaeri quidque conueniat, et unum aliquod aut alterum, non omnia quae eius generis erunt **exempli causa** subicere, quo res possit esse dilucidior.*
      'Finally, it is the instructor's duty to teach the proper method of search in each case, and, for the sake of greater clarity, to add in illustration some one or two examples of its kind, but not all.'

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26 *Exempli causa* is a mere adjunct without exemplifying meaning in 11 passages (Apul. *Plat.* 2.25, p. 141; Cic. *Mur.* 27; *S. Rosc.* 27; *Verr.* 2.183; Fronto p. 155.4; Ps. Quint. *decl.* 6.1; *Rhet. Her.* 3.6.11; 3.23.39; 4.51. 65; Liv. 1.11.7; Svet. *Tib.* 67.3.9); it appears in contexts of meta-exemplification nine times (Cels. 5.19.11a; Cic. *Phil.* 13.2; *Cluent.* 119; *inv.* 1.66; *off.* 3.19; *de orat.* 2.271; Frontin. *aq.* 112; Svet. *rhet.* 25.9; Varro *rust.* 2. 4.21) and works as a canonical example marker in two cases (Cic. *inv.* 1.85; Colum. 5.2.3).

In nine cases the phrase contributes to meta-exemplification within syntactically variable structures, as in (24), where the order is [*exempli causa* V O], and in (25), where the order is [*exempli causa* O V]:[27]

(24)　　(Cic. *Cluent.* 119)
　　　　exempli causa <u>ponam unum illud</u> […]
　　　　'I will merely illustrate it with a single example […]'

(25)　　(Cels. 5.19.11a)
　　　　Sunt autem quaedam emplastra […]. ***Exempli causa*** <u>duo proponam.</u> […]
　　　　'Now there are certain plasters […]. I will mention two as examples […]'

In other cases, the phrase is inserted between object and verb in the structure [O *exempli causa* V], as shown in (26) and (27):[28]

(26)　　(Varro *rust.* 2.4.21)
　　　　De sanitate suum <u>unum</u> *modo* ***exempli causa*** <u>dicam:</u> *porcis lactentibus si scrofa lac non potest suppeditare, triticum frictum dari oportet (crudum enim soluit aluom) uel hordeum obici ex aqua, quaad fiant trimestres*
　　　　'As to the health of swine, I shall give but one illustration: if the sow cannot furnish enough milk for the sucking-pigs, toasted wheat should be fed (for raw wheat loosens the bowels), or barley soaked in water, until they are three months old.'

(27)　　(Svet. *rhet.* 25.9)
　　　　Sic certe collectae editaeque se habent, ex quibus non alienum fuerit <u>unam et alteram</u> ***exempli causa*** *ad uerbum* <u>referre.</u>
　　　　'At any rate that is the case with the published collections, from which it may be enlightening to give one or two specimens word for word. [two quotations follow]'

Despite their variability, these constructions show that *exempli causa* is still integrated into the syntax of the sentence and contributes to its propositional meaning. Structures with *exempli gratia*, on the other hand, seem to outline a clearer path towards the emergence of a discourse marker devoted to exemplification.

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27 See also Cic. *Cluent.* 119 and Fronto p. 7.1. In Cic. *Phil.* 13.2.16 the locution *exempli causa paucos nominaui* 'I have named a few as examples' follows a (probably) open list of Cicero's enemies.
28 See also Cic. *inv.* 1.66.4 and Frontin. *aq.* 112.2.

4.2.3 Locutions with the phrase *exempli gratia*

The first expression that comes to mind when we think about exemplification in Latin is certainly *exempli gratia*, also for its fortune in modern academic prose, particularly in the abbreviated form *e.g.*[29] The phrase appears only ten times in the *Antiquitas* section of the *LLT*, and nine occurrences have exemplifying functions, but in six cases the phrase is found within metacommunicative utterances and speech acts, as in (28):[30]

(28)   (Quint. *inst.* 5.10.110)
        Sit ***exempli gratia*** *proposita controuersia quae minime communes cum aliis quaestiones habet: 'Cum Thebas euertisset Alexander,* […]
        'Let us take for example a *controuersia* in which the Questions have very little in common with other themes: "When Alexander sacked Thebes, […]"'

In the remaining cases, the phrase is embedded within the structure [O *exempli gratia* V], as in (29)–(31):

(29)   (Nep. *Lys.* 2.1.3)
        Cuius de crudelitate ac perfidia satis est **unam rem exempli gratia proferre**, *ne de eodem plura enumerando defatigemus lectores.*
        'Of his [*sc.* Lysander] cruelty and treachery it is enough to cite a single instance by way of illustration, rather than weary my readers by enumerating more of the same kind.'

(30)   (Quint. *inst.* 9.2.56)
        Nam brevior illa, ut ait Cicero, a re digressio plurimis fit modis. Sed **haec exempli gratia sufficient** […]
        'What Cicero calls the 'shorter' form of Digression can be effected in many ways. The following examples will suffice [two examples follow]'

(31)   (Quint. *inst.* 6.5.6)
        Sed haec quoque ut quisque passus est locus monuimus, idemque in reliqua parte faciemus, **pauca** *tamen* **exempli gratia ponam**, *quibus manifestius appareat quid sit quod demonstrari posse praeceptis non arbitror.*

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29 Pinkster (2015: 907, 911) states that the ablatives *causā* and *gratiā* can be used as postpositions after a genitive noun to express both purpose and reason adjuncts, but he also acknowledges that their distinction is sometimes difficult (Pinkster 2015: 909).
30 *Exempli gratia* is used as an adjunct just once (Quint. *inst.* 4.2.17); it occurs in context of meta-exemplification six times (Gell. 19.14.4; Nep. *Lys.* 2.1.3; Plin. *nat.* 18.213; Quint. *inst.* 5.10.110; 6.5.6; 9.2.56), and it is a canonical example marker three times (Cic. *off.* 30.50.5; Plin. *nat.* 2.77; 2.110.7).

'I have given advice on all these matters wherever the context allowed, and I shall do the same in the rest of my work. However, I shall make a few points here, by way of example, to clarify what it is that I think cannot be covered by rules.'

The phrase always precedes the verb even when the structure is expanded, as in (32):

(32)   (Gell. 19.14.4)
         Sicuti sunt quae paulo ante legimus in commentariis eius, quos grammaticos inscripsit, ex quibus **quaedam** *ad demonstrandum scripturae genus* **exempli gratia sumpsi**.
         'As a specimen I may cite what I read a short time ago in his work [*sc.* of P. Nigidius] entitled *Grammatical Notes*; from this book I have made a few extracts, as an example of the nature of his writings.'

The only exception is the passage in (33), where Pliny moves *exempli gratia* after the verb *ponō*, and immediately before the *illustrans*: five Greek scholars with differing opinions about the morning setting of Pleiades:

(33)   (Plin*. nat.* 18.213)
         eorum qui in eadem regione dissedere **unam discordiam ponemus exempli gratia**: *occasum matutinum uergiliarum Hesiodus* […] *tradidit fieri cum aequinoctium autumni conficeretur, Thales xxv die ab aequinoctio, Anaximander xxx, Euctemon xliv, Eudoxus xlviii.*
         'as for those who have differed in their views in the same country, we will give one case of disagreement as an example: the morning setting of the Pleiades is given by Hesiod […] as taking place at the close of the autumnal equinox, whereas Thales puts it on the 25th day after the equinox, Anaximander on the 30th, Euctemon on the 44th, and Eudoxus on the 48th.'

Although evidence is scarce, similar structures could be seen as bridging contexts that lead to the emergence of a discourse marker through processes of reanalysis and rebracketing, in which the postverbal phrases become parenthetical segments, as shown in (34):

(34)   [*unam* **discordiam** *ponemus*]$_E$ [**exempli gratia**]$_{ExM}$ [*occasum matutinum uergiliarum* **Hesiodus** *tradidit fieri*…]$_e$ [**Thales**…]$_e$ [**Anaximander**…]$_e$ [**Euctemon**…]$_e$ [**Eudoxus**…]$_e$
         'we will give one case of disagreement: for example, Hesiod gives the morning setting of the Pleiades as taking place… , Thales… , Anaximander… , Euctemon… , Eudoxus…'

The hypothesis concerning the parentheticalization of *exempli gratia* will find support in the next section, which discusses the emergence of true example markers in Latin.

5 From meta-exemplification to canonical exemplification

5.1 *Exempli gratia*

The above discussion suggests that markers whose core function is canonical exemplification are not yet fully developed in Classical Latin, which lacks expressions equivalent to 'for example' or 'for instance' in all their possible syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic uses. However, *exempli gratia* – which will be very successful in medieval argumentative Latin prose – seems on the verge of becoming a true example marker. The ambiguous passage from the *Naturalis Historia* in (33) shows that, once dislocated in peripheral position, *exempli gratia* appears detached from the syntax of the sentence and available for cooptation (Heine 2013: 1221–1224; Heine et al. 2021) as a marker introducing the exemplifying sequence.[31] Therefore, the emergence of markers devoted to exemplification can proceed from strategies of meta-exemplification through syntactic shifts, bridging contexts, and parentheticalization.

Interestingly, it is in the very same work by Pliny that we find two of the first attestations of the phrase as a true example marker, as shown in (35) and (36):

(35)   (Plin. *nat.* 2.110)
        in his quidam mille sexcentas adnotauere stellas, insignes scilicet effectu uisuue, **exempli gratia** *in cauda tauri septem quas appellauere Vergilias, in fronte suculas, Booten quae sequitur Septem Triones.*
        'In them [*sc.* constellations] they have indeed noted 1600 stars as being especially remarkable for their influence or their appearance, for instance the seven which they have named the Pleiades in the tail of the Bull and the Little Pigs in his forehead, and Bootes the star that follows the Seven Plough-oxen.'

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31 On the lack of syntactic integration in the host utterance as a constitutive property of discourse markers, see the discussion in Fischer (2006: 8–12). In Heine et al. (2021), cooptation is defined as "a cognitive-communicative operation which enables speakers to switch their perspective from the level of reasoning anchored in the meaning of sentences to a meta-level of reasoning immediately anchored to and shaped by the situation of discourse" (Heine et al. 2021: 67).

(36)   (Plin. *nat.* 2.77)

*Multa promi amplius circa haec possunt secreta naturae legesque quibus ipsa seruiat, **exempli gratia** in Martis sidere (cuius est maxime inobseruabilis cursus) numquam id stationem facere Iouis sidere triquetro, raro admodum sexaginta partibus discreto* […]

'Many more facts can be produced about these mysteries of nature and the laws that she obeys – for example, in the case of the planet Mars (whose course it is very difficult to observe) that it never makes its station with Jupiter at an angle of 120°, and very seldom with Jupiter separated 60° […]'

Technical prose is the genre in which canonical examples abound, since complex categories need to be illustrated by representative items, as in (35), and general statements need to be proven by detailed facts, as in (36). Thus, canonical exemplification develops its own structures and linguistic markers within a literary genre in which the word *exemplum* shifts from the sense of 'exemplary model, precedent' to the meaning of 'typical instance, illustration'. In accordance with the nature of the *illustrandum*, the *illustrans* is often multiplied into a virtually open list of *illustrantia*, which are selected as parts or proofs of the *illustrandum* itself. In other words, while the rhetorical *exemplum* persuades or argues as a model or a precedent, showing similarities or analogies through comparison, the canonical example illustrates as a sample or demonstrates as a proof, focusing on details or properties through selection.

The third attestation of *exempli gratia* as an example marker suggests a sort of continuity between the two modes of exemplification: in (37) Cicero discusses the conflict between expediency and honesty in business by means of a hypothetical situation. What follows *exempli gratia* concretizes an abstract issue, but in the form of a narrative digression that lies between the illustrative example and the moral *exemplum*:

(37)   (Cic. *off.* 3.12.50)

*Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones si **exempli gratia** uir bonus Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti numerum aduexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame* […]

'The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria to Rhodes, at a time of dearth and famine of the Rhodians […]'

Although scarcely attested in *Antiquitas* and primarily used for meta-exemplification in *Aetas patrum* (raw data: 108 occurrences, including 41 in Augustin), *exempli gratia* becomes a widespread example marker and, over time, undoubtedly more fortunate than *exempli causa*.

5.2 *Exempli causa*

As said in Section 4.2.2, *exempli causa* is mostly used as an adjunct or as a meta-exemplifier, but in (38) Cicero uses the same mode of exemplification seen in (37): the phrase introduces a hypothetical case that illustrates how to respond to an accusation of theft:

(38)   (Cic. *Inv*. 1.85.6)
         Altero autem modo reprehendetur si aut contra aliquid dicetur, hoc est, si
         ***exempli causa**, ut in eodem uersemur, poterit ostendi hereditate uenisse,*
         […]
         'The second method of answering, that is, if any point can be denied, is
         exemplified by the following case: if, for instance (to use the same illustration)
         it can be shown that [the horse] was inherited […]'

In the same period, Columella explains how to calculate a rectangular area by solving a concrete problem of measuring a field:

(39)   (Colum. 5.2.3)
         *At si longior fuerit, quam latior, ut **exempli causa** iugeri forma pedes habeat*
         longitudinis ccxl, latitudinis pedes cxx, ita ut paulo ante dixi, latitudinis pedes
         cum longitudinis pedibus sic multiplicabis […]
         'If it is longer than it is broad (for example let the form of the *iugerum* have
         240 feet of length and 120 of breadth), as I said just now, you will multiply the
         feet of the breadth with the feet of the length in the following manner […]'

The sections *Aetas Patrum* of the *LLT* database show 68 occurrences of *exempli causa*, mostly in conjunction with *ponō*, to convey meta-exemplification. Interesting exceptions are found in *De medicina*, a fifth-century medical treatise where the physician Cassius Felix uses *ut exempli causa* to introduce a list of alternative illustrations, as in (40), from the chapter *Ad reuma* 'on flux, rheum':[32]

(40)   (Cass. Fel. 23.1)
         *Contingit frequenter, maxime tamen in articulosis locis, ut **exempli causa** in*
         genu aut in cubito aut iugulo aut maxilla cum aure usque ad tempora,
         aliquando etiam simul et faciem, […]
         'It affects people often, predominantly in the joints, like for example the
         knee, the elbow, the collarbone, or the jawbone with the ear and up to the
         temples, sometimes even the whole of the face […]'

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32 See also Cass. Fel. 18.5. For the Latin text see Fraisse's (2002) edition, the translation is our own.

The use of example markers combined with para-exemplifiers like *ut* will be discussed in Section 6.2.1, after completing the description of the phrases with *gratia* and *causa*.

5.3 *Verbi gratia*

Beside those with the noun *exemplum*, also the phrases containing *uerbum* can perform the operation of exemplification, since the noun 'word, term' also refers to the communicative process. In the period *Antiquitas*, the expression *uerbi gratia* occurs 27 times and in 26 cases behaves as a parenthetical example marker.[33] However, while *exempli gratia* literally means 'for the sake of an example', *uerbi gratia* literally means 'for the sake of a word' and, as such, acts as meta-communicative device commenting on the choice of an expression, sometimes a "loose" example without an explicit *illustrandum*, which is presented as an alternative within a set of equally illustrative items.[34] The focus on a single term and the nuance of apparent randomness are quite evident in (41), where *uerbi gratia* interrupts the phrase *populum Centuripinum*: Centuripe is just one among many rich cities in Sicily:

(41) (Cic. *Verr*. 2.2.143)
      Etenim, si C. Verres HS c milia populum **uerbi gratia** *Centuripinum*
      poposcisset eamque ab iis pecuniam abstulisset, […]
      'For surely, if Verres had simply demanded the sum of a thousand pounds
      from, shall we say, the people of Centuripe, and taken that sum away from
      them, […]'

Rather than 'arbitrary choices', however, the examples introduced by *uerbi gratia* are often improbable eventualities or surprising facts, which are presented, as such, in hypothetical or mitigated form. In (42), pleasure is an absurd motivation for self-love:[35]

(42) (Cic. *fin*. 5.30.16)
      in nobismet ipsis autem ne intellegi quidem ut propter aliam quampiam rem,
      uerbi gratia *propter uoluptatem, nos amemus;*
      'but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love
      ourselves for the sake of something else, let's say, for the sake of pleasure.'

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33 The only exception is in *Rhet. Her.* 4.36.26.

34 In the terminology of Eggs and McElholm (2013), what we have labelled as a "loose" example corresponds to a *selection*.

35 See also Cic. *ac.* 94.12.

In (43), irregularity in inflection is illustrated by means of a paradoxical anomaly:

(43)   (Varro *ling*. 8.3.8)
        *at si **uerbi gratia** alterum horum diceretur Priamus, alterum Hecuba,*
        nullam unitatem adsignificaret, quae apparet in lego et legi et in Priamus
        Priamo.
        'But if, for the sake of a word, one of these two related ideas was called
        Priamus and the other *Hecuba*, there would be no indication of the unity of
        idea which is clear in *lego* and *legi*, and in nominative *Priamus*, dative
        Priamo.'

In (44), Pliny describes stones with wonderful pareidolic figures:

(44)   (Plin*. nat.* 37.71)
        *hi sunt fluctuosi ac rerum imagines complexi, papauerum **uerbi gratia** aut*
        auium catulorumque uel pinnarum
        'These stones [*sc.* emeralds from Media] have undulating bands and contain
        inclusions resembling various objects, for example, poppies, birds, puppies,
        or feathers.'

In similar cases, *uerbi gratia* performs pragmatic hedging as a shield, modulating the
writer's subjective stance towards the plausibility of a controversial or incredible
illustrans. In other cases, it performs semantic hedging as an approximator,
rounding off quantities and measures in conjunction with numerals, as in (45):[36]

(45)   (Plin. *nat*. 18.327)
        *per huius mediam longitudinem duci sarculo sulcum uel cinere liniam **uerbi***
        ***gratia** pedum xx conueniet*
        'Through the middle of the length of this shadow you will have to draw a
        furrow with a hoe or a line with ashes let's say 20 ft. long.'

The increasing use of *uerbi gratia* in technical prose (see also Frontin. *aq*. 34.4.1) is
confirmed by the fact that 19 out of 26 occurrences are found in Gaius' *Institutiones*.[37]
In most passages, the example marker is used parenthetically (within quotations), as
in (46), or inserted in hypothetical contexts illustrating private law cases, as in (47),
since it is very common to exemplify an abstract concept or rule by proposing an
imaginary situation:

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36 On the notions of *shields* and *approximators,* see Prince et al. (1982). Mihatsch (2010) confirms the
functional connection between exemplification and hedging by studying Port. *ponhamos* 'let's put'
and Fr. *disons* 'let's say', which, like It. *poniamo, mettiamo*, and *diciamo*, can also act as approx-
imators. See also Barotto (2018) on Japanese example markers.
37 The translations of the examples follow de Zulueta's (1946) edition.

Table 1: Frequency of *uerbi gratia* and *uerbi causa*.

	Frequency in *Antiquitas*		Frequency in *Aetas Patrum*	
	Absolute	Per million words	Absolute	Per million words
uerbi gratia	27	4,674,381	932	42,22,261
uerbi causa	12	2,077,503	270	12,23,187

(46)   (Gaius *inst.* 2.193.2)

       Per uindicationem hoc modo legamus: Titio, **uerbi gratia**, *hominem Stichum do lego*

       'By vindication we legate in this way: "To Titius", say, "I give and legate the slave Stichus"'

(47)   (Gaius *inst.* 4.17.1)

       Si qua res talis erat ut sine incommodo non posset in ius adferri uel adduci, **uerbi gratia** *si columna aut nauis aut grex alicuius pecoris esset, pars aliqua inde sumebatur, eaque in ius adferebatur; deinde in eam partem quasi in totam rem praesentem fiebat uindicatio.*

       'If the thing was such as could not be carried or led into court without inconvenience – for example, if it was a column or a ship or a flock or herd – some part was taken from it and brought into court, and claim was laid on that part as representing the whole thing.'

With more than 900 attestations in the period *Aetas Patrum I* and *II, uerbi gratia* is indeed the most fortunate of the Latin expressions related to exemplification, also compared to the variant *uerbi causa* (cf. Table 1).

5.4 *Verbi causa*

The phrase *uerbi causa* is attested twelve times in the period *Antiquitas*, and in ten cases behaves as an example marker with the same characteristics and parenthetical uses of *uerbi gratia.* Since the syntactic independence of discourse markers is also related to their scope variability, *uerbi causa* can focus and act upon discourse units of almost any size, or remain ambiguous between phrasal and clausal scope, as in (48) and (49):

(48)   (Lucr. 3.421–424)
         tu fac utrumque uno sub iungas nomine eorum,
         *atque animam **uerbi causa** cum dicere pergam,*
         mortalem esse docens, animum quoque dicere credas,
         quatenus est unum inter se coniunctaque res est.
         'Be so good as to apply both these names to one thing; and when I speak of
         spirit, for example, showing it to be mortal, believe me to speak also of mind,
         inasmuch as it is one thing and a combined nature.'

(49)   (Cic. *Mil.* 60.2)
         Age uero, quae erat aut qualis quaestio? 'Heus tu Rufio' **uerbi causa** *'caue sis*
         mentiare. Clodius insidias fecit Miloni?'
         'Well now, what was the manner of examination, and how did it proceed?
         "Look here, Rufio," let's say, "mind you don't tell lies! Did Clodius plot
         against Milo?"'

Used as a hedge to attenuate the full meaning or the pragmatic force of an utterance,
this parenthetical expression can also modulate the writer's attitude towards a
nonsensical or disputable *illustrans*, as in (50) and (51):[38]

(50)   (Cic. *fat.* 12.2)
         *Sint igitur astrologorum percepta huiusmodi: 'si quis **uerbi causa** oriente*
         Canicula natus est, is in mari non morietur.'
         'So let the observations of the astrologers be like this: "If (for instance) a man
         was born at the rising of the dogstar, he will not die at sea."'

(51)   (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.12.9)
         *Quid dicis igitur? Miserum esse **uerbi causa** M. Crassum, qui illas fortunas*
         morte dimiserit, miserum Cn. Pompeium, qui tanta gloria sit orbatus, omnis
         denique miseros, qui hac luce careant.
         'What do you say then? I say that M. Crassus for example, because he lost a
         noble fortune by death, is wretched, that Cn. Pompeius is wretched because
         he was robbed of a splendid reputation, in a word that all are wretched who
         quit the light of day.'

In other cases, *uerbi causa* negotiates the suitability of "loose" examples to the matter
at hand, as in (52)–(54):

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38 In (50), as an anonymous reviewer rightly points out, even the concessive value of *sint* suggests
epistemic distance.

(52)   (Vel. *gramm.* VII 61.11)
*et in eo quod est appello, quod alterum sit 'nauem appellentis', aliud **uerbi***
***causa** 'pecuniam appellantis'.*
'and in the case of *appello*, for it is one thing *nauem appellere* "to land a ship",
and another, for example, *pecuniam appellare* "to claim payment".'

(53)   (*Rhet. Her.* 4.47.60)
Nam hoc simile est ut apertius intellegatur mala ratione facere qui
*reprehendant eos qui, **uerbi causa**, post mortem amici liberos eius*
custodiant.
'Indeed this Comparison serves to make more obvious the poor reasoning
evinced by the detractors of those who, for example, are protectors of a
friend's children after his death.'

(54)   (*Rhet. Her.* 4.3.5)
*Non enim, cum dicimus esse exornationem quae **uerbi causa** constet ex*
similiter desinentibus uerbis, et sumimus hoc exemplum a Crasso: "quibus
possumus et debemus," testimonium conlocamus, sed exemplum. Hoc interest
igitur inter testimonium et exemplum: exemplo demonstratur id quod
dicimus cuiusmodi sit; testimonio esse illud ita ut nos dicimus confirmatur.
'When I say there is a figure of speech which, for instance, consists of like-
ending words, and take this example from Crassus: "quibus possumus et
debemus" I am setting up, not testimony, but an example. The difference
between testimony and example is this: by example we clarify the nature of
our statement, while by testimony we establish its truth.'

The passage in (54) nicely explains the difference between *testimonium* and *exem-
plum*, which is a means of clarifying a statement, as the open list in (55) does:

(55)   (Cic. *fat.* 24.7)
Ut cum uas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane esse
*nihil placet, sed ita **ut uerbi causa** sine aqua, sine uino, sine oleo uas esse*
dicamus
'Just as when we say that a vessel is empty, we do not use the expression in
the sense in which it is used by the natural philosophers, who hold that no
absolute vacuum exists, but we employ it to mean that the vessel has (for
example) no water in it, or wine, or oil.'

Here, the second *ita ut* is ambiguous: in parallel with *ita … ut physici*, it triggers the
inference of an authority (indeed, common sense), but joined with *uerbi causa* it
confirms the interaction between example markers and para-exemplifiers.

6 Sources of para-exemplification

6.1 Para-exemplifiers

As already mentioned in 3.2, in English and Romance languages para-exemplifiers develop from linguistic items that convey diverse textual or pragmatic functions and perform exemplification at the intersection of two contiguous cognitive domains. The same phenomena occur in Latin, where various connectors and expressions flank – and often precede – the emergence of true example markers.

More specifically, we distinguish the following types of para-exemplification:
– analogical (cf. Fr. *comme*, It. *come*), performed in Latin by the markers of similative and equative constructions *ut, uelut, sicut, tamquam*, and by the adjective *qualis*;
– cooperative (cf. Eng. *let's say*, Fr. *disons*), performed by the parenthetical imperative *puta*, especially in combination with *ut*;
– demonstrative (cf. Fr. *ainsi*, It. *così*), occasionally performed by the conclusive connectors *igitur* and *itaque*, and by the explicative connectors *nam, namque* and *enim*;
– mitigating (cf. colloquial Eng. *dunno*, It. *magari*), performed from Late Latin onwards by the dubitative adverbs *forsitan* and *forsan;*[39]
– particularizing (cf. Eng. *including*, Fr. *notamment*), but the Latin adverbs *praesertim, praecipue, speciatim* are never used for this kind of para-exemplification.

In what follows we will therefore analyse analogical, cooperative, and demonstrative para-exemplifiers. Due to the frequency and the high degree of polysemy of the markers at issue, quantitative data will be limited to the emergence of (*ut*) *puta* as an example marker.

6.2 Analogical exemplification

Comparative markers are highly polysemic and can serve various semantic and pragmatic functions because, as Tarriño (2011) notes, the relationship between the comparative construction and the main clause tends to remain vague, leading to different interpretations and to "all kinds of pragmatic inferences that bringing the two situations into contact makes possible" (Tarriño 2011: 420). In particular, the fact that the *illustrantia* share some properties with the *illustrandum* can make it difficult to determine whether a discursive sequence is (merely) analogical or (also) serves

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39 Cf. *ThLL* s.v. *forsan* 1137.70–72 and s.v. *forsitan* 1140.52–55.

exemplification (Miéville 1983), and this explains why Latin, like many other languages, recruits similative markers as para-exemplifiers.[40] Furthermore, as mentioned above (cf. Section 2.1), comparison plays a relevant role in the narrative and instructive rhetorical *exemplum*, which is often viewed as a type of simile. Considering the *continuum* between rhetorical and canonical examples (Herman 2011: 97), analogical para-exemplification is thus the domain where the two types meet.

From a syntactic viewpoint, analogical para-exemplifiers do not display the same positional flexibility as canonical example markers and cooperative para-exemplifiers (cf. Eng. *for example*, It. *diciamo*), as they typically occur before the *illustrandum*. Moreover, when Latin similative markers are employed as para-exemplifiers, they do not feature the correlative particle (*ita* or *sic*) in the main clause.[41] That said, let us now turn to the peculiarities of *ut, uelut, sicut, tamquam* and *qualis*.[42]

6.2.1 *Ut*

In its origin, *ut* was a relative adverb of manner (Ernout and Meillet 2001 [1932], s.v. *ut*), apparently derived from the stem *$*k^w u$-* related to the interrogative-relative pronoun (Panchón Cabañeros 1992) and used in correlation with the particle *ita*.[43] Having similarity of manner as its core meaning, *ut* is the most frequent and more versatile similative marker in Latin, but it also serves as a multifunctional connector introducing a variety of subordinate clauses (complement clauses, purpose clauses, comparative clauses, etc.), as manner adverbs are known to grammaticalize into comparatives and sentence connectors (see König [2015, 2017] and the discussion in Section 4.4.4).

Scholars have in fact focused on the comparative and parenthetical uses of *ut* (cf. e.g., Mellet 2007; Van Laer 2013, 2015), as well as on its role as a subordinator, while the exemplifying function, though frequent, has not received as much attention in

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40 "Comment reconnaître qu'une séquence discursive est analogique ou qu'elle joue le rôle d'exemple? Il est en effet douteux que les seules marques linguistiques puissent y suffire" [How can we determine whether a discourse sequence is analogical or serves as an example? It is doubtful that linguistic markers alone will suffice] (Miéville 1983: 150). For a typological account of the similative and equative subtypes of comparison, see the contributions in Treis and Vanhove (2017).

41 A possible reason is that, as suggested by Tarriño (2011: 413), in these contexts, the comparative clause acts as a propositional disjunct, operating at the interpersonal level of the clause.

42 Ancient Greek too performs para-exemplification with similative markers, such as ὡς (cf. ex. [61]), ὥσπερ (cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* 3.3.12) and οἷος (cf. Section 6.2.5).

43 However, as noted by Gibert (2011: 299), non-correlative uses of *ut* (which include exemplification) are much more frequent.

reference grammars.[44] However, the *OLD* lists 'as for example' as one of the meanings of non-correlative *ut* and Gibert (2011: 327–342) devotes some insightful paragraphs to the syntax and semantics of exemplifying *ut*, used both to introduce individual phrases (as happens in canonical exemplifying structures) and whole clauses.

In many cases, the *illustrantia* appear in the same case or within the same syntactic structure of the *illustrandum*, as in (56), where Cicero gives examples of moral diseases similar to avarice:[45]

(56)   (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.25)
          *eique morbo nomen est auaritia; similiterque ceteri morbi, **ut** gloriae*
          *cupiditas, **ut** mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam, quae Graece* φιλογυνία
          dicitur, […]
          'and for such a disease the name is avarice. And similarly the other diseases
          like thirst for fame, like love of women, to give this term to what the Greeks
          call φιλογυνία, […]'

Canonical structures with one or more *illustrantia* introduced by *ut* are widespread in technical and scientific prose whenever the author needs to illustrate general categories or clarify abstract concepts with specific and concrete instances, as in (57), to be compared with ex. (10):[46]

(57)   (Sen. *nat.* 3.22.1)
          Iudicant quidam flumina quoque quorum inenarrabilis natura est cum ipso
          *mundo traxisse principia, **ut** Histrum, **ut** Nilum, uastos amnes magisque*
          insignes quam ut dici possit eandem illis originem quam ceteris esse.
          'Some judge that also the rivers whose nature is inexplicable take their
          beginning along with the universe itself, such as the Danube and the Nile,
          rivers so vast and so remarkable that they cannot be said to have the same
          origin as the other rivers.'

In grammatical and rhetorical treatises, *ut* introduces linguistic phenomena or *exempla ficta* that resemble quotations, as in (58), where *ut* does not precede each listed example:

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44 "Ebenso ist häufig nachgestelltes einfaches *ut, uelut, sicut* zur Einführung eines Beispieles, das einen tatsächlichen Fall einführt" [Similarly, simple *ut, uelut, sicut* are often used to introduce an example that presents an actual case] (Kühner and Stegmann 1976 [1914]: 450).
45 Sometimes the *illustrantia* do not have the same syntactic structure of the *illustrandum* but have a functional link, as in Plin. *nat.* 35.39 (Gibert 2011: 335).
46 Cf. also Cic. *nat. deor.* 2.70; Cic. *de orat.* 3.117.1; Sen. *nat.* 2.51.3.

(58)   (Quint. *inst*. 1.4.13)
          mutationes, quas adferunt declinatio aut praepositio, **ut** *'secat secuit', 'cadit*
          excidit', 'caedit excidit', 'calcat exculcat'
          'The changes due to inflexion and composition, like *secat secuit, cadit excidit,*
          caedit excīdit, calcat exculcat'

Vainio (2000: 33) remarks that some linguistic examples presented by *ut* – typically indeclinable nouns – may be followed by a prepositional phrase containing proximal or distal demonstrative pronouns such as *ut in hoc* 'as in this', *ut in illo* 'as in that', as in (59):

(59)   (Quint. *inst*. 1.4)
          desintne aliquae nobis necessariae litterae, non cum Graeca scribimus […]*,*
          sed proprie in Latinis: **ut in his** *'seruus' et 'uulgus' Aeolicum digammon*
          desideratu
          'Are we lacking some necessary letters, not indeed when we are writing
          Greek words […], but strictly in Latin? For example, we feel the lack of the
          Aeolic digamma in *seruus* and *uulgus*'

In (59) the *illustrantia* in the nominative case are isolated from the syntax of the clause, and for Vainio (2000) this "is a feature which indicates that the grammatical language is becoming technical" (Vainio 2000: 34). When these expressions are used to introduce complex sentences or literary passages as illustrative quotations, the pronoun works as a cataphoric device, encapsulating what follows, as in (60):

(60)   (Cic. *inv*. 2.96)
          Casus autem inferetur in concessionem, cum demonstratur aliqua fortunae
          uis uoluntati obstitisse, **ut in hac**: *Cum Lacedaemoniis lex esset ut, hostias*
          nisi ad sacrificium quoddam redemptor praebuisset, capital esset, hostias is
          qui redemerat cum sacrifici dies instaret, in urbem ex agro coepit agere.
          'Chance will be brought into the plea of avoidance when it is shown that the
          defendant's intention was thwarted by some act of Fortune, as in the following
          case: The Lacedaemonians had a law that visited capital punishment on a
          contractor who did not furnish the animals for a certain sacrifice.'

As already noted by Priscian (*gramm*. 1048.14–18), Roman grammarians employed demonstrative pronouns to compensate for the lack of the article when calquing the expression ὡς ἐν τῷ 'as in this', which Greek grammarians used to introduce meta-linguistic examples (Chevillard et al. 2007: 15–17; Vainio 2000: 34), as in (61):[47]

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[47] The text and the translation are taken from Householder's (1981) edition. See also the use of the demonstrative in the *pro*-structure in (91) *infra*: *dicere pro* **hae** *ceruices ceruix* 'to say *ceruix* instead of **the** *ceruices*' (Varro *ling*. 10.78).

(61)   (Apollonius Dyscolus *De Constructione* 2.80)
Εἰ γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ε ἀρχόμεναι ἀντωνυμίαι, ἡνίκα ἐγκλίνονται,
παραφθείρουσι τὸ ε, **ὡς ἐν τῷ** δός μοι, ἄκουσόν μου […]
'For if pronouns which inherently begin with e- [*emou, emoi, eme* "me"],
when they become enclitic, drop the e-, as in *dos moi* ("give me"), *akouson
mou* ("listen to me") […]'

The examples introduced by *ut* show various levels of syntactic complexity: as noted
by Gibert (2011: 331–332), it is commonly followed by a conditional (cf. Cic. *part*. 124)
or temporal clause (cf. Cic. *part*. 98) that presents possible evidence for the general
statement in the main clause. When *ut* precedes whole clauses or connects sections of
discourse, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between proper examples and
rhetorical *exempla*. In fact, the *ut*-clause often refers to facts from history or myth
that reinforce the argument, as in (60), or serve as models for future behaviour, as in
the following passage from Cicero:

(62)   (Cic. *Brut*. 292)
*Est enim et minime inepti hominis et eiusdem etiam faceti, cum de sapientia
disceptetur, hanc sibi ipsum detrahere, eis tribuere illudentem, qui eam sibi
arrogant,* ***ut*** *apud Platonem Socrates in caelum effert laudibus Protagoram
Hippiam Prodicum Gorgiam ceteros,* […]
'It marks a man as free from conceit, and at the same time witty, when
discussing wisdom, to deny it to himself and to attribute it playfully to those
who make pretensions to it. Thus Socrates in the pages of Plato praises to the
skies Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and the rest, […]'

Moving from Classical to Late Latin, *ut* begins to be replaced in similative contexts by
sicut, quemadmodum and especially *quomodo* (from which It. *come* and Fr. *comme*
originate), but its exemplifying function remains stable, particularly in grammatical
treatises (Vainio 2000). For instance, in Priscian's book VIII, *ut* introduces examples
and quotations in 222 out of 261 occurrences, but in most cases its use "n'est guère
plus signifiant que le signe de ponctuation des deux points" [is no more significant
than the colon punctuation mark] (Biville 2014: 705).[48] As a metalinguistic sign of
exemplification, the marker "établit une relation de similitude et d'inclusion entre
un énoncé théorique, général, et son illustration concrète par des citations ou des
exemples qui peuvent prendre des formes linguistiques variées (mot, syntagme,
proposition), et qui se présentent souvent sous la forme de listes énumératives"
[establishes a relationship of similarity and inclusion between a theoretical, general
statement and its concrete illustration by quotations or examples which may take a

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48 On the *Entwertung* [devaluation] of *ut* see also Leumann et al. (1977 [1965]: 646).

variety of linguistic forms (word, phrase, proposition), often as enumerative lists]
(Biville 2014: 706).

In general, *ut* strengthens its illustrative function by cumulating with other
example markers (as in [39] and [40]) and combining with particles and reduced
clauses – such as *ut etiam*, *ut est*, *ut puta* (cf. Section 6.3.1), *ut si dicam* (cf. Section
6.3.2): as the need for expressiveness and phonetic volume produces more complex
and transparent markers, these connectors also tend to become less polysemic and
develop more specific meanings (Tarriño 2011: 404). This tendency supports
the idea that markers devoted to exemplification can develop from strategies
of para-exemplification through semantic shifts, syntagmatic chains, and
conventionalization.

6.2.2 *Velut*

The need to create more expressive similative markers was already present in the
early stages of Latin, as testified by *uelut* (from *uel* + *ut*) and *sicut* (from *sic* + *ut*). If we
accept the view that the disjunctive conjunction *uel* derives from **welsi*, a second
person of the verb *uolo* (cf. Ernout and Meillet 2001 [1932], s.v. *uel*, de Vaan 2008, s.v.
uolō, *uelle*) or from an imperative form originally meaning 'choose!' (Wackernagel
1897: 25), it can be argued that *uelut* and *ut puta* have similar structures and origi-
nated in a similar way (cf. Section 6.3). Interestingly, in Early Latin *uel* occasionally
retains the original meaning '(if) you want', and in some contexts (e.g., Pl. *Mil.* 59, but
also Cic. *Fam.* 260.1) could be interpreted as a para-exemplifier (David and Nelson
1954: 119–121; Leumann et al. 1977 [1965]: 501).

The first meaning of *uelut* listed on the *OLD* is indeed 'as for example, for
instance', and the exemplifying function is said to be prevalent especially in Plautus
(Tarriño 2011: 405). In his comedies, however, *uelut* is never found in canonical
exemplification, but normally appears in the opening verses of a monologue, con-
necting two discourse sections: a general truth or a common-sense statement and the
circumstance at hand.[49] For example, in (63) the observation that gods send strange
dreams to men is illustrated by Daemon's ridiculous dream about a talking
monkey:[50]

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49 "Bei Plt. leitet *velut(i)* stets ganze Sätze ein, die an einem Einzelfall einen vorausgehenden all-
gemeinen Gedanken exemplifizieren" [In Plautus *uelut*(*i*) always introduces whole sentences that
exemplify a preceding general idea with a single specific instance] (Leumann et al. 1977 [1965]: 502).
50 Likewise, in Plaut. *Truc.* 572, the slave Geta compares the rapacity of prostitutes to the voracity of
the sea and links this elaborate simile to the narration of his master's problems by means of a *uelut-*
clause.

(63)   (Plaut. *Rud.* 596 = *Merc.* 227)
    miris modis di ludos faciunt hominibus,
    mirisque exemplis somnia in somnis danunt:
    ne dormientis quidem sinunt quiescere.   595
    uelut *ego hac nocte quae processit proxuma*
    mirum atque inscitum somniaui somnium.
    'The gods mystify men in a strange fashion and give them dreams in their
    sleep in strange ways: they don't even allow those who are sleeping to rest.
    For instance, I dreamed a strange and uncanny dream last night.'

In (64), Pacuvius' fragment presents Oreste's hardships as an illustration of the role of chance (*temeritas*) in human troubles: as in (62), the sentence introduced by *uelut* could be interpreted as both an exemplifying sequence and a mythical *exemplum*:

(64)   (Pacuv. *ex incert. fab.* 37-46 = *Rhet. Her.* 2.23.36)
    Sunt autem alii philosophi qui contra fortuna negant
    Ullam miseriam esse, temeritate omnia geri autumant.
    Id magis ueri simile esse usus reapse experiundo edocet:
    uelut *Orestes modo fuit rex, factust mendicus modo*
    naufragio, nempe ergo id fluctu, hau forte aut fortuna optigit
    'Other philosophers who against all this
    Deny that there is any goddess Fortune,
    Saying it is Chance Medley rules the world.
    That this is more like unto truth, in fact
    Practice doth teach us by the experience;
    Orestes thus, who one time was a king,
    Was one time made a beggar'.

Classical authors continue to use *uelut* as a para-exemplifier, especially in philosophical and rhetorical treatises, as in the following passage from the *Tusculanae Disputationes*:[51]

(65)   (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.5)
    sic Stoicorum ista magis gustata quam potata delectant. **Velut** *iste chorus uirtutum in eculeum impositus imagines constituit ante oculos cum amplissima dignitate,* […]
    'there is more delight in a sip than a draught of this Stoic vintage. For instance your troop of virtues, when laid upon the rack, bring before the eyes visions of majestic splendour.'

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51 Cf. also Cic. *Tusc.* 2.1; 5.10; 5.34; Cic. *nat. deor.* 1.2; 1.25.

It can also introduce literary quotations as examples, as in the sentence (66), that immediately precedes the Pacuvius' fragment reported in (64):

(66)   (*Rhet. Her.* 2.23.36)
         Itemque infirma ratio est quae non necessariam causam adfert expositionis,
         uelut *Pacuvius:* […]
         'Again, a Reason is weak if the causal basis which it submits for the
         Proposition is not a compelling one. For example, Pacuvius: […]'

Besides connecting discourse sections, *uelut* also appears in canonical exemplification. In (67) it connects a superordinate set defined by a certain property to its members, expressed by nominal phrases:

(67)   (Cic. *nat. deor.* 2.124)
         Est etiam admiratio non nulla in bestiis aquatilibus iis quae gignuntur in
         terra: **ueluti** *crocodili fluuiatilesque testudines quaedamque serpentes ortae*
         extra aquam simul ac primum niti possunt aquam persequuntur.
         'Our wonder is also considerably excited by those aquatic animals which are
         born on land – crocodiles, for instance, and water-tortoises and certain
         snakes, which are born on dry land but as soon as they can first crawl make
         for the water.'

6.2.3 *Sicut*

As shown by König (2015, 2017), manner deictics can be sources for the grammaticalization of similative and equative markers: *sicut*, which combines the deictic adverb *sīc* (an ancient locative *sei 'in this, thus' merged with the basic deictic particle -*ce*, cf. Ernout and Meillet [2001 (1932)], s.v. *sīc*, De Vaan [2008], s.v. *sī, sīc*) and *ut*, is a case in point. It alternates with *ut, uelut* and *tamquam* in canonical exemplification, especially in technical prose, as in (68), and can also introduce open lists, as in (69):[52]

(68)   (Frontin. *aq.* 1.4)
         Fontium memoria cum sanctitate adhuc exstat et colitur; salubritatem aegris
         corporibus afferre creduntur, **sicut** *Camenarum et Apollinis et Iuturnae.*
         'Esteem for springs still continues, and is observed with veneration. They
         are believed to bring healing to the sick, as, for example, the springs of the
         Camenae, of Apollo, and of Juturna.'

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[52] Cf. also Cic. *de orat.* 1.238.4; Svet. *Aug.* 56.4; Plin. *nat.* 7.57; 16.122; 31.61.

(69)   (Quint. *inst.* 9.3.89)

       Haec omnia copiosius sunt executi qui non ut partem operis transcurrerunt, sed proprie libros huic operi dedicauerunt, **sicut** *Caecilius, Dionysius, Rutilius, Cornificius, Visellius aliique non pauci (sed non minor erit eorum qui uiuunt gloria).*

       'These questions have been discussed at length by those who have devoted books specially to this subject, instead of treating it cursorily as a part of a larger work; these are Caecilius, Dionysius, Rutilius, Cornificius, Visellius, and many others – some now living will be no less famous.'

As a para-exemplifier, *sicut* can also introduce "loose" examples that lack an explicit *illustrandum*, as in (70):

(70)   (Sen. *nat.* 2.22.1)

       Fit duobus modis, uno si excitatur **sicut** *e lapide; altero si attritu inuenitur,* **sicut** *cum duo ligna inter se diutius fricta sunt.*

       'It [*sc.* fire] is produced in two ways: one, by striking it out, as from a stone, for example; another, it is acquired by friction, as when two pieces of wood have been rubbed together for some time.'

Furthermore, it presents illustrative digressions that tie together entire sections of text, as in the following passage, where Cornelius Nepos introduces an account of one of the many times Datames escaped the Artaserxes' plots against him:[53]

(71)   (Nep. *Dat.* 9.1–2)

       At rex, quod implacabile odium in Datamen susceperat, postquam bello eum opprimi non posse animaduertit, insidiis interficere studuit: quas ille plerasque euitauit. **Sicut***, cum ei nuntiatum esset quosdam sibi insidiari, qui in amicorum erant numero (de quibus, quod inimici detulerant, neque credendum neque neglegendum putauit), experiri uoluit, uerum falsumne sibi esset relatum.*

       'The king, however, having conceived implacable hatred of Datames and finding that he could not get the better of him in war, tried to kill him by treachery; but Datames escaped many of his plots. For example, when it was reported to him that certain men were conspiring against him who were included among his friends, he thought that charges against friends, made by their personal enemies, ought neither to be believed nor disregarded; but he wished to find out whether what had been reported to him was true or false.'

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53 Cf. also Nep. *Pel.* 4.3; Quint. *inst.* 1.11.48.

6.2.4 *Tamquam*

The original equative marker *tamquam* 'as much as', derived from the degree deictic *tam* plus the interrogative/relative *quam*, develops the same meanings and functions of a similative marker and, from the post-Augustan era onwards, is used as an analogical para-exemplifier (Leumann et al. 1977 [1965]: 597).[54] As noted for *ut*, *uelut* and *sicut*, it can introduce either exemplifying units with the same syntactic structure of the *illustrandum*, as in (72), or connect complex discourse units, as in (73), where the *tamquam*-clause is followed by a poem:[55]

(72)   (Sen. *epist.* 66.5)
         coloratur id cuius alia fit quam fuit facies, **tamquam** *caerulea uel nigra uel pallida.*
         'Something is coloured [*sc.* by the lightning] when its appearance becomes other than it was, for example, blue, or black, or whitish.'

(73)   (Petr. 118.6)
         non enim res gestae uersibus comprehendendae sunt, quod longe melius historici faciunt, sed per ambages deorumque ministeria et fabulosum sententiarum tormentum praecipitandus est liber spiritus, ut potius furentis animi uaticinatio appareat quam religiosae orationis sub testibus fides: **tamquam***, si placet, hic impetus, etiam si nondum recepit ultimam manum.*
         'Historical achievements should not be dealt with in verse, for historians do this far better. Rather it should be the free spirit of genius that plunges headlong through dark metaphors, divine interventions, and the anguish of meaning in legends, so that it gives the impression of prophetic frenzy rather than the trustworthy accuracy of a solemn account read before witnesses. As an example, if you like, here is my bold attempt at such, though it has not received my final touches.'

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54 Haspelmath and Buchholz (1998) distinguish between equatives and similatives observing that "similatives express identity of manner while equatives express identity of degree or extent, or in other words, similatives express quality while equatives express quantity" (Haspelmath and Buchholz 1998: 313). Equative markers frequently derive from manner or degree deictics such as *tam* (König 2017). Interestingly, Leumann et al. (1977 [1965]: 597) cite a Plautine passage (*Pers.* 638) in which *tamquam* already seems to function as a para-exemplifier: *Omne ego pro nilo esse duco quod fuit, quando fuit: | Tamquam hominem, quando animam ecflauit, quid eum quaeras qui fuit?* 'I reckon everything in the past as nothing, once it's in the past; like a man who has breathed his last, why would you ask who he was?'.
55 Cf. also Sen. *Contr.* 1. praef. 23; Sen. *epist.* 66.5; Colum. 3.9.1; 3.11.5; 7.9.7; Frontin. *aq.* 2.87.

Considering the crucial role of exemplification in technical prose with an educational purpose, the following passage from Columella is particularly interesting: here *tamquam* introduces a geometry problem that illustrates the formula for calculating the area of a square (cf. also ex. [39] *supra*):

(74)   (Colum. 5.2.3)

*Quadrati mensura facillima est. Nam cum sit undique pedum totidem, multiplicantur in se duo latera, et quae summa ex multiplicatione effecta est, eam dicemus esse quadratorum pedum. **Tanquam** est locus quoquo uersus c pedum: ducimus centies centenos, fiunt decem milia. Dicemus igitur eum locum habere decem milia pedum quadratorum*

'The measuring of a square is very easy; for, since it has the same number of feet on every one of its sides, two sides are multiplied together and the product of this multiplication we shall say is the number of square feet. For example, if an area were 100 feet each way, we multiply 100 by 100 and the result is 10,000. We shall, therefore, say that the area contains 10,000 square feet […].'

6.2.5 *Qualis*

The relative adjective *qualis* 'of such sort', which is generally used in correlation with *talis*, can also introduce examples, especially in combination with the verb *sum* 'to be'.[56] In (75), *quale est* appears in a context of canonical exemplification, as it does in (76), where it alternates with the more frequent *ut*:

(75)   (Cic. *Div.* 2.135)

*Ad aperta et clara ueniamus, **quale est** de illo interfecto a caupone Megaris; **quale** de Simonide, qui ab eo, quem humarat, uetitus est nauigare; **quale** etiam de Alexandro, quod a te praeteritum esse miror, Quinte.*

'Let us now consider dreams that are clear and direct, like the dream of the man who was killed by the innkeeper at Megara; or like that of Simonides who was warned by the man he had buried not to sail; and also like Alexander's dream, which, to my surprise, my dear Quintus, you passed by without notice.'

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56 For a discussion on exemplifying *quails,* see also Gibert (2011: 141–143).

(76)   (Quint. *inst*. 1.5.65)

      *compositae aut praepositionibus subiunguntur, ut 'innocens' (dum ne pugnantibus inter se duabus, **quale est** 'inperterritus': alioqui possunt aliquando continuari duae, ut 'incompositus reconditus' et quo Cicero utitur 'subabsurdum'), aut e duobus quasi corporibus coalescunt, ut 'maleficus'.*

      'compounds are formed by adding a prefix, as in *innocens* (with the proviso that two mutually incompatible prefixes must not be used, as in *imperterritus*; otherwise, two can sometimes be combined, as in *incompositus, reconditus*, or Cicero's *subabsurdum*), or arise from the coalescence of two separate elements, as in *maleficus*.'

Sometimes *qualis* introduces illustrative quotations, as in (77), where Quintilian takes an example of enthymeme from Demosthenes:

(77)   (Quint. *inst*. 5.14.4)

      *Optimum autem uidetur enthymematis genus cum proposito dissimili uel contrario ratio subiungitur, **quale est** Demosthenis:* […]

      'The best kind of Enthymeme, however, seems to be one in which a Reason is combined with a Dissimilar or Contrary Statement, as here in Demosthenes: […]'

While *qualis* does not seem to be fully entrenched as an example marker in Latin, its Greek equivalent οἷος is well established in exemplification already in the Classical period.[57]

6.3 Cooperative exemplification

The main purpose of exemplification, in accordance with the cooperative principle that underlies human communication, is to facilitate the understanding of abstract concepts or categories for the addressee (Grice 1975). This is precisely why exemplification is often signalled by reduced parenthetical clauses with interactional meaning. In Schneider's (2007) definition, clauses such as Eng. *I must say* or *I think* are "inserted into or adjoined to the beginning or the end of a host clause in a way similar to sentence adverbs" and "they can be added as well as dropped freely without endangering the grammatical acceptability of the host" (Schneider 2007: 1–2). Schneider also observes their almost unlimited mobility and their connection to the main clause, which pragmatically corresponds to their missing argument (as in Eng. *the soup is quite cold, I must say* vs. *I must say that the soup is quite cold*).

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57   The adverbial neuter οἷον, besides performing exemplification (cf. Plato *Sophista* 218e; *Theaetetus* 207a), is also used as a rounder (cf. Thucydides 4.90.4).

Some types of reduced parenthetical clauses tend to evolve into signals of cooperative exemplification, e.g., Eng. *say*, Fr. *disons*, It. *mettiamo*, Rom. *să zicem* 'let's say'. These expressions typically involve *verba dicendi* or *cogitandi* in the second person imperative or in the first person plural indicative, emphasizing the cognitive effort required of the addressee, or the speech act involving the speaker and, often, the interlocutor as well.

In this section we will investigate the exemplifying role of the parenthetical imperative *puta* (especially in combination with the analogical para-exemplifier *ut*) and of some locutions formed by the protasis of a conditional clause with a *verbum dicendi* (such as *si dicam*).

6.3.1 (*Ut*) *puta*

Reference grammars make cursory remarks about the development of the meaning 'for example' by the second person imperative of the cognitive verb *putō* 'to consider, to think, to suppose' (Kühner and Stegmann 1976 [1914]: 450; Leumann et al. 1977 [1965]: 339). When used non-parenthetically (as happens 154 times in the *Antiquitas*), this verb usually appears with a double accusative or an *Accusativus-cum-Infinitivo*, as in (78):

(78)   (Sen. *epist.* 44.6)
         Puta itaque te non equitem Romanum esse, sed libertinum.
         'Suppose, then, that you were not a Roman knight, but a freedman.'

In similar cases, as rightly pointed out by the *OLD* (s.v. *putō*), *puta*, while being perfectly integrated into the syntax of the clause, shows some semantic features that are crucial to the discourse function of exemplification: the hypothetical situation presented in the complement clause is used to strengthen an argument. The passage in (79) is notable due to three occurrences of *puta* before cases where the lese-majesty offense does not apply. The first occurrence is followed by an *Accusativus-cum-Infinitivo*, but the other two are parenthetical clauses external to clausal syntax, and the exemplifying nature of the presented situations is evident:

(79)   (Sen. *Contr.* 9.2.13)
         Puta aliquem dum magistratus est patrem suum occidere, ueneno uxorem suam necare: puto, non hac lege causam dicet, sed aliis, parricidii et ueneficii. […] **Puta**, amicam habet proconsul: ideo maiestatis damnabitur? Quod amplius est dico: puta, matronam corrumpit dum proconsul est: adulterii causam dicet, non maiestatis.

> 'Suppose someone kills his father or poisons his wife during his term of office; he will, surely, plead his cause not under this law, but under others, those on parricide and poisoning. […] Suppose that a proconsul has a girlfriend: will he then be condemned for lèse-majesté? Suppose, further, that he seduces a married woman during his proconsulship. He will plead on a charge of adultery, not of lèse-majesté.'

In many languages, cognitive verbs are used parenthetically to convey diverse pragmatic effects (Schneider 2007: 139–157), and this also occurs for Latin verbs like *opinor*, *censeō*, *credō*, and others. The parenthetical form *puto* 'I think, I suppose' can also convey epistemic stance (as in Cic. *Att*. 8.9a.2), while the interrogative *putasne* 'don't you think?' introduces and strengthens questions (as in Hor. *sat*. 2.5.76–78).[58] On the other hand, reduced parenthetical clauses with second person imperatives are hearer-oriented, inviting the addressee's cooperation and maintaining the effectiveness of communication (Schneider 2007: 110); therefore, they are not unexpected in exemplification, as the main purpose of this interaction-driven operation is to aid the hearer's comprehension. In fact, the Latin expression *puta* has a distinct cooperative function, since it works at the intersubjective and textual levels, creating a joint focus of attention between the interlocutors, but it can also act as a metadirective (Risselada 1993), explicitly stating what the speakers expect from the hearers, namely that they cooperate with their imagination in the exemplification process.[59]

In the *Antiquitas* section of the Brepols corpus we find 39 instances of parenthetical *puta* (17 times alone and 22 times preceded by *ut*, cf. *infra*), always with an exemplifying value. This usage, as evidenced by its first appearance in satirical poetry, probably originated in everyday speech:

(80)   (Hor. *sat*. 2.5.32)
      *'Quinte' **puta** aut 'Publi' – gaudent praenomine molles*
      auriculae – 'tibi me uirtus tua fecit amicum'.
      'Say: "Quintus" it may be, or "Publius" (sensitive ears delight in the personal name), "your worth has made me your friend".'

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58 On parentheticals in Latin, see Pinkster (2021: 909–919).

59 An analogous reduced parenthetical clause used "to mark an expression as an example" is It. *poni* 'let's suppose', which "is exceptional insofar as it is a second person imperative that is not employed as a phatic device" (Schneider 2007: 115).

(81)   (Pers. 4.9)
         […] *quid deinde loquere? 'Quirites,*
         hoc' **puta** *'non iustum est, illud male, rectius illud.'*
         'What will you say then? "Citizens of Rome," imagine, "this is unjust, that is
         ill-advised, the third way is more correct."'

In (80), Tiresias tells Odysseus about the best ways to make money, instructing him
on how to captivate a hypothetical rich scoundrel by calling him by his *praenomen*:
here *puta* has phrasal scope, for *Quinte* and *Publi* are examples of possible *praeno-
mina*. Similarly, in (81) Socrates imagines how the young and inexperienced politi-
cian Alcibiades might address an angry crowd of citizens: in this case, *puta* has
clausal scope, for the sentence illustrates a possible speech in this hypothetical
situation.[60]

As a para-exemplifier urging the interlocutor to engage in a cognitive activity,
puta is frequently associated with non-factual situations, as in (82), where Quintilian
explains the functioning of a famous mnemonics, the Memory Palace. Here, paren-
thetical *puta* makes it clear that the *atrium* is only one among many possible rooms
and, at the same time, emphasizes the imaginative and fictive nature of the tech-
nique, as does *quasi* in the previous clause.[61]

(82)   (Quint. *inst.* 11.2.20)
         *Sit autem signum nauigationis ut ancora, militiae ut aliquid ex armis. Haec
         ita digerunt: primum sensum uestibulo quasi adsignant, secundum* **(puta)**
         *atrio, tum inpluuia circumeunt, nec cubiculis modo aut exhedris, sed statuis
         etiam similibusque per ordinem committunt*
         'Let us suppose a symbol of navigation, such as an anchor, or of warfare,
         such as a weapon. Then this is how they arrange it. They place the first idea,
         as it were, in the vestibule, the second, let us say, in the atrium, and then
         they go round the open areas, assigning ideas systematically not only to
         bedrooms and bays, but to statues and the like.'

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60 The hexameter in (81) highlights another interesting feature of this para-exemplifier: the
etymologically heavy final syllable, in fact, is scanned as a light one due to iambic shortening. The
label *correptio iambica* (or *brevis brevians*) refers both to a purely metrical phenomenon and to a
linguistic process: the latter was active in Archaic Latin and involves disyllables like *bĕnē > bĕnĕ, nĭsī >
nĭsĭ*, etc. As Wackernagel (1897: 24–25) states, this might indicate that *puta* was already parenthetical
in spoken Archaic Latin, when the shortening of iambic disyllables was still active. According to Stolz
et al. (1993 [1966]: 147), *pută/pută* 'for example' was no longer seen as an inflected form, in contrast
with the imperative *putā*. This generalization, however, seems too schematic, since Martial uses *pută*
both parenthetically (Mart. 2.44) and as an imperative governing a double accusative or an *Accu-
sativus-cum-Infinitivo* (Mart. 3.26.5; 9.95.5; 11.58.2; 11.95.2).
61 Another instance where *puta* is connected to a purely hypothetical situation is Sen. *Contr.* 7.5.11.

The para-exemplifier also appears when the writer chooses a single illustrative instance among many, as in the following passage from Celsus:

(83)   (Cels. 5.19.11b)
        *Curata uocant, quum ex seuo, **puta**, omnes membranulae diligenter exemptae sunt.*
        'They call it prepared, when, for instance, from suet all membranous particles are carefully removed.'

In many cases, *puta* parasitically strengthens its illustrative function by combining with the analogical para-exemplifier *ut*. In later writers, the two markers, cumulated in *ut puta* (also written as *utputa*), frequently introduce canonical examples. The following passage from the *Priapea* shows that, in earlier periods, the sequence was not yet fixed and inseparable:[62]

(84)   (Priap. 37.3–7)
        cum penis mihi forte laesus esset
        chirurgique manum miser timerem,
        dis me legitimis nimisque magnis,
        ***ut** Phoebo **puta** filioque Phoebi,*
        curatum dare mentulam uerebar.
        'My poor penis had suffered injury,
        And I was scared of a surgeon's remedy,
        The proper gods are much too great to care –
        Such as Phoebus or Phoebus's son and heir –
        To bring them my sick tool I was afraid.'

The expression is very frequent in canonical exemplification, and particularly in technical prose, as in (85), but it can also connect whole chunks of discourse, as in (86):[63]

(85)   (Cels. 1.pr.30.5)
        *Saepe etiam causas apparere, **ut puta** lippitudinis, uulneris, neque ex his patere medicinam.*
        'often, too, the causes are apparent, as, for example, of ophthalmia, or of wounds, yet such causes do not disclose the treatment.'

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62 Text and translation are taken from Parker's (1988) edition.
63 Cf. also Cels. 5.26.21c; 8.11.5; Colum. 5.2.4; Front. *aq.* 28.1; Quint. *decl.* 247.1; 342.3; Quint. *inst.* 7.1.14; Sen. *epist.* 47.15; Sen. *nat.* 2.2.3.

(86)   (Quint. *inst*. 11.3.110)
          Melius illud, cum sint in sermone omni breuia quaedam membra ad quae, si
          necesse sit, recipere spiritum liceat, ad haec gestum disponere. **Ut puta:**
          'nouum crimen C. Caesar' habet per se finem quendam suum, quia sequitur
          coniunctio: deinde 'et ante hanc diem non auditum' satis circumscriptum est:
          ad haec commodanda manus est.
          'It is better therefore, in view of the fact that there are short units in all
          speech, where we can draw breath if we need to, to arrange the Gesture to fit
          these. For instance, *novum crimen, Gai Caesar* has a sort of end of its own,
          because a conjunction follows; and then *et ante hanc diem non auditum* is
          clearly marked off. It is to these divisions that the hand movements should
          be adapted.'

Moreover, *ut puta* behaves as a rounder when accompanied by numerals (Mihatsch
2010), as in (87) and (88):

(87)   (Mart. *epigr*. 2.44.1–2)
          Emi seu puerum togamue pexam
          seu tres, **ut puta,** *quattuorue libras,* […]
          'If I buy a boy or a woolly gown or three, say, or four pounds of plate, […]'

(88)   (Apic. 1.13.1)
          Laser in spatiosum doliolum uitreum mittis et nucleos pineos **ut puta** *uiginti,*
          […]
          'Put the asafoetida in a large glass jar with about twenty pine nuts, […]'

As a para-exemplifier, *ut puta* occurs only 21 times in the *Antiquitas* section, but its
frequency increases drastically in *Aetas Patrum I*, where we find 956 occurrences of
ut puta and 103 of *utputa*. It has a prominent use among Roman grammarians, where
it lends vividness to the introduction of both literary and fictitious examples of
grammatical phenomena: occurrences in Servius number 30 and as many as 50 in
the *Ars* attributed to Palaemon. Admittedly, *ut puta* is well suited to the style of
grammatical treatises that, as pointed out by Pontani (2007: 206–209), were meant to
be read aloud as a support for the interaction between the *grammaticus* and his
pupils. For this reason, the *Artes* frequently exploit features of spoken language (such
as reformulations, autocorrections, and digressions): in this context *ut puta* is a good
fit, since it is a hearer-oriented marker that was probably frequent in oral Latin, as
proven by the iambic shortening.

6.3.2 *Si dicas, si dicam, si dicamus*

Locutions consisting of a conditional clause with a *verbum dicendi* highlight the proximity between exemplification and quotation and, at the same time, between meta- and para-exemplification (cf. Section 4.2), as they present the example as a hypothetical interaction integrated in the flow of discourse.[64] These locutions usually involve a present subjunctive in the first person singular or plural or, more frequently, in the second person singular. Thus, they pertain to the so-called 'second type' of conditional clause, relating to possibility: as noted by Bertocchi and Maraldi (2011), this kind of conditional clause is generally "found in crystallized expressions or in a limited number of particular forms, such as *exempla ficta* – imaginary hypotheses which an author uses to prove a theory" (Bertocchi and Maraldi 2011: 104).

Sometimes, the *verbum dicendi* in the protasis precedes a fragment of direct or reported speech, while the apodosis contains the *illustrandum*, as in (89):

(89)   (Quint. *inst*. 8.6.43)
    *Nam **si dicas** 'ille qui Numantiam et Carthaginem euertit', antonomasia est, si adieceris 'Scipio' adpositum.*
    'If you say "He who sacked Numantia and Carthage," it is Antonomasia; if you add "Scipio," it becomes an Epithet.'

In other instances, *si dicam/dicas/dicamus* reinforce their illustrative function by combining with *ut*, which also gives a nuance of hypothetical comparison to the clause, as in (90) and (91):[65]

(90)   (Quint. *inst.* 6.1.4)
    *Illa uero iucundissima, si contingat aliquod ex aduersario ducere argumentum, **ut si dicas**: 'reliquit hanc partem causae', aut 'inuidia premere maluit', aut 'ad preces confugit merito, cum sciret haec et haec.'*
    'The most satisfactory thing is if you are in a position to derive an Argument from your opponent: for example, "he left out this part of the Cause," or "he preferred to harry us by rousing hostile feelings," or "he was right to beg for mercy, when he knew this or that."'

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64 *Si dicas* appears 14 times in *Antiquitas*, of which just six are related to exemplification (Apul. *apol.* 34; Ps. Apul. *herm.* 4.192; Quint. *inst.* 8.6.43; *Rhet. Her.* 4.67; Sen. *nat.* 1.11; Varro *ling.* 5.1.4; 10.78), *si dicam* occurs six times, of which two introduce examples (Quint. *inst.* 5.10.48; 5.10.52), while *si dicamus* is found only four times, of which two are in exemplification (Cic. *inv.* 2.28; Ps. Apul. *herm.* 2).
65 Similar constructions are also used to introduce narrative and dialogical examples in Ancient Greek (e.g., ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι in Aristoteles *Rhetorica* 1393a and ὡς εἴ τις λέγοι in Apollonius Dyscolus *De Constructione* 2.200).

(91)　　(Varro *ling*. 10.78)

Adiectum est "non repugnante consuetudine co<m>muni," quod quaedam uerba contra usum ueterem inclinata patietur, **ut** *passa Hortensium dicere pro hae ceruices ceruix, quaedam non,* **ut si dicas** *pro fauces faux*

'There is the addition "not inconsistent with common usage," because usage tolerates some words inflected contrary to the old practice, as it suffered Hortensius to say *ceruix* 'neck' instead of the plural *ceruices*, but does not tolerate certain others, as when you should say *faux* 'throat' instead of the plural *fauces*.'

Although rare in *Antiquitas*, these conditional constructions become increasingly more frequent in later grammarians, sometimes concatenated to *ut puta*. As Pontani (2007: 206–207) points out, in the interaction with the pupils the oral dimension of the lecture merged with the written nature of the grammatical text, in which the *grammaticus* employed conversational features centred on the relationship between speaker ("I") and hearers ("you"), as the dialogical or "question-and-answer" examples introduced by these inherently interactive para-exemplifiers (cf. Pomp. *gramm*. 5.97.12).

6.4 Demonstrative exemplification

Under the label 'demonstrative exemplification', we will discuss the peculiar uses of a group of cohesive devices that convey heterogeneous relations between a preceding textual unit *p* and a following sentence or larger unit *q*. More specifically, we will first compare the connectors *igitur* and *itaque*, which usually mark sentences that stand in a relation of consequence, inference, or result to the preceding ones, and then the conjunctions *nam*, *namque*, and *enim*, which signal explanatory, evidential, or causal connections between the second and the first unit (Pinkster 2021: 1193 and 1208).

Within specific cotextual configurations, these expressions denote a logical transition from the general assertion *p* to the particular case *q* contemplated by *p*, so that *q* stands as a demonstration of *p*. Accordingly, the cases in point chosen for this type of exemplification are never condensed and listed into phrasal form but are always expanded at the sentential or discursive level (Manzotti 1995: 35). Being logically linked to what precedes them, these narrative examples confirm the retrospective nature of exemplification (cf. Section 2.2), but their role as *illustrantia* tend to remain implicit and in some cases ambiguous, whereas true example markers and analogical or cooperative para-exemplifiers mark the exemplifying sequence more explicitly and directly.

Finally, as will be seen in the following, the term 'demonstrative' refers not only to the synchronic functions, but also to the diachronic sources of some of the expressions that convey this type of exemplification.

6.4.1 *Igitur* and *itaque*

The adverb *igitur* 'then, therefore' is often found in argumentative, didactic, or narrative texts, where it appears in the second position (Pinkster 2021: 1211), perhaps in accordance with its debated etymology as "the post-tonic development of **agetor* 'it is done' (>*agitur*) after e.g. *quid*" (de Vaan 2008, s.v. *igitur*). After losing the original temporal meaning, *igitur* is mainly used to present logical inferences and conclusions reached by reasoning, and to resume a term after a parenthesis. In keeping with these anaphoric functions, the connector can occasionally introduce examples, almost in the same way as *exempli gratia* ("*inducitur exemplum [fere i. q. 'ex. gr.']*" *ThLL* s.v. *igitur* 265.35–46).[66] In (92) *igitur* actually precedes a specific instance of a more general issue, but in (93) it seems to introduce a consequence and an illustration at the same time, thus confirming the ambiguous nature of demonstrative exemplification:[67]

(92)   (Cic. *de orat.* 1.175)
        Quid, si ne paruae quidem causae sunt, sed saepe maximae, in quibus certatur de iure ciuili […]*? Quae potuit* **igitur** *esse causa maior, quam illius militis, de cuius morte cum domum falsus ab exercitu nuntius uenisset, et pater eius, re credita, testamentum mutasset,* […]*?*
        'Suppose however that the cases are not even trifling, but often of the greatest moment, involving a dispute about the common law […]. What case, for example, could be more important than that of the well-known soldier, of whose death false news had arrived home from the army, and whose father, believing the tale, had altered his will, […]?'

(93)   (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.4)
        Summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in neruorum uocumque cantibus: **igitur** *et Epaminondas princeps meo iudicio Graeciae fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur, Themistoclesque aliquot ante annis, cum in epulis recusaret lyram, est habitus indoctior.*

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66 "Die konklusiven Konjunktionen *igitur, itaque* bedeuten 'daher zum Beispiel'" [The conclusive conjunctions *igitur, itaque* mean 'therefore, for example'] (Menge 2009 [1873]: 234).
67 Among the passages cited in the *ThLL*, see also Cic. *orat.* 103 and Cic. *div.* 2.55.

> 'The Greeks held that the proof of the highest education was found in instrumental and vocal music: thus it is that Epaminondas, to my mind the leading man in Greek history, was, we are told, an accomplished singer to the accompaniment of the harp, whilst Themistocles, to go back many years previously, was held to show a lack of culture in refusing to play the lyre at banquets.'

While the origin of *igitur* remains problematic, *itaque* transparently combines the manner adverb *ita* 'so, in this way, yes' (from the same root of the pronoun *is* 'this, that') and the conjunction *-que* (from the indefinite pronominal stem *$k^w i/k^w e$*, cf. Ernout and Meillet [2001 (1932)], s.v. *-que*). Its development is partly similar to that of It. *così* and Fr. *ainsi*, which renew the identificational/presentational deictic *eccum/ *accum* 'here he is' by adding the adverb *sīc*.[68] As is well known, demonstratives are often renewed through further deictic material and tend to undergo processes of semantic change and grammaticalization, leading from exophoric (gestural) uses that identify entities in the surrounding reality, to endophoric (anaphoric and cataphoric) uses that refer to preceding or subsequent parts of the unfolding discourse, to connective uses that mark relationships between sentences, and to recognitive uses that signal shared knowledge between interlocutors (Diessel 1999).[69]

Following these cross-linguistic paths, manner demonstratives lose their exophoric component and develop anaphoric functions, which can turn them into comparative adverbs and then consecutive sentence connectors (König 2015), as we also noted for *ut* and *sicut* (cf. Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.3). In contemporary French, *ainsi* occurs as both a manner adverb and a sentence adverb with quotative, consecutive, and illustrative uses; according to Karssenberg and Lahousse, the exemplifying function is very frequent and "deserves to be integrated into the grammaticalization paths of *ainsi*, although it is not clear yet from which interpretation it originally emerged" (Karssenberg and Lahousse 2018: 35). Regarding *così* as a para-exemplifier, Manzotti (1995) sees it as a special case of the consecutive, which occurs when the transition between the two connected states of affairs is taken for granted, and not as the result of reasoning, as happens with the connectors *quindi* and *dunque* 'therefore, hence'.[70]

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68 For alternative etymologies of the first element in *ainsi*, see *TLFi* s.v. *ainsi*.

69 Beside the deictic dimension that indicates the distance, position, etc., of a referent relative to the centre of orientation in a speech situation, demonstratives can also be described in terms of a content dimension, which assigns a referent to a certain ontological category such as object, human being or animal, time, sex, etc., but also manner, quality, and degree (König 2015: 37).

70 Cf. Manzotti (1995: 35): "*così* riesce a presentare come scontata una evoluzione che non si dichiari di per sé come insolita, come frutto di un ragionamento, di una costruzione di pensiero" [*così*

Not surprisingly, a similar distinction applies to Latin, where "*itaque* 'and so' signals that the content of the sentence in which it occurs is the natural result of the content of the preceding sentence. It does not present the content of the sentence as the outcome of personal reflection like *igitur*, but as an objective fact" (Pinkster 2021: 1212). These considerations are already found in Kühner and Stegmann (1976 [1914]: 130–131), who also note the residual effect of the original meaning (proven by the impossibility of *et itaque) when the adverb introduces a situation that is closely related to what precedes, rather than its outcome, and thus adds a particular case to a general idea, or a summarizing concept to a list of specific cases. In other words, when the order is particular-general *itaque* presents an observation in the form of a concluding remark instead of an inference (as in Cic. *Lael.* 22), and when the order is general-particular it adds a demonstration in the form of a relevant illustration instead of a deduction. The use "*in exemplo afferendo*" (*ThLL* s.v. *itaque* 530.65–79) is shown in (94) and (95):

(94)   (Quint. *inst*. 5.10.56)
         Genus ad probandam speciem minimum ualet, plurimum ad refellendam.
         Itaque *non quia est arbor platanus est, at quod non est arbor utique platanus non est* […]
         'Genus is little use in proving Species, but very useful for eliminating it. An object is not a plane because it is a tree, but what is not a tree certainly cannot be a plane […]'

(95)   (Cic. *nat. deor*. 3.45.12)
         iure naturae qui dea matre est deus sit necesse est. **Itaque** *Achillem Astypalaeenses insulani sanctissume colunt*
         'by the law of nature one whose mother is a goddess must be a god. And in the island of Astypalaea Achilles is most devoutly worshipped by the inhabitants on these grounds.'

In both cases the translators do not make explicit the relationship between the two sentences, but in (95) the coordinator 'and' seems to highlight the role of *-que* in a context where *itaque* actually adds a proof to the preceding argument. The anaphoric nature of manner adverbs plays an important role in their grammaticalization into complex and polysemic connectors like *itaque*, which, due to its structural and semantic ambivalence, contributes to textual cohesion with conclusive or additive interpretations, depending on the different cotextual configurations. The cumulation of readings can be seen in (96) and (97):

presents as a matter of course a development that does not appear as unusual, as the result of reasoning, of a construction of thought].

(96)   (Quint. *inst*. 8.3.48)

[…] *sed errore par est paruis dare excedentia modum nomina, nisi cum ex industria risus inde captatur.* **Itaque** *nec parricidam 'nequam' dixeris hominem nec deditum forte meretrici 'nefarium', quia alterum parum, alterum nimium est.*

'[…] but no less wrong, unless one is deliberately seeking a laugh, is giving small things extravagant names. We must neither call a parricide "naughty," nor for example a man who is in the clutches of a prostitute "evil," because the former epithet is too weak and the latter too strong.'

(97)   (Cic. *off*. 3.11.10)

dubitandum non est, quin numquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere. **Itaque** *accepimus Socratem exsecrari solitum eos, qui primum haec natura cohaerentia opinione distraxissent.*

'it is beyond question that expediency can never conflict with moral rectitude. And so, we have heard, Socrates used to pronounce a curse upon those who first drew a conceptual distinction between things naturally inseparable.'

Moreover, the causal nuance of *itaque* in (95) announces its growing proximity to *enim* in Late Latin (Pinkster 2021: 1213, *ThLL* s.v. *itaque* 531.52–69).

6.4.2 *Nam*, *namque* and *enim*

In Latin, the main particles that mark explanatory, evidential, or causal relations between discourse units are the connectors *nam*, *namque* 'for, certainly, yes' and *enim* 'for, and indeed, well', which are very common in all periods of Latin (Pinkster 2021: 1193). Etymology confirms their deictic origin, as *nam* is traced back to a thematic stem *no/e-, which can be related to the pronoun/particle *$h_2(e)n$- 'that' (de Vaan 2008, s.v. *nam*), and *enim* too is compared to Gr. ἐκεῖνος 'that' < *e-ke-eno- (de Vaan 2008, s.v. *enim*).[71]

For Kühner and Stegmann (1976 [1914]: 112–114), *nam* originally has only an affirmative force, from which the explanatory and argumentative meanings develop.[72] This explains the frequent combination of *nam* and *namque* with assertive interjections such as *hercle* 'by Hercules!', *(m)ecastor* 'by Castor!', *(ede)pol* 'by Pollux!'

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71 Interestingly, de Vaan (2008, s.v. *nam*) also mentions the alternative hypothesis that *nam* could be "an Italic inflected continuant of a PIE particle *ne 'like'".

72 The grammaticalization into affirmative particles can involve not only manner demonstratives (cf. It. *sì* < Lat. *sīc*), but also proximal and distal deictics (cf. Fr. *oui* 'yes' < Old Fr. *oïl* < Lat. *hoc ille* lit. 'this he (that one)' *sc.* did, said …).

in ancient comedy, and their regular use in first position in later prose. Also, the relation of affirmation manifests the property of grammatical forms derived from demonstratives to establish connections across clause boundaries, in the domain of discourse deixis (König 2015: 57). As anaphoric items, *nam* and *namque* are thus mostly used to signal the supportive or subsidiary function of their host unit in relation to a preceding and more central discourse unit (Kroon 1995: 144), but besides confirming and explaining, they can also prove a general statement by adding concrete and specific cases, as in (98) and (99):[73]

(98)   (Tac. *ann.* 6.7–8)
         *nobis pleraque digna cognitu obuenere, quamquam ab aliis incelebrata. **Nam** ea tempestate, qua Seiani amicitiam ceteri falso exuerant, ausus est eques Romanus M. Terentius, ob id reus,* […]
         'For my own part, much has come my way that deserves a record, even though unchronicled by others. For instance, at the very period when all others had falsely disclaimed the friendship of Sejanus, the Roman knight Marcus Terentius, accused on that score, dared […]'

(99)   (Cic. *Div.* 1.75)
         *Eademque tempestate multis signis Lacedaemoniis Leuctricae pugnae calamitas denuntiabatur. **Namque** et Lysandri, qui Lacedaemoniorum clarissimus fuerat, statuae, quae Delphis stabat, in capite corona subito exstitit ex asperis herbis et agrestibus;*
         'The Spartans received many warnings given at that time of their impending defeat at Leuctra. For example, a crown of wild, prickly herbs suddenly appeared on the head of the statue erected at Delphi in honour of Lysander, the most eminent of the Spartans.'

The particle *enim* displays the same original affirmative force as *nam*, but is most frequently found in the second position, where it serves as a pragmatic marker with interactional functions. Indeed, as Pinkster (2021) notes, "[w]hereas *nam* 'for' indicates that the sentence in which it occurs contains some form of evidence for the correctness of the preceding sentence, *enim* 'you know' appeals to the cooperation of the addressee to recognize the correctness of what precedes: it is a 'consensus' particle" (Pinkster 2021: 1165). This behaviour is consistent with the basic function of deictics to coordinate the interlocutors' joint attention, but also with the cooperative

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73 "En particulier, *nam* introduit une explication, un complément, une justification, des exemples à l'appui d'une affirmation précédemment exprimée" [In particular, *nam* introduces an explanation, a complement, a justification or examples to support a previously expressed statement] (Ernout and Meillet 2001 [1932], s.v. *nam*).

dimension of exemplification, especially when the case in point concerns general cultural information known to all readers/hearers, as in (100) and (101):[74]

(100)   (Cic. *Tusc.* 1.34)
         *Opifices post mortem nobilitari uolunt; Phidias **enim** sui similem speciem inclusit in clipeo Minervae cum inscribere non liceret?*
         'Artists wish to become famous after death. Or why did Phidias insert his likeness on the shield of Minerva, though not allowed to inscribe his name on it?'

(101)   (Nep. *pr.* 6)
         *Contra ea pleraque nostris moribus sunt decora quae apud illos turpia putantur. Quem **enim** Romanorum pudet uxorem ducere in conuiuium?*
         'On the other hand, many actions are seemly according to our code which the Greeks look upon as shameful. For instance, what Roman would blush to take his wife to a dinner-party?'

Of the forms used for demonstrative exemplification, none are fully entrenched as para-exemplifiers in Latin, and all disappear in Romance languages, where only *exempli gratia* and *uerbi gratia* survive, but new markers emerge over time.

7 Concluding remarks

This research addressed a gap in the study of Latin pragmatics, investigating how Classical authors performed exemplification. In order to explore the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of this discursive operation, we started with a preliminary distinction between two modes of exemplification that stem from the polysemy of the noun *exemplum*. In the sense of 'model for imitation', the term originates the centuries-old tradition of exemplarity, which goes from the Roman *exemplum* as a classical rhetorical figure based on the prestige of famous historical personages, to the Christian *exemplum* as an ideal or symbol praised in the literature of the early Church, to the Medieval *exemplum* as a genre centred on hagiographic narratives. On the other hand, in the sense of 'particular case selected to illustrate or demonstrate a general concept, rule, or category', the word becomes the core of the textual and discursive operation of exemplification, which is usually described according to the canonical structure consisting of an exemplified unit, a dedicated example marker, and an exemplifying sequence.

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74 All demonstratives "establish a joint focus of attention between speaker and addressee both in their basic and in their extended uses" (König 2015: 37).

However, instances conforming to this prototypical scheme are relatively rare in Early Latin, as phrases with *exemplum* or *uerbum* begin to overtly mark segments of discourse as examples from Cicero onwards (cf. Section 5). The nascent technical prose, in particular, fosters the development of exemplification as an independent discourse function, endowed with its own linguistic markers. To capture the emergence and the variety of example markers found in Latin texts, we have devised a dynamic taxonomy of the linguistic signals of exemplification along the *continuum* from meta-exemplification to para-exemplification.

As a cognitive-communicative operation originally driven by analogical reasoning and rhetorical induction, exemplification recruits various para-exemplifiers, depending on the nature and purpose of the example, but also on the literary genre and the audience. In this respect, the different sources of para-exemplifiers – coopted over time into canonical exemplifying structures – highlight the different facets and functions of the examples. At the argumentative level, the versatility of similative markers (such as *ut*, *uelut*, *sicut*) goes hand in hand with the analogical character of the rhetorical *exempla*; at the textual level, the ambiguity of conclusive and explicative connectors (such as *itaque*, *namque*) supports the logical integration of narrative and demonstrative examples into the flow of discourse; at the pragmatic level, the interactivity of reduced parenthetical clauses (such as *puta*, *si dicas*) matches the cooperative dimension of enumerative and illustrative examples.

The pragmatic aspects of exemplification also promote the development of canonical example markers from meta-exemplifiers that convey the communicative awareness of the speaker/writer. In this way, set phrases occurring in metadiscourse (such as *exempli gratia*) are coopted to concatenate text segments, to enlarge the textual perspective by adding proofs, illustrations, or supplementary information, and to interact with the reader/hearer (Heine et al. 2021: 72).

The interactional dimension is indeed an important thread in the evolution of exemplification as a "multimodal" and cooperative operation. In the interplay between writing and orality that characterizes the composition (through dictation) and the reception (through reading aloud) of Latin works, the *exemplum* and the *illustrantia* were likely depicted and brought before the audience's eyes through co-speech and oratorical gestures, as in ex. (86). While concrete exophoric deixis is still evident in underdetermined exemplification (cf. ex. [10]: *hinc Nilus* […] *hinc* […] *Danuuius ac Rhenus* 'there is the Nile … , there the Danube or the Rhine'), abstract endophoric deixis manifests in the anaphoric and connective functions of analogical and demonstrative para-exemplifiers. As expressions of deictic origin establish a shared focus of attention between the interlocutors, exemplification can also become a shared task of co-constructing knowledge or categories, in which the sender openly

elicits the cooperation and understanding of the addressee via cooperative para-exemplifiers.

In this regard, the exemplifying process – intended as a meta-predication of similarity, relevance, or inclusion (cf. Section 2.2) – underlies a variety of semantic relations and implicatures, also depending on the nature of the exemplified component (which may be overtly expressed or presupposed), and on the type of linguistic signals that introduce the exemplifying component (which may be in narrative or enumerative form).

Beside the multiple dimensions of exemplification, this research has also explored the multiple sources of example markers. As we have seen, the markers devoted to exemplification can develop both from contexts of meta-exemplification, through syntactic shifts, bridging contexts, and parentheticalization, and from strategies of para-exemplification, through semantic shifts, syntagmatic chains, and conventionalization. The dynamic processes along the *continuum* of our classification show the potential for cross-linguistic investigations about the origin of example markers.

For instance, as noted in Section 1.1, adverbials containing epigones of *exemplum* in modern European languages do not have a direct Latin antecedent and develop their full range of metatextual functions quite late. In particular, Old Italian *esempio* (often written *essemplo*, *asempro*, etc., see *TLIO* s.v. *esempio*) maintains the polysemy of its Latin etymon and is frequently followed by a prepositional phrase, introduced by *di* 'of', often specifying a moral quality (e.g., *esempio di cavalleria* 'an example of chivalry'), or the person whose behaviour must be taken as a model (e.g., *per esempio di Cristo* 'after the example of Christ'). The phrase *per esempio*, however, also occurs in sentences conveying meta-exemplification, such as *questa fabula induce Dante per esempio* 'Dante introduces this story as an example' (Guido da Pisa, *Fiore d'Italia*); it is therefore likely that such contexts favoured its cooptation as an example marker, similarly to *exempli gratia* (cf. Section 5.1). Be that as it may, the adverbial locution *per essemplo* 'for example' is attested for the first time only in 1484 (*LEI* 22.195), Fr. *pour exemple* in 1580 (*TLFi*), and Eng. *as for exempill* in 1584 (*OED*).

On the opposite end of the *continuum*, analogical para-exemplifiers of deictic origin are not exclusive to European languages. For instance, Treis (2017) and Boyeldieu (2017) show that similative morphemes also develop exemplifying functions in Kambaata (Highland East Cushitic) and Yulu (Central Sudanic). According to Diessel (1999), demonstratives are a sort of semantic primitives and "an exception to the hypothesis that all grammatical expressions are eventually derived from lexical items" (Diessel 1999: 151). This perspective encourages cross-linguistic research into the diachronic (and possibly ontological) priority of para-exemplification over canonical exemplification.

The situation of Latin supports this idea, as exemplification is still in the process of developing dedicated markers from meta-exemplifiers. In Classical Latin, those with the noun *exemplum* are still incipient and not fully lexicalized, while *uerbi gratia* and *uerbi causa* are more versatile and multifunctional. However, since Early Latin, speakers and writers employed a variegated inventory of para-exemplifiers, some of which survived and became more frequent in Late Latin, like *ut* (*puta*). A study of example markers in Ancient Greek (in preparation) will help confirm how this evolution also correlates with the emerging textual genres, where exemplification balances between narration and enumeration, and between persuasion and illustration.

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