FRONTIERS OF EXTERNALISATION
Borders and temporality in the Euro-African zone[*]

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ABSTRACT. Since the early 2000s, Europe has externalised its management of migration beyond its borders, Africa being a prime destination. This article proposes a two-fold frontier heuristic to study the spatial and temporal un/making of Euro-African borders. Building on Frederick Turner's (1920) classic model, externalisation can be analysed as a frontier of control advancing into Africa, albeit not in a linear and irreversible manner. Igor Kopytoff's (1987) notion of the internal or interstitial frontier, on the other hand, contributes to going beyond Eurocentric and state-centric perspectives on externalisation. External borders can be analysed as emerging at the intersection between different regimes and temporalities of migration in Africa. I will illustrate this dynamic through the example of the repatriation of transit migrants in the Gambia, whose European Union (EU)-sponsored governance both blurs the boundaries of sovereignty and depends on migration being managed at the community and family levels.

INTRODUCTION

This article develops a frontier heuristic for studying emergent border regimes, with specific reference to border externalisation in the Euro-African zone.[1] Beginning in the early 2000s, the European Union (EU) and its member states have systematically sought to offshore the control of migration to countries of origin and transit, North and Sub-Saharan Africa having become a key laboratory of this policy of externalisation. Together with Alice Bellagamba and Stephan Dünnwald, I have suggested describing externalisation between Europe and Africa as a double frontier (Gaibazzi, Bellagamba, and Dünnwald 2017). In this article, I refine this argument further and elaborate on the temporal dimension of frontiers of externalisation.

Externalisation can be viewed as an external front encroaching into African soil that aims to contain and regulate African mobility to Europe. At the same time, externalisation can be seen, in what might seem like an oxymoron, as an internal frontier. I will show that Igor Kopytoff's (1987) classic notion of the internal or interstitial frontier in Africa is still useful as a heuristic device (Korf, Hagmann, and Doevenspeck 2013) to avoid taking Europe's hegemonic project at face value, and instead to view externalised migration management as being grounded in zones of ambivalent, plural and emergent

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[1] For an overview of frontiers and borders as research approaches, see Wendl and Rösler (1999).

authority in Africa. Like Kopytoff, I seek to determine the political cultures that animate this interstitial field, thereby making a case for an anthropological approach to border externalisation. To illustrate this frontier analytic, I will draw on ethnographic and comparative insights that I have gathered since 2006 in the Gambia and West Africa, extending to recent fieldwork (2019) on the repatriation and reintegration of transit migrants.

A frontier perspective complicates the temporality of border externalisation. In the first place, although Europe's external front of migration governance may be expanding both in Africa and globally, it does not follow an evolutionary course, nor is it irreversible. Frontiers of externalisation expand and are retrenched over time, often by reacting contingently to shifts in mobility and regional geopolitics, rather than by following a precise plan. Secondly, there is no single temporal regime of de/frontierisation, that is, the un/making of frontier spaces (Acciaioli and Sabharwal 2017). To understand interstitial frontiers as contact zones between diverse political cultures of mobility, the diverse temporalities of frontierisation need to be taken into account.[2] An internal frontier perspective is significant precisely because it allows attention to be focused on the heterogeneous temporalities of mobility regulation (pre-, inter-, postcolonial, etc.) that surface in and through bordering practices in Africa (cf. Roitman 2005). This is important not only in analytical terms, but also to counter the disturbing presentism of the European discourse on African migration, which elides both the historicity of Europe's own, partly colonial bordering practices and the historical depth, and hence legitimacy, of African models of mobility management, which externalised border regimes both use and criminalise.

FRONTS OF EXTERNALISATION

The intensification of global interconnectedness since the 1990s has gone hand in hand with a re-bordering of the world, especially with the rise of securitisation in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Borders have not only been fortified in situ, their functions have also been deterritorialised. Externalisation is one example of this (Stock, Üstübici and Schultz 2019). The goal of externalisation is essentially to bring migration management 'where the migrant is', hence adopting a dynamic, proactive stance to bordering that reaches beyond the territorial limits of the receiving state (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles 2016:232).

Europe's southern border with Africa is a main stage of externalisation. Starting in the early 2000s, Europe has sought to extend migration control beyond its borders, especially to curb 'irregular migration'. As part of its so-called Global Approach to Migration (2005), the EU devised a 'route strategy' to dislocate bordering practices in

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2 See the contribution by Timo Kaartinen in this collection.

transit and origin countries, first in North and then in Sub-Saharan Africa.[3] This was realised through frameworks like the Rabat Process and later the Khartoum Process, designed to ensure cooperation between states along, respectively, the West and East African routes to the Mediterranean.[4] The 'refugee crisis' of 2015 further extended and strengthened Europe's extraterritorial borders. In 2016 the EU launched the Migration Partnership Framework, which in Africa involves Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Ethiopia, to move cooperation on migration management beyond control and link it to other sectors (European Commission 2016). The EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF), which has a much wider geographical scope and impact, further aims to address the 'root causes of irregular migration' through political stabilisation and, chiefly, through socio-economic development. Nevertheless, Europe's approach to African migration remains heavily characterised by securitisation and containment (Landau 2019), which accounts in no small measure for the popular label 'Fortress Europe'.

The trope of the fortress, however, is too static to represent Europe's fluid border geography. Conversely, Frederick Turner's (1920) classic notion of the tidal frontier is useful to visualise Europe's southern border as a front moving from Europe into Africa.[5] This frontier does not acquire new territory for settlement by displacing native populations, as in the American frontier studied by Turner; rather, it is a 'frontier of control' (Geiger 2008:98) that aims to regulate, ward off and sedentarise mostly unwanted mobile populations. However, the Euro-African frontier is more spatially and temporally complex than Turner's model would allow. As the Gambian case will illustrate in a later section, there are several fronts of externalisation and phases of de/frontierisation. After all, tides are a dynamic process of cyclical rise and fall, and they move unevenly in space, leaving tidemarks.[6] Externalisation fronts also move in a contingent and uncoordinated manner by reacting to geo-political shifts and migrant tactics.

In addition, although it may appear to be a novel paradigm of migration management, externalisation in the Euro-African zone has a longer history of frontier-making.[7] Contemporary discourses and imaginations of the Euro-African space are often rooted in colonial history (Hansen and Jonsson 2011). Going beyond rhetorical evocations of coloniality, Martin Lemberg-Pedersen (2019) has convincingly demonstrated that specific policies of externalised migration control have a colonial origin. There are revealing parallels between anti-trafficking policing after the end of the Atlantic slave trade in the second half of the nineteenth century and Europe's contemporary approach to unauthorised migration from Africa. In both cases, the dismantling of smuggling networks goes hand in hand with a system of the repatriation of 'trafficked victims' along the route, to which I will return in the last section of the article.

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[3]   European Commission (2006), Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias and Pickles (2016:233–234)
[4]   Gaibazzi, Bellagamba and Dünnwald (2017), Rinelli (2015)
[5]   Gaibazzi, Bellagamba and Dünnwald (2017:12). Cf. also Raeymaekers (2014b), Rinelli (2015).
[6]   Cf. Green (2018).
[7]   See the contribution by Christian Oesterheld in this collection.

Externalisation as interstitial frontiers

While the image of a front-like frontier is helpful in framing Europe's expansive role, a different image is needed to understand what happens on the frontlines. By offshoring, outsourcing and delegating, Europe's externalised border management involves numerous actors. These actors do not necessarily operate within a standard framework of multilateral governance. Instead, they often cooperate on uncertain legal bases, and even through informal and extra-legal arrangements both among states themselves and between states and non-state actors (Del Sarto and Steindler 2015, Cassarino 2017). Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stevenson and Vassilis Tsianos (2008:179) speak in this respect of 'liminal porocratic institutions' created to govern the porosity of borders at the margins of officialdom.

Igor Kopytoff's seminal essay "The internal African frontier" (1987) is useful in thinking about such liminal modalities of externalisation. Kopytoff wanted to understand socio-political genesis in precolonial Africa, which was dotted by polities separated by zones rather than by clearly demarcated boundaries. He called these 'interstitial' or 'internal frontiers', distinguishing them from Turner's 'tidal frontier'. Interstitial frontiers were not necessarily empty spaces, but were defined as an 'institutional vacuum' by the frontiersmen. Whether driven by expansionist ambitions, expulsion or flight, various actors who had been disengaged from the metropoles met in the peripheries, bringing with them their models of social order. They would give rise to a new social formation, which, if successful, would become a new metropole over time. While centres of influence thus waxed and waned, the reiteration of this frontier dynamic diffused a distinctive political culture across Africa, based, among other principles, on the priority and authority of first-comers over late-comers.

Kopytoff's model of the frontier remains valid for describing mobility and settlement in contemporary Africa (Lentz 2013). It also offers a heuristic of shifting logics and geographies of rule (Korf, Hagmann and Doevenspeck 2013), particularly in African borderlands. By fixing territorial boundaries, colonisation has hindered the emergence of internal frontiers as a spatial process (Herbst 1989). In postcolonial times, however, some borderlands have again become interstitial frontiers on the margins of states in which authority is ambivalent, plural and contested. Neoliberal reforms, capitalist penetration, the internationalisation of governance and local dynamics have variously transformed states and their ability to control borderlands, not infrequently leading to conflict and violence.[8] Timothy Raeymaekers (2014a), for instance, describes the Congo-Uganda borderland not simply as a resource frontier for multinational extractive corporations, but also as a contact zone between state officials, transborder traders and movers, military missions, rebels and warlords, and a plethora of international organisations. This borderland is a space in which state authority is fragmented, but has also been

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[8]   Roitman (2005), Chalfin (2010), Raeymaekers (2014a) and Watts (2017)

regenerated by giving shape to hybrid regimes of 'formalised informality' over territory and cross-border flows.

There are analogies between externalised borders and national borders in Africa (Gaibazzi, Bellagamba, and Dünnwald 2017). Europe's offshoring of border management not only relies on official borders in Africa to control migratory routes, it also deploys various elements of governance, from security to development, that are also present in African borderlands. Without ignoring asymmetries of power, an interstitial frontier perspective does not take Europe's hegemonic project at face value, nor does it assume it as the privileged point of departure for the analysis of externalisation. Rather, it locates analytical attention in the fluid spaces between diverse mobility regimes and sees Euro-African b/orders as emerging from their interaction.

An interstitial perspective therefore adds temporal complexity to border formation in the Euro-African zone. Kopytoff's model is at its core a processual model of the frontier whereby frontiers become centres, which in turn create frontiers, and so on. This further defies the teleology of frontierisation in Turner's model. Kopytoff argues that the internal frontier dynamic helped to explain the diffusion and reproduction of a particular African political culture. Although he conceded that frontiers may bring about change, his model appears conservative and cyclical. Contemporary studies of African frontiers place greater emphasis on novelty and creativity (Raeymaekers 2014a).

Considering the processual and the plural aspect of interstitial frontiers together, it follows that the interstices of externalisation are sites of plural temporality. It has been noted that African borderlands may show the re-emergence of older logics of authority (Roitman 2005). More generally, governance in contemporary Africa is a heterogeneous landscape of temporalities of rule (Arnaut *et al.* 2008). As a consequence, while externalisation may revive colonial legacies, it also refracts other temporal regimes of mobility.

Governing emigration and repatriation in the Gambia

I shall now illustrate the frontier analytics of border externalisation in the Gambian context. A first wave of externalisation reached the Gambia in the mid-2000s in response to migration by boat to the Canary Islands (Gaibazzi 2015:51–53). The western Atlantic was indeed a laboratory for the kind of sea operations and cooperation agreements that Europe later implemented in the Mediterranean and beyond (Andersson 2014). The wave progressively receded, partly due to the deterioration of relations between the Jammeh regime and Europe,[9] to return in recent years on a much greater scale. Despite

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[9] President Yahya Jammeh (1994–2017) gave rise to an authoritarian regime known for its anti-Western positions and especially for gross violations of human and civil rights, which caused significant frictions with the EU especially in the last years of his rule.

being a tiny country, in the mid-2010s the Gambia attracted public and policy attention as one of the main source countries of unauthorised migration to Europe in Sub-Saharan Africa (Conrad Suso 2019). The fall of Jammeh's anti-Western regime in early 2017 proved a favourable event for Europe, as it was now able to negotiate with a friendly and financially needy government. Crucially, the Gambia lacked a proper migration policy – an 'institutional vacuum' (Kopytoff 1987:25) that made it an ideal frontier for promoting a management approach to orderly, safe and regular migration.[10]

In addition to state capacity through the EUTF, the EU has promoted socio-economic development to combat the 'root causes' of going on the 'backway', as unauthorised migration to Europe is known in the Gambia. One of the main interventions has been the Youth Empowerment Project (YEP) run by the International Trade Centre (ITC), a joint initiative of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations dedicated to supporting small- and medium-size enterprises. In 2019, the YEP was incorporated into a larger multi-agency project called "Building a future – making it in the Gambia".[11] As their names suggest, these projects target young Gambians as potential backway migrants and promote them in establishing their sedentary livelihoods through micro-entrepreneurship and professional training.

Deportation and repatriation are an important and contentious aspect of the externalisation frontier in the Gambia.[12] This concerns rejected asylum-seekers in Europe and the much larger mass of so-called transit migrants. Between 2017 and 2019, the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) repatriated over four thousand Gambians (mostly young men) stranded and detained primarily in Libya and Niger. The scheme was part of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, a regional framework financed through the EUTF. While repatriation reduced migratory pressure on the Central Mediterranean route, reintegration aimed to mitigate re-migration (and to make expulsion more palatable politically). Reintegration packages included socio-economic support via the aforementioned schemes for potential migrants.[13] Transit returnees have actively shaped migration policies, including the IOM's, through protest and collective organisation (Zanker and Altrogge 2019).

In the Euro-African zone, the IOM operates as a subcontractor for the EU (Lavenex 2016:554–555) while simultaneously expanding its foothold as a player in migration governance in West Africa and beyond (Brachet 2016). Although the IOM has been in the Gambia since 2001, its size and operational scale have expanded dramatically since 2016/17. The Gambian branch became a Country Office in July 2017. By the summer of 2019, two extension offices had been opened upcountry in Janjanbureh and Basse,

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[10]   On the rise of the management approach to migration, see Geiger and Pécoud (2010).
[11]   This consortium includes the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) International Services, the Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF), Enabel, GK Partners and the ITC.
[12]   For a detailed description, see Zanker and Altrogge (2017, 2019), Action Aid (2019).
[13]   The package was worth around 1,060 Euros, in principle adjustable to personal needs.

together with three Migration Information Centres supported by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in cooperation with the National Youth Council (a body of the Gambian state).

In short, the Gambia is at the forefront of externalisation. This front seeks to control and contain migration through hard (expulsion) and soft (development) power, while also reinforcing actors, norms and models of migration management, mainly via the IOM. Externalisation builds on and polarises existing frameworks of transnational governance, notably the development sector. Old and new agencies, NGOs and service providers vie for EUTF-funding even when they previously had no focus on migration.[14] In a way, externalisation is also a lucrative resource frontier.[15]

Externalisation in the Gambia creates and exploits interstitial frontiers. In the first place, the internationalisation and pluralisation of governance inevitably blurs the boundaries of authority. During my fieldwork in 2019, a number of Gambian and international interlocutors raised concerns about the IOM's lack of transparency and local accountability with respect to repatriation.[16] In an interview with the Focal Point for Migration at the Interior Ministry,[17] a representative said that the Ministry intended to implement its own monitoring system, independently of that of IOM. This surprised me: the Ministry represents the sovereign state and is formally in charge of the steering committee, which includes the IOM, overseeing the repatriation of Gambian transit migrants. This speaks volumes about the ambivalent zones of sovereignty in which externalised border regimes emerge. On the other hand, ambivalence can be a political strategy. Rumours had been circulating in the Gambia about the government's dealings with Europe, including the sending of Gambian police officers to Europe, especially to Germany, to identify fellow nationals in asylum-seekers' centres and those awaiting deportation. Again to my surprise, the representative confirmed the existence of this collaboration regarding the 'verification' (his word) of nationality. He did not make it clear, however, whether this was part of a Memorandum of Understanding, an instrument that European and third states often utilise to informalise readmission agreements and shield them from public scrutiny (Cassarino 2017).

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[14] For these and other reasons, the EUTF has attracted criticism in the development sector (European Confederation of Relief and Development NGOs and Coordinamento Italiano NGO Internazionali 2018).

[15] Cf. Andersson (2014).

[16] Research in August 2019 focused on the governance of repatriation and involved governance and civil-society actors, as well as returnees, their families and communities in the Greater Banjul Area, Niamina West and Basse District.

[17] This is a unit set up by the Barrow government (2017–) as a coordinating point for migration-related issues, excluding refugees and diaspora relations.

POLITICAL CULTURES OF MOBILITY IN AND BEYOND GOVERNANCE

I now focus more narrowly on an interstitial frontier at the very frontline of externalisation in the Gambia. In the summer of 2019, the newly opened Migration Information Centre in Basse (Upper River Region) selected Sabi, a village where I have been conducting fieldwork since 2006, for one of its pilot projects to promote community-based migration management. At the time of my visit in August 2019, projects were still in their preparatory stage. From speaking to both migration officers and interlocutors in Sabi, it became clear that preliminary meetings followed a rather standard form. Migration officers contacted Sabi's Village Development Committee (VDC), a local government institution. The VDC in turn summoned the village youth committee and the women's committee (non-governmental associations) and sent word to household heads to inform backway returnees in their homes. At the first meeting, officers shared information on campaigns and training and entrepreneurship opportunities. They also said that development projects would come to sensitise backway returnees to the pursuit of collective reintegration projects.[18] As a leading VDC member summed it up, 'We should make a list of [backway returnees]. They should get together in small groups and make business plans [for joint enterprises]'.

In contacting the VDC, migration officers were following the official protocol. However, the meetings also contained unofficial elements. Local hierarchies of status, age and gender are reproduced within the VDC in Sabi, as in many other Gambian villages: the VDC is headed by a member of the chiefly family, its other members all being mature men. This gives a hint of the kinds of 'formalised informality' on which migration governance may rely. Furthermore, the quote from the VDC member might suggest that the officers proceeded in a rather top-down manner. Yet, following the custom, the officers, all young Gambian nationals, although portraying themselves as 'guests' and deferring to the village 'hosts', were actually asking for the cooperation of the village authorities, household heads and women, young people and the returnees in participating in governance initiatives. Hospitality and entrustment have a long history in the Gambia valley as a mechanism through which pre-, inter- and post-colonial power holders become grafted on to local institutions, both reproducing them and allowing them to deteriorate (Bellagamba 2004, Kea 2010). External migration management continues this history of indirect government.

At the same time, the meetings reveal the continued significance of political cultures of mobility in Africa. As already noted, Kopytoff (1987) identified relationships between hosts and guests, and first-comers and late-comers, as a key feature of his internal frontier model. The meetings can thus be seen as a reiteration of frontier processes of mobility and settlement in which political cultures such as hospitality mediate the

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[18]   By this stage in the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, the IOM was promoting collective and community reintegration (Samuel Hall 2018), whereas the majority of reintegration packages remained individual.

emergence of a novel order of migration and its integration into transnational structures of governance.

I am not suggesting that externalisation follows exactly a Kopytoffian model of the frontier. Rather, an interstitial view decentres attention from governmental institutions and prompts consideration of the plurality of actors, logics and temporalities in migration control. Whereas the EU-IOM partnership markets itself as a dominant player that both expels and cares for expellees, it is communities and especially families that carry out the bulk of repatriation and reintegration. It is true that some backway migrants avoid their families and communities because they fear being stigmatised as failed migrants. However, in Sabi as well as in other rural and urban settlements I visited in 2019, families have a decisive role in managing both the return and post-return phases.

I had a conversation with Ousman and Ibrahima, two young returnees who had been at the Sabi meeting. They did not hide their irritation upon hearing about collective reintegration packages. Many months after their return, which was assisted by the IOM, they still had to benefit from their own packages. In the meantime, they stayed with their families in Sabi and Serekunda, the urban sprawl along the Atlantic coast. Ousman complained: 'How many times we told them our story! We gave them our fingerprints. They told us to come and we came [travelling at our expense]. Twice we went. We registered [for a package]. And still nothing!'

Their experience of delayed or non-existent assistance was a leitmotif among backway returnees during my fieldwork. Even more common was the condition of so-called 'self-sponsored returnees' (Samuel Hall 2018:6), who did not qualify for assistance. Actually, returns are often co-sponsored by family members, who may also pressurise migrants into abandoning the perilous journey. In 2017, Buba, a man in his thirties, was assisted by the IOM to go from detention in Libya to Agadez in Niger and to Bamako in Mali, but then his brother in Spain had to send him money to pay for the final trip to the Gambia. He reached Sabi in 2017, weak and barely able to walk. His family cared for him until he recovered. When we spoke in 2019, he was working as a shop assistant in a store in Serekunda. He had little interest in programmes for potential migrants and returnees, and was instead trying to find support from his relatives either to set up a business of his own or to obtain a visa to travel abroad.

Externalised management does not merely offload its costs on to families, it also partly benefits from the latter's active management of im/mobility. For men like Buba, realising their business and travel plans entails securing family support, which is a selective process based on an intergenerational logic and temporality of care and discipline (Gaibazzi 2015:110–113). Candidates for support are often many, and support is limited. To qualify, they must cultivate a reputation as loyal, obedient juniors and as hard workers both on and off family farms. They must convince prospective supporters of their potential to ensure the survival and reproduction of the household as its breadwinners. Families and governance have different logics of migration management, but on closer examination these may be seen to converge. As I have described elsewhere, the selec-

tive moral economy of support becomes entangled with consular procedures, de facto indirectly facilitating the pre-filtering of would-be travellers (Gaibazzi 2014). Similarly, while Buba avoids programmes for potential (re)migrants like him, his plan to start a business in the Gambia is partly in line with the governance agenda of promoting sedentariness through local entrepreneuship.[19]

Conclusion

What I have proposed in this article is less a theoretical model than an analytical strategy for studying externalisation as an emergent spatial order. Turner's tidal frontier helps to frame Europe's imagination of Africa as a 'Wild West' of uncontrolled, irregular mobility that needs to be b/ordered.[20] By contrast, Kopytoff's notion of the frontier helps to overcome this Eurocentric gaze and to view Europe's external front as being internal to Africa. Frontiers of externalisation rearrange the elements of a heterogeneous landscape of governance that are created and arise in interstitial frontiers between existing orders.

Such interstices are not necessarily a distortion of a governance model designed in metropolitan Europe and corrupted in Africa. Externalising migration management in and beyond Europe often entails operating in grey zones, or even deliberately creating them in order to bypass international conventions on migrant rights.[21] Furthermore, grey zones of (migration) governance are not peculiar to externalised borders but also exist within national territories as an integral element of state sovereignty (Feldman 2019). Speaking of frontiers as interstitial spaces does more than acknowledge the 'greyness' of border regimes, their fluidity and ambivalence: it also focuses attention on their emergent character, in which the loosening and reshuffling of existing orders of law and politics can serve the creation of new ones.[22]

An interstitial perspective recognises migration control as a plural field by going beyond state-centric perspectives. Governance actors may criminalise unofficial actors of mobility, such as 'smugglers', as a strategy to gain authority over migration (Brachet 2016), but they may also co-opt and exploit their regulatory power (Gaibazzi 2014, Raineri 2018). As already noted, governing repatriation depends on, while concealing, the migration management of families and local authorities.

Finally, a frontier perspective invites a processual understanding of border formation, while also adding temporal complexity to it. Frontiers should not be understood as

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[19]   However, in contrast to the governance ideology, becoming sedentary is not incompatible with mobile livelihoods (see Gaibazzi 2015).
[20]   Cf. Cons and Eilenberg (2019:8).
[21]   For parallels outside Europe, see, for instance, Watkins (2017) on Australia and Winters and Izaguirre (2019) on US-Central America.
[22]   Tsing (2005:27), Chalfin (2010:29), Raeymaekers (2014a:42), Cons and Eilenberg (2019)

an irreversible telos.[23] Kopytoff's (1987) frontier concept places the emphasis on cyclicity and reversibility. Externalisation continues a Euro-African legacy of colonial domination and violence, but also of disengagement and abandonment. It follows waves and cycles, accelerating, decelerating and bouncing back at contingent moments. Certainly Kopytoff (1987) stressed reproduction and diffusion as well. In the long run, the reiteration of externalisation frontiers may spread a culture of migration management centred on European norms. For the moment, however, viewing migration governance from its interstices refracts different political and temporal logics. Host-guest reciprocities mediate the inclusion of local authority in the governance of transnational migration, while intergenerational cycles of reproduction shape return, reintegration and re-migration. Frontiers of externalisation are, in short, not simply a plural landscape of regulation, but also a plural temporal horizon.

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