

Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna
Archivio istituzionale della ricerca

Life and death in audience development. The exhibition on Pompeii at the British museum, 2013

This is the final peer-reviewed author's accepted manuscript (postprint) of the following publication:

Published Version:

Pegoraro, M., Zan, L. (2017). Life and death in audience development. The exhibition on Pompeii at the British museum, 2013. MUSEUM MANAGEMENT AND CURATORSHIP, 32(3), 210-231 [10.1080/09647775.2017.1307781].

Availability:

This version is available at: <https://hdl.handle.net/11585/687529> since: 2019-05-23

Published:

DOI: <http://doi.org/10.1080/09647775.2017.1307781>

Terms of use:

Some rights reserved. The terms and conditions for the reuse of this version of the manuscript are specified in the publishing policy. For all terms of use and more information see the publisher's website.

This item was downloaded from IRIS Università di Bologna (<https://cris.unibo.it/>).
When citing, please refer to the published version.

(Article begins on next page)

Life and death in audience development. The exhibition on Pompeii at the British Museum, 2013

Maneula Pegoraro & Luca Zan

Abstract: Values and orientations of cultural professionals are important to understand the performance of the institutions they manage. While there are striking differences in orientation across countries, their impact has rarely been investigated systematically. This paper offers a case study of a blockbuster exhibition mounted by the British Museum in 2013 using objects loaned by the Superintendence of Napoli and Pompeii. Based on interviews and documentary sources, the study analyses and explains the perceptions of the Italian professionals with relation to the value and the payoffs of the exhibition, and critically compares these to those of the British Museum. The Italian authority did not recognize the strategic potential of the partnership with the British Museum. Consequently it did not pursue or win any significant gains in the areas of resources, reputation or audience development.

Keywords: Arts management; audience development; professionalism; institutional change

A single case focus: the exhibition *Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum*

In 2013 the British Museum staged the third most popular exhibition in the Museum's history, *Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum*. Seen by over 471,000 visitors (The British Museum, 2014a), the exhibition had an estimated admission income of around £5 million (Marchesoni, 2013; see also The British Museum, 2014b, 25). The blockbuster was made possible by a unique, massive loan by the Superintendence for Archaeological Heritage of Naples and Pompeii, the Italian authority in charge of the heritage sites of Pompeii, Herculaneum and Stabiae, and of the Archaeological Museum in Naples.

Whereas from the point of view of the British Museum and its public the event can be seen as good practice in terms of both reputation management and audience development, in Italy it generated controversy and conflicting opinions, especially in the press. As we will see later, Italian media opinions were split between celebrating the fact that Pompeii was being exhibited abroad and directing heavy criticism towards both the heritage authority and the Italian State, portrayed as easily exploitable targets.

In order to understand what really happened, and if the Superintendence shared the success with the British Museum or failed to benefit from it in terms of either economic or reputational gains, we will look at the differences characterizing two outwardly similar professional organisations, and reconstruct the roles and the transactions that made the loan and the exhibit possible.

While this case study is also intriguing in terms of power relations between cultural organisations, what predominantly matters here is that in the context of different organisational perceptions and behaviours, similar professional values can generate quite different results. Consequently, comparing the Italian and the British organisations, and studying the dynamics accompanying the exhibition, can contribute to the debate over processes of managerialisation of heritage entities.

In studying the exhibition, particular attention is paid to gathering and analysing evidence on the Italian side in order to better understand and illustrate the pre-conceptions with which they approached this exhibition. This is then juxtaposed with the British approach to this collaboration.

Our objective is to reconstruct the flow of events, to examine the different narratives that emerged around the loan, and to explain if and why the Superintendence took advantage of the loan, or, on the contrary, missed an exceptional opportunity for recognition. Following a phenomenon-driven research agenda (Pfeffer, 2009), we start from the exhibition, trying to make sense of it and linking it with wider issues concerning the management of cultural organisations.

The research is based on qualitative information gathered mainly between April and August 2013 through semi-structured interviews with the main actors directly involved in the loan, or else well-informed regarding its dynamics. The Interviewees were the curator at the British Museum and five senior officials of the Italian cultural authority. The latter include a former Superintendent who headed the Italian authority in the initial phase of its relations with the British Museum (end 2007 and beginning 2008). The Superintendent in office before and during the exhibition (beginning 2011 throughout 2013) declined our requests for an interview.¹

The interviews were paramount for understanding the organisational behaviour of both organisations, and the beliefs and motivations of the interviewees of both sides – all of them archaeologists. Additional data were gathered through semi-structured interviews and email exchanges with two Italian journalists and three Italian expert informants. These added important information to the narrative provided by the Superintendence's employees. Exhibition products – such as the catalogue, the app, and the documentary – were also examined. Finally, around 100 media accounts from Italy and the UK and the few relevant, publicly available reports were analysed.²

After positioning the case in the literature about management studies and museums, and summarising the Italian context of heritage management, we examine *Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum*, its background, the role played by the two cultural organisations and their relationships. We then discuss the reasons that can explain the opportunity missed by the Superintendence: both environmental and institutional factors are considered, especially the distinct profile of the Italian cultural managers-archaeologists. Conclusions follow.

2. Arts organizations between professionalism and administrative transformation

Arts organisations (and especially heritage organisations) have a specific nature that makes it difficult for them to manage processes of change, and consequently it is revealing to study these processes within this sector. Firstly, they are professional organizations, i.e. fully value-driven. In such contexts important processes of identity, sense-making and value driven choices tend to be tacit and largely happen “underground”, via the “clan” mechanism of control (Ouchi, 1980; O'Dwyer, Conboy, and Lang, 2013).³

Secondly, most organizations are historically related to the state, sometimes simply state-funded, sometimes directly state-managed (here the US represents the exception to the rule, compared to the rest of the world).

Both of these aspects have been challenged to some extent in the process of transformation of the public arts sector (see the literature on New Public Management, NPM. For a reconstruction

¹ The list of interviewees is as follows: a former Superintendent, who held the position from 1994 to 2009 (Interviewee no. 1); the director of the National Archaeological Museum in Naples (no. 2); the director of the Excavations Office in Pompeii who was responsible for the loans at the time of the collaboration with the British Museum (no. 3); two former senior officials of the Superintendence (numbers 4 and 5); and the curator of exhibition at the British Museum (no. 6). In addition we also interviewed three expert informants, among them a university professor and opinion maker (no. 7).

² Later (in February 2016), while drafting this paper we also interviewed the administrative director of the *Museo Nazionale della Scienza e della Tecnologia Leonardo da Vinci* in Milan, Dr. Giovanni Crupi.

³ “Clan control has been defined as ‘the informal socialization mechanisms that take place and that facilitate shared values, beliefs, and understandings among organizational members’ (Turner and Makhija, 2006). [...] Clan control exists when groups exhibit behavior that is motivated by shared values and norms, individuals attempt to be “regular” members of the group by behaving in a manner consistent with O'Dwyer et al., 2013 O'Dwyer et al., 2013 accepted behaviors, and the group accordingly rewards or censures its members (Ouchi, 1979)” (O'Dwyer, Conboy, and Lang, 2013, 2).

see Glynn, Gray, and Jenkins, 1992; Hood, 1995; Gruening, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Lapsley, 2008; Haque, 2004; De Vries, 2010; OECD, 2010; Hood and Dixon, 2015). Processes of institutional transformation, privatization, and outsourcing have spread all over the world, with significant impacts on Continental Europe and its more centralized tradition. Given the traditional humanist background of those working in the sector, they have often perceived the call for a resource orientation and visitor orientation brought by the NPM discourse as a sort of hostile take-over. This is especially the case in Italy. This type of reaction is an example of the dialectics linked to the multidimensional nature of management in cultural organisations, which can be analyzed using a framework developed in our previous research (Zan, 2006). According to this framework, three orientations coexist among the expert staff of cultural organisations: a *professional orientation* (which contributes to making them a clan); a *user orientation* (which forces them to think in terms of users/market issues); and a *resources orientation* (which calls for, and addresses attention to, rationalisation, efficiency, etc.).

While arts organisations have traditionally focussed on their professional orientation, in the last twenty years new debates have also emerged around visitor orientation (or customer, user, audience, client) and resource orientation (human and financial resources). We claim not only that these three dimensions should be considered together, but also that the potential conflict between them, and the issue of viable and sustainable trade-offs amongst them, should be taken into account when analysing the behaviour of arts and heritage organisations and the institutional transformation of the sector.

In this context it is interesting to comment briefly on the diffusion of the discourse on Audience Development (see for instance Seagram, Patten, and Lockett 1993; Hayes and Slater, 2002; Arts Council England, 2004, 2011; Scottish Arts Council, 2004; Kawashima, 2006; Barlow and Shibli, 2007; Rentschler, 2007; Barbosa and Brito, 2012). Firstly, this discourse makes an effort to understand the features of the public (audience), thus avoiding the generic rhetoric of the ‘client’ present in much of the NPM debate. Secondly, it takes into account the marketing discourse without ignoring professional values. In fact, it specifically addresses core activities such as interpretation, education, acquisition of potential new customers etc., in ways that are familiar and easy to understand by professionals themselves. However, the literature on Audience Development also suffers from two main weaknesses. It lacks systematic bridges with the marketing-as-such literature (academic marketing journals do not engage in any dialogue with the Audience Development debate, and vice versa). In addition, similar to the rhetoric on stakeholders, it tends to ignore the issue of *trade-offs*. The question of viability – amongst stakeholders with conflicting claims, or between the three dimensions of our framework, professional, customer and resource focus – is crucial in any practical situation, and needs to be addressed directly by research frameworks.

From this point of view, the case study of *Life and death* is interesting because it allows us to compare a completely different attitude toward visitor orientation (particularly in terms of audience development) in the transformation of the public sector in the two countries, in a context sharing the same basic professional values. The multidimensional nature of managing art/heritage organizations is also impacted by the legal and administrative tradition of the local or national context. Therefore, for our case, understanding the Italian context in terms of regulation and management of cultural heritage is essential to appreciating the environmental conditions that affect a public sector cultural organisation like the Superintendence for Naples and Pompeii.

Italian regulation on cultural heritage is among the most restrictive worldwide and strongly protects heritage as a “public good” (Piergigli and Maccari, 2006; Settis, 2002). Heritage management in Italy has a long tradition of centralisation. The Ministry of Heritage plays the main role and operates locally through a complex system of Superintendences (local branches) that suffer from a structural lack of resources. While centralisation itself is an outdated term in current political debate, in Italy it has produced pros and cons: on the one hand, strong professional control, a clearinghouse effect between richer and poorer entities (Zan, Bonini Baraldi, and Gordon, 2007), and considerable achievements in preservation (centralization largely explains why the Italian

Cultural Heritage, as a whole, is still one of the best preserved all over the world, even considering the many cases of deterioration). On the other hand, centralisation has its cons (Zan, 2006; Zan, Bonini Baraldi, and Gordon, 2007): a burdensome, centralised, multi-layered bureaucratic structure not only prevents liberalisation of heritage management, but also generates transaction costs that are likely to produce inefficiencies, and, de facto, make it difficult to create conditions for effective resource management and economic benefits of heritage. This is the environmental framework in which cultural civil servants operate in Italy. While they are likely to criticize what they perceive as a bungling system that does not provide sufficient resources, they nevertheless generally prize the restrictive regulation (Benedikter, 2011) – which, simplifying, favours heritage preservation over economic exploitation. Italian cultural officials tend to share a pro-public sector view that considers heritage important primarily for its civic value (Settis, 2002), fears a business (market) approach to culture, and champions a scientific and educational perspective.⁴

The Superintendence for Pompeii and Naples is no exception to this characterization. Indeed, it seemingly embodies the ‘worst case scenario’ of Italian cultural heritage offices: lack of staff, resources and competences to properly operate multiple archaeological sites and especially Pompeii, visited yearly by almost three million visitors.⁵ The Superintendence suffers from a cumbersome managerial setup; lack of administrative rationalisation; struggles with central powers (the Ministry of Culture, trade unions, the Government, etc.); a series of destabilizing administrative reforms like merging and demerging;⁶ a poor reputation, especially in 2010 and 2011 after warnings by UNESCO and the EU over the state of Pompeii; and infiltrations of criminal organisations in procurement procedures. These circumstances have already been thoroughly researched (Zan, 2002; Povoledo, 2010; UNESCO, 2011; Figurato, 2011; Erban, 2011; Ferri and Zan, 2014).

3. *Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum*: the organization of the exhibition

On 28 March 2013 the British Museum inaugurated the exhibition *Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum*. Despite the rich collection of the Roman period held by the museum, the exhibition was based almost entirely on some 319 objects lent free of charge by the Superintendence of Naples and Pompeii, as specified in the 66-page list of material on loan published on the exhibition’s website.⁷ Among the objects we find sculpted marble reliefs, carved ivory panels, wall paintings, carbonized furniture, and casts of some of the victims of the eruption. As celebrated by the Director of the British Museum in the press release, some of the pieces had never travelled before.

The exhibition was a huge success from the very beginning. The first exhibition on Pompeii in London since 1976, supported by a global sponsor (Goldman Sachs), *Life and death* was immediately celebrated by the press. Though scientifically rigorous, it was designed to appeal to the masses by “emphasis[ing] ‘day-to-day existence’” (Pearson, 2013) and showing how the Romans were “folks like us” (Masségia, 2013). As stated by the press release issued by the British Museum:

The exhibition will give visitors a taste of the daily life of the people of Pompeii and Herculaneum, from the bustling street to the family home. [...] This exhibition will explore the lives of individuals in Roman society, not the classic figures of films and television, such as emperors, gladiators and legionaries, but businessmen, powerful women, freed slaves and children. (The British Museum, 2012)

⁴ This traditional attitude explains the criticism expressed by many Italian cultural professionals after the Ministry of Culture appointed 7 foreign museum directors in the summer of 2015 (Day, 2015; Rodenigo, 2015).

⁵ See statistics on the annual number of visitors www.pompeisites.org/Sezione.jsp?idSezione=9

⁶ In 2008 the Superintendence for Pompeii and Herculaneum was merged with the Archaeological Museum of Naples – at that time under the Superintendence of Naples – for rationalization reasons (Ferri and Zan, 2014). In January 2014 the museum was moved back to the Superintendence of Naples (see <http://pompeisites.org/Sezione.jsp?titolo=Chi+siamo&idSezione=6>), apparently in order to lessen the load on the Superintendence of Pompeii and let it focus on the massive task of managing Pompeii.

⁷ See the list of objects on loan at http://www.britishmuseum.org/pdf/pompeii_herculaneum_ifs_10jan.pdf.

In order to better understand the event, it is necessary to reconstruct the backstage story of the exhibition and the conditions under which the collaboration was initiated and built. Contacts between the British Museum and the Superintendence of Pompeii began at the end of 2007, when a senior curator (Interviewee 6) from the British organization approached the Italian heritage authority and discussed his idea of an exhibition around the *domus romana* and the lifestyle of the Roman family. After a meeting with the then Superintendent (Interviewee 1), the curator – an archaeologist with excavation experience in Italy – was put directly in contact with three key civil servants: the Director of the Archaeological Museum in Naples (Interviewee 2), the official responsible for the loans (Interviewee 3) and the head of the Herculaneum site.⁸ Because these archaeologists played a crucial role in selecting the items included in the loan and its overall management, their narratives are valuable for understanding the viewpoint of the Italian authority.


The curator was offered the ready-made exhibition *A day in Pompeii*, designed by the Superintendence in 2010 specifically for foreign museums. It is a modular exhibition for audiences who do not know Pompeii, lent for a fee which, as stated by one of the Interviewees, covers the organizational costs of the loan (archival research, photographers, moves, restoration) and not the actual loan of artefacts. The British Museum curator refused the offer of the ready-made exhibition as – he stated – he was interested in developing his own project.

The British Museum took around five years to prepare the exhibition. We learn from the interview with the exhibition curator that, apart from some initial contacts with the then Superintendent in 2007, and later with the new Superintendent in 2011, he did not deal with the senior management at a higher, ‘strategic’ level. Instead he described his working relations with the Italian authority as taking place at the scientific or ‘technical’ level. He portrayed as extremely rewarding his collaboration with the three Italian officials mentioned above, whom he described as “tremendously passionate about their work, very knowledgeable of their collections, remarkably well organised in terms of planning loans, used to dealing with overseas associates, and ready to ease formal requirements – [...] real heroes”.

During the long preparation of the exhibition, the management of the Superintendence faced a variety of environmental and organisational challenges and a sharp decrease in its reputation. As mentioned, at the beginning of 2008 the Superintendences of Pompeii and Naples were merged in order to decrease costs, with the result that Pompeii had to support the extremely under-resourced operation in Naples, and the Superintendence experienced organisational and administrative chaos (for an extensive reconstruction of this period see Ferri and Zan, 2014). A special ‘commissioner’ was appointed by the then Prime Minister (2008-2010); justified by an alleged ‘state of emergency’ in Pompeii because of repeated collapses of structures. This action (which was later ruled to be unjustified by the Italian Courts of Auditors – Corte Conti Del. 16/2010) de facto overruled the authority of the superintendent (Ferri, 2012). The Superintendent (Interviewee 1) who had been in charge of the organisation for some 15 years retired not long after the commissioner took office. A chaotic phase ensued, in which no superintendent was in office or else was only appointed for very brief terms (in total four different superintendents in three years). Moreover, the Superintendence was put under pressure by other events. These included press campaigns denouncing the “dreadful” state of Pompeii (Laudadio, 2011; Osser, 2010c); government threats of privatisation (*Corriere Del Mezzogiorno.it*, 2010; Osser, 2010a); and inspections by UNESCO (Bailey, 2012). Concern was also expressed by the European Union (Figurato, 2011), which provided special funding to support conservation activities (Erbani, 2011). Figure 1 makes it clear why the relationship that developed with the British Museum between 2008 and 2013 could not have been a high organisational priority for the Italian organization.

Figure 1. Timeline of the loan

⁸ The then head of the Herculaneum site was not available for interview.



It is noteworthy that the British archaeologist was the exclusive curator of *Life and death*. As interviews with senior officials at the Superintendence revealed, this is quite exceptional, as other international exhibitions on Pompeii had almost always been curated by the Superintendence (Coates, Lapatin, and Seydl, 2012). A recent example that was mentioned is the 2011 exhibition in Halle, *Pompeii, Nola, Herculaneum - Katastrophen am Vesuv*, curated in collaboration with the local museum (Landesmuseum für Vorgeschichte, 2011).

In addition, the Italian organisation played no role in the design, development, or promotion of any products or events of the marketing-savvy British Museum: an impressive marketing campaign that began as early as the end of 2012 (Havelock, 2013); an exclusive partnership with The Telegraph to disseminate various warm-up videos before the launch and to feature special articles in the press (Beard, 2013); extended use of social media; a trailer; a competition to win a holiday in Pompeii; an iPad app and an iBook; the recreation of a “Pompeii loaf of bread” by an Italian chef. The British Museum also produced the movie *Pompeii Live from the British Museum*, and distributed it worldwide offering the spectator “the wonders of the exhibition from the comfort of the cinema” (The British Museum, 2013). In *Pompeii Live* curators and celebrities take the exhibition outside the museum alongside live performances of music and poetry and scenes of Pompeii and Herculaneum today.

[Pompeii Live] is the first cinema event to be produced by a museum for a major exhibition [...] Pompeii is one of the top ten best known archaeological sites in the world: generally, most of us will never get to visit the ruins. The British Museum is arguably one of the top ten best museums in the world: and outside of the UK, most of us never get within its doors. "Pompeii from the British Museum" is our opportunity to see both, from the comfort of a movie theatre and in the company of a handful of experts on all things Roman. What else can you ask for? (Hirst, 2013)

The movie, representing an authentically global strategy that deserves a study of its own, was massively successful, as reported by various articles that appeared in different countries (Montini, 2013; Mitchell, 2013); but once again, the Superintendence was not involved in its making and therefore did not gain any benefit. None of the scenes in the film were shot on location at the archaeological sites (Maisano, 2013), and a recreated set of Pompeii within the British Museum was used to evoke sensations and atmospheres experienced by Pompeii citizens centuries ago.

Surprisingly enough, the Italian authority was not even involved in drafting a much more traditional product, i.e. the exhibition's catalogue, which mentions the Superintendence only as a lender. Asked about this, the curator of the British Museum stated that there was no time to involve multiple authors and that it was an internal decision, as in any case the catalogue is very close to the exhibition that he designed.

The Italian authority did not gain much from the loan itself. The Italian regulation on loans does not provide for the lender to request a payment by the borrowing organisation. Moreover, the British Museum mainly requested well-known pieces and therefore did not contribute to the restoration of items, as the lender might have wished. "In other exhibitions for which we could make a suggestion, we selected pieces from the storage rooms precisely in order to have them restored and to avoid sending the usual ones" (Interviewee 2). In fact, loan against restoration (or covering the costs of restoration) is a common practice employed by Italian heritage authorities and museums. Yet in the present case, not even this opportunity – proposing or negotiating a mix of objects in need of restoration – was exploited as a sort of pay-back.

It is important to note that, in contrast to our interpretation, the Superintendence's archaeologists did not seem to perceive any unbalanced relations in their partnership with the borrower. They acknowledged the exhibition's success and the British Museum's expertise in promotion and its "power" in terms of resources. The following statements made in interviews are illustrative. "The exhibition in Halle also received extensive media coverage, but the British Museum clearly has more means" (Interviewee 1). "The British Museum is well organised, they are excellent in advertising; in Italy we do not bother with it. For the rest there are no big differences [between us and them]" (Interviewee 3).

"I believe the exceptionality of this loan was mainly produced by an excellent media campaign that was orchestrated by the British Museum [...] coupled with the happy coincidence of the negative media reports that have often hit the management of Pompeii" (Interviewee 5).

From additional statements made during the interviews with the Italian civil servants or in the press, it is clear that they considered the loan to the British Museum as 'business as usual'. "The loan of archaeological pieces abroad is an old practice" (Interviewee 2). "Pieces of the storage rooms have always toured in this way [through loans and exhibitions]" (Interviewee 1). "[M]any of the items on display were the usual masterpieces" (Interviewee 3). The loan request by the British Museum was considered "just another opportunity" to engage in the promotion of Pompeii's heritage, an activity additional to the "Superintendence's main tasks of preservation and conservation" reported the Italian press, quoting the Superintendent at the time of the exhibition (Caragliano, 2013). According to Interviewee 2, who enumerated the many exhibitions organised by the Superintendence, *Life and death* was "one of many" and therefore "not substantially very different from [our] touring exhibits on daily Pompeian life" (the above-mentioned exhibition that was refused by the curator from the British Museum).

Asked about the spillover effect of the exhibition, Interviewee 3 said she expected that the visitors to the exhibition in London would be keen to visit the archaeological sites. But while the Superintendence publishes online the figures of monthly visits, this interviewee confirmed that it is not technically possible to verify if exhibitions bring more visitors.

To complete the picture, it is worth noting that no evidence could be found indicating that the Superintendence tried to exploit the success of the British Museum. The Italian organisation is mentioned on the exhibition's website and catalogue and in the press release issued by the British Museum, but its role was reduced to no more than a highly cooperative lending organisation. In the *Acknowledgements* section of the exhibition's catalogue (Roberts, 2013) the British curator expresses his deep gratitude to each of the Superintendence staff members who facilitated his work. Pompeii's authority did not issue any press release on the exhibition, nor apparently any other form of communication other than a rather short and factual note in the 'exhibitions' section of the Superintendence website.

Notwithstanding this lack of proactivity by the Superintendence, the Italian press – traditionally extremely critical of the heritage authority and of the state of conservation of Pompeii – expressed two competing narratives. The first, celebratory of Pompeii's fame, was fairly positive whereas the second was either moderately or extremely critical. This second narrative mainly focused on the remarkable astuteness of the British Museum in profiting from the neglected treasures held by an incompetent country, Italy, which is responsible for Pompeii's downfall. "Goldman Sachs, please buy Pompeii and Herculaneum" (Tristano, 2013)⁹; "a cultural emigration without precedent" (Maisano 2013)¹⁰; "Abroad they know how to make business with Italian art" (Ferroni, 2013), and "promote a brand" (Perillo, 2013): these are only a few examples of the rhetoric utilised by press articles that denounced the inertia of the Italian political class and severe inefficiencies in the management of Italy's cultural heritage. A similar sentiment was expressed by one of the interviewees.

...at the British Museum the charm of Pompeii works without Pompeii [...] as if Pompeii was a 'lost city'. In the quiet rooms of the British Museum, in an international capital city like London, an illusion has been created: that what is on display is the real Pompeii, that Pompeii can be moved around the world. (Interviewee 7)

Asked to comment on the criticisms made in the Italian media, Interviewee 3 claimed that they reveal the "manipulation of the press" and the rather "parochial approach of many journalists who do not appreciate the promotional dimension" of the exhibition at the British Museum. The same archaeologist emphasised that the Superintendence holds numerous similar items that cannot all be displayed, which would overcrowd the available facilities, and that exhibitions are a way to display such artefacts to different audiences.

The interviews clearly unveil the different institutional behaviours of the two bodies that produced a very unbalanced relationship. On the one side, the British Museum and its curator fail to fully acknowledge the scientific and professional value of the Superintendence, by not involving the latter in the production of any of the exhibition's products and more broadly in their exploitation of the exhibition. On the other side, the Italian authority – not requesting to share any benefits with the British Museum – fails to recognize the enormous potential of the blockbuster exhibition and partnership with a global institution. On the contrary, the Italian archaeologists reject the

⁹ "Dear Goldman Sachs, you have put tons of money in the super London exhibit on Pompeii and Herculaneum; do not stop, not yet, but rather come down here, to Vesuvius, and enjoy the Gulf of Naples. And finally make the last effort: buy these blessed excavations ... maybe in your hands, in the sharp claws of capitalism, what is theoretically a treasure will really become as such. And the current time of smart dummies, of champions of lost opportunities will finally end."

¹⁰ "Pompeii collapses in Pompeii but rises again in London. The paradox created by such a cultural migration - with few or maybe no precedents - couldn't be more clear, and at the same time excruciating, from comparing the Italian news section (accounts) with the latest report issued by the British Museum. The Minister [of Culture] Massimo Bray responds to the admonishment by Unesco [on the poor state of conservation of Pompeii] by reiterating the will to protect the most extraordinary archaeological site threatened by the negligence of a country spoiled by its own beauty. In the meantime Neil MacGregor, director of the palace of Great Russell Street, rejoices over the British success created out of an Italian treasure. At this latitude Pompeii is a big business. The exhibition Life and Death Pompeii and Herculaneum is about to become the third biggest event in 250 years of history of the British Museum, after the Treasures of Tutankamon (1972) and the China's Terracotta Army (2007)."

“spectacularisation” of heritage, and (as will be shown subsequently) they dismiss the ‘business’ type of success of art exhibitions.

The result for the Superintendence was the loss of a strategic opportunity for both scientific recognition and self-promotion as a cultural organization (not to mention forfeiting payoff in the form of restoration of objects). In fact, if the ‘content’ of *Life and death* (the Italian heritage) has an international reputation and produces the impressive success of the exhibition, we cannot state the same for the lending institution.

3. Discussion

How can this missed opportunity be explained? What are the reasons for the Italian officials’ misperception and failure to acknowledge the substantial difference between *Life and death* and the exhibitions they had previously designed? Why didn’t they even notice the unbalanced relationship they helped to establish?

Some of the answers can be found in the very different priorities of the two organisations and the extremely challenging environmental conditions (described above) that have always pressured the Superintendence and that became more evident in the last fifteen years, especially with the imposition of staff cuts and outsourcing (Zan, 2002; Ferri and Zan, 2014). The organisational chaos and ever more uncertain environment reached a peak around the time that the British Museum contacted the Italian authority. Almost all of our officials, especially Interviewee 1, emphasized their preoccupation at the time with economic and organisational challenges.

In contrast to the British Museum, we can therefore assume a lack of incentives for the Superintendence in even considering blockbuster exhibitions, with the prospect of increasing their audience by adopting a narrative that would appeal to the common woman or man. The main preoccupation of the responsible officials has always been resource management, i.e. preserving the archaeological sites, above all Pompeii. As put by Interviewee n. 2, “I don’t expect anything from our collaboration with the British Museum as exhibitions have nothing to do with the management of a museum and of archaeological sites”. The focus on preservation therefore contributes to hampering their ability to perceive the opportunities opened by the global cultural market in terms of audience and reputation development.

As especially highlighted by Interviewee 1, a former Superintendent, cultural officials believe that their core task is to accomplish the institutional goals of carrying out heritage conservation¹¹ and engaging in scientific and cultural activities that are in the public interest. Responsibility for safeguarding public property is therefore a fundamental trait of the professional identity of the Italian archaeologists. This value is also at the core of the Italian regulations on cultural heritage mentioned earlier, considered by Interviewee 1 as the best in the world: “foreign archaeologists envy our legislation that ties a cultural item to the locality where it is placed and that puts cultural interests above economic ones”.

We can assume that this value explains why appreciation of a missed opportunity in the relations with the British Museum emerges only when Interviewee 2 acknowledges that very little restoration of pieces (i.e. public heritage) occurred as a result of the selections made by the British curator – selections that the Superintendence’s officials did not substantially contrast, even if they were clearly in the position to negotiate a different outcome.

Another value which probably hindered acknowledgement of what was really at stake in the loan is professional orientation and pride. “The staff of the Superintendence is unquestionably qualified and equal to the demands of the assigned tasks” even if not in sufficient numbers, maintains Interviewee 2.¹²

¹¹ One of the responsibilities of all Superintendences in Italy for the preservation of heritage is what might be called ‘heritage policing’ of any archaeological material under its jurisdiction (excavated, still to be discovered, discovered during building works, and robbed).

¹² Only the former Head of the Superintendence mentioned the fact that management is a required task that not all archaeologists are interested in carrying out.

The British Museum is the most important museum we ever dealt with [...] We didn't learn new things, we examined in depth scientific elements and aspects related to the public's enjoyment [visitor experience]. [...] [I do] not perceive a big difference [between us] and the British Museum or other organisations; they do a great job in terms of promotion and advertising. (Interviewee 3)

This professional pride emerges also when all Italian archaeologists refer to the Superintendence's very long history of international exhibitions that – in their opinion – have globalised Pompeii: internationalism and innovation are the terms they employ in the following statements.

Since the seventies the various Superintendents in charge of the site have turned Pompeii heritage into one of the first and best cases of internationalisation, serving both local tourism (and hence adding a new 'tool' to the two hundred year tradition of the Grand Tour) and Italy's cultural relations. (Interviewee 4)

Pompeii has always been global [...] since the seventies with the exhibitions in Japan and Australia [...] it's a site of major importance for the entire world [...] the Pompeii brand is increasingly well known. (Interviewee 3)

The Superintendence has always been a pioneer with regard to exhibitions, as in the nineties it started [a policy of] big exhibitions that was not very common [at the time]. (Interviewee 3)¹³

The practice of organising exhibitions and the perceived value of exhibitions are related, yet again, to the professional ('expert') orientation of the Interviewees, i.e. to how they perceive themselves as cultural public servants. As highlighted by Interviewee 4, exhibitions are considered as educational and scientific projects for society; they have more added value if they bring heritage to 'peripheral' areas of the world not familiar with it, or to audiences that are less likely to travel. The same perspective is expressed by Interviewee 3.

I regard exhibitions as opportunities for education ... personal development of visitors. [...] the success of an exhibition is not only related to the number of visitors (size of the audience) as there are different situations. It might be more important to have visitors in a city where European culture is not very widespread, rather than in London. We must not forget that exhibitions are organised in order to produce culture [*fare cultura*] and not business [*soldi*]. (Interviewee 3)

Along the same lines, Interviewee 4 praises an exhibition organised by the Superintendence in Germany in 2001: "for the first time [Pompeii landed] in the former DDR [...] it targeted the 'underprivileged' East Germany ... it gained remarkable international attention". In an additional statement the same Interviewee praise the Superintendence for pioneering the use of information technology in exhibitions. Interviewee 3 emphasized that this approach produced advances in the cataloguing and diffusion of scientific data.

All of these statements underscore that the understanding of audience and exhibitions on the part of Superintendence officials lacks a modern visitor orientation. What matters is the quality and innovation of the content of the exhibition itself, and not the experience offered to the public, which is paternalistically seen as 'needy' in terms of education. The central role of the audience and its experience, as well as interpretational and promotional aspects, are never mentioned.

These last statements introduce another professional value that is typical of academia, i.e. recognition by peers, the international scholarly community. The Interviewees – all of whom have scholarly publications – agree on the fact that they are highly respected: "when we create an exhibition, museums flock [to host it]" declares Interviewee 3. Other statements reflect the same opinion.

¹³ The Interviewee is referring to *Rediscovering Pompeii*, an international touring exhibition in partnership with IBM that made extensive use of ICT. Organised in 2010, it toured for four years in different countries. For an account of the exhibition see Bruschini (1991).

The Superintendence coordinated [archaeological missions and partnerships], granted freedom of research and offered spaces for the equipment [...] we had won the battle for internationalisation. (Interviewee 1)

In this context Interviewee 1 refers to what he defines as the international scholarly collaborations he initiated in 1995 that were allegedly stopped in 2008 when the appointed ‘commissioner’ overruled his authority (see Ferri, 2012; Ferri and Zan, 2014). Along the same lines, Interviewee 2 mentions exhibitions organized abroad by archaeological organizations as a result of research activities, which they carried out in Pompeii in coordination with the Superintendence:

Since 1948 Pompeii has been home to an International Association of Friends of Pompeii¹⁴ that has attracted the interest of many scholars. (Interviewee 4)

The Superintendence should make good use of its heritage by (developing) scientific and cultural activities ... the substance and not the appearance. (Interviewee 1; by appearance he refers to the market-oriented exploitation of heritage “that is in fashion now”).

The same Interviewee also mentions the journal series *Rivista di Studi Pompeiani* (sponsored by the International Association of Friends of Pompeii) and the international symposia on the challenges related to the preservation of Pompeii (see Barbet, 1998; World Monuments Fund, Soprintendenza Archeologica di Pompei, 2003; Osse, 2010b).

Recognition by peers is how the interviewed officials interpret the interest for Pompeii and Herculaneum expressed by the British Museum.

Maybe the interest of the British Museum is one of the results of the internalisation policy I carried out in the mid-nineties. (Interviewee n.1)

This perspective also explains why apparently nobody at the Superintendence felt the need to deal with the British Museum beyond a scholarly and technical level and therefore why the relationship was never upgraded to a more strategic, political level.

Given the interviewees’ statements on the excellence of Italy’s regulatory framework, the internationally recognised status of its archaeologists, and the long track record of the global appeal of ‘Pompeii’s brand’, it appears that the only problems they perceive in their own work are a structural lack of resources and the absence of serious cultural policies – problems for which the government is to blame, and which cultural officials cannot influence. One could wonder whether these senior officials are preoccupied with their own self-promotion as respectable scholars among their peer community, without realizing that this does not compensate for the fact that their organisation does not have an international reputation (let alone a national one).

The situation can be described as one where employees perceive their role as more academic than managerial, failing to see themselves as a member of an organisation that provides a service beyond knowledge and education. In their perception the importance of the individual reputation of the archaeologist is high, while the reputation of the organisation as such is low.

To sum up, it appears that the Italian civil servants fail to acknowledge the substantial difference between *Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum* and the exhibitions they designed, and between their previous balanced (equal) partnerships with museums and the non-equal one they established with the British Museum. They do not express any interest in learning from the example of a global cultural actor, or any regret at not having participated as peers in the building of such a success. The goals of increasing the prestige of the Superintendence as an institution through a blockbuster exhibition, and potentially pursuing economic gains for their organisation, were simply inconceivable to the officials interviewed for this study.

¹⁴ The International Association of Friends of Pompeii (<http://www.amici dipompei.com>), located at the excavation site of Pompeii, was established in 1955 with the aim of increasing and disseminating knowledge about Pompeii. In addition to scholarly publications, they organize conferences and visits to Pompeii. From the website, all their activities appear to be solely in Italian.

The institutional framework of the Italian authority and the values of the senior officials make it difficult for them to appreciate the strategic value of acquiring anything beyond a respectable scholarly profile, i.e. to become a high-status organisation with a reputation and political capital that can be exploited at home as well as abroad. In fact, the interviewees' accounts do not reveal any awareness of a different, more competitive and global cultural market in which scholarly prestige is no longer the only indicator of reputation. The importance of a wider global presence in the cultural market is appreciated, but this is perceived as a task which falls outside their remit and has been neglected by the ministry of culture.

In this sense the case of the exhibition *Leonardo da Vinci: The Mechanics of a Genius*¹⁵ provides a very different example for Italian entities. According to the Administrative Director of the lending institution (Museo Nazionale della Scienza e della Tecnologia Leonardo da Vinci), Giovanni Crupi, the museum provided 80% of the objects, but it was not in the position of fully taking the risk of co-organizing the exhibition with a French partner, in a period of severe resource cutting. Nonetheless the museum was able to be involved in co-curatorship, with relevant benefits:

1. in terms of reputation (almost 800.000 visitors in the five locations so far - Paris, Munich, San Paolo, Brasilia, and London - wherein the role of the museum was clearly acknowledged);
2. in terms of restoration of some of the objects exposed;
3. in terms of direct involvement of the staff (a representative of the museum was present at the desk at the inauguration in each of the locations, while two employees were always involved in the moving of the objects);
4. Even in mere monetary terms the museum was able to set a fee for co-curatorship of 50.000 € for each location (30.000 € for Brasilia), up to a total of 230.000 €.

All in all, the impact of the managerialization process observed elsewhere in the world seems marginal in the Pompeii context, as professionals seem to be immune to the emerging call for visitor orientation. It is not simply resistance in the name of professional specificities: in this sense the striking differences from their colleagues (i.e. archaeologists) at the British Museum are very telling.

We now look briefly at the second actor in the transaction and analyse his behaviour. The interview held with the curator of the British Museum basically reiterates the message expressed in the acknowledgements section of the exhibition's catalogue:

In 2008 Pietro Giovanni Guzzo, then Superintendent of Pompeii, enthused over the exhibition concept facilitated by the late Maria Emma Pirozzi [...]. To these people I owe a very special grazie. [...] From 2009 I began assembling the exhibition [...] under Soprintendente Teresa Elena Cinquantaquattro, to whom I am extremely grateful.

At Naples, the Director of the Museo Nazionale Archeologico di Napoli, Valeria Sampaolo, provided masterpieces from her Museum's galleries [...]. This is a considerable pain for Naples Museum and her very great generosity is much appreciated. [...] At Pompeii, the Director Grete Stefani and Antonio Varone beforehand, kindly lent many treasures from the reserve collections [...]. Grete was also responsible for the Italian side of the exhibition organization. For all her support, good humor and sound advice I am professionally and personally enormously grateful. (Interviewee 6)

All the relevant officials of the Superintendence are mentioned, together with all other people within and outside of the British Museum who helped out with the organization of the exhibition. In addition to commenting on their remarkable generosity and kindness, in his interview the curator also praised the competence and commitment of the Italian archaeologists:

They know their collection, they have a very organised planning of loans [...] we had a true, close collaboration, we explored the items together, constructed something together. (Interviewee 6)

¹⁵ See http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/visitmuseum/plan_your_visit/exhibitions/leonardo and footnote n. 3

The curator at the British Museum was also preoccupied with giving the interviewer a very valiant image of the Italian archaeologists he met, possibly because he is aware of the Superintendence's poor reputation in the Italian media and public opinion:

They have worked up through the chain [...] it is important that the staff know a lot about culture itself and not only how to organise culture ... I was surprised by the depth of their knowledge [...] they have passion for what they do [...] this is not reported in the press, [there is] no recognition.

[They] are used to deal internationally [...] they are real heroes [...] for instance there are only two people [in charge of] exhibitions, while the British Museum has a whole department.
(Interviewee 6)

However, this appreciation for his Italian peers and for the “close” and “excellent” collaboration he experienced is not reflected in a scholarly recognition in any of the catalogue's sections. As stated earlier, the catalogue has a sole author, the curator; he chose not to offer full, significant recognition to the Italian archaeologists because of “time pressure” and a “decision concerning the British Museum”. Finally, no special role was given to the Italian authority at the inauguration of the exhibition. According to participants who prefer to remain anonymous, the Superintendent was simply sitting in the audience, while twenty minutes were allocated to a speech by the exhibition's private sponsor.

Yet, 95% of the objects came from the Superintendence. Compared to the academic world, where it is customary to acknowledge contributions of peers, this looks somehow strange. Simply put, the exhibition was the result of a joint effort and joint resources; it was clearly a well-designed initiative, showing a sophisticated audience development approach, and effectively managed; but without the Superintendence, nothing would have happened.

If we consider the relationship in terms of power and opportunity, it must be acknowledged that the Italians behaved passively and did not make any claims.¹⁶ However, in terms of values, acknowledgment is an issue in itself (i.e. significant explicit forms of acknowledging): a joint catalogue (or at least one jointly written chapter), a joint organization/set-up, a joint presentation, some mutual recognition and promotion, some ways of sharing the outcomes would have appeared more fair from the point of view of a collaboration between peers.¹⁷

The history of the British Museum no doubt includes more controversial episodes of unequal relationships. In the specific context of our research the British institution continued to exhibit, perhaps only marginally, the remnants of a historically self-centred orientation and a colonialist tone. The visitor orientation successfully embraced by the British Museum has clearly boosted its competitive advantage and international reputation. In the case at hand, it also reaped a generous harvest in monetary terms. However, the Museum's professional orientation – in terms of belonging to a peer community – looks like the losing dimension in the trade-off implied by the threefold nature of management of arts organizations.

5. Conclusions

It could be argued that *Life and death* produced some benefits for the Italian institution (as stated by both some media reports and the Italian archaeologists involved in its organisation). However, we

¹⁶ While conducting other research activities, the authors learnt about an ‘alternative story’ from experts who belong to the environment of the Herculaneum Conservation project (HCP). HCP is a collaboration set up in 2001 between the Packard Humanities Institute (an American philanthropic foundation) and the Superintendence of Pompeii for the preservation of the archaeological site of Herculaneum – from where many of the lent objects came from. “HCP tried to obtain some benefits from the British Museum (including participating in the catalogue), but most of their requests were not granted. The reason, in the view of HCP stakeholders, is related to the insufficient managerial skills of the very small team set up by the British Museum considering the international significance of the exhibition”. (Anonymous Interviewee)

¹⁷ See by contrast the case of the Leonardo exhibition referred above.

claim that the Superintendence missed the most significant paybacks, and let the very entrepreneurial British Museum exploit the universally recognized ‘Pompeii brand’ in order to gain great success. In reviewing the evidence, we propose evaluating the performance of the Superintendence in handling of the loan to the British Museum in relation to two criteria: their awareness of the strategic nature of the partnership and their exploitation of the opportunity for gains.

Strategic awareness: The partnership was treated by the Italian Authority as business as usual, i.e. just another international loan, even if with exceptional pleasure and pride. This lack of awareness of the potential opportunities opened up by the loan occurred even if the Superintendence shares an important set of values with the British Museum, i.e. professional orientation. The irony is that, as acknowledged in the broader debate (e.g. Zan et al., 2007), heritage professionals (curators, archaeologists, etc.) tend to share the fear of being taken over by *other* professional jurisdictions (management experts and economists) that are seen as disrespectful towards their values. Instead, in this case sharing the same values did not prevent the emergence of quite different perspectives.

Exploitation of the opportunity for gains can be looked at in relation to resources, reputation, and audience development:

- **Resources:** Following the usual professional practice by Italian public heritage organizations the Superintendence did not request a fee for the loan, or indirect compensation in the form of restoration of loaned objects or inclusion of its own brand in the marketing of the exhibition. According to the British Museum curator, some negotiation in terms of which object should be loaned was performed on the side of the Superintendence, but the Italian archaeologists did not push the negotiation to gain free restoration.
- **Reputation:** The Italian archaeologists did not even pursue basic peer-to-peer recognition (for example, through co-authorship of the catalogue), a seeming paradox especially if we consider their ‘clan culture’. They emphasized that the exhibition’s conception rested entirely with the British Museum, contrary to their tradition of organizing exhibitions abroad. One possible explanation for their acceptance of this arrangement is that Superintendence officials trusted the British institution at a scholarly level, and therefore did not feel they had to intervene.¹⁸ In addition, the fact that a prestigious museum requested a massive loan was seen as recognition in itself.
- **Audience:** Unlike their British colleagues, the Italian officials lack audience orientation. To be more precise, they hold what can be called a paternalistic understanding of audience development: visitors need to be educated, and the civic task of the Italian authority is to take care of the most underdeveloped audiences. The Superintendence officials are seemingly not interested in or are even opposed to the pressures and changes brought by a modern, ‘economic’ interpretation of audience development. This resistance to change is applied in forms and magnitude that appear to be more country-specific than related to the profession involved. In fact, the very passive behavior of the Italian national bureaucracy can be explained by both institutional and environmental factors, with intriguing differences from other Italian museums (cf. the Leonardo exhibition mentioned above).

In conclusion, the case study shows that referring to the trade-offs involved in managing arts organizations (professional values, visitor orientation, resource orientation) requires a further specification. When it comes to reforming heritage organizations, it is also essential to consider national/regional cultures and routine practices, as opposed to rhetorical calls for managerialism, generic reference to autonomy, and an ongoing bias toward a legalist view that still permeates Italy. The variety of attitudes amongst professionals is the most interesting element in our narrative.

¹⁸ This seems to be implied by a statement by Interviewee 1, “for instance Seoul bought the finished product [for the exhibition *Pompeii: chew ho we nart*, Seoul Arts Centre, 1997] as they do not have competences”.

This difference in attitudes takes on particular relevance in light of the recent reform of museums approved by the Ministry of Culture and the subsequent international tender for appointing the directors of twenty Italian top museums (Day, 2015; MIBAC, 2016; Rodenigo, 2015; Settis, 2015; Today redazione, 2015).¹⁹ The reform shows a clear Anglo-Saxon orientation that has been criticized by many: politicians, large sectors of the public cultural sector, and leading figures in the Italian cultural sphere (Jalla, 2015). It focuses on both visitor orientation and efficient resource management, without – so far – conceding full autonomy. Museums will "hold technical-scientific autonomy" (DM 23/12/2014), while staff management is kept within the national collective bargaining agreement, run at the Ministry level. Monitoring the effects of this reform will be an interesting opportunity to understand if shifts in orientation, when implemented within a specific culture, will produce results similar to those observed in other contexts – as for instance the transformation of the British Museum after the Edwards Report in 1996 (Zan, 2000), which explains the new attitudes and behaviors emerged in this study – taking autonomy seriously into account.

Acknowledgmnts

The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of the interviewed employees of the Superintendence and the British Museum, plus the three interviewed experts (see footnote 1).

References

- Arts Council England. 2004. "New Audiences for the Arts". London, UK: Arts Council England.
- . 2011. "Grants for the Arts – Audience Development and Marketing". London, UK: Arts Council England.
- Bailey, Martin. 2012. "Italy Allows Unesco into Pompeii." *The Art Newspaper*, January. <http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Italy-allows-Unesco-into-Pompeii/25422>.
- Barbet, Alix. 1998. "Compte rendu du Colloque international de Naples pour le 250e anniversaire des fouilles de Pompéi (25-27 novembre 1998)." *Mélanges de l'Ecole française de Rome. Antiquité T.* 110, N°2. 1998. http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/mefr_0223-5102_1998_num_110_2_2060.
- Barbosa, Belem, and Pedro Quelhas Brito. 2012. "Do Open Day Events Develop Art Museum Audiences?" *Museum Management and Curatorship* 27 (1): 17–33. doi:10.1080/09647775.2012.644694.
- Barlow, Maxine, and Simon Shibli. 2007. "Audience Development in the Arts: A Case Study of Chamber Music." *Managing Leisure* 12 (2-3): 102–19.
- Beard, Mary. 2013. "Pompeii Exhibition: Mary Beard on Life in Pompeii and Herculaneum -." *Telegraph*, March 3. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/pompeii/9848596/Pompeii-exhibition-Mary-Beard-on-life-in-Pompeii-and-Herculaneum.html>.
- Benedikter, Roland. 2011. "Part 1: Introductory Remarks (modified July 2011)." In *15 Years of Privatization of Italian Cultural Heritage (Working Paper)*. The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/15_years_of_privatization_of_italian_cultural_heritage/.
- Bruschini, Stefano. 1991. "Verso Il Museo Di Domani." *Rivista Di Studi Pompeiani*, no. V (1992): 5–6.

¹⁹ In a decision that opened an intense controversy, seven foreign candidates were appointed. Only one of the twenty current directors comes directly from the Ministry and Superintendence's community.

- Caragliano, Renata. 2013. "Pompei Al British Museum." *La Repubblica.it*, February 1. <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2013/02/01/pompei-al-british-museum.html>.
- Coates, Victoria C. Gardner, Kenneth DS Lapatin, and Jon L. Seydl. 2012. *The Last Days of Pompeii: Decadence, Apocalypse, Resurrection*. Getty Publications.
- Corriere Del Mezzogiorno.it*. 2010. "Bondi: Dopo Il Commissario Fiori Pompei Diventerà Una Fondazione", April 10. http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/napoli/notizie/arte_e_cultura/2010/15-aprile-2010/bondi-il-commissario-fioripompei-diventera-fondazione-1602840906895.shtml.
- Day, Michael. 2015. "Appointment of Foreign Museum Directors Labelled a 'Slap in the Face for Italy' by Curators and Art Critics." *The Independent*, August 19. <http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/appointment-of-foreign-museum-directors-labelled-a-slap-in-the-face-for-italy-by-curators-and-art-10462675.html>.
- De Vries, Jouke. 2010. "Is New Public Management Really Dead?" *OECD Journal on Budgeting* 10 (1): 87.
- Erbani, Francesco. 2011. "Ecco I Soldi Europei E Tutti Corrono Al Capezzale Della Città Fantasma." *La Repubblica.it*, November 10. http://inchieste.repubblica.it/it/repubblica/rep-it/2011/11/10/news/principale_pompei-24809765/.
- Ferri, Paolo. 2012. "L'eccezione E La Regola: Ricerca Esplorativa Sul Fenomeno Del Commissariamento Nel Settore Culturale Italiano. Dottorato in Direzione Aziendale (XXIII Ciclo)." Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Aziendali.
- Ferri, Paolo, and Luca Zan. 2014. "Ten Years after: The Rise and Fall of Managerial Autonomy in Pompeii." *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 25 (4-5). doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2013.05.007.
- Ferroni, Gianfranco. 2013. "Londra Sì Che Valorizza Pompei." *ItaliaOggi*, March 29. http://www.italiaoggi.it/giornali/stampa_giornali.asp?id=1818730&codiciTestate=1&accesso=FA.
- Figurato, Marisa. 2011. "POMPEI – Misteri Di Pompei Da Svelare." *La Repubblica Edizione Di Napoli*, November 9. <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2011/11/09/misteri-di-pompei-da-svelare.html>.
- Glynn, John, Andrew Gray, and Bill Jenkins. 1992. "Auditing the Three Es: The Challenge of Effectiveness." *Public Policy and Administration* 7 (3): 56–70.
- Gruening, Gernod. 2001. "Origin and Theoretical Basis of NPM." *International Public Management Journal* 4 (1): 1–25.
- Haque, M. Shamsul. 2004. "New Public Management: Origins, Dimensions and Critical Implications." *Public Administration and Public Policy* 1.
- Havelock, Kathryn. 2013. "Pompeii Exhibition at the British Museum Case Study." <http://culturehive.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Pompeii-exhibition-at-the-British-Museum.pdf>.
- Hayes, Debi, and Alix Slater. 2002. "'Rethinking the Missionary Position' - the Quest for Sustainable Audience Development Strategies." *Managing Leisure* 7 (1): 1–17. doi:10.1080/13606710110079882.
- Hirst, K. Kris. 2013. "Pompeii from the British Museum - Movie Review." *Archaeology About.com*, September 25. <http://archaeology.about.com/od/romanempire/fr/Pompeii-From-The-British-Museum.htm?p=1>.
- Hood, Christopher. 1995. "Emerging Issues in Public Administration." *Public Administration* 73 (1): 165–83. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1995.tb00822.x.
- Hood, Christopher, and Ruth Dixon. 2015. "What We Have to Show for 30 Years of New Public Management: Higher Costs, More Complaints." *Governance* 28 (3): 265–67. doi:10.1111/gove.12150.
- Jalla, Daniele Lupo. 2015. "La Riforma Dei Musei Statali Italiani." *Il Giornale Delle Fondazioni*, April. <http://www.ilgiornaledellefondazioni.com/content/la-riforma-dei-musei-statali-italiani>.
- Kawashima, Nobuko. 2006. "Audience Development and Social Inclusion in Britain." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 12 (1): 55–72. doi:10.1080/10286630600613309.
- Landesmuseum für Vorgeschichte. 2011. "Pompeji - Nola - Herculaneum - Katastrophen Am Vesuv." http://www.lda-lsa.de/de/landesmuseum_fuer_vorgeschichte/sonderausstellungen/ausstellungsarchiv/pompeji/.
- Lapsley, Irvine. 2008. "The NPM Agenda: Back to the Future." *Financial Accountability & Management* 24 (1): 77–96.

- Laudadio, Vito. 2011. "Pompei, Le Fiamme Gialle Indagano Sulle Spese Folli Dei Bertolaso Boys." *Il Fatto Quotidiano*, January 23. <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2011/01/23/pompei-indagini-sulle-spesse-folli-dei-bertolaso-boys/87932/>.
- Maisano, Leonardo. 2013. "Pompei Sprofonda Ma Fa Il Tutto Esaurito Al British Museum." *Il Sole 24 ORE*, July 3. <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/impresa-e-territori/2013-07-02/pompei-sprofonda-tutto-esaurito-130816.shtml?uuid=AbZUSUAL>.
- Marchesoni, Maria Adeliade. 2013. "Londra, Pompei È Un Successo Al British Museum." *Il Sole 24 ORE*, July 6. <http://www.arteconomy24.ilsole24ore.com/art/musei/2013-07-06/pompei-british-museum-101833.php>.
- Masségia, Jane. 2013. "Ancient Romans? Folks Just like Us." *The Art Newspaper*, May 8. <http://old.theartnewspaper.com/reviews/Ancient-Romans-Folks-just-like-us/29514>.
- MIBAC. 2016. "SELEZIONE PUBBLICA PER I DIRETTORI DEI MUSEI ITALIANI." Accessed June 1. http://www.beniculturali.it/mibac/export/MiBAC/sito-MiBAC/Contenuti/visualizza_asset.html_1656248911.html.
- Mitchell, Wendy. 2013. "CineEurope Day 3: Paramount Sequels, Pompeii Live Success". News. June 26. <http://www.screendaily.com/news/distribution/cineurope-day-3-paramount-sequels-pompeii-live-success/5057785.article>.
- Montini, Franco. 2013. "Record Di Incassi per Il Film Documentario Su Pompei, Realizzato Dal British Museum - Media E Tv." *La Repubblica*, November 29. http://www.dagospia.com/rubrica-2/media_e_tv/cultura-incassa-solo-se-producono-inglesi-film-documentario-67505.htm.
- O'Dwyer, Orla, Kieran Conboy, and Michael Lang. 2013. "A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Clan Control in ISD Project Teams." In Utrecht University, The Netherlands.
- OECD. 2010. *Public Administration after "New Public Management"*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264086449-en>.
- Osser, Edek. 2010a. "Pompei, Fondazione O Soprintendenza?" *Il Giornale dell'Arte*, November. <http://www.ilgiornaledellarte.com/articoli/2010/11/104937.htm>.
- . 2010b. "È Così Che Si Salva Pompei, Credetemi." *Il Giornale dell'Arte*, December. <http://www.ilgiornaledellarte.com/articoli/2010/12/105464.html>.
- . 2010c. "Pompei Dopo Il Crollo. Commissari Inefficienti?" *Il Giornale dell'Arte*, December.
- Ouchi, William G. 1980. "Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25 (1): 129–41. doi:10.2307/2392231.
- Pearson, Stephanie. 2013. "Review of Exhibition: Life and death in Pompeii and Herculaneum, (review No. 1479)." <http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1479>.
- Perillo, Marco. 2013. "Visitate La Pompei in Mostra a Londra: Capirete Come Si Vende (e Bene) Un Brand." *Corriere Del Mezzogiorno*, January 23. http://corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it/napoli/notizie/arte_e_cultura/2013/3-maggio-2013/visitate-pompei-mostra-londracapirete-come-si-vende-bene-brand--212957105250.shtml.
- Pfeffer, Jeffrey. 2009. "Renaissance and Renewal in Management Studies: Relevance Regained." *European Management Review* 6 (3): 141–48.
- Piergigli, Valeria, and Anna Lisa Maccari. 2006. *Il Codice Dei Beni Culturali E Del Paesaggio Tra Teoria E Prassi*. Vol. 25. Milano: Giuffrè Editore.
- Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2004. *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. USA: Oxford University Press.
- Povoledo, Elisabetta. 2010. "Pompeii's Problems Reflect Longstanding Neglect." *New York Times*, December 13. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/arts/design/14pompeii.html>.
- Rentschler, Ruth. 2007. "Museum Marketing: Understanding Different Types of Audiences." In *Museum Management and Marketing*, edited by Richard Sandell and Robert R. Janes, 345–65. London, UK: Routledge.
- Roberts, Paul. 2013. *Life and Death in Pompeii and Herculaneum (exhibition Catalogue)*. London, UK: British Museum Press. <https://www.amazon.co.uk/Life-death-Pompeii-Herculaneum-Roberts/dp/0714122823>.
- Rodenigo, Veronica. 2015. "L'autonomia Dei Grandi Musei, Una Scelta Oculata E Indispensabile." *Il Giornale dell'Arte*, October 8. <http://www.ilgiornaledellarte.com/articoli/2015/10/125056.html>.

- Scottish Arts Council. 2004. "Audience Development Strategy, 2004–2007". Scottish Arts Council. <http://www.scottisharts.org.uk/resources/publications/Strategies/Pdf/STR3%20Audience%20Development%20Strategy%202004-09.pdf>.
- Seagram, Belinda Crawford, Leslie H. Patten, and Christine W. Lockett. 1993. "Audience Research and Exhibit Development: A Framework." *Museum Management and Curatorship* 12 (1): 29–41. doi:10.1080/09647779309515341.
- Settis, Salvatore. 2002. *Italia SpA: L'assalto Al Patrimonio Culturale*. Torino: Einaudi.
- . 2015. "UNA CURA DA ELEFANTE - La Repubblica.it." *La Repubblica.it*, August 25. <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2015/08/19/una-cura-da-elefante27.html>.
- The British Museum. 2012. "Life and Death in Pompeii and Herculaneum (Press Release)." http://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2012/pompeii_and_herculaneum.aspx.
- . 2013. "Pompeii Live from the British Museum (press Release)." *The British Museum*. https://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2013/pompeii_live.aspx.
- . 2014a. "British Museum Has Record Year of 6.7 Million Visitors in 2013." https://www.britishmuseum.org/about_us/news_and_press/press_releases/2014/record_visitor_figure_s.aspx.
- . 2014b. "REPORT AND ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2014". The British Museum. <https://www.britishmuseum.org/pdf/Report%20and%20accounts%202013%20-%202014.pdf>.
- Today redazione. 2015. "Rivoluzione Nei Musei Italiani: 7 Direttori Su 20 Sono Stranieri." *Today*, August 15. <http://www.today.it/cronaca/nuovi-direttori-musei-italiani-stranieri.html>.
- Tristano, Alberto Alfredo. 2013. "Goldman Sachs, per Favore, Comprati Pompei Ed Ercolano." *Linkiesta.it*, March 30. <http://www.linkiesta.it/pompei-addio#ixzz2eLT7X5Zf>.
- UNESCO. 2011. "Report on the Mission to the Archaeological Areas of Pompeii, Herculaneum and Torre Annunziata". C829. [http://www.unita.it/polopoly_fs/1.321558.1312883325!/menu/standard/file/mission_report_Unesco\(2\).pdf](http://www.unita.it/polopoly_fs/1.321558.1312883325!/menu/standard/file/mission_report_Unesco(2).pdf).
- World Monuments Fund, Soprintendenza Archeologica di Pompei. 2003. "Conservation in the Shadow of Vesuvius: A Review of Best Practices." <https://www.wmf.org/publication/conservation-shadow-vesuvius-review-best-practices-conservazione-all%E2%80%99ombra-del-vesuvio>.
- Zan, Luca. 2000. "Management and the British Museum." *Museum Management and Curatorship* 18 (3): 221–70. doi:10.1080/09647770000201803.
- . 2002. "Renewing Pompeii, Year Zero. Promises and Expectations from New Approaches to Museum Management and Accountability." *Critical Perspectives on Accounting* 13 (1): 89–137. doi:10.1006/cpac.2001.0484.
- . 2006. *Managerial Rhetoric and Arts Organizations*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zan, Luca, Sara Bonini Baraldi, and Christopher Gordon. 2007. "Cultural Heritage between Centralisation and Decentralisation: Insights from the Italian Context." *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 13 (1): 49–70.