

The book cover features a decorative border with intricate black and gold patterns. The border contains fragments of Latin text in a gold, Gothic-style font, including "exaudi orationem m", "tem", "ate", "E", "a seruo tuo, quia no", and "in".

Riccardo Fedriga
Monika Michałowska

SAFEGUARDING
**FREE
WILL**

William Ockham, Walter Chatton,
and Richard Kilvington
on the Will

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Kraków 2022

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ISBN 978-83-8138-740-8 (print)
ISBN 978-83-8138-741-5 (PDF)
<https://doi.org/10.12797/9788381387415>

On the cover: Grass Moths and Milkwort from *Mira Calligraphiae Monumenta or The Model Book of Calligraphy* (1561–1596) by Georg Boesky and Joris Hoefnagel. Original from The Getty. Digitally enhanced by rawpixel.

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066

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KSIĘGARNIA AKADEMICKA PUBLISHING

ul. św. Anny 6, 31-008 Kraków
tel.: 12 421-13-87; 12 431-27-43
e-mail: publishing@akademicka.pl

Internet bookstore: <https://akademicka.com.pl>

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INTRODUCTION

Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska

Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will features an array of varied issues that made up the much-debated will problem in late medieval philosophy and theology. The book discusses concepts of the will produced in the first half of the 14th century, whereby its special focus is on the ideas that sprang up and evolved at Oxford in the 1330s. Although the literature on medieval concepts of the will and will-related issues is indeed extensive, this particular timeframe remains under-researched. There are several reasons for this neglect. Firstly, some important textual sources are still available solely in manuscripts. Secondly, some authors whose merits as ingenious philosophers and/or logicians have already been acknowledged did not pen texts explicitly or entirely devoted to the will and have thus been regarded as irrelevant to debates on the will. Consequently, their writings have not been studied from the will-perspective. Thirdly, the contemporary discourse on late medieval theories of the will developed by scholars working on ethics, the metaphysics of the will, and moral psychology has of late been dominated by a tendency to marginalize “minor authors” and those whose reputation lay elsewhere. We believe that this trend has particularly disadvantaged the Oxford Calculators, who have been recognized as experts in logic and mathematical physics, yet their writings on and concepts of the will have been grievously overlooked so far. Admittedly, there are signs that this trend is abating, and that a new group of scholars has arisen who probe beyond the surface and glean will-issues from writings that less expressly engage with the problem. Nevertheless, this shift is only just starting to emerge. Therefore, this book seeks to shed some light on the concepts of the will hatched at Oxford in the 1330s by exploring the themes and approaches adopted by Walter Chatton (an opponent of William Ockham) and Richard Kilvington (one of the Oxford Calculators).

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The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

It would be naive to think that the ideas conceived at Oxford in the 1330s appeared in a theoretical and conceptual void. The authors whose concepts we examine in this book are greatly indebted to those who had come before them and whose writings inspired them either to follow and advance certain ideas or to develop a critical standpoint and offer alternative solutions. The variety of will-related themes investigated at Oxford in the 1330s is impressive. Presenting and analyzing all the threads and knots involved (if feasible, in the first place) lies beyond the scope of our book. The aim we have in mind is much more modest; it is merely to study an ensemble of selected issues that were considered vital at that time.

This threefold volume starts with the theories of William Ockham to show how he paved the way for the Oxonian thinkers of the 1330s, some of whom were his conversation partners and opponents in disputes. Ockham's concepts in fact provide a starting point for our further argument. In Part 1, we offer a detail study of his notions of the human and the divine wills, the freedom of the will as entwined with the problem of future contingents and divine foreknowledge, the will and time, and the will in relation to causal chains. This not only outlines a doctrinal framework for the theories of Chatton and Kilvington (Part 2 and Part 3), but also shows the varied ways in which Ockham's ideas were adopted, advanced, criticized, and referred to by the Oxonian philosophers and theologians.

In Part 1 (Chapters 1–3), entitled “William Ockham: An Action-Guiding Sense of Freedom,” Riccardo Fedriga analyzes Ockham's theories of the human and the divine wills in conjunction with a range of issues, such as divine foreknowledge, future contingents, prophecies, the logic of belief, causal determinism, and the distinction between *soft* and *hard* facts. Fedriga presents Ockham's theory of the will in terms of the freedom of indifference, where the will is conceptualized as independent from reason. Rather than indicating that the will is the sole cause of its action (which is the case in the voluntaristic want-belief model), indifference refers in this context to the causal structure of the will and implies that the will is morally indifferent. Because of its moral indifference, the will is not bound by or to the injunctions of reason. This means that, according to Ockham, humans are free to choose an end to pursue, even if this end is morally wrong, since its moral value never determines the act of the will. Consequently, the freedom of indifference is not a pre-reflexive state of the will, but rather represents an unlimited, extra-temporal, volitional power, as the will itself is indifferent to the objects that the intellect presents to it. The indifference of the will is ontologically undetermined, because the will is not just indifferent to what the intellect dictates, but also capable of acting against what the intellect commands. However, the existence of this intrinsic freedom of the will is only

established by practical experience and cannot be either demonstrated *a priori* or grounded in transcendental categories. In Ockham's view, for the intention of a free action to be achieved, it must occur and be pursued in a proper way. This means that it must always exhibit a causal regularity, such that it can be followed and socially ascertained. This regularity is based on the reciprocal referentiality between a particular intentional act and its actual regularity. It is precisely in this reciprocity that, in our view, the epistemological-ethical function of the practical intellect (and not the moral value of the action) lies. More than that: it is thanks to this reciprocal process that the will is completely free and indifferent regarding the action itself. While admissible because of God's absolute power, God's free action *extra ordinem* is not presented by Ockham either as an arbitrary intervention in the actual world or as an exception to the order created by God, or, much less even, as preparation for a free divine intervention. Rather, it represents a possible foundation of a new and different order: a potential, counterfactual alternative to the existing laws of fact. While such an action remains possible, it is not implemented. Otherwise, the divine intellect could be subjected to the dominion of its own will, or a believer would only depend on God's *imperium voluntatis*, or God would be unable to foreknow future contingents with certainty. God can work a miracle, threaten the fulfillment of a prophecy, or even bestow grace, revealing that God's intention is simple and free—unrestricted by the will—and indicate to a believer the path to an eventual, yet free, good action. In this way, God safeguards divine free will. But how can a *viator* evade the risks of theological fatalism amidst this “conundrum of foreknowledge”? Chiefly (though not exclusively) in the *Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium* (1321–1324), Ockham finds a way to retain and reconcile divine foreknowledge and human free will, whereby his criticism of John Duns Scotus's voluntaristic position serves him as a springboard. Specifically, Ockham explains that while propositions of *divina praescientia* are verbally (*secundum vocem*) related to the present, they in fact (*secundum rem*) concern the future, from the perspective of which they can be determined as being true or false. Consequently, the truth-value of propositions about the future is guaranteed by their being objects of divine foreknowledge, but these propositions are at the same time amenable to the choices of free will, because they are still undetermined in the present. By scrutinizing Ockham's ideas of and solutions for safeguarding the freedom of the will, Fedriga builds a platform for our analyses in Parts 2 and 3.

Part 2 (Chapters 4–5), entitled “The Complex and Multifarious Nature of the Will and Its Acts,” illumines the diversity of the will's acts and the manifold structure of the will as envisaged by Walter Chatton and Richard Kilvington. Chapter 4 by Monika Michałowska depicts the concept of the will articulated

by Chatton in his quodlibetal questions and in his question commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. Although Chatton never penned an ethical commentary, an avid interest in the freedom of the will and in the interaction of the intellect and the will in moral decision-making is clearly visible in his works. Michałowska examines the structure of the will-act as posited by Chatton to highlight its diverse components. In Chatton's framework, although moral decision-making is associated with the activity of the intellect, the will possesses the power to accept, reject, or act against the intellect's judgments, and even to suspend the intellect's activity in order to redirect it or act without its further involvement. This approach to the will-intellect relationship serves Chatton to prove the dominance and independence of the will in moral decision-making.

Chapter 5 by Michałowska studies the concept of second-order volitions in Chatton and Kilvington. To highlight the novelty of their approaches and solutions, she first sketches a doctrinal background of the problem, outlining how the issue was spawned by the works of Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury. Subsequently, she shows how it was later pondered by 12th-century theologians, such as Peter of Poitiers and Stephen Langton, who focused on the conditionality of the will to debate higher-level acts of the will. Finally, she looks into John Duns Scotus and William Ockham as the sources of Chatton's and Kilvington's ideas to present the way higher-order volitions were interpreted by the two Oxonian philosophers and elucidate the purposes second-order volitions served in their theories of the will. This study reveals that a) both Chatton and Kilvington employed the distinction into first- and second-order volitions to emphasize the self-determination and self-reflexivity of the will and to prove its freedom; and that b) their strategy for the defense of the freedom of the will by stressing its higher-order acts relied on Ockham's theory.

Part 3 (Chapters 6–8), entitled “The Will and Time,” concentrates on the complexity of the temporal entanglements of the will's acting and shows how the problem of simultaneous contradictories was advanced by the Oxonian philosophers to finally develop into a separate issue, known as the contradiction theory of change. The possibility of change in the will's acts was analyzed by both Chatton and Kilvington, with their explorations generating different specific themes and solutions for the scrutiny of the will's causality and its temporality. Chapter 6 by Fedriga and Michałowska investigates the origin of the problem that can be traced back to the Condemnation of 1277 and the conundrum of how “rectitude and malice can/cannot be present in the will at the same time,” faced by 13th-century thinkers. First attempts to solve this puzzle were undertaken by Henry of Ghent and by John of Pouilly, who are considered the founders of the contradiction theory of change. However, Scotus's contingency theory can be suggested as another possible origin of the

simultaneous contradictories problem. By detailing Scotus's position, Chapter 6 offers an introduction to the Oxonian approaches depicted in Chapters 7 and 8, which look into volitional acts, changes in the will, causal chains, and the problem of necessity and freedom. These classical disputes are closely related to debates on canonic theological queries such as, for instance, whether God can save a human being without the sacraments. Or, can God do so, even more radically, without giving a human being grace? In general, how can God directly cause what is normally caused by an intermediate agent? What is the relationship between changing causal chains and the establishment of deviant orders of the world?

In Chapter 7, Fedriga retraces some historiographically well-established points, such as God's absolute and ordained powers, the role of free will, and the idea of righteous action in order to delve into the themes of change, wayward causal chains, and the influence of Scotus's doctrine on Chatton and Adam Wodeham, two of Ockham's most important interlocutors.

Chapter 8 by Michałowska portrays a different facet of the simultaneous contradictories issue by pondering the temporal factor in the will's acting as discussed by Richard Kilvington in question 5.1 in his *Questions on the Sentences* (*Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis pro aliquo instanti debeat ipsum actum per aliquod tempus necessario tenere*). In order to capture Kilvington's position, Michałowska delves into the role that the circumstance of time plays in the acting of the will, and into his reasoning on the extent of resemblance between the will's acting and natural processes. By highlighting Kilvington's unique analytical methods and tools, Michałowska elucidates Kilvington's idea of the uniformity of ethical and physical processes, a perspective that eventually led him to approach ethical and physical processes in a similar manner. Chapter 8 is accompanied by the first critical edition of question 5.1 and an introduction to it.

Any history of philosophy that neglects analytically informed philosophizing is futile. We consider ourselves as much historians of philosophy as philosophers; therefore, in our study, we occasionally take the liberty of doing philosophy along with critically assessing the concepts we investigate. We realize that while some readers may welcome this combination, others may be less obliging, but we hope that this will become a starting point for further discussions on the robustness and diversity of the will-debate at Oxford in the 1330s.

PART I

WILLIAM OCKHAM
AN ACTION-GUIDING SENSE
OF FREEDOM

CHAPTER 1

WILL, MIND, AND FREE ACTION

OCKHAM'S WAY OUT OF FATALISM

Riccardo Fedriga

1.1 Introduction

The relationship between necessity and contingency, between the stable and certain order of the world and free, contingent actions, is of great relevance to any cultural tradition, religious or otherwise. While Aristotle himself wondered how to reconcile the entirely natural requirements of propositional logic and the freedom of choice, the introduction to philosophy of the analytical attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness of the Christian God made future contingents an even more pivotal issue for the interpreters of the revealed datum. If God knows everything with certainty, God also know what I and any other human will or will not do tomorrow or at any other moment. This, however, does not preclude my freedom to choose between doing something or not, between performing one action or its opposite.

Free will lies at the core of medieval Christian thought and attempts to solve the conflict between God's omniscience and the freedom of will have repeatedly revealed new aspects of the problem, just like when untying a knot, one finds new, variously entangled ends time and again. How can an absolutely single and simple God want such different things? What is the relationship between an essentially simple and eternal God, and the world in which time passes? All things were created, but was their creation instantaneous or stretched over time? Has it been concluded or can it be further expanded? Faced with the entirely regulated and ordered world (*ordinatio*), what would happen if one admitted that God could act with complete freedom, regardless of the laws and the world's order God has set in motion? And, most importantly, how can free will be safeguard in this scenario?

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Among this multitude of problems, the possible creation of deviant causal chains is a particularly thorny issue. The introduction of contingency to the world and competition among different causes—particularly causal competition between free agents—may spark the birth of deviant causal chains. These are a result of either an unwanted effect from the first agent of an action, or of a desired effect obtained through means other than those initially foreseen. Furthermore, deviant causal chains rupture the more rigorously deterministic models of the world, precisely because the entire concatenation of cause and effect evades the determination originally established by the action—whether free or not—of the first cause and is instead open to the intervention of a random mix of different and differently ordered agents.¹ Such deviant causal chains are explored in theology, where the *magisters* ponder whether the divine will can be impeded by creatural action, or whether God can stir up an evident cognition of the things to be believed in the human mind (without this being derived from a vision that has God as its object). Efforts to tackle these pertinent questions were perhaps at their peak between the end of the 13th and in the first half of the 14th century, breeding solutions of utmost sophistication and originality.

1.2 The Freedom of Indifference

Let us start with William Ockham's outlook. While Ockham's life alone is worthy of a novel (and has actually been given a novelistic rendering), here we shall retrace only the stages of Ockham's philosophical and theological production. The English theologian's conceptions lie at the core of the analysis below.² In

¹ Cf. Anscombe 2001, pp. 57–73; Davidson 1973, pp. 685–700; Searle 1983. For works following the medieval tradition, see Bunge 2009; Courtenay 1990, pp. 77–94; Esposito, Porro (eds.) 2002; Hintikka 1981, pp. 57–72; Knuutilla 1981, pp. 163–258; Maier 1949, pp. 219–250; McCord Adams 2007, pp. 47–76; McCord Adams 2013, pp. 3–26; Porro 2013, pp. 113–147. See also Demange 2007, pp. 48–65, 115–157.

² For an accurate account, see Courtenay 2008; Panaccio, Spade 2016; Spade 2006. Much of Ockham's philosophical and theological writing dates from 1317 to 1323: His *Summa logicae*, later completed in Avignon; the *Scriptum* or *Ordinatio*, on Book I of Peter the Lombard *Sentences*; the *Reportatio* on books II–IV of the *Sentences*; a series of commentaries on the logical works of Aristotle and Porphyry, from the *Expositio in libros artis logicae, prooemium et expositio in librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus* to the *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, and from the *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis* to the *Expositio super libros Elenchorum*; texts on Aristotelian physics, such as the *Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (incomplete), the *Summula philosophiae naturalis*, the *Brevis summa libri Physicorum* and the *Quaestiones in libros Physicorum Aristotelis*; the *Quodlibeta septem* on theological questions,

this part, we will address free will understood as a freedom of indifference by way of preparation for the analysis of the relationship between intentions and causal chains in the next section (1.3). Grasping Ockham's vision of the human will is fundamental to examining his solutions to the dilemma of free will and its relation to divine foreknowledge and fatalism. An especially salient feature to consider is the choice between good and evil in which one exercises what can be defined as the "freedom of indifference."³ In Ockham's view, when the will faces the choice between good and evil, it is essentially indifferent to both, and therefore entirely autonomous and free to opt for the end it prefers.⁴ Both good and evil entail an obligation, where "[t]he good is the intention to respect it, and the evil is the intention to escape it."⁵ Ockham is, therefore, not simply a theorist of the freedom of indifference, but first and foremost an opponent of the concept of indifference as a purely pre-intentional state of the will. The freedom of indifference calls for interpretation, and contrary to those who, like Scotus and Henry of Ghent, conceived it as a freedom to choose between indistinguishable objects, Ockham considers it to be doubly independent. Specifically, within the determinism of natural phenomena, the will is not determined either by external natural factors (perceived objects) or by internal ones (passions). At the same time, the will is independent of reason, as there is a causal break between what is known and what is wanted. Following Marilyn McCord Adams and, more recently, Valentin Braekman, we can list the two consequences of the will's independence regarding reason: the will is the sole cause of its action (the causal indifference of the will), and does not have to obey the injunctions of reason (the

later completed in Avignon; probably treatises on the Eucharist *Tractatus de quantitate* and *De corpore Christi*; The *Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium*, (hereinafter *Tractatus*) which is in all probability chronologically overlaps with or shortly follows the *Scriptum* (1321–1324), where the problems addressed in five questions of the *Tractatus* are widely discussed.

³ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. I, q. 16 (ed. Wey 1980, pp. 87–89). For the historical rise of the expression "freedom of indifference," see King 1999; McCord Adams 1986; Panaccio 2012, p. 90; Pinckaers 1985 [Eng. transl. 1995].

⁴ Ockham, *Sent.* III, *Reportatio*, q. 6 (ed. Kelley, Etzkorn 1982, pp. 175–176): "Et ideo, quia voluntas non habet inclinationem naturalem ad aliquid quod fit in ea plus quam ad eius oppositum, ideo voluntas non potest moveri violenter, quia violenter movetur aliquid quod movetur contra inclinationem naturalem in eo." As observed by Vincent Spade and Claude Panaccio, this does not imply that the will does not have any natural inclination, but rather that its inclination is but a tendency and not a decisive factor in the voluntary act. Cf. Spade, Panaccio 2016.

⁵ Ockham, *Sent.* IV, qq. 10–11 (ed. Wood, Gál, Green 1984, p. 198): "Obligatio igitur facit aliquem peccatorem (...)" For further details, see King 1999, p. 231.

moral indifference of the will), with the latter presupposing the former.⁶ What this means is that, according to Ockham, humans are free to choose the end to pursue even if it is morally wrong, since its moral value never determines the act of the will. The freedom of indifference is not then a pre-intentional state of the will, “[b]ut rather consists of unlimited volitional power as the will itself is indifferent to the objects presented to it by the intellect, even when rational reasons favor the choice of one object over another.”⁷ Ockham also claims that the will's indifference is ontologically undetermined, since the will is essentially not only indifferent to what the intellect dictates, but also capable of acting against the commands of the intellect.⁸ This intrinsic freedom of the will, however, is only assured by experience and cannot be demonstrated *a priori*.⁹

The will does not directly grasp the actual object but relies on direct apprehension by the intellect. According to Braekman, Ockham identifies four modes (*rationes*) of this apprehension by the intellect: “[t]he intellect can apprehend 1) a real good *sub ratione boni*; 2) a real good *sub ratione mali*; 3) a real evil *sub ratione boni*; 4) a real evil *sub ratione mali*”¹⁰ In situations 1) and 4), the intellect produces a righteous judgment consistent with reality. In 2) and 3), the intellect produces an erroneous judgment that is contrary to reality. As we shall see, Ockham thinks that the freedom of the will implies a possibility to want or to reject (*nolle*) any intellectual apprehension. The will can, therefore, want a real good *sub ratione mali* or reject it *sub ratione boni*. It may also want an evil *sub ratione mali* and reject it *sub ratione boni*. Consequently, the will can conform to the intellect's judgment or reject it, no matter how correct or erroneous this judgment is.¹¹ Ockham envisions no causal relationship (*talis connexio*) between the intellect and the will so strong as to make voluntary choices, which are contrary to reason, impossible,

⁶ Cf. Braekman 2019, p. 579.

⁷ Braekman 2019, p. 580.

⁸ Ockham, *Sent. I, Prol.*, q. 1 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 40–41): “(...) voluntas potest libere velle oppositum illius quod est dictatum per intellectum.”

⁹ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. I, q. 16 (ed. Wey 1980, p. 88): “Potest (...) evidenter cognosci per experientiam, per hoc quod homo experitur quod quantumcumque ratio dicitur aliquid, potest tamen voluntas hoc velle vel non velle vel nolle.”

¹⁰ Braekman 2019, p. 579.

¹¹ Ockham, *Sent. I*, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, p. 503): “(...) voluntas non necessario conformetur iudicio rationis, potest tamen conformari iudicio rationis tam recto quam erroneo.”

and clarify that one cannot sin otherwise.¹² What ensues is its relation to the judgment of the intellect.

Before delving into this, let us return to reason (*ratio*), which Ockham views as one of the two ways bestowed by God upon humans to enable them to fulfil divine will. The other way is Revelation, which gives humans the knowledge of commandments relative to moral conduct (such as the prohibition to kill, steal, lie, etc.). Reason is supposed to serve as a natural moral compass, enabling humans to recognize universal moral norms. Reason plays this role if it is righteously exercised (*recta ratio*), that is, if both its cognitive and prescriptive functions are performed. Through the former, it recognizes the moral value of a given action in relation to a norm, while through the latter, it imposes its *dictamen* on the will. As the actions reason prohibits always overlap with those prohibited by God, Ockham regards morality as universal, objective, and grounded in divine will.¹³

If the will could not be separated from judgments of the intellect, it would be immune to sin (*impeccabilis*). Sin, in fact, is an act by which the will consciously abandons the right reason of the intellect or divine law.¹⁴ Furthermore, if the will was unable to choose to obey or disobey either rational or divine law, it would automatically be subordinated to reason and thus would not be the main cause

¹² Ockham, *Sent.* III, q. 11 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn 1982, p. 355): “Item, si tales virtutes non sunt ponendae in voluntate, aut hoc est propter necessariam connexionem inter intellectum et voluntatem, aut propter determinationem voluntatis ad bonum, aut propter libertatem voluntatis. (...) non est talis connexio inter intellectum et voluntatem quin voluntas possit in oppositum iudicati ab intellectu (...)”

¹³ Ockham distinguishes two natural and positive levels of morality. The natural level is “demonstrative” and contains purely formal precepts, such as “one must do good and avoid evil,” “one must obey right reason,” etc. The positive level is deductive and linked to experience. According to Calvin Normore 1998, p. 35, instead of “A free agent can set up any object whatever as an end for itself, instead of the end for which God implanted a desire in us. This marks, I suggest, a fundamental shift in theory about the relation between ‘good’ in a metaphysically descriptive sense and ‘good’ in an action guiding sense.”

¹⁴ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 8 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 435). See Braekman 2019, p. 578: “L’indifférence de la volonté n’est pas un état d’indécision, mais d’indifférence active ou essentielle: la liberté de s’autodéterminer. Cette liberté intrinsèque de la volonté n’est néanmoins pas démontrable *a priori*: seule l’expérience nous assure de son existence. Nous faisons l’expérience que, peu importe les décrets de notre intellect, nous avons le pouvoir de les ignorer volontairement: [potes evidenter conosci per experientiam per hoc quod quantumcumque ratio dictet aliquid, potes tamen voluntas velle vel non velle vel nolle.] [Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. I, q. 16 (ed. Wey 1980, p. 88)]

of its own acts.¹⁵ Accordingly, both terms “right” and “wrong” assume a moral connotation. As Braekman points out, “[t]he will is morally right if it conforms to the *dictamen* of reason, if it wants what it knows, it must want”.¹⁶ In the same way, when the will moves away from the *dictamen* of reason, it is morally “erroneous” and “unjust,” since it consciously pursues what reason considers to be evil.¹⁷ Moreover, the moral meaning of the terms “right” and “wrong” does not necessarily presuppose their epistemological meaning, as the will can be morally bad even when reason is epistemologically right, and on the contrary, it can be morally right even if reason is epistemologically wrong. Lastly, the terms “right” and “wrong” as applied to the will are synonymous with “morally good” and “morally bad,” “virtuous” and “vicious.” Hence, for Ockham,

righteous reason has only a moral function, not a moral value: it commands the will to do good, but it only depends on it to do the good. (...) The will can be morally bad while the judgment of the intellect is epistemologically correct. Conversely, the will can be morally right, even if the judgment is epistemologically incorrect.¹⁸

To conclude, Ockham considers the will to be entirely free. What matters in the choice is not necessarily the good, but rather the desirable, which covers everything of which the intellect can conceive. The good and the desirable are not, however, the same thing. If they were identical, that would support a relativist and/or a fideistic conception of morality, which would be unacceptable to Ockham.¹⁹ The latter, in fact, holds that good and evil qualify objects

¹⁵ Cf. Ockham, *Quaestiones variaae*, q. 7, art. 3 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 367): “Sexto, ostendo quod posito quod voluntas necessario conformetur rationi in eliciendo actum, quod voluntas non erit liberior appetitu sensitivo (...)”

¹⁶ See Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 42, q. unica (ed. Etkorn, Kelley, 1979, p. 610): “(...) omnis voluntas recta est conformis rationi rectae sed non semper est conformis rationi rectae praeviae quae ostendat cuasam quare debet voluntas hoc velle. Sed eo ipso quod voluntas divina hoc vult, ratio recta dictat quod est volendum.”

¹⁷ Ockham, *Quaestiones variaae*, q. 8 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 432): “(...) illa voluntas est recta quae in operando conformatur voluntati divinae tamquam suae regulae, et illa non est recta quae discordat ab intellectu divino et voluntate divina in volendo.”

¹⁸ Braekman 2019, p. 580. See Ockham, *Quaestiones variaae*, q. 7, art. 3 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 364): “(...) si actus virtuosus necessario poneretur posita recta ratione, necessario conformaretur sibi, et sic ille actus non esset primo virtuosus, sed actus intellectus, cuius opus positum est prius probatum.”

¹⁹ For the discussion in the Oxonian conversational community on the infinite reference of acts of will, see chapters 4 (especially sections 4.3 and 4.4) and 5 here, pp. 88–136.

related to the will and according to objective and universal norms, as opposed to classifying them as either volition or aversion. In this sense, good represents intentional compliance with the law, while evil represents intentional contempt for it. Therefore, any object, including evil ones, can be potentially desired, and vice versa, any object, including good ones, may be undesirable. The will is thus metaphysically liberated from the good, even though it is morally subjected to it and bound to reject evil (and thus embrace good). However, as the will is essentially indifferent, it can reject good and deliberately embrace evil. The concepts of good and evil are thus emptied of any metaphysical substance, in favor of a strictly moral meaning; they designate only the intention of the rational agent and its causal link to the norm.²⁰

1.3 The Freedom of Action and the Freedom of Indifference

Having defined these aspects of Ockham's conception of the will and human freedom, it is now possible to return to its link to causal chains. The notion of such chains is part of larger theological issues concerning prophecies, predestination, personal salvation, justification, and grace, insofar as they are intended as bearers of such chains. In Ockham's thought, while human acts are not deemed sufficient for obtaining personal salvation, the notion of grace conceived of as *de potentia ordinata* is rejected, and a different type of divine free action is envisaged instead—one that is simple, not mediated by causal chains, and not even the result of the human action it concerns.²¹ For Ockham, in fact, for the intention of a free action to be achieved, it must occur and be pursued in a particular way (*rectus*). That is, it must always exhibit a causal regularity such that it can be followed and socially ascertained. It is a regularity which, to occur in the right way, is based precisely on the reciprocal referentiality between a particular intentional act and its actual regularity. Otherwise, the intention remains only at the logical level, *de possibile*. If the intention is not verified both in time (in T1 ... Tn) and in the facts, it always remains a conditional which, however well disguised (as is the case with syllogisms, which, according to Ockham, could

²⁰ As Braekman puts it, evil “[n]’est autre que l’acte proscrit par la droite raison et par la volonté divine. Or, selon Ockham, il est évident que la volonté humaine peut choisir d’enfreindre les lois de la raison, ainsi que les commandements divins. Quel sens y aurait-il à interdire ce qui ne peut être enfreint? La possibilité de vouloir le mal sub ratione mal représente donc la condition nécessaire de l’existence de la morale” (Braekman 2019, p. 593).

²¹ A similar solution will be that of Adam Wodeham. For his analysis of grace in a logical-propositional context, see chapter 7 here, pp. 155–168.

not be without there being at least one human), will always need at least one true referent to exemplify its regularity. The existence of regularity is inferred not only from the purpose and/or the enunciation of intention, because they in themselves can be indifferent or unintentionally diverted from their intended aim or, again, achieved by unplanned means from those planned. The existence of a free act must actually be inferred from the exhibited regularity of the act itself, to the point that the object of the intentional act (and free action) can be said to be not its foundation, but rather the trace of a reciprocal-referential transaction between the mind and the world. It is precisely in this exhibited reciprocity that the epistemological-ethical function of the practical intellect (and not the moral value of the action) lies. On the contrary, it is precisely thanks to this reciprocal process that the will can be said to be completely free with regards to the action itself. And not only, as it is in this strict conformity between intentions, the shared regularity of the causal sequence and acts that the peculiar being of intentional states lies (cognitively, ethically, and regardless of whether there is an object yet or not). By the absolute power (*de potentia absoluta*), God can skip one or more links in the chain and reduce it by one or more causal connections. In doing so, God can work a miracle, threaten the fulfillment of a prophecy, or even bestow grace, revealing that God's intention is simple and free—unrestricted by the will. In this sense, rather than being revealed by a divine, volitional act in this world, simplicity is this world order's (*ordinatio*) purifying itself of soft facts and is revealed by precisely the counterfactual interruption of the temporal continuum and causal regularity. God's *extra ordinem* action, while admissible because of God's absolute power, is not presented by Ockham as either an arbitrary intervention in the actual world, or as an exception to the order created by God, or much less as preparation for a free divine intervention. Rather, it is like a possible foundation of a new and different order, a potential alternative to the existing laws of fact. While this action remains possible, it is not implemented. Otherwise, the divine intellect could be subjected to the dominion of its own will, or the believer would only depend on God's dictate of the will; or God would be unable to know future contingents with any certainty. Rather, not even simple correspondence between the generic content of a voluntary intention and the state of things to come to be is enough (according to what can be described as a "want-belief" model) to guarantee the intentional belief in the mind/world transaction. To speak properly of an intentional act, this reciprocal-referentiality is required. For this reason, mental states revealing a (possible) temporal/causal deviance (contingent soft facts such as intentions, beliefs, love, memory, and perception)

and not necessarily regarding the present are fundamental tests that a coherent theory of the mind/world relationship must take into account.²²

This is where the deep meaning of the freedom of indifference lies, as through counterfactuality, it reveals the absolute emptiness of freedom. Subject S is authentically and completely free if, and only if, it is in S's power to abstain from doing an action A. And to abstain from doing A at T is in S's power if, and only if, this abstention is compatible with the sum total of this world's frameworks that are antecedent to T, purified of the soft facts, whose emptiness is revealed. From this, two conclusions follow. One is that hard facts are temporally necessary facts, and are conceived of as facts that are actually grounded in the past. The other conclusion concerns the human capacity to act freely. In order for an action to be accomplished, we must actually fulfill a mind/world transaction involving temporal continuum and causal regularity. This means that the passage from freedom of indifference to freedom of action consists of "filling" the void of absolute simplicity (i.e., divine) in keeping with the principle of responsibility (*recta ratio*) during the course (T1 ... Tn) of this life, in this world order (*ordinatio*), regardless of what the divine judgment might be. As we shall see in the case of the logic of religious belief and prophecies, on which Ockham states that he does not know how the transition between *revelandum* and *revelatum* takes place, this is not an apophatic drift or a fideistic voluntarism. Rather, this means that the passage from one mode of freedom to another takes place according to a set of norms that regulate the transition from soft to hard facts and govern change in covenantal theology, as different from fatalist theology.²³

1.4 Fatalism, Divine Foreknowledge, and Human Free Will

To explain briefly the concept of fatalism, let us start with Hugh Rice's observation that

[t]hough the word 'fatalism' is commonly used to refer to an attitude of resignation in the face of some future event or events which are thought to be inevitable, philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.²⁴

²² For a broader discussion of soft and hard facts in the context of the Ockhamist distinction between *secundum rem et secundum vocem*, see here chapter 2, pp. 41–66.

²³ For the definition of covenant theology see Courtenay 1984a and Courtenay 1984b; see also here chapter 7, p. 155.

²⁴ Cf. Rice 2018.

In other words, fatalism claims that we cannot act any differently than we act. When this situation is determined by a necessity inscribed in logical or metaphysical laws, an instance of “logical fatalism” occurs. For its part, “theological fatalism” denotes a conception which holds that there is an intelligent divine subject, possessed of essential attributes (perfection and omnipotence) and epistemic properties (primarily omniscience and foreknowledge), that binds future states and makes them contingent and necessary. The problem of theological fatalism arises when the idea of an omnipotent subject is connected to the knowledge of future contingents. With its foreknowledge, such a subject can make the truth of propositions about future contingents necessary, thus fostering scenarios of strict determinism, in which there is apparently no room for human free will. The relevance of theological fatalism is associated with its crucial and multiple ethical and metaphysical implications and lies in its natural consequences for the relationship between divine necessity and the free contingency of human acts. Ockham's contribution was to spell out how this issue was essentially based on presuppositions related to cognitive acts. Theological fatalism is linked firstly to the possibility of knowing the conditions of verifiability of the acts of divine belief, and secondly, to the implications following on from the determination of the truth-value of statements concerning future states of affairs. Any action which ensues from a free choice involves, in fact, a contingent conception of the future. The future, however, appears to be fixed and “restricted” by the divine foreknowledge of it.

In light of this complex intertwining of theories and traditions, it is necessary to return to Ockham's *Tractatus*, where he critically examines Scotus's position. Both Franciscans take the ninth book of Aristotle's *De interpretatione* as their main point of reference.²⁵ Scotus, however, departs from the now classical interpretation traditionally attributed to Boethius, according to which the indetermination/indeterminacy and the consequent impossibility to know the truth-value of propositions about future contingents do not imply limitations to divine foreknowledge, as this is not bound to the temporal flux.²⁶ Scotus's interpretation is poised between fatalism and determinism, on the one hand, and radical contingentism on the other. The epistemological indeterminism of the divine intellect, which inspects neutral propositions, is paralleled by the

²⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, IX 28–32 (ed. Weidemann 2014). For the extensive debate on the logical problem of statements about future contingents, starting from different readings of the *De interpretatione*, IX, see Hintikka 1981, pp. 57–72.

²⁶ John Marenbon has recently put this reading up for discussion, showing how Boethius's reasoning is founded on divine simplicity rather than on atemporality. Cf. Marenbon 2013, pp. 9–19.

“determinist” action of the divine will, which absolutely contingently establishes the truth of propositions, which does not pre-exist the act of volition, just as the factual reality of propositions does not exist until the divine decides to create it. In Scotus’s model, the contingency of the will is not an imperfection, but the source from which all freedom originates thanks to there being a simultaneous disposition to do otherwise. Such a disposition marks voluntary actions of creatures and God, and is strong enough to prevail over any indecision, indeterminacy or fear to take a decision (*formido alterius partis*), allowing the will to open up to assent and focus on something, while ensuring, in the same logical instant, the intellect and its mental states have a semantically evaluable content that characterizes the voluntary actions of both God and creatures.²⁷

Ockham explores divine foreknowledge and its compatibility with the free will of creatures against the background of the logical picture painted by Aristotle. The suspension of the truth-value of future-contingent statements (which, in Aristotle, is obligatory when precluding a deterministic conception of reality) produces for Ockham—who, among other things, considers it questionable even from a logical point of view²⁸—a different and graver kind of implication, namely, that even an omnipotent subject such as God cannot have a scientific and, therefore, stable and determined knowledge of future contingents. Moving on to the analysis of individual issues, in the third question of the *Tractatus*, Ockham wonders whether and how it is possible to preserve the contingency of the will (both created and divine) when it causes something outside of itself. That is, whether it is possible for the will as a cause (naturally anterior to its effect and, therefore, potentially in need of it) to produce an act opposite to the one it is effectively causing at the same temporal moment. The question is in large part made up of the Ockhamist exposition of Duns Scotus’s synchronic modality, which Ockham criticizes, proposing his own solution. The freedom and contingency of the created will’s acts are placed in the model of divine will, in which the will can want one thing and its opposite (*p* and *not-p*) at the same moment. Ockham is very accurate in his reading of Scotus and correctly interprets his thinking by arguing that Scotus thinks of modality in synchronic terms.

²⁷ Cf. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III–3 (ed. Boehner, Gál, Brown 1974, pp. 697–707). For a broader discussion of Scotus’s theory and its implications for 14th-century Oxonian debates about change, see chapter 6, pp. 142–148.

²⁸ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, qq. 2–3, nn. 4–9 (editio Vaticana 1966, pp. 481–482); *Ordinatio*, I, dist. 38, q. unica, nn. 1–12 (editio Vaticana 1963, p. 303–308) et dist. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 7 (editio Vaticana 1963, p. 407). For Ockham’s point of view against Duns Scotus, cf. *Sent.* I, *Ordinatio*, dist. 38, q. unica (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 578).

Scotus's position was earlier analyzed by Ockham in the sixth supposition of the first question, where Ockham examined the viability and coherence of the Scotistic solution to the problem of the foreknowledge of future contingent. Here, Ockham focused on the relationship between the neutrality of propositions when learned by the divine intellect and their determination when dealt with by the divine will, which chooses which part of the contradiction is true. In the third question, Ockham addresses predestination and its fatalistic implications for free human action, whereby he still dwells on the Scotistic solution, but his attention shifts from the divine level of predestination to the temporality-bound human level.²⁹ Ockham argues that power as such must sooner or later be translated into action, but that cannot happen at the same moment in time when opposite power *not-p* is translated into action, as this would violate fundamental rules of logic, such as the principle of contradiction, but not that of contradictory pairs. Even in this case, *necessitas per accidens* plays a decisive role, since Ockham's focus is not necessarily on the divine will, which, in the Scotistic model, operates in an *eternal present*, but rather on the acts of the human will, which are bound by the rules of temporality.³⁰ Once *p* has become actual at T, the opposite tendency, *not-p*, which has not been fulfilled, acquires

²⁹ See Hoffmann 2009, pp. 359–379; King 2001, pp. 175–199; Knuuttila 2000, pp. 312–341; Lagerlund 2000.

³⁰ According to a tradition that appears to be already consolidated in the logical debate, starting from the early twelfth century, *necessitas per accidens* concerns the events or states of affairs that do not have an intrinsic (or *per se*) necessity, so that there is no possibility, neither in the present, nor in the past, nor the future, that they are false. Nevertheless, necessity is applied to these events “accidentally,” a term used to indicate what cannot be false in the present but could have been false in the past. Necessity, in this case, is modal (relative to a state of affairs) and occurs when this state of affairs leaves the purely possible—and therefore contingent—sphere and becomes real. Thus, propositions (*dicta/enuntiabilia*) that describe this state of things do not possess an atemporal character of necessity. On the contrary, there was a moment (before that contingent state of fact was realized, thus necessitating itself) when these propositions were not necessary, because the events they described were still open to the horizon of the possible; this is true both for the pure possibles that come into being when turning contingent and for the possibles that were intended as potential states of fact that sooner or later, according to a statistical and diachronic definition, would come to pass. A similar understanding of the concept of *necessitas per accidens* was shared by Thomas Aquinas, Robert Kilwardby, Robert of Lincoln, and William Ockham. See Lewis 1988, pp. 69–77; Rudavsky 1985; Wciórka 2018, pp. 1–46 (esp. p. 12). For a review of discussions about *necessitas per accidens*, starting from the logical debate of the early twelfth century brought forward by the likes of *Ars Meliduna*, Magister Udo, Stephen Langton, Uberto di Pirovano, Prepositino da Cremona, and Abelard himself, to its morphing into Ockham's *secundum vocem* solution, see Binini 2020; Wciórka

accidental necessity in the past, and it will therefore always be true to state that it did not occur at T, and that p was translated into action in the same instant as T. Nonetheless, Ockham dispels any doubt as to whether the will acts contingently. The rejection of Scotus's solution does not preclude that the will is free to choose at T1 or T3 on a diachronic plane, the opposite of what it chose at T2. Such freedom is guaranteed by the contingency and openness of the future rather than by the counterfactuality of temporal instants or of nature's instants, as shown in the first and second questions about foreknowledge, future contingents, and the free will of creatures. For this reason, the causality produced by the acts of the human will is not deterministic, unlike natural causality, where once a cause is set, a fixed causal chain follows. The will can cause p at T and *not-p* at T2, or the other way round, without any link of the causal chain binding the subsequent ones.³¹

1.5 Predestination and Freedom: Various Ways of References as a Solution

These are the premises that build up to William Ockham's linguistic and propositional solution. In the third supposition, Ockham introduces a crucial distinction between propositions referring to the present both verbally (*secundum vocem*) and in terms of the facts they describe (*secundum rem*) and propositions that are such only verbally. The former fall under the logical principle that every proposition that is true in the present (like in *Sortes sedet*) must correspond to one that is necessary in the past (like in *Sortes sedit*).³² In other words, the truth of the proposition about the present *Sortes sedet* (i.e., the fulfilment of the described state of affairs) includes the necessity of the corresponding proposition about the past *Sortes sedit*. However, there are propositions which

2020, p. 36. For the use and/or reinterpretation of *necessitas per accidens* in the contemporary philosophy of religion, see chapter 2, pp. 44–50.

³¹ Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis*, I, 6, 15 (ed. Gambatese, Brown 1978 p. 422): “Tertio sciendum quod nihil est contingens ad utrumlibet, de quo Philosophus hic loquitur, nisi quod est in potestate alicuius libere agentis vel dependet ab aliquo tali. Et ideo in puris naturalibus, hoc est, in animatis anima sensitiva tantum et in inanimatis, nulla est contingentia, nec etiam casus et fortuna, nisi aliquo modo dependeant ab agente libero.”

³² Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1, s. 3 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 515): “Tertia suppositio: quod aliquae sunt propositiones de praesenti secundum vocem et secundum rem, et in talibus est universaliter verum, quod omnis propositio de praesenti vera habet aliquam de praeterito necessariam, sicut tales: Sortes sedet, Sortes ambulat, Sortes est iustus, et huiusmodi.”

only refer to the present verbally, while referring *secundum rem* to the future, as their truth-value depends on the realization of the determined events at a future moment. The rule that any true present proposition must necessarily have a corresponding past one is not applicable to such propositions, and there is no link that determines the necessity of the present:³³ 'White was black' and 'white will be black', though true, have a false corresponding present proposition ('white is black'). What is still certain in Ockham is that any proposition has a determined truth-value. Such a value has already been firmly and definitively fixed for some utterances (*propositiones*), because the events they describe have already occurred in time. However, the truth-value of other propositions is not yet knowable, since what will bring them into being in the future has yet to be determined. In short, they are contingent, a distinction which serves Ockham to dismiss the Aristotelian principle of the necessary relationship between a true present proposition and a corresponding true past one. Once again, Ockham is preoccupied with deterministic implications: if 'Peter was predestined' is the corresponding proposition to the true present one 'Peter is predestined', the former, given the past's own necessity, would require a corresponding proposition in the present. Ockham distinguishes propositions which actually concern the present and past from those which do so only verbally but actually correspond to future propositions. If the former has already been established as necessary, the latter are contingent, have yet to be confirmed, and their truth-value, though immutable, is yet to be determined:

All propositions about this matter, though verbally focused on the present or the past, nevertheless refer to the future in an equivalent way, considering that their truth depends on the truth of the propositions formally referring to the future. For the third *suppositio*, however, it is obvious that those true propositions referring to the present do not have a [corresponding] necessary proposition in the past, but only a contingent one, just as the [corresponding] one referring to the present is contingent. It follows that no proposition in the present about this subject has a necessary [corresponding] proposition in the past.³⁴

³³ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1, s. 3 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 515): "Aliquae sunt propositiones de praesenti tantum secundum vocem et sunt aequivalenter de futuro, quia earum veritas dependet ex veritate propositionum de futuro; et in talibus non est ista regula vera, quod omnis propositio vera de presenti habet aliquam de praeterito necessariam."

³⁴ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1, s. 4 (ed. Gambatese, Brown 1978, p. 515): "Quarta suppositio: quod omnes propositiones in ista materia, quantumcumque sint vocaliter de praesenti vel de praeterito, sunt tamen aequivalenter de futuro, quia earum veritas dependet ex veritate propositionum formaliter de futuro. Sed ex tertia suppositione patet quod tales verae de praesenti

Although future events are known in a contingent and not necessary way, they are nonetheless immutably determined future events that are known in a contingent and not necessary way, but that does detract from their immutable determination. The epistemological indeterminism of the knowledge of future contingents rests on their ontological determination, to which the possibility of definite knowledge, and thus of the science of that which, while contingent, could also not be or be differently, is tied. On the one hand, the determined nature of future contingents implies the contingency of cognitive acts, which, traversing time, may only have a knowledge of events on condition that the events have been concluded (and thus necessitated). On the other hand, it justifies the possibility, affirmed in principle although without an explanation, of the divine knowledge of future contingents, which would be impossible if they were indeterminate, as Aristotle had earlier concluded. God can have a stable knowledge of that which is not stable, as results from Ockham's claim that, against Aristotle's classical position in *De interpretatione*, future contingents are determinate. Divine knowledge knows determinately which of the parts of the contradiction is (already) true and which is (already) false.³⁵ Foreknowledge is, then, the knowledge of such realities which are indeed contingent, considering that they could have also been otherwise, but not therefore mutable, since the truth-value of a proposition cannot change over time and is still anchored to factual reality. If 'Peter is damned' is true at T2, 'Peter will be damned' was also true at T1. And if the proposition turned out to be false at T2, this would indicate that it was false at T1, too. Thus, in Ockham, the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will ensues from the positioning of divine knowledge within a temporal horizon that guarantees both the contingency of events and their factual and, therefore, concluded nature. Although God's foreknowledge is rendered verbally in propositions *de praeterito* or *de praesenti* (like in *Deus praedestinavit* or *Deus praedestinat*), the semantic content of

non habent aliquam de praeterito necessariam, sed solum contingentem, sicut illa de praesenti est contingens. Ex quibus sequitur quod nulla propositio de praesenti in ista materia habet aliquam de praeterito necessariam." [transl. R.F.] Cf. also Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III-3, 32 (ed. Boehner, Gál, Brown 1974, pp. 712–713).

³⁵ See also Ockham, *Sent. I, Ordinatio*, dist. 38, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 585): "(...) ipse Deus, vel divina essentia, est una cognitio intuitiva, tam sui ipsius quam omnium aliorum factibilium, tam perfecta et tam clara quod ipsa etiam est notitia evidens omnium praeteritorum, futurorum et praesentium (...). Sed etiam posito per impossibile quod ipsa divina cognitione existente ita perfecta sicut modo est, non esset causa effectiva nec totalis nec partialis effectum contingentium, adhuc esset notitia qua evidenter sciretur a Deo quae pars contraddictionis erit vera et quae falsa."

propositions is future-oriented, and, thus, their truth-value does not fall under the strict necessity of the past, as it is open to possible determination by future events. God knows many propositions as necessary and immutable, but God also knows many contingent and non-necessary ones. This changes the manner in which divine knowledge learns about its own objects. If divine knowledge is meant to be understood as propositional, as Ockham appears to accept in the *Tractatus*, it must also be conceived as an action of the divine intellect, which not only moves through time, but also changes its own cognitive ways in relation to the temporal succession of various factual realities,³⁶ without undermining the substance of what it knows. At the same time, the distinction between past propositions *vocaliter* and *secundum rem* appears to be rooted in the very structure of Ockham's propositional logic. In fact, it envisages both mental statements and statements of verbal language as having a direct reference to the *res*, without the presence of intermediary intentional objects. Rather, direct apprehension (*notitia intuitiva*) is framed as an intentional act in which things are directly apprehended in their regularity, and thus its completion requires the presence of a factual reference on the plane of reality. The contingent future is therefore not an intentional object, but a determined and real event towards which the intellective acts of both the human and divine intellect are oriented. Truth is not a quality of propositions, and it does not mean anything other than that the event described by these propositions will occur.³⁷

Questions 3, 4, and 5 take up about one sixth of the *Tractatus*. Ockham returns in them to some previously developed and concluded argumentations, and applies the solutions devised in them to predestination, which is the other evident theme of the *Tractatus*, besides foreknowledge. This marks a shift in the object of investigation. The problem of predestination is addressed as a particular case of divine foreknowledge regarding statements about future contingents. Predestination is transferred from the ontological-metaphysical level onto the linguistic-propositional one, as an attribute of a subject within a proposition, consistently with the general mindset of the *Tractatus*. Approaching the

³⁶ The open character of propositions about future contingents and the difference between present and past statements *vocaliter* and *secundum rem* have been at the center of the contemporary debate on theological fatalism and compatibilism, particularly in the contemporary philosophy of religion; cf. McCord Adams 1967; Pike 1965, pp. 27–46; Pike 1966, pp. 369–379; Saunders 1966, pp. 219–225. A useful and concise survey of these positions is found in Fischer 1983, pp. 67–79; Fischer (ed.) 1989.

³⁷ In the first *quaestio* of the *Tractatus*, Ockham establishes that damnation and salvation, referring to the future, should in no way be considered real qualities inherent to the predestined subject.

problem in an epistemic vein helps avoid the potentially fatalist implications of predestination or reprobation. In the opening of the *Tractatus*, Ockham argues against predestination and reprobation being qualities (and hence also causal factors) present in the predestined or reprobated before the Last Judgement. The opposite, involving the transfer of necessity from the past, would entail pre-determined and immutable salvation or damnation at the expense of the *viator's* freedom.³⁸ Instead, Ockham's questions concerning predestination identify the contingency of the will as a principle to be defended against theological fatalism. Such a contingency of the will is grounded in the openness of the future, seeing that salvation and damnation (the statement at T1 regarding predestination and blame) depend on a *relatum* (the Last Judgment at T10), which, itself temporal, has not yet been deterministically established. This line of argument is already put forward in the first question of the *Tractatus* with regard to future contingents and foreknowledge founded on the crucial distinction between future propositions *secundum rem* and *secundum vocem*.³⁹

1.6 The Criticism of and Counterarguments to Scotus's Voluntarism

The previous section examines Ockham's arguments as put forward in the *Tractatus* and in the *Ordinatio* against Scotus's position. We argue that it is precisely the solution to the Scotistic position that helps Ockham find his own way out of theological fatalism. Let us now see how Ockham's criticism of Scotus's voluntarism helps him find arguments against determinism. Ockham reprises his criticism of Scotus's voluntarism in the sixth *suppositio* of the *Tractatus* by continuing to use the conceptual tool of future contingents as a testbed. This is the most comprehensive of the *suppositiones* in the appendix to the first question.⁴⁰ At the beginning of the *suppositio*, Ockham affirms God's determined and necessary knowledge of future contingents ("[i]t must be held beyond question that God knows with certainty all future contingents—i.e., He knows with certainty which part of the contradiction is true and which false"⁴¹) and, above all, disagrees with Aristotle's position in *De interpretatione*. Then, he bolsters

³⁸ See the first *Quaestio Quodlibetalis*, in particular the first and fifth doubt. Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. I (ed. Wey 1980).

³⁹ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. I (ed. Wey 1980, pp. 208–220).

⁴⁰ Ockham uses *suppositio* in this context as a synonym of "assumption." For a broader interpretation of the term *suppositio*, see section 2.3, pp. 44–50.

⁴¹ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 516): "Sexta suppositio: quod indubitanter est tenendum quod Deus certitudinaliter scit omnia futura contingentia, ita quod

his stance with a relevant observation: "Nevertheless all such propositions as 'God knows that this part—or that part—of the contradiction is true' are contingent, not necessary."⁴²

The strategy adopted by the *Venerabilis Inceptor* essentially relies on a logical distinction between the certainty and the necessity of a proposition. While a future event is contingent insofar as it cannot be known for certain by the human intellect, it is nevertheless a determined reality, and the proposition describing it is, therefore, determinedly either true or false. Thus, the indeterminacy of future contingents is not intrinsic to future events, but inheres in the epistemic conditions under which the human intellect is able to understand them. On the one hand, a proposition about a future contingent is true in a determined way, meaning, according to Ockham, that an event is caused and fixed by the fact that at T2 it will either be *p* or *not-p*, where *p* is an actual fact and not merely the term of a proposition. Things either are or they are not, and, when referring to them, propositions referring to them are bound to determined realities. For Ockham, contingent denotes a reality that is, but could also not be.⁴³ On the other hand, it is the conditions of truth of propositions that remain indeterminate, as they depend on the effective occurrence of the events they describe. It is, therefore, possible for the divine intellect to know future contingents, since their determined nature turns them into a possible object of divine knowledge, and to simultaneously preserve the freedom of the created wills, which belong to the temporal level of epistemic contingency.

It is at this point that Ockham explicitly refers to Scotus's position:

The Subtle Doctor maintains that the divine intellect, insofar as it is in some respect prior to the determination of the divine will, apprehends those complexes as neutral with respect to itself, and then the divine will determines that one part [of the contradiction] is true for some instant, willing that the other part is false for that same instant. After the determination of the divine will is effected, however, the divine intellect sees the determination of its own will, which is immutable. It

certitudinaliter scit quae pars contradictionis erit vera et quae falsa." [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 48]

⁴² Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 516): "(...) ita tamen quod omnes tales propositiones 'Deus scit hanc partem contradictionis esse veram' vel 'illam' sunt contingentes et non necessariae." [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 46]

⁴³ Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III-3, 32 (ed. Boehner, Gál, Brown 1974, pp. 512-513): "Secundum veritatem nulla propositio de illis quae important praecise res corruptibiles, domere affirmativa et mere categorica et mere de praesenti, potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis, quia quaelibet talis est contingens."

sees clearly that one part is true with certainty—viz., that part which its own will wills to be true.⁴⁴

Ockham's criticism mainly addresses two aspects. One is divine will's capacity (or lack thereof) to be the necessary and sufficient cause of the created wills' determinations and, consequently, the efficacy (or lack thereof) of Scotus's solution. The other is, from an epistemological perspective, the possibility for the divine intellect to know with certainty that which is contingent. For the former, Ockham wonders whether determinations of the created wills necessarily and integrally depend on the contingent choices of the divine will. He concludes that Scotus's voluntarism implies such a constraint, which, if admitted, would lead to falling back on theological fatalism, thus making the created wills very similar to fire, in that it is in their nature to burn necessarily.

On the other hand, if the divine will were not a sufficient cause to determine which part of the contradiction is true, because this depended (even minimally) on the concurrence of the created wills, the determination of what would happen would also require the involvement of human free will as a necessary condition for events to occur. Given that the created wills have not existed throughout eternity (unlike the divine will), and yet they are necessary to determine the truth-content of propositions concerning future contingents, God cannot know the determinations of these wills (which are yet to be) with certainty. Consequently, Ockham concludes, the Scotistic theory cannot result in affirming the impossibility for the divine intellect to learn future contingents.⁴⁵ As for the latter aspect, the *Tractatus* points out another difficulty presented by Scotus's position. It pertains to shifting from the plane of (both the human and divine) will's determination to the epistemological level, that of the possibility of knowing with certainty what is not firmly determined. While for Scotus it is

⁴⁴ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 516): "Et dicit Doctor Subtilis quod intellectus divinus, prout quodammodo praecedat determinationem voluntatis divinae, apprehendit illa complexa ut neutra, et voluntas determinat alteram partem esse veram pro aliquo instanti, volens altera in partem esse veram pro eodem instanti. Posita autem determinatione voluntatis, intellectus divinus videt determinationem voluntatis suae quae est immutabilis: videt evidenter alteram partem esse veram, illam scilicet quam voluntas sua vult esse veram certitudinaliter" [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, pp. 48–49]

⁴⁵ Marilyn McCord Adams has called attention to a passage from distinction 38 of the *Ordinatio*, where Ockham suggests another argument in favor of the freedom of the human will. Specifically, if God has granted the created will the freedom to choose one or the other of the two sides of a contradiction, any imposition of the divine will aimed to necessitate the human will's determinations would be contradictory. See McCord Adams 1967, pp. 492–503.

inconceivable to have the certain and determined knowledge of events which are contingent, Ockham claims that the determinations of the divine will are precisely of this kind since they are absolutely contingent, in the sense that God could have wanted something completely different from what God wanted:

[The argument] is supported as follows. All such propositions as 'God from eternity willed this part of the contradiction to be true' and 'God from eternity determined this' are contingent, as is clear from Assumption 2. Consequently, they can be true and [they can be] false. Therefore, one will have no certain cognition based on such a determination.⁴⁶

Ockham unveils aporias in Scotistic voluntarism to show that the absolute contingency of divine determination—which, according to Scotus, enables God to know future contingents through inspecting God's own will—actually makes it impossible for the First Cause to know them with certainty.

In the first question of the *Tractatus*, Ockham ponders whether passive predestination and foreknowledge are real aspects of the predestined person or the foreknown object ("Are passive predestination and passive foreknowledge real relations in the person who is predestinate and foreknown?"⁴⁷). Ockham's answer is negative. Claiming, in the present tense, someone's predestination would mean affirming the presence, in this person, of a real trait that is inherent in her/him from the moment (s)he is predestined onwards. But, if this were the case, the future would necessarily be determined, in the way of providential determinism, without any contribution from the free will of the involved subject.⁴⁸ Yet answering the question in the negative does not mean falling into Pelagius's error if a double modality (*secundum rem* and *secundum vocem*) of the sentence in question is possible, as it is in Ockham. Indeed, it means attributing to God the maximum freedom of action within the model of causal regularity of this *ordinatio*. Furthermore, if 'Peter was predestined' and 'Peter was damned' were Peter's real qualities, the subject would simultaneously possess contradictory qualities, and it would thus be possible to admit and formulate contradictory

⁴⁶ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 517): "Confirmatur: omnes tales sunt contingentes 'Deus ab aeterno voluit hanc partem esse veram', 'Deus ab aeterno determinavit hoc' et huiusmodi—patet ex secunda suppositione—et possunt per consequens esse verae et falsae; igitur propter talem determinationem nulla habebitur certa notitia." [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 24]

⁴⁷ Ockham 1969, p. 34.

⁴⁸ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 507).

but equally true propositions about the future.⁴⁹ Consequently, Ockham concludes that “there is no way in which this argument can be resolved as long as one supposes that predestination and foreknowledge are real relations.”⁵⁰ The problem does not concern the predestined subject’s real qualities, but the intentional relationship between the divine subject of predestination and the recipient of the act:

But the noun ‘predestination’ (or the concept), whether taken in the active or in the passive sense, signifies not only God Himself who will give eternal life to someone but also the person to whom it is given. Thus, it signifies three things: God [who will give eternal life to someone], eternal life, and the person to whom it is given. Similarly, ‘reprobation’ signifies God who will give eternal punishment to someone, [eternal punishment, and the person to whom it is given].⁵¹

1.7 Conclusion

According to Ockham, predestination does not exist except in the propositional context. That is, as a logical relationship connecting the subject and the object of a sentence that talks of contingent future events. In the first question of his *Tractatus*, Ockham is mostly preoccupied with the deterministic implications of divine predestination in relation to the will of creatures, which should not be understood as mere executors of God’s decrees: “the created will follows the divine order (*ordinationem divinam*) or God’s determination not in a necessary way but freely and in a contingent manner (*libere et contingenter*).”⁵² This does not make the decrees of God’s will any less necessary or any less unstopable. If the proposition ‘God has predestined Peter’ is true, the proposition ‘Peter is damned’ cannot be true at the same time, while God’s determination to damn Peter implies that Peter will effectively and really be damned. To reconcile the

⁴⁹ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 509).

⁵⁰ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 508): “Nec aliquo modo potest salvi ista ratio ponendo praedestinationem et praescientiam esse respectus reales.” [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 36]

⁵¹ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 514): “Sed hoc nomen ‘praedestinatio’ vel conceptus, sive accipiatur active sive passive, et significat ipsum Deum qui daturus est vitam aeternam alicui et illum cui datur, ita quod tria significat, scilicet Deum, vitam aeternam, et illum cui datur. Et similiter ‘reprobatio’ significat Deum daturum alicui poenam aeternam.” [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 45]

⁵² Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 510). [transl. R.F.]

free will of creatures and the infallibility of God's foreknowledge, Ockham comes up with a distinction between two different forms of the divine will. As noted by McCord Adams and Kretzmann, the analysis of the two ways in which God's will is manifested is pivotal to Ockham's theory. While it is not explicitly incorporated into the *Tractatus*, it is indirectly evoked both in the first question (in Ockham's response to the third and fifth objections) and in the first and sixth *suppositiones*.⁵³ The issue is directly addressed in a brief passage of distinction 46 of the *Ordinatio*, where Ockham distinguishes between a revealed will (*voluntas signi*), consisting of God's prohibitions, precepts, advice, fulfillments, and concessions to humans, and a will inclined to action (*voluntas beneplaciti*).⁵⁴ The latter is further divided into "consequent" and "antecedent."⁵⁵ The consequent will is that through which God puts something in action. It is not conditioned by either present or past events, nor those that are determined or pre-established, because it is God's contingent will to realize an act which could altogether not occur otherwise. Consequently, such a will cannot be impeded. When propositions such as 'God wants that Peter be saved' are understood as an expression of God's consequent will, the proposition 'Peter will necessarily be saved' is also true. In this way, the necessity of the divine will safeguarding Peter is contingent, i.e., not fixed by something real in the present or the past, but limited to what will happen in the future. Additionally, it implies that the consequent will is analogously indeterminate.

For its part, the "antecedent" will is a will through which God attributes certain traits or conditions to humans (literally, *antecedentia* and *naturalia*, that is, either qualities or natural propensions) that will persuade them to act correctly.⁵⁶ For example, it is through God's antecedent will that God wants every human to be saved and to persevere in doing good. It is therefore determined, because it is fixed by the present and past reality of antecedents. Nevertheless,

⁵³ Ockham 1969, pp. 17–19.

⁵⁴ Cf. Ockham, *Sent. I, Ordinatio*, dist. 46, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 671). McCord Adams, Kretzmann translate *voluntas beneplaciti* as "disposing will," i.e., "whatever God is pleased to bring about"; cf. Ockham 1969, p. 17.

⁵⁵ Ockham's distinction seems to resume the distinction between *necessitas sequens* and *necessitas praecedens* found in Anselm of Canterbury. For the relationship between the Anselmian theory of the two necessities and the Ockhamist tradition, see Vittorini 2004, p. 148.

⁵⁶ Ockham, *Sent. I, Ordinatio*, dist. 46, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 673): "Ut ista sit definitio exprimens quid nominis voluntatis antecedentis Dei 'voluntas antecedens Dei est illa qua Dei dat alicui naturalia vel antecedentia quibus potest aliquid consequi, cui Deus est paratus coagere si alius velit, nec sibi contrarium manifestabit cum precepto vel consilio exsequendi?"

the creatures can freely choose whether to follow this natural inclination placed in their souls by God or to depart from it. Humans cannot oppose God's will when it wants something, but they can operate in ways that diverge from the antecedent divine will, which guides—but does not necessitate—the choices made by those created wills.

CHAPTER 2

THE LOGIC OF BELIEF AS A PRAGMATICS OF FREEDOM

Riccardo Fedriga

2.1 Introduction

Ockham's analysis of human free will and divine foreknowledge carried out in the previous chapter, has shown us how necessity and contingency represent two poles on the continuum of solutions to the dilemma of free will versus determinism. Doctrinal models closer to the necessitarian pole open the way to fatalism, an understanding which holds that it is not in our power to act differently from the way we act. When such a position is underpinned by the reference to an intelligent subject (of divine nature), characterized by some essential attributes (such as perfection and omnipotence) and, consequently, by certain epistemic properties (such as infallibility, omniscience, and foreknowledge) that bind future states, we speak of theological fatalism.

The rise of theological fatalism also lays the foundation for compatibilism. Very broadly speaking, compatibilism is defined as an attempt to combine determinism, according to which everything that happens is causally determined by a preceding event, with human freedom understood as the human will's unconstrained and unbounded capacity to self-determine and act otherwise. Therefore, not only causal determinism is called into question, but also that which is expressed through the attempt to obtain epistemic guarantees with the purpose of conceiving and knowing contingent objects in a stable, but not thus pre-established and predetermined way. Essentially, what is at stake is the problem of the freedom to know and understand. In this sense, the chapter will present an analysis of Ockham's doctrinal thought in order both to update

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

it, thus bringing it historically closer to us, and to make it more immediately comprehensible.¹

If a dialogue can be established between the past and the present, it seems to revolve around the relationship the freedom of the chosen theses of the past and the freedom of the present ones—with some conjecture but without any pre-determined guarantee as to the point of arrival of the research.

2.2 The Compatibilist Dilemma and the Foreknowledge Conundrum

It is well known that a significant turn and a clear relaunch of the contemporary compatibilist debate was affected by Marilyn McCord Adams's decision to trace the issue back to William Ockham as its historical-theoretical source. McCord Adams's thought can be framed within the renewed interest in historical explorations of theological compatibilism in medieval philosophy and philosophy of religion, which took place in the previous century, particularly in Anglo-American scholarship. As its distinctive trait, this renewed interest is marked by a revival of past (especially medieval) theological theories that are supposed to solve or find a way out of the contradictions bound up with theological fatalism. Within this framework, explorations are generally based on historical decontextualization and logical reductionism, practices mainly carried out by philosophers coming from an analytic background. The first medieval theologian to become an object of such an interest was none other than Ockham, probably because he was deemed more amenable to a purely logical and philosophical reading and therefore translatable into the formal terms proper to the contemporary analytic debate. McCord Adams, a pioneer of the neo-Ockhamist approach, drew attention to the centrality of the *necessitas per accidens* in Ockham's solution, as well as to the distinction between past facts *secundum vocem* and *secundum rem*, as the cornerstone of a possible linguistic-epistemological solution to the compatibilist dilemma.

In her article "Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?" published in 1967, McCord Adams offered her own contribution to the debate by applying an explicitly Ockhamist approach to the themes under discussion. As already shown, in his examination of the statements of divine foreknowledge, such as prophecies and propositions about future contingents in the *Tractatus*, Ockham distinguishes between propositions truly about the past or the present (*secundum rem*) and those which, regardless of their verbal form, actually focus on a future

¹ Marenbon 2005.

time (*secundum vocem*).² In this way, he can consider compatibilism at the level of linguistic rules that govern the statements of divine foreknowledge, and avoid the deterministic implications of them being pronounced by an omniscient and infallible divine subject. ‘Peter is predestined’ and ‘Peter has been predestined’ both fall under the necessity of the present and the past and would both determine the future without any room for Peter’s freedom. By defining certain propositions as only linguistically (*vocaliter*) about the future but actually constrained by a state of things yet to be determined, Ockham shows how divine foreknowledge could be implemented without binding future events and their free determination to the work of the created wills.

The scrutiny of Ockham’s historical position led McCord Adams to locate it at the center of the compatibilist debate, thus redirecting the discussions towards epistemology (foreknowledge, rather than predestination), as well as towards a solution developed within the linguistic-propositional approach. In looking for an interpretative key to the compatibilist dilemma, McCord Adams and, subsequently, the Calvinist theologian Alvin Plantinga identified *necessitas per accidens*, understood in terms of counterfactual power over the past, as the pivot of the issue. According to McCord Adams, because propositions only verbally in the past tense (*secundum vocem*) refer to soft facts, the states of affairs they describe are open and do not fall under the accidental necessity characteristic of all past events. In her 1967 article, she also reformulated the problem in terms of propositional logic, transposing Ockham’s position on future contingents into an analytic key. McCord Adams, in fact, claimed that the proposition ‘If X happened in the past, it is now necessary for it to have happened’ can only be applied to the past as understood in a strict sense: to use her phrase, to the “hard” past. Propositions only formally about the past but actually open to the future do not impose the necessity of the past on the present and guarantee the freedom of human choices.³ Although some linguistic mediation is still undeniable, Ockham’s position envisions language and thus terms and propositions as referring to things, and not as mere mental representations, because Ockham’s notion of science is not about propositions but things. The truth-value of propositions, regardless of whether they concern human or divine cognition, is tied

² On the relationship between hard facts/soft facts and Ockham’s thought on it, see Alston 1986; Michon 2002; Plantinga 1986; Prior 1967, pp. 121–127.

³ The contemporary debate focuses on the—causal or not (rigid or not)—sense attributable to the expression “to bring about,” employed by Pike to define the transfer of necessity from the past to the future deterministically. On this issue, see Michael Dummett (cf. Dummett 1964), whose observations testify to a widespread interest in the matters which were shortly to be addressed in the conversation started by Nelson Pike.

to the states of affairs which they describe and on which they depend. If they describe future states of affairs, their truth-value is tied to what will contingently be determined at a future moment but is currently impossible to establish.

McCord Adams's position is Ockhamist in that it picks up both the logical-propositional thread and the core purposes behind Ockham's research, aimed at demonstrating the non-incompatibility between free will and divine foreknowledge or, in its less peremptory form assumed in contemporary philosophy of religion, the absence of a definitive refutation of their compatibility. Besides, Ockham, who oscillated between a propositional analysis (positing it as a model of divine knowledge) and evocations of an intuitive cognition capable of capturing future contingents clearly and perfectly, entertained the notion that the way God could possess a stable knowledge of future contingents was indescribable. According to the neo-Ockhamist position, God knows future contingents with certitude precisely because they are soft facts. If so, counterfactual power in the hands of an agent would redefine what divine foreknowledge had thought without this entailing a real change of the past. In other words, if at T1, an agent had behaved differently from what God had thought, God would have thought differently.

2.3 Revisiting Historical Positions

Alvin Plantinga has also identified the temporal necessity of the past (*necessitas per accidens*)—understood in terms of counterfactual powers over the past—as the crux of compatibilism. Plantinga has sought to redefine and soften *necessitas per accidens* in order to grant the agentive subject counterfactual power over the past and, later, a freedom vis-à-vis things which, if having come to pass in the past, would now impose a deterministic constraint on its future events. The postulate that there are *hard facts* about the past which are not absolutely necessary blurs the problematic boundary between contingency and necessity and opens up a possibility of compatibilism, which Plantinga articulates within the logic of possible worlds. His solution is premised on a set of presuppositions attributable to theological fatalism, including temporal asymmetry (TA)—i.e., the idea that there is an ontological difference between the past and the present, such that the past is necessary and therefore inalterable, while the future is open to the free contingency of events, the temporal necessity of the past, and the Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP), according to which if state of affairs S2 is bound by implication to accidentally necessary state of things S1, state of things S2 also becomes necessary. In theological terms, this means that, if God is essentially infallible and omniscient, God's past belief that I would perform

a certain action in the future is now marked by the necessity of the past, which entails that my future action is now necessary in the same way that the past is necessary.⁴

Plantinga used this theoretical nucleus as a starting point for developing a solution proposed in “On Ockham’s Way Out” of 1986, a paper which still remains an object of lively discussion and an exemplary case study of the uses and abuses of contemporary neo-Ockhamists’ views.⁵ Briefly, Plantinga redefines the crucial concept of accidental necessity and its boundaries, not just because he regards this approach as the most viable theoretically, but primarily because the tradition of temporal logic has always associated accidental necessity with the contingent sphere, where humans act: accidental necessity is, as it were, all the necessity to which contingency can aspire, and it is thus in this sphere that one must look for a support for the variety of compatibilism that centers around free human choice.

In the first step, Plantinga endorses the concept of *necessitas per accidens*, which, in fact, appears to be neither a logical nor a causal or metaphysical necessity. To define accidental necessity, Plantinga uses the expression “bringing about” in the sense of counterfactual power guaranteed by the plurality of possible worlds.⁶ He then proceeds to release accidental necessity from the strictures of temporal asymmetry. It is not the inalterability of the past, as asymmetrical with the alterability of the future, that fixes the necessity of the past. The future is just as unchangeable as the past, if by discarding the notion of temporal asymmetry and adopting that of power of an agent, changing the past means that:

[P1] A proposition P, referring to the past and true at T1, is such that an action A performed at T1 by a subject S can become false at T2 ($T1 < T2$).

In fact, P1 can also be adapted to the future, which then proves equally unalterable. For the future to be modifiable, it should be possible for an individual S to undertake an action A at T1 such that a proposition P referring to T2 will be true before the completion of A and will become false afterwards. This scenario is impossible; therefore, the future cannot be altered either. Plantinga’s oscillation between facts and propositions should be carefully examined. Although he often talks about “propositions” in “On Ockham’s Way Out,” it is not always clear whether his framework of reference is ontological or linguistic. In other

⁴ Cf. Zagzebski 2002; Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, Vargas 2007.

⁵ For more details on this issue, see Fedriga, Limonta 2015b.

⁶ On the nature and implications of *bringing about* as a sort of soft entailment without determining the contents and truth-value of our items of knowledge, see Hasker 1989, pp. 116–143.

words, Plantinga nonchalantly mixes the linguistic-propositional level, on which Ockham operates, with the level of facts, which is more often addressed in contemporary debates. Consequently, because the two levels, distinctly separated in Ockham, are not clearly set apart in Plantinga's reasoning, his argument has not only invited contradictions, but it has also, historiographically, led to an "abuse" of the interpretation of Ockham's thought.

Leaving aside temporal asymmetry as a criterion for the definition of past necessity, Plantinga revives the Ockhamist distinction between propositions about the past *secundum rem* and *secundum vocem*. What matters in the former is that nobody can act at T2 so as to prevent an action which took place at a previous time (T1) from having occurred or to modify this action. The fixity and, thus, the accidental necessity of the past, close or resolve the event, making it a hard fact, so, a proposition describing it is either determinately true or false. Regarding the latter propositions whose truth-value is decided by the *relatum*, i.e., a state of affairs, happening in the future (e.g., 'Judas has been destined for damnation'), the accidental necessity of the past does not work, and future contingency is reasserted.

The past as such, then, does not entail *necessitas per accidens* or the fatalistic implications of the transfer of necessity. God's acts of belief in the past do not necessarily bind the states of future things they describe. On the contrary, it is the future contingency and, hence, human free choice that establishes the truth-value of divine foreknowledge, in a compatibilist model which Plantinga considers to be coherent. This means that, in his model, accidental necessity is associated with a subject's capacity to act rather than with an agent's power. The definition of accidental necessity can thus be reformulated as follows:

[P2] P is accidentally necessary at T if and only if P is true at T and it is not possible for P to be true at T and contemporarily for an agent S and an action A to exist, so that (1) S had the power at T—or successively—to perform action A and (2) if S had performed action A at T or later, then P would have been false.⁷

This (re)definition highlights an obvious shift from the linguistic considerations (what changes in P1 is the truth-value of the past proposition) to the notion of power to act and, consequently, to freedom. This entails that in Plantinga's view, even the past acts of divine foreknowledge are not accidentally necessary, and counterfactuals such as 'if X had refrained from doing Y at T2,' then God

⁷ Plantinga 1986.

would not have believed at T1 that X would do Y at T2', are true, provided we accept that an agent X generally has the power not to perform action A.

The question to answer—not for the sake of historiography, but in order to assess Plantinga's solution—is whether his is indeed *Ockham's way out*. Re-read in the light of Ockham's theory, Plantinga seems all too easily and indiscriminately to alternate between ethical reasoning fueled by the demands of libertarianism and epistemic explorations of foreknowledge, which may involve implication requiring the inclusion of the factual context in which human free will acts. Depending on the meaning attributed to the connection between the linguistic and the epistemic plane, the relationship of implication between them may vary from bringing about (a more tenuous implication) to *necessitas per accidens* (a more binding implication). Plantinga opts for restricting *necessitas per accidens* to propositions strictly about the past in order to leave some room for human free will. However, his strategy appears to be rather fragile, and does not clearly distinguish the plane of propositions from that of facts and actions. As a result, the ethical dimension alone does not suffice to sustain or justify free will operating within it, just as the epistemic one does not bind human actions either necessarily or univocally. The more or less soft relationship (*bringing about*) between the two spheres (according to Ockham's solution, in which the level of ways of knowing and the ontological one—on which the ethical one is based—always operated in tandem) determines whether the factual plane inclines towards necessity, or contrarily, towards contingency.

Notably, such a softened redefinition of *necessitas per accidens* is founded on counterfactual power. Accordingly, Plantinga's reasoning starts with considerations on the future, understood as a privileged medium of contingency and possible free choices (wherein he remains faithful to Ockham): even if God's foreknowledge, which operates in the past, dictates the conditions of truth, i.e., the conditions which reality will have to meet in order for the divine statement to be an accurate description, it is nonetheless up to the contingent future to determine the truth-value of the propositions of divine foreknowledge expressed in the past, without this implying the past indeterminacy of this truth-value.

The fact that Plantinga's Ockhamist solution often proves to be very autonomous in relation to its own historical source is particularly evident from their different capacity for tackling certain critical remarks, such as that raised by William Hasker, one of the main contributors to the contemporary compatibilist debate. Hasker highlights an inherent weakness in Plantinga's argumentation. Specifically, Hasker focuses on Plantinga's insistence that S is capable of acting freely at T2, regardless of the fact that, at T1, God claimed that S would act differently, and that S is free because S has the power to act in such a way as to make God's affirmation at T1 not true, namely for it not to be true for the

accidental necessity of the past. But, as Hasker argues, if the whole point is to show that divine foreknowledge does not imply that human freedom is restricted by theological fatalism, free will is what must be proven and, as such, cannot be used as a premise of the reasoning. Hasker claims that Plantinga's approach leaves the following question unexplained:

How *can* Cuthbert have the power to cause 'Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at T3' to be false, when its truth is immutably fixed and guaranteed by the truth of 'God believes at T1 that Cuthbert will purchase an iguana at T3'?⁸

Confounding a premise (or *petitio principii*) and a conclusion, this sentence exemplifies a vicious circle: S's action A at T2 is free because it can alter divine knowledge at T1 in such a way that action A is free.

Such criticism is entirely on the mark if it targets an Ockhamist framework, such as that put forward by Plantinga and others, which primarily aims to prove that human free will is possible despite the omniscience of God. Nevertheless, this line of argumentation in Hasker proves scarcely efficacious in relation to Ockham, who takes human freedom not as the *demonstrandum*, but as the premise of his causal intentionality. As we have shown in Chapter 1, according to Ockham, free intentional action is the beginning of a general model of transaction between mind and world. I know, I see, I believe, and I think of the existence of X because I observe the ascertained causal regularity of T1 ... Tn, not vice versa. Ockham's argument seeks to arrive at a compatibilist solution between the logical level of divine necessity and the factual level of the created worlds. The *Venerabilis Inceptor's* solution rests on a shared theological and ontological foundation, which is and perhaps will always be lacking in the contemporary debate in philosophy of religion, articulated in negotiations between different conceptions of God.

Hasker's solution to the compatibilist problem consists of a "[t]horough revision of the conception of God and of God's relationship with the world."⁹ In this revision, God is envisaged as "open," unconstrained either by the analyticity of God's own attributes or by the principle of the transfer of necessity, and not determining the events and laws of this world in a rigidly causal way. As the openness of God is posited and divine foreknowledge is softened, the "fatalistic riddle" is not solved. At the same time, Hasker also fails to propose a clear distinction between facts and propositions, which is axial to Ockham's

⁸ Hasker 2001, p. 103.

⁹ Hasker 2001, p. 110. For a broader depiction of Open Theism and for Hasker's redefinition of the attributes of divine omniscience, see Fedriga 2015, pp. 194–215.

position. Namely, Ockham's solution to the compatibilist problem essentially relies on clearly setting the realms of *voces* and *res* apart. This separation makes it possible to displace divine foreknowledge on the level of *voces*, while at the same time avoiding *res* being forced into a deterministically oriented order. In other words, Ockham once again proves the strength of his logical razor, a notion that starts from the assumption of the supreme simplicity and superiority of divine nature to insist that it is pointless to multiply the planes of belief or reality without necessity.

The revisiting of historical positions is always heavily ideologically charged, regardless of its direction, the efficacy and conceptual validity of the solutions it proposes, or its claims about the purely logical underpinnings of the theories it advances. Linda Zagzebski's critique of the Ockhamist position is based on the supposition that divine and human mental states are the same. In doing this, she revisits the Thomist idea of the Simplicity in order to claim that divine mental states are immediate. God's cognitive state is identical in every possible world, regardless of whether the events it cognizes are contingent. This approach helps forestall any rigidly deterministic consequences of theological fatalism, since no divine belief is bound by a determined action. From this perspective, which solves the fatalistic dilemma by shifting it to the side of necessity, Ockham is led back, so to speak, to the Thomist, and the centrality of contingency in his solution, with the ensuing load of indeterminism, is radically subdued. Zagzebski's case shows that the discussion is stirred not only by the distinction between soft and hard facts.¹⁰

For our purposes, other over-interpretations of Ockham's thought include John Martin Fischer's reading of Ockham.¹¹ 'Presentism' denotes a theory which holds that only the object or states of affairs that are actually present exists, and that as such, past and future events do not have a "substantial" existence. For their part, "eternalist" scholars contend that, just as objects in space are located at different distances from the agent, objects placed in temporality are differentiated by being farther from or closer to the observer. Involving concepts such as temporality and necessity, eternalism and presentism constitutes a framework of reference for assessing the (in)efficacy of the historical arguments adopted in the debate. This has particularly been the case for Ockham and the *secundum rem/secundum vocem* distinction, which, as Fisher avers, would require assuming the eternalist stance to exclude permanently any risk of incompatibilism.¹² Such a position is absolutely unacceptable to those who, like most Ockhamists,

¹⁰ Zagzebski 2002, pp. 45–64.

¹¹ For the concept of over-interpretation, see Marenbon 2017, pp. 77–94.

¹² Fischer 2011, pp. 461–474.

connect the softness of divine foreknowledge to the free nature of future acts. Hence, Fischer's critique appears to be pointless, as it targets the Ockhamists rather than Ockham himself. It is, nonetheless, revealing about how the resumption of historical theories is always informed by present theoretical interests, which produce ideological biases and often result in a misunderstanding or weakening of past positions. The continual re-engagement with the themes pondered by William Ockham in search of solutions to dilemmas in the contemporary debate compels us now to go back and re-examine the source writings of the *Venerabilis Inceptor* in order to correctly grasp his terms and argumentation methods, as well as his goals and the coherence of his theory.

2.4 Epistemic Guarantees for Compatibilism

Since, as well as determinism, epistemic guarantees also involve theological fatalism, compatibilism appears as a good solution for recasting fatalism as a theory in which God's analytical attributes can leave room for the consciousness of future and mutable events, as well as states of affairs. Calvin Normore believes that the theological traditions of the three main monotheistic religions have always espoused a plurality and heterogeneity of compatibilist frameworks. However, Normore adopts a narrower definition of compatibilism as a theory stating that freely engaging in action S at time T does not necessarily imply abstaining from doing S at T.¹³ This position is prompted by the fear that, without some form of compatibilism, anything, even the simplest act of the will, could be considered determined and accomplished by God.

When an omniscient subject (being also an object of belief to the point of indisputability) is introduced into the matters of determinism and free will, the problem arises as to how this subject can be reconciled with the free will of humans. If God's cognitive power comprises the totality of things (omniscience) and time (foreknowledge), it seems to fix the future states of affairs that it comes

¹³ Normore 1985, p. 310. A different meaning is attributed to compatibilism by Linda Zagzebski (in Zagzebski 2002), who defines it as comprising all the positions, claiming that both beliefs—i.e., God's infallibility and human free will—can be maintained without endorsing determinism. To achieve this, the compatibilist has two options: either identify a false premise in the argument or prove that a conclusion does not follow from the premises. On the other hand, the one supporting incompatibilism, accepts the incompatibility between infallible divine foreknowledge and human freedom, in the abovementioned sense of the term, ultimately denying either one or the other. Further aspects of Zagzebski's theory are mentioned at the end of this chapter.

to know, making them determined events. As an omniscient being, God knows all states of affairs, past, present, or future. Because God's knowledge of the future states of affairs is determined, certain, and infallible, these events will no longer be either free or contingent, but rather, necessary. Once determined by the divine cognitive act, there will be no possibility for them to be otherwise. On the contrary, if humans possess free will, they will be capable, in the absence of a superior force, of acting differently from how they effectively act or would have acted. Thus, some of their actions will indeed be free. This dilemma rests on two fundamental beliefs of the Christian doctrine: firstly, that God has an infallible knowledge of anything that will occur in the future and, secondly, that human beings are free to act and decide in ways that are irreconcilable with determinism.

These two theological principles imply two logical principles. One of them is the principle of past necessity, or accidental necessity, following which nothing can alter the past events or states of affairs (similarly to the cognitive acts through which God knows what will happen).¹⁴ The notion of past necessity is grounded in a widespread conception of the fundamental asymmetry of past and future. While it is often argued that the past is real and the future is not, this difference essentially means that there is nothing we can do in the present to alter our past, even if we deem it possible to influence our future. Put plainly, there is only one past, but there are many possible futures. The other principle is that of the transfer of necessity (TNP), stating that necessity is transferable from the antecedent to the consequent of a conditional proposition. Therefore, providing that God is infallible, 'If God believes that P, P is true'. These two principles give rise to three possible scenarios: 1) the affirmation of human freedom as an absolute value and, thus, the rejection of divine omniscience; 2) the affirmation of God's perfection and hence of God's knowledge, which has no limits in the world, not even for events which have not yet taken place; and 3) the assertion that the freedom of the human will (and of the human intellect's cognitive acts) coexists with infallible divine knowledge and absolute power. Across its historical varieties, compatibilism has attempted to resolve this dilemma without denying either pole of this coexistence.

At the turn of the 13th century, a shift marked by ascribing greater importance to contingency takes place in the debates on providential determinism of causal and metaphysical matrix,¹⁵ as well as those on the rules determining the

¹⁴ See chapter 1, n. 27.

¹⁵ A kind of determinism on which Aquinas bases the problem of theological fatalism and constructs his own solution. In line with the Christian theological tradition, Aquinas claims that God is essentially omnipotent and omniscient and, as such, also knows the future choices

order of the world and on the necessity of divine knowledge. As a reaction to both providential determinism and, more broadly, theological fatalism, a plurality of positions emerges, shaped by the awareness of sharing an indeterministic perspective. These positions are associated with an array of their respective autonomous and original theories, which all help affirm the absolute objectivity, in the medieval sense of *subjective simpliciter*, of the contingency of *res*. The protagonists of this new era, who develop their own, novel solutions, include figures like Henry of Ghent (ca. 1217–1293) stemming from a voluntaristic and Augustinian background, Peter John Olivi (1248–1298), and, above all, John Duns Scotus (1265–1308) and William Ockham (ca. 1280–ca. 1347). I explore the latter two in depth below.

As we shall see in Chapter 6, Duns Scotus proposes a theory of contingency in which creation is the act of the divine free will, which not only wants freely but can want and not want the same thing at the same time (according to the synchronic theory of modality founded on present contingency). Though entangled in the causal links made necessary by God's wanted order, human will finds the foundation of its liberty in an analogy to divine will, with contingency being an essential attribute of the divine order in the world rather than a sign of limits to the human and temporal sphere.

For his own part, Ockham develops a solution which attempts to embrace two apparently incompatible premises: God situated in a temporal flux and future contingency. He claims that (past) divine knowledge of future events is not part of the combined states of affairs to which *necessitas per accidens* can be applied. Ockham identifies this type of necessity as a *vulnus* for any possible compatibilist solution. Divine foreknowledge propositions, such as 'Peter has been predestined' are fixed in a determined way by the temporal necessity (*per accidens*) of the past, which produces fatalistic implications for future events. If divine foreknowledge is infallible and the statement 'Peter has been predestined' is necessary, as it refers to a past event, Peter apparently cannot act in any way other than that which has already established. However, propositions of divine foreknowledge are only verbally about the past and not actually so. Hence, they do not express an already-fixed reality, but rather they await the

of any agentive subject. The role of the will and of the *formido alterius partis* (the fear of the other side, i.e., doubt in the face of the two terms of a contradiction) in human cognitive and moral choices becomes crucial. The will is a tool established by the First Cause to guide human actions to the ultimate goal of reconciling with God; nevertheless, that same will would prove inconsistent with humans' intrinsic and natural free wanting, if divine omniscience knew their choices in advance. For more on providential determinism and causality in late medieval theology, see Gelber 2004; McCord Adams 2007; Pasnau 2012; Porro 2013.

determination of their own truth-value from the (non)occurrence of the event they describe. By transposing the compatibilist problem onto a logical-linguistic plane of propositional rules, Ockham manages to concurrently retain the necessary character of divine foreknowledge and the contingent nature of acts of the human will. This solution will shortly become a major framework which, though not always accepted, is embraced, disputed, and critiqued in reference to compatibilist issues in the first half of the 14th century.

2.5 Contingency and True Reference: A Puzzle about Belief

The originality and strength of Ockham's position clearly emerges upon closer inspection of his exploration of future contingents. His logical-linguistic solution qualifies as one of the most sophisticated compatibilist attempts at reconciling divine omni-foreknowledge, on the one hand, and the freedom and autonomy of the contingent world, in which the *viator* lives and acts, on the other. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the discussion on future contingents, divine foreknowledge and compatibilism is pivotal for the *Tractatus*, which vividly illustrates that Ockham's logical-linguistic solutions respond to the relevant theological requirements and thus must be understood in the context of a logic of believing (*logica fidei*). This theme recurs in the *Ordinatio in primum Sententiarum*, particularly in distinction 38, and in the first book of the *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis*, both coeval with the *Tractatus*.¹⁶ Ockham's solution, which brings together and reimagines ideas of different backgrounds, relies on a propositional analysis of statements about future contingents.¹⁷ In this way, he employs the tools of logical argumentation and of linguistic and semantic enquiry to address the theological implications of the issue. He also forges a solution that simultaneously guarantees divine foreknowledge and human free will that is carefully positioned between the contemporary theological debate's opposing poles of fatalism and determinism on the one hand and Pelagianism on the other.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ockham, *Tractatus* (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978); *Sent. I, Ordinatio* (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979); *Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis* (ed. Gambatese, Brown 1978). All three works are attributable to the period between 1321 and 1324. See chapter 1, n. 2.

¹⁷ Cf. Normore 1999, pp. 323–324.

¹⁸ In the *De Causa Dei* (1342), Thomas Bradwardine labels both the position of Ockham and that of the theologians inspired by him as “Pelagian” for having linked the divine knowledge of future contingents to the real occurrence of the foreknown events, thus subordinating the divine intellect to the creatures' plan, and the propositions of God's foreknowledge to the

Ockham regards the problem of future contingents as tied up with propositional temporality and the truth-value attributable to a statement. As such, it is important to establish the significance assigned to propositional attitudes expressed by formulations such as ‘knowing that’ and ‘believing that’ when we claim that God knows something. While it appears natural that, if the proposition ‘Peter knows that P’ is true, it follows that P is true, one can object that the proposition ‘Peter knows that P’ does not imply that ‘P is true’ but only ‘that P’. Thus, a given fact (P) on the level of *res* must be distinguished from the truth of a proposition in which the act of knowing the fact is conveyed (Peter knows that P). This distinction depends on the truth-value one assigns to epistemic behaviors. Thereby, the originality of Ockham’s solution consists in interlacing propositional analysis and the logic of believing. Formulated in conformity with the logic of belief, statements on future contingents are meant to be interpreted with the aim of providing the premises for an argumentative chain, which is supposed to culminate in an unquestionable theological conclusion.

The Ockhamist model of compatibilism would be fully elaborated in an appendix of the *Tractatus* titled *Suppositiones pro istis dubiis solvendi*. It is a highly relevant part, both because it offers a thorough elaboration of Ockham’s own propositional solution to the problem and because it features the term *suppositio* in a different meaning than its referential usual one, namely one in which the term *suppositio* is intended as the referential property which allows the terms to replace objects in a proposition and to directly and truly connect the planes of logic and reality.¹⁹ In Ockham’s *Tractatus*, however, the truth of suppositions is legitimized and proven both by the *auctoritates* and by the epistemic function of “suppositional” statements (*suppositiones*), within what is presented as a logic of belief. This is how Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann knew how to capture the epistemic value attributed to the term by Ockham, translating it as *assumption*, meaning a hypothesis or a presumption.²⁰

Once assumed as premises, suppositions allow one to proceed according to sequences of causal argumentative chains, even in a theological context, without

coming into being of the factual content described by them. For instead the Ockhamist theologian’s definition, inside the Oxonian *Quaestio de futuris contingentibus as pestiferi pelagiani*, see Vittorini 2004, pp. 133–135. For the state of the discussion on Ockham’s and the Ockhamists’ “Pelagianism” or “Semi-Pelagianism,” see Spade (ed.) 2006, pp. 350–373.

¹⁹ In the *Summa logicae*, Ockham adopted the definition according to which “Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus in propositione stat pro aliquo.” Ockham, *Summa logicae* I, 63 (ed. Boehner, Gál, Brown 1974, p. 193). On the use of the term *suppositio* in late Scholastic’s logic terminology, see the classic Maierù 1972, p. 306.

²⁰ Cf. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969.

the need to postulate other ontological levels that justify their coherence. Ockham elaborates his proposal in the third and fourth of the nine suppositions that appear at the end of the first question of the *Tractatus*. This concerns the question of whether passive predestination and passive foreknowledge are real relationships for the one who is predestined and for what is foreknown (forms inherent in the predestined, the damned, or the foreknown object, i.e., relationships permanently present in them). This question is crucial for Ockham, since, if the relationship in which predestination and foreknowledge coexist had an ontological value (that is, if it were a form present in the predestined subject or the object learned by foreknowledge), this would mean, in his opinion, the negation of free will for created wills. For this reason, Ockham follows the first question with a series of nine suppositions (understood in the aforementioned sense). The first underlines how predestination is a concept referring not to a substantial entity (damnation or salvation, present in the damned or saved) but to a relationship that foresees a subject (God) who grants the salvation of the soul, a creature who receives the gift, and eternal life itself. The second supposition affirms the contingent nature of all propositions on this matter, avoiding deterministic implications. The *suppositiones* from the fifth to the ninth continue along the lines of the first and are therefore aimed at examining single aspects that may threaten the freedom of the human will or the certainty of God's foreknowledge in an attempt to construct a compatibilist theory that holds together free will and divine omniscience.²¹

If, in Aristotle's scientific reasoning, the hypothesis is both the premise and the guarantee of its necessity, in the examination of objects and mental events, i.e., future contingents and prophecies, in the *Tractatus*, the *suppositiones* function as necessary assumptions which enable Ockham to proceed according to propositional semantics. Thus, the *suppositiones* which sustain the causal chains of future contingents are to be construed as testbeds for the viability of any theory meant to express a truth about objects and mental events.²² As already mentioned, Ockham's choice is corroborated in the *Aristoteles Latinus*, particularly in the *Posterior Analytics*, where *suppositio* is translated as ὑπόθεσις and defined as follows:

What must be the case and must be thought to be the case because of itself is not a supposition or a postulate. (Deductions, and therefore demonstrations, are

²¹ Cf. Fedriga 2015, pp. 125–152.

²² Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 516): “Suppositiones pro istis dubiis solvendis. Pro istis dubiis solvendis primo suppono aliqua, quibus visis patebit solutio argumentorum.”

not addressed to external argument but rather to argument in the soul, since you can always object to external argument, but not always to internal argument). If you assume something which is provable without proving it yourself, then if it is something which the learner thinks to be the case, you are supposing it (and it is a supposition not simpliciter but only in relation to the learner); and if you make the same assumption when the learner has no opinion or actually a contrary opinion on the matter, then you are postulating it. It is in this that suppositions and postulates differ: a postulate is something not in accordance with the opinion of the learner which, though demonstrable, you assume and use without proving it.²³

Aristotle specifies that, insofar as premises go, hypotheses are intrinsically “demonstrable” but “you assume and use [them] without proving it.” That which must needs exist and must necessarily be supposed to exist is neither Hypothesis nor Petition, but Axiom. Demonstration is not concerned with the outward expression of an idea but with its inner significance, for that is the case with syllogism in general, and one may always raise objections to the external expression but not always to its internal significance.

A crucial difference in this respect between Aristotle and William Ockham is that the latter holds *suppositiones* to be unprovable, though equally necessary and still comprehensible, given the theological context in which the Ockham employed the concept. As previously stated, both legitimizing and “truth-proving” are performed in the context of an established logic of belief. *Suppositiones* appear as both necessary and provable assertions. Much like the postulates in Euclidean geometry, they too are expressed in propositions with an epistemologically undetermined and undeterminable (yet certain) truth-value. Hence, *suppositiones* have an axiom-like character, but, unlike scientific propositions, they do not rely either on the self-evidence of their own content’s truth or on inductive verification. Instead, they are supported by the unverifiable—and, for Ockham, equally self-evident—certainty of belief.

2.6 Divine Foreknowledge and Verbal Tenses

According to Ockham, God knows (*scit*) all future contingents with certainty (*certitudinaliter*). Because God assuredly knows which part of the contradiction will be true and which one false, all the propositions such as ‘God knows

²³ Aristotle, *APo*. I 10, 76b22–34 (ed. Ross 1964). [transl. Barnes, 1993, p. 16]

that this part of the contradiction is true' and 'God knows that that part of the contradiction is true' are contingent and not necessary.²⁴

In discussing whether God possesses an immutable knowledge of future contingents, Ockham primarily rejects two opposing arguments. The first one claims that, because the future is contingent, its truth-value may vary, thus, a change may take place in God's knowledge of it and, ultimately, in God. Yet Ockham objects that it is not possible for a proposition to change its truth-value. If a proposition is true, it will always be true, and if it proves false after being thought of as true, it only means that it has, in fact, always been false. The immutability of God's nature and foreknowledge is thus translated into a logically coherent rule of temporal statements. The other argument claims that even if God does not know the proposition 'I am in Rome' at T1, as it is false at this moment, God could nevertheless know it at time T2 when it could become true. This would also attribute mutability to divine knowledge. Ockham's rejoinder is that the error lies in considering the proposition 'I am in Rome' true at T1 and false at T2, thus implying different mental states. Furthermore, he claims that the proposition remains identical in the mind of the knowing subject, and that the change takes place not in the subject's intellect but rather in the thing itself.²⁵

The difficulty in reconciling the immutability of foreknowledge and the contingency of known events leads Ockham to insist on the impossibility of clearly comprehending the way in which divine intelligence knows the truth-value of future propositions. Although it is certain that God knows which part of the contradiction is true and which is false, the proposition 'God knows which part of the contradiction is true' is not necessary but contingent (because of the nature of the event it describes): 'It is impossible to clearly show how God knows

²⁴ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 516): "Sexta suppositio: quod indubitanter est tenendum quod Deus certitudinaliter scit omnia futura contingentia, ita quod certitudinaliter scit quae pars contradictionis erit vera et quae falsa, ita tamen quod omnes tales propositiones 'Deus scit hanc partem contradictionis esse veram' vel 'illam' sunt contingentes et non necessariae."

²⁵ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 2, art. 3 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, pp. 524–525). See Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 39, q. unica (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 590). This does not mean that Ockham regards divine knowledge (*scientia*) as eternal, in the sense that God would not possess knowledge of *Sortes sedet in "A"* and then of *Sortes sedebit in "A"* as distinct propositions, thus rather knowing the eternally present fact of Socrates being seated at T2. Such a position, which McCord Adams and Kretzmann trace back to Boethius and Thomas Aquinas (cf. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 63; attribution contested in Marenbon 2005), is explicitly dismissed by William Ockham (Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 2, art. 3).

future contingents?²⁶ Similar reasoning is found in distinction 38 of the *Ordinatio*, where the infallibility and inscrutability of God's knowledge of future contingents are insistently reaffirmed in words echoing the *Tractatus*: "It must be held beyond question that God knows *with certainty* all future contingents—i.e., he knows *with certainty* which part of the contradiction is true and which is false." Furthermore, he acknowledges that "[i]t is difficult, however, to see *how* he knows this [with certainty], since one part [of the contradiction] is no more determined to truth than the other."²⁷ Because these passages, both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Ordinatio*, are accompanied by a theorization of God's peculiar intuitive cognition of future contingents, this statement can be deduced to be something else or more than merely an apophatic drift of the discourse.

Let us look into *suppositio* 6 of the *Tractatus*:

Just as the [human] intellect on the basis of one and the same [intuitive] cognition of certain non-complexes can have evident cognition of contradictory contingent propositions such as 'A exists,' 'A does not exist,' in the same way it can be granted that the divine essence is intuitive cognition that is so perfect, so clear, that it is evident cognition of all things past and future, so that it knows which part of a contradiction [involving such things] is true and which part false.²⁸

Here, Ockham relies on the principle of analogy. The human intellect is capable of knowing with certainty some simple contingent propositions through a direct apprehension of their terms, which form the object of its own cognitive

²⁶ Ockham *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, pp. 516–517): "(...) ideo dico quod impossibile est clare exprimere modum quo Deus scit futura contingentia. Tamen tenendum est quod scit contingentem tantum."

²⁷ Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 38, q. unica (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, pp. 583–584): "Deus certitudinaliter et evidenter scit omnia futura contingentia. Sed hoc evidenter declarare et modum quo scit omnia futura contingentia exprimere est impossibile omni intellectui pro statu isto (...). Tenendum est quod Deus evidenter cognoscit omnia futura contingentia. Sed modum exprimere nescio." [transl. R.F. For the discussion of this topic within the discussion of prophetic utterances, see here chapter 3, pp. 76–83.]

²⁸ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 518): "Potest tamen talis modus assignari, nam sicut ex eadem notitia intuitiva aliquorum incomplexorum potest intellectus evidenter cognoscere propositiones contingentes contradictorias, puta quod a est, a non est, eodem modo potest concedi quod essentia divina est notitia intuitiva quae est tam perfecta, tam clara quod ipsa est notitia evidens omnium praeteritum et futurorum, ita quod ipsa scit quae pars contradictionis erit vera et quae pars falsa." [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 50]

act.²⁹ Direct apprehension, in this case, is defined as the first act of intellective knowledge, which differentiates between the existence and non-existence of the object.³⁰ Likewise, Ockham explains, we can imagine God to possess such certain and undoubtable knowledge of all temporally determined events so that God knows both the truth-value of future propositions, and which of the two parts of the contradiction is true and which is false.³¹

Incidentally, the explicit reference to statements as objects of God's cognitive act and to the truth of knowledge it produces as relative to the proposition itself (in fact, the whole of the proposition is to be known as either true or false) appears to confirm that Ockham understands divine knowledge as propositional, paralleling human ways of knowing, and articulated in compliance with the syntactic and inferential rules for propositions.³² In any case, the direct apprehension which makes divine cognition possible pertains to God's

²⁹ McCord Adams 1987, p. 1146: "An intuitive cognition of Socrates is a cognition by virtue of which one has evident knowledge that Socrates exists when he exists, or evident knowledge that Socrates does not exist when Socrates does not exist." For the relationship between *cognitio intuitiva* and cognition in Ockham, cf. Goddu 1984, pp. 23–50; Michon 2002, esp. pp. 163–169. See also Brower-Toland 2017, pp. 59–80; Fedrigo 2019, pp. 26–34; Karger 2006, pp. 204–226; Panaccio 2014.

³⁰ Ockham, *Sent.* I, *Ordinatio, Prol.*, q. 1 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 31–32): "Similiter notitia intuitiva est talis quod quando aliqua res cognoscuntur quarum inhaeret alteri vel una distat loco ab altera vel alio modo se habet ad alteram, statim virtute illius notitiae incomplexae illarum rerum scitur si res inhaeret vel non inhaeret, si distat vel non distat, et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus |§ nisi illa notitata sic nimis remissa, vel sit aliquod aliud impedimentum. |§ Sicut si Sortes in rei veritate sit albus, illa notitia Sortis et albedinis virtute cuius potes evidenter cognosci quod Sortes est albus, dicitur notitia intuitiva. Et universaliter omnis notitia incomplexa termini vel terminorum, |§ seu rei vel rerum |§ (...) virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci aliqua veritas contingens, maxime de praesenti, est notitia intuitiva."

³¹ However, the natural inference that *praescientia Dei* parallels the epistemic modalities of the human *notitia intuitiva* must not be understood as an extension of the logical properties of the latter onto the former. The *cognitio intuitiva* mentioned in the *Tractatus* refers to divine foreknowledge and highlights the clarity, certitude, and obviousness of the knowledge of future propositions.

³² The particularly thorny issue—and not devoid of ambiguous traits—of divine knowledge's propositional nature (or lack thereof) in Ockham is examined by Alfred Fredoso (Fredoso 1998, pp. 42–43), who provides an English translation of the second part of the *Summa logicae*, dedicated to the theory of propositions: "(...) Ockham often speaks of God's knowing propositions. That is, in order to explicate the notion of God's omniscience, Ockham speaks as if God has a divine language, analogous to human language, in which he formulates propositions. God is omniscient in that he knows with respect to every proposition whether it is true or false?"

essence itself, which is a perfect intuitive *notitia*: a *notitia evidens* of all events past and future.³³ Thus, the divine essence should be understood not so much as a collection of all true propositions about the world, almost as if foreknowledge were exercised (in a semblance of Scotus's voluntarism) through the inspection of the truths present in God, but as a *notitia* or *cognitio*, i.e., an intentional act in which the divine mind infallibly targets any future event and apprehends it steadily.³⁴

2.7 From a Theological Point of View

Foreknowledge almost seems to be exercised directly on the factual plane of events (rather than on propositions) only to judge the truth-value of statements on future contingents afterwards. In other words, foreknowledge translates the cognitive and psychological acts with which God captures and learns about states of affairs into true statements.

A passage from distinction 38 of the *Ordinatio* offers more clarity on the matter. Once again, the hypothesis is introduced via a declaration of ignorance (*modo exprimere nescio*) about the ways in which divine foreknowledge works. As Ockham says,

³³ A similar position is adopted by Gregory of Rimini, who embraces a different (Augustinian) conceptual model but in many respects (nearly) shares Ockhamist views. He claims that it is possible to describe the ways of divine foreknowledge starting from the human *cognitio intuitiva* and concludes that God intuitively, and in a single act of vision, knows all things regardless of their temporal placement. Daniela Ciammetti traces Gregory's solution back to Adam Wodeham (the metaphor of the *intellectualis aeternusque oculus Dei*) and in particular to a widespread tradition dating back to Boethius and Augustine (cf. Ciammetti 2011, pp. 86–89). Nevertheless, the reference to Wodeham suggests that, in his considerations, the Italian *magister* may only have considered *cognitio intuitiva Dei* as theorized by Ockham.

³⁴ Though part of an otherwise established theory, Ockham's solution reminds of Peter Auriol's notion of a God who is *similitudo indistans* of all the things and who, by turning the divine essence into an intentional object, acquires an awareness of future contingents (cf. Fedriga 2013, pp. 162–166). Similarly, Gregory of Rimini considers divine foreknowledge to capture every intuitive aspect of the divine essence. Gregory of Rimini, *In I Sent.*, dist. 35 et 36, q. 1 (ed. Trapp 1979, pp. 234–235): "(...) quaecumque Deus novit, sive sint sive fuerint sive sint possibilis esse, cognoscit intuitive. (...) deus omnia videt in essentia sua, quia scilicet ipsa sua essentia est notitia quorumcumque nec aliquid aliud praeter ipsam est sibi necessarium ad intelligendum."

However, it can be said that God Himself, or the divine essence, is a single intuitive cognition as much of Himself as of all things creatable and uncreatable—[a cognition] so perfect and so clear that it is also evident cognition of all things past, future, and present. Thus, just as our intellect can have evident cognition of some contingent propositions from our intuitive intellectual cognition of the extremes [of those propositions], so the divine essence itself is a cognition (*cognitio et notitia*) by which is known not only what is true (both necessary and contingent) regarding the present but also which part of the contradiction [involving future contingents] will be true and which will be false.³⁵

Compared to the corresponding passage in the *Tractatus*, Ockham evokes here the distinction between a broader definition of knowing, understood as knowledge of everything, and a stricter one put forward in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, according to which divine knowledge must be understood as God's exclusive knowledge of that which is true, as per the *nihil scitur nisi verum* principle.³⁶ In its narrow meaning, divine foreknowledge occurs at a time in which the factual reality and, consequently, the truth of ensuing statements are determined. What follows is a definition of contingency as the knowledge of true statements that have the property of being false (which cannot exist as there is no knowledge, in the strictest sense of the term, of what is false), and the implication that God does not know anything that is not true. In the passage from distinction 38 cited above, Ockham refers to divine foreknowledge in the broader sense of the term, where divine essence is a particular, absolutely simple way of knowing through which God knows with absolute certitude the truth-value of future contingent propositions. How such cognition is meant to be interpreted is explained shortly afterwards:

³⁵ Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 38, q. unica (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 585): "Potest tamen dici quod ipse Deus, vel divina essentia, est una cognitio intuitiva, tam sui ipsius quam omnium aliorum factibilium et infactibilium, tam perfecta et tam clara quod ipsa etiam est notitia evidens omnium praeteritorum, futurorum et praesentium. Ita quod sicut ex notitia intuitiva intellectiva nostra extremorum potest intellectus noster cognoscere evidenter aliquas propositiones contingentes, ita ipsa divina essentia est quaedam cognitio et notitia qua non tantum scitur verum, necessarium et contingens de praesenti, sed etiam scitur quae pars contradictionis erit vera quae erit falsa." [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 90]

³⁶ Cf. Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1, s. 7 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, pp. 518, 299–304); Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 39, q. unica (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1979, p. 589). For Aristotle, the reference is to *Prior Analytics*, I, cap. 4, 71b, 19–26 (ed. Ross 1964).

And this would not be because future contingents would be present to Him to be cognized either by means of ideas or by means of reasons, but by the divine essence itself or the divine cognition, which is the cognition by which it is known what is false and what is true, what was false and what was true, what will be false and what will be true.³⁷

Ockham denies that there is foreknowledge in the sense of cognizing future contingents as temporarily undetermined and eternally apparent to God's intellect. The fact that such foreknowledge is representational and/or comes through causal ways of knowing (*per ideas tamquam per rationes cognoscendi*) is precluded by the very simplicity of divine knowledge. What is affirmed instead is the cognitive nature of divine essence.³⁸ God knows at any time 'that P', in the sense that God's knowledge 'that P' can be contingent before P occurs and necessary afterwards. This, however, does not mean that divine knowledge changes. Rather, what changes is merely the intentional relationship with which God knows things. This way, divine cognition can entail knowledge, alternatively, of P and not-P, depending on what occurs factually. Nevertheless, divine cognition remains extrinsic to God's nature and to divine knowledge, and does not imply any modifications thereof.³⁹

We have seen that *suppositiones* in Ockham serve as a scientific axiom onto theological belief and then fit into an act of faith which provides the foundation for causal reasoning.⁴⁰ To clarify these passages further in the broader context of Ockham's thought, it is useful to recall the first of the four technical definitions of the term "science" (*scientia*) set out in the *Expositio in libros Physicorum*. This is a way in which we express faith in something to which we give our preliminary assent:

³⁷ Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 38, q. unica (ed. Kelley, Etkorn 1979, p. 585): "Et hoc non esset quia futura contingentia essent sibi praesentia, nec per ideas tamquam per rationes cognoscendi, sed per ipsammet divinam essentiam vel divinam cognitionem, quae est notitia qua scitur quid est falsum et quid est verum, quid fuit falsum et quid fuit verum, quid erit falsum et quid erit verum." [transl. McCord Adams, Kretzmann 1969, p. 90]

³⁸ Cf. McCord Adams 1977, pp. 163–166.

³⁹ Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 38, q. unica (ed. Kelley, Etkorn 1979, p. 587): "In Deo est unica cognitio quae est complexorum et incomplexorum, necessariorum et contingentium et universaliter omnium imaginabilium. Et illa scientia est ipsa divina essentia quae est necessaria et immutabilis."

⁴⁰ See Panaccio 2010, pp. 241–243.

‘Science’ is the reliable knowledge of something true, and thus some things are known only through faith. This happens, for example, when we say we know that Rome is a big city without having seen it. Not dissimilar is the case when I say that I know that this is my father and this my mother, and it is the same for other things that are not known in an ‘evident way’; however, since we adhere to them without the slightest doubt, and since they are true, we say we have knowledge of them.⁴¹

“Science” therefore also designates the assent given to propositions held to be true. Ockham extends the definition of the term designating the very scientific knowledge, showing how even scientific disciplines often proceed in their demonstrations, starting from presupposed or shared truths—namely the definition of *auctoritas*—or from the authority of those scientists who preceded them. *Suppositiones* and *auctoritates* of faith perform the same function of postulates necessary to reach true conclusions: an initial act of assent is necessary to avoid an infinite regression that would render any cognitive process useless. Thus, a logic of belief emerges as an epistemic state which, although distinct from evident knowledge, is nevertheless able to produce knowledge since it moves according to the rules of inference typical of propositional logic starting from premises guaranteed by the *auctoritates* of theology.⁴² In this context,

⁴¹ Ockham, *Expositio in libros Physicorum, Prol.*, (ed. Richter, Leibold 1985, p. 13): “Scientia uno modo est certa notitia alicuius veri; et sic sciuntur aliqua per fidem tantum. Sicut dicimus nos scire quod Roma est magna civitas, quam tamen non vidimus; et similiter dico quod scio istum esse patrem meum et istam esse matrem meam, et sic de aliis quae non sunt evidenter nota; quia tamen eis sine omni dubitatione adhaeremus et sunt vera, dicimur scire illa.” [transl. R.F.]

⁴² We can distinguish between the three senses of “justification.” In the first sense, an assertion or belief is justified in the sense that it is argued, and many false beliefs are therefore justified. In the second sense, a belief is justified insofar as it convincingly derives from plausible premises, and in the third sense, beliefs or statements are justified insofar as they are true since they include the truth of the justified proposition in the very concept of justification. However, truth and justification do not necessarily coincide. This seems to be the case with Ockham’s *scientia*: the *suppositiones* and the *auctoritates* are not justified but true (and as such, they can justify the conclusions drawn from them) according to the logic of belief. This can be confirmed by the position of an Ockhamist like Robert Holcot, for whom the term *scientia* must mean the conscious act of assent given to some propositions which are absent without doubting that reality is as those propositions describe it. For Holcot, this would be how the human intellect can come to understand the way God knows future contingents (Holcot, *Sent.* 2, q. 2). See Holcot, *Seeing the Future Clearly: Questions on Future Contingents* (ed. Streveler, Tachau 1995, pp. 7–235).

suppositiones are axiom-like, but unlike scientific propositions, they are not underpinned by either the truth of their self-evident content or by inductive verification. Rather, they are supported by the verifiable and equally self-evident certainty of belief.⁴³

In this respect, Ockham abides by the structure of the *Summa logicae*, where the theory of *suppositio* responds to an urge to guarantee a direct link to the plane of *res*. As a matter of fact, the *Tractatus* does not cast *suppositio* as a mental experiment or a prefiguration of a possible world. Instead, *suppositio* is treated as real, albeit theologically founded, data which, almost *ut naturalis*, offers a starting point from which Ockham's reasoning and the causal chain unfold. The foundation of the logic of belief notwithstanding, *suppositiones*, once assumed as premises, enable Ockham to operate in a theological setting, therefore in a temporally indexicalized context that must always exhibit a causal regularity such that it can be socially followed and ascertained.

In the *Tractatus*, *suppositiones*, which are applied both to future contingents and to prophecies, are unverifiable, since they stem from an act of faith, provide the necessary foundation for logical-demonstrative reasoning about objects, and can only be presented in a fictional form to the intellect's apprehension (as they have not come to pass yet or they have but differently than announced). It is exactly *suppositiones* (and fictions, such as future contingents and prophecies, upon which they rest) that enable Ockham to apply the method of propositional logic (always within a theological context) and thus confer the status of scientific knowledge on the *logica fidei*.

2.8 Conclusion

It is Ockham's merit to have shown clearly that theological fatalism is essentially based on presumptions regarding cognitive acts. It is linked, first, to the possibility of knowing the conditions of verifiability required of acts of divine belief and, second, to the implications of the statements' impact on the truth-value of future affairs. Any action that stems from a free choice implies, in fact, a contingent conception of the future; the future, however, appears to be fixed and 'sealed' by divine foreknowledge.

As we have seen, the compatibilist/fatalist debate involves the strict correspondence between intention and the ascertained regularity of the causal sequence (whether the object is there yet or not) that reveals the *sui generis* nature

⁴³ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1, s. 6 (see n. 17 above).

of mental states, be they individual (e.g., intentions, belief, hope, faith, love, etc.) or socially shared (such as prophecies, theological precepts). In particular, compatibilism involves a) the free action as intentional transaction between mind and world; b) controversies concerning the nature of time, including the temporality and atemporality of knowledge, particularly divine knowledge; c) the application or non-application of the *logica fidei* to cognition and to the divine mind of logical principles, such as the law of excluded middle and the principle of bivalence; d) the conception of (diachronic or synchronic) modality; and e) the validity of divine predicates tested for God being in time or outside of it. The relative attribution of importance to these various issues has historically defined the theoretical importance of various approaches and determined their position in the debate on compatibilism.

The theme of compatibilism, like that of fatalism and Ockham's logical-semantic solutions as way out of determinism, has recently been the subject of debate among historians, theologians, and philosophers of religion and it is useful to revisit the themes here. This is not to move unjustifiably from a historical reconstruction to a doctrinal one, but to show the ideological assumptions, boundaries, and forbidden senses of a possible dialogue between us and the past. To show, for example, that it is not true that historical-conceptual reconstruction is not essential to systematic philosophy and is only useful if it plays the role of "water bearer."

Contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion have begun to deal with medieval philosophy in a non-sporadic way, believing they could find similarities between the method of argumentation used by 13th- and 14th-century thinkers and their own.⁴⁴ This belief was placed on the context and modalities (restricted professional field, use of a technical terminology, importance attached to logic and philosophy of language), as well as on an alleged coincidence of the philosophical problems discussed. Convinced that it is possible to conceptually bridge the philosophical work of contemporary scholars with the theological and scientific thought of the past, these thinkers set themselves the objective of translating the medieval concepts and even the technical tools into contemporary ones. As such, Ockham's theology was, for instance, given the same care as a contemporary author, and then the extent to which it could be useful for the contemporary debate on a certain topic or problem identified earlier was assessed. The relevance of a topic it is not based on the choice, made by the interpreter, to highlight some parts while consciously leaving others in the

⁴⁴ For a survey of the debate, see Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, Vargas 2007; see also Fedriga 2015, pp. 194–215.

shade. Rather, it becomes the conceptual presupposition of the investigation, which in turn runs the risk of being led to confirm its own presupposition.⁴⁵

The dialog between doctrinal theses and methods of enquiry could only function if it moved on different categorical levels: that i) of the reconstruction of themes, of philosophical styles and of different conceptual schemes, released from a single truth implied by the arguments to which these themes allow a plurality of approaches; or ii) the level of justification, whereby there are a number of concretely historicised arguments for thinking that an assertion is true. The plurality of conceptual schemes does not imply that they are mutually irreducible. The fact that a state of affairs is accessible from a certain conceptual scheme does not imply that the same state of affairs cannot also be accessed from another.⁴⁶ Conceptual schemes of the past should never be bent to one's own beliefs, as history is made up of unguaranteed possibilities. History implies time, and time implies possibility, chance, eventuality, risk, and choice. Logical and epistemological tools, such as the ordained or absolute power of God, *suppositiones*, temporal necessity (*necessitas per accidens*), even objects conceived as bearers of mental experiments (such as contingent futures and prophecies): these are all 'conceptual tools' that allow us not so much to access timeless and eternal logical solutions (nor to extract them from this or that author), but to negotiate concepts conceived to respond to precise theoretical questions.

⁴⁵ I make use here of the expressions "conceptual scheme" or "conceptual assumptions," "historical habits," "habits of thought," following Jaakko Hintikka (Hintikka 1981). See also Knuuttila 1998, p. 75: "Quand nous lisons des textes philosophiques historiques, nous pouvons remarquer que les arguments impliquent des présupposés non formulés explicitement que l'auteur, de manière plus ou moins consciente, tient pour donnés. Leur détectio par l'analyse conceptuelle peut avoir une grande importance à l'égard de la compréhension historique des ces arguments. Mais ils peuvent aussi aider les interprètes à identifier certains traits de leurs propres modèles conceptuels et leur donner conscience des autres manières qui existent de former structures conceptuelles. Ces fils d'interprétation sont reliés les uns aux autres. Nous ne remarquons pas des presuppositions conceptuels importants dans les textes sans penser qu'il peut exister de telle presuppositions, et qu'elles peuvent être différentes des nôtres. Et l'une des meilleures manières de nous rendre compte que nos habitudes de pensée sont contingents est de le comparer à des idées dans l'histoire de la philosophie." See also *Conclusion* here.

⁴⁶ As Diego Marconi well illustrates (Marconi 2007), professing relativism about conceptual schemes or an epistemic one and on truth does not necessarily imply that embrace that of truth. See also Bonomi 1987; Picardi 1999, pp. 53–68.

CHAPTER 3

SIGNS, RULES, AND PROPHECIES

AN ACTION-GUIDING SENSE TO FREEDOM

Riccardo Fedriga

3.1 Introduction

For Ockham, the first creation of a two-way model between mind and world is an intentional act of direct reference. It is fundamental, then, for its complete realization that this act is free and not subject to any constraint on the part of the will, which in turn steers it towards either one thing or another, one action or another. For this to occur, there must always be a logical possibility that exhibits such indifferent freedom of action concerning the object, and that is why the contingency gets effectually strengthened from the purely modal, logical to the causal, temporal sphere. On the other hand, we have seen how the success and implementation of this free action are given not only by the prediction of the intention but also by the observable regularity of the act. As we saw in the Chapter 1, will and intentionality are, for Ockham, completely emptied of all metaphysical meaning. Thus, good and evil are not principles that constitute conditions for the cognizability of the will and/or the will against. Nor do they constitute transcendental conditions for the knowability of the will and/or the will against (*nolle*). They are only signs of obedience or disobedience to the regularity of the laws that humans must follow. A statement such as “the will cannot but will what is to be willed” has only a formal value. In order for it to have a cognitive meaning or to be, in our case, morally effective and perform ethically, it must find its counterpart in an actual action. There is no mystery, only a direct two-way correspondence between act and object of the act. It is through the regularity of the actions performed that the existence of a moral norm can be inferred, and not vice versa. As Calvin Normore writes:

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

A free agent can set up any object whatever as an end for itself, instead of the end for which God implanted a desire in us. This marks, I suggest, a fundamental shift in theory about the relation between ‘good’ in a metaphysically descriptive sense and ‘good’ in an action guiding sense.¹

This is why we have argued about the causal self-referentiality between intention and showed regularity of an action: this close link of a linguistic-semiotic nature is expressed in the form of a biconditional and is necessary for the existence of free intentional action, in the prediction of its effects as well as in time. By extension, we can say that the object of the intentional action is not its foundation but, on the contrary, that it marks the existence of the self-referential transaction. In this context, the cases of future contingents and, above all, of prophecies, represent a particularly effective way of testing the coherence of a theory characterized i) by the fact that it is based on free ethical action, subtracted from possible voluntary restrictions, and ii) by the consequent covenant of responsibility that performs the *actio recta* of this freedom in the world (e.g., through the respect, individual and social, towards what is announced by prophetic utterances). However, there are no guarantees or gains linked to the granting of the pardon. Indeed, precisely because of the libertarian construction of the model, indifferent to objects, divine grace is in turn safeguarded in its simple and gratuitous contingency.

Future events are known in a contingent and unnecessary way, but they remain immutably determined: the epistemological indeterminism typical of the science of future contingents rests on their ontological determination, to which the possibility of a definite knowledge is bound and therefore of a certain knowledge of that which, being contingent, might be different from how it is or might not be at all. If you consider what this conclusion means once transposed into the context of the relationship between predestination and free will, Ockham’s solution opens up to the ability of acting differently within a limited space of action according to a model of freedom governed by a conditional counterfactual proposition (of the type ‘if S were in C, there would be X’) as opposed to open to a plurality of worlds instantiated by a free divine will.² Ockham addresses prophecies within the context of his more mature theory of knowledge, according to which mental states, aware of objects, are concepts and correspond to the terms of enunciation (*complexa*) of mental language, which, directly and without any intermediary, stand for objects in the world. What lies behind Ockham’s linguistic point of view is not just a different position on

¹ Normore 1998, p. 35.

² For more, see here, pp. 58–60.

prophecy-related problems, but a thorough redefinition of the cognitive reach of science. Indeed, prophecies become a testbed for the validity of every theory presented as science, while at the same time helping avoid the risks of a rigid determinism—particularly for the free will of humans and God’s freedom in the act of predestination—in which every past event has necessity attributed to it in the future.

The analysis of Ockham’s theory in terms of intentional causality leads us to the crucial question of prophecies as prophetic enunciations: an intuition (*notitia*) which is simultaneously certain (as it stems from God’s free action and its efficient cause) and yet devoid of object. In this context we can talk about externalism, understood as the notion that our knowledge is produced by a direct action of external reality on the subject’s cognitive faculties. Its objects are states of things (*res*) and not intermediary realities, such as concepts, intentional objects or any mental representations. It is therefore possible for two conscious subjects to have nearly identical mental states and yet address two different objects. Actually, mental states constitute propositions with which a certain truth content is oriented towards future contingents, insofar that the events they predict cannot yet be considered to have occurred and thus do not exist in any literal sense. This means that cognitive acts are not representational but causal.

To sum up, it is undeniable that it is possible to ascribe to Ockham the following externalist thesis: i) the meaning of words does not depend in first instance on what we have in mind when we use them; ii) the content of our thoughts depends on the causal chain that produces those mental states; and iii) the reference to mental factors does not allow knowledge to be distinguished from mere belief. But it is also true that we can admit a cognitive theory grounded purely on causal processes that does not need the metaphysical assumption of the necessity *per accidens* nor an externalist foundation, because the causal chain simply describes the operative mode of the cognitive processes and their regularity in the *ordinatio* *W*, even in absence of an external reference. And this is exactly what happens in the case of mental states and propositional attitudes like free actions, miracles, and prophecies.³

³ Conversely, internalism refers to the idea that human consciousness is the apperception of mental processes and states which have a semantic content regardless of what their real objects are. Following the internalist interpretation, the mechanism of consciousness is representational: it is founded on a (more or less) strong relation of similarity between *res* and concept. See Brower-Toland 2017, p. 76. See also Fedriga 2019, pp. 33–34.

3.2 Prophecies

Prophecy assumes an increasingly prominent role in the theological debate between the 13th and 14th centuries, serving, so to speak, as a theological mental experiment for testing the validity of new theological models, particularly regarding the ways of divine knowledge in relation to the contingent nature both of the created world and of the propositions of human language. By definition, prophetic science moves on the border between the epistemological human plane (with the prophet having exceptional access to a cognitive status beyond that of the human species) and the divine one, where the truth-value of prophetic enunciations is guaranteed by the fact that the *revelatum*, though relative to temporal and contingent facts, is still the object of divine foreknowledge.

Ockham's thought on prophecies coincides with the turning point in the medieval tradition of prophetic studies.⁴ Let us summarize it briefly. The theological debate of the 13th century, involving authors such as William of Auxerre (ca. 1150–1231), Albert the Great (ca. 1205–1280), and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), had shifted the discourse from exegesis and apology (aligned with the patristic and high medieval tradition) to the psychology of knowledge, which sought to define the cognitive faculties of the soul,⁵ whereas the first decades of the 14th century proposed a new way of understanding and analyzing prophecies. The discussions were increasingly re-focused from prophecies to the study of prophetic enunciations as a particular linguistic *complexum*, committed to identifying its syntactic and semantic rules, the coherence of the logical interferences and the ways to determine their truth-value. By the revisiting of a number of themes that had already been discussed in the logical-theological disputes of the early 12th century, this “linguistic shift” took shape in the context of theological debates spanning the second half of the 13th century and the first decades of the 14th century.⁶ Consequently, in this regard, centrality is attributed not so much to the change of the object of the prophecies or the *habitus/status* of the prophet, but rather to the transformation of the human language in prophetic language, the only one capable of correctly and efficaciously transforming the truth coming from God's illumination.

In the Franciscan school, while Bonaventure (ca. 1217–1274), in the wake of the Augustinian and high-medieval tradition, still understands prophecy as

⁴ See Fedriga, Limonta 2020.

⁵ On prophecy in medieval theologies, see especially Garfagnini, Rodolfi 2013; Palazzo, Rodolfi (eds.) 2020; Potestà, Rusconi 1996; Schlosser 2000; Torrell 1992; Vauchez 1990.

⁶ For the role of the Franciscan tradition in meditation on prophecies, see Fedriga, Limonta 2015, pp. 399–400.

strictly connected to a correct exegesis of the Scriptures,⁷ with Peter John Olivi (1248–1298) the focus shifts onto the modes of prophetic knowledge and its degree of certitude.⁸ The Franciscan primarily explores the *visio* of future contingents, a vision which he considers not as a form of contemplation but rather as a change of habitus induced in the prophet's intellect by divine illumination. This does not entail the existence of a divide between the object of the prophecy and the prophetic enunciation in which human moral action is situated, and which, as we will see, in the context of Ockham's linguistic analysis, turns into a hiatus between the time of the prophetic proposition and the time of the prophesized event. Scotus's definition of the theology as a practical science will eventually pave the way for numerous theological and epistemological models which, in the dialectic between necessity and contingency, will see the latter prevail, considering that Scotus places it at the heart of Creation, i.e., in the absolute liberty of the First Cause.⁹ Contingentists are also theologians such as Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322), who develops a theory of future contingents centered around the analysis of prophetic enunciates and, from a critical perspective, William of Ockham, who denounces Auriol's position as spoiled by some elements of representation between the intellective act and the real object.¹⁰

Prophecies are the focus of Ockham's short but meticulous analysis at the end of the first question of his *Tractatus*.¹¹ They constitute a particularly interesting case among the topics of the *Tractatus*, as they help throw the pragmatic aspect of the propositions on prophecies into relief, a crucial act in the comprehension of Ockham's theory. The analysis is conducted on the level of the internal logic of the proposition's rules. This implies that prophecy is understood in the form of a statement relative to future contingent events whose truth-value is set by Revelation. Ockham ponders whether or not such prophetic revelations occur in a necessary way.¹²

The crucial point concerns the fatalistic implications of propositions whose truth-value is guaranteed by their status as objects of divine revelation, but

⁷ Bonaventura, *Collationes in Hexaëmeron* (ed. Collegii s. Bonaventurae 1891, vol. IX, pp. 48–49).

⁸ In the Franciscan tradition, reasoning on prophecy is not articulated in the form of the ponderous *quaestiones de prophetia* of the Dominican tradition, but rather in the context of the writings addressing the scriptural exegesis. For Olivi, see in particular Peter Olivi, *Postilla in Isaiam* (ed. Flood, Gál 1997, pp. 192–200).

⁹ See Bianchi, Randi 1990, pp. 67–75.

¹⁰ Cf. Friedman, Klima (eds.) 2015, pp. 141–165. See also Schabel 2000; Thakkar 2010.

¹¹ See Davison 2005. On the topic of prophecies in Ockham, see Edidin, Normore 1982.

¹² Cf. Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 513).

whose content pertains to as yet undetermined and “open” states of affairs. It is either the nature of events that project their own contingency on cognitive acts through which they are learned, or the necessity of divine foreknowledge that requires these *res* to become its object. In the former case, there would be no guarantee as to the falsity of prophetic enunciates, whereas in the latter case, evident deterministic repercussions would ensue. Therefore, the major challenge Ockham faces pertains not only to the truth-value or to the “scientific” status of prophecy, crucial as such issues were in 13th-century theology, but more so to the fatalist implications¹³ resulting from the new standards of logical reasoning introduced to theology by debates on Aristotelianism. In particular, the problem of the causal relation determining the *notitia intuitiva* reemerges, and along with it, a reliable knowledge when—for prophecies—the *relatum* necessary to start the chain of causal inferences disappears and the difficulty in explaining the relationship between *explanandum* and *explanatum* becomes a counterexample (to use contemporary philosophical terms) capable of falsifying the theory.

A two-fold distinction is adopted to solve the problem of prophecy as a necessarily true enunciate at T1 vis-a-vis a contingent event that will occur at T2. Firstly, the distinction is ontological, with Jonah the prophet predicting at T1 that event P will occur at T2. For Jonah’s assertion to be recognized and “verified” as a prophecy, it will be required to wait for the occurrence of the foretold event *p* at T2. However, the necessity of such a verification (which is possible only *a posteriori*) does not detract from the fact that the enunciate ‘P will occur at T2’ would be considered a true prophecy to all effects at T1 as well, and so can be referent of a causal chain. Still, determinism is precluded since the prophetic character of the enunciate ‘P will occur at T2’, insofar as already true at T1, will only be recognizable as such on the secondary, epistemological plane, when it will be possible to verify that the status of things described by the enunciate will have been achieved, thus conferring necessity on the proposition and turning Jonah’s affirmation into a prophetic one.¹⁴

Ockham once again distinguishes between the certainty and the necessity of a proposition. A contingent future event, as much as it cannot be firmly known by the human intellect, is nonetheless a determined reality. So, it is either true or false, which is, in a way, even determined by the proposition that describes it. The indeterminacy of future contingents is not an intrinsic trait of future events, but only of the epistemic conditions under which the human intellect is

¹³ Hence the choice to tackle the issue within a treatise on predestination and, therefore, on the presumed constraint imposed by the divine will on the human one.

¹⁴ For the relationship between foreknowledge and liberty in the case of divine prophecies, see Michon 2004, pp. 7–17.

able to understand them.¹⁵ Thus, prophetic enunciates seem to fall into the category to which the distinction between future propositions *secundum rem* and *secundum vocem*, rooted in the structure of Ockham's propositional logic itself, is applicable. This distinction requires that both mental enunciates and verbal enunciates have a direct reference to things, without the presence of mental representations or of intermediary intentional objects.¹⁶ The cognitive act is therefore set up as an intentional act involving the direct grasp of things and requiring the presence of a reality-based reference to be completed and show its regularity. In this approach, a future contingent appears as a determined and real event towards which the acts of both human and divine intellect are directed. Just as future damnation and salvation are not real qualities inherent to the subject of predestination, truth should not be considered something that belongs to propositions, as it only means that the event described by them will occur and nothing more.¹⁷

3.3 *Adhuc post quadraginta dies et Ninive subverteretur*

Ockham's solution is, then, the reduction of enunciates referring to states of affairs to the correctly applied terms that, following the referential rules of the *suppositio*, substitute such states in the proposition. In this way, the divine foreknowledge of future contingents must be understood as strictly propositional. More precisely, it is *scientia* as a stable possession of the contingent propositions' truth-content. A prophetic statement uttered at T1, for example, 'Peter is predestined'; requires that the object of its enunciate should take place at T2. So, the proposition 'Peter is predestined', though today possibly considered guaranteed as true by the divine *auctoritas* that revealed it, awaits its own completion by a series of actions which will determine the actuation at T2 of the situation described at T1. It must, therefore, be understood as a proposition which is only verbally about the present, but which factually is certainly relative

¹⁵ See Fedriga, Limonta 2015, pp. 61–65.

¹⁶ McCord Adams 1977.

¹⁷ Just as in the first *quaestio* of the *Tractatus*, Ockham had established that damnation and salvation (in reference to the future) should not under any circumstance be considered as real qualities inherent to the predestined subject. It was the lack of understanding of the theological sense in which Ockham views the contingent character of grace that attracted Chatton's accusations. For more on this subject, see chapter 7, pp. 155–168.

to the future and, as such, evades the constraints of the Aristotelian necessity of the present, as well as the *per accidens* necessity.¹⁸

Nevertheless, applying the Ockhamist distinction proves problematic in this case, because a prophetic enunciate is the object of one of God's revelations. The announcement of Peter's betrayal predicts an act which should be carried out freely, but if the one formulating this proposition is a divine, omni-prescient and infallible subject, its necessity will extend onto the enunciates of its cognitive act and thus also onto the state of things it prophesises. In the *Tractatus*, the two examples cited by Ockham both fall into the category of the *prophetia comminationis*, or threat: the prophecy (*Ps*, 131, 11–12) which promised the throne of Israel to David's children if they maintained the alliance with God, and Jonah's prophecy, directly quoted by Ockham: "Adhuc post quadraginta dies et Ninive subverteretur" (*Jon* 3, 4). The attention in the *Tractatus* is, in fact, not just focused on the reality (or lack thereof) of the objects of the prophetic enunciate, but much more so on their status at the moment in which they are formulated as a prophecy.

This means that the truth of prophecies is simply asserted and not an object of demonstration. For Ockham, the problem lies not in ascertaining whether the future events revealed by the prophets on divine inspiration will take place, but in establishing whether they need to happen in a necessary way. If that were indeed the case, the future would not be free and contingent. If, however, that were not the case, a prophecy at T1 concerning an event at T2 would have to be regarded as a concrete event in time. As such, a prophecy cannot be anything but true, both in the past and in the future. The truth of the prophetic enunciate at T1 entails the truth of the prophesised event at T2: the epistemic conditions of the proposition *hoc est revelatum* at T1 imply the factual determination of the event at T2. This means the necessity of the one (the event constituted by the prophetic enunciate) as much as of the other (the event of the realization of the *revelatum*). As a matter of fact, prophecy itself is framed as an event with

¹⁸ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. IV, q. 4 (ed. Wey 1989, p. 316): "Nunc autem ista propositio 'hoc revelatum a Deo', licet sit de praesenti secundum vocem, aequivalet tamen isti de futuro 'hoc erit', scilicet 'futurum contingens quod revelatur, erit'. Et ideo illa de praesenti, et de praeterito similariter, est contingens." The close connection between the Ockhamist distinction, the problem of future contingents and the prophetic revelations is explicitly discussed in q. 4 of the *Quodlibet* 4, where Ockham ponders "Utrum Deus possit revelare alicui notitiam evidentem futurorum contingentium," [Ockham, Q. IV, q. 4 (ed. Wey 1989, p. 314)]. The examples used in this case, namely Peter's predestination and the revelation of the future resurrection of the dead, fall into the category of prophetic foreknowledge, and Ockham replies to its deterministic implications by resorting to the *secundum rem/secundum vocem* distinction.

the property of predicting and, by virtue thereof, also producing another event. Contained within a proposition that has a character of necessity, this event cannot help but become a necessity itself. Since the deterministic consequences of this solution are obvious, Ockham reaffirms that created wills act freely, in respect to both the determinations of God's will and the fatalistic implication of propositions on future contingents. Ockham distinguishes between the concepts of true, necessary, and contingent. If in the Aristotelian definition truth (*verum*) is a proposition that corresponds to a real state of affairs, with terms in place of things, and if the *necessarium* is that whose opposite cannot take place, prophetic enunciations are propositions with an immutable truth-value that is contingent nonetheless.

3.4 Prophecies and Performative Statements

Contingency is thus the characteristic that marks events situated in the future. In other respects, Ockham complies with the Aristotelian thought that stipulates the necessity of the past and the present. In a prophecy, this means that the *revelatum* can be, and could have been, false, because the future, which is open to the free choice of created wills, does not have the trait of necessity caused, in both the past and the present, by the fact that the events situated in it are already factually determined. Hence, instead of describing at T1 a completely determined fact at T2, a prophetic enunciation defines the conditions of truth of a future enunciation, which—as the crucial passage reads—presents itself as an “implicit conditional proposition.”¹⁹ If the event which forms its premise occurs, the conditional proposition will be true, and it will be necessarily so.

A prophecy predicts the factual realization of an event as follows: it will (necessarily) happen if concurring (contingent) situations occur which will make it become real. Therefore, for Ockham, the truth-value attributable to prophecies is that of the *necessitas consequentiae*—the necessity following from the logical implication between two propositions—and not the ontological one of the necessity of the consequent, which presupposes the deterministically pre-established happening of a future event.

Thus, Jonah's prophecy of the destruction of Nineveh will be true on condition that “unless they repent” is added to it. This means it will be true in relation to the truth of the conditions which cannot be ignored, for events relative

¹⁹ Ockham, *Tractatus*, q. 1 (ed. Boehner, Brown 1978, p. 513): “(…), [q]uia omnes prophetiae de quibuscumque futuris contingentibus fuerunt condicionales, quamvis non semper exprimebatur condicio.”

to the future, from an epistemologically undetermined (for the human intellect) character tied to the contingent choices of created wills. When prophecy is understood as an implicit conditional proposition, formed as $p \rightarrow q$ (where q stands for an enunciate that describes a future event), enunciate q can be considered necessarily true, without indicating that the event prophesied in it will necessarily occur. This allows Ockham to safeguard the contingency of the plan of events, while at the same time guaranteeing the truth of the prophecy at the epistemological level. Prophecy builds a relationship between the propositional *complexum* (i.e., proposition in $T_1 \dots T_n$) and the *res*, in the absence of the *res* itself. Given this, prophetic propositions rely on suppositions to refer to states of affairs which, though real for divine cognition, are not yet factually so, at least not for the human intellect. The *nescio* with which Ockham seems to dismiss the issue²⁰ through recourse to the apophatic *ad hoc* solution actually means not so much the abandonment of a fideist solution, as the need for the analysis not to linger on how it is possible for divine foreknowledge to connect linguistic enunciates according to truth to states of affairs which are not yet real. The tacitly assumed premise is that the divine subject of prophecies suffices to guarantee the inferences that may be drawn from prophetic enunciates according to a logic of belief. In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle claimed that

At any rate we hold that that ‘knowledge comes through demonstration.’ By ‘demonstration’ I mean a scientific syllogism, and by ‘scientific’ a syllogism the mere possession of which makes us know. If then the definition of knowledge be such as we have stated, the premises of demonstrative knowledge must needs be true, primary, immediate, better known than, anterior to, and the cause of, the conclusion, for under these conditions the principles will also be appropriate to the conclusion.²¹

As we have seen in chapter two of this book, in the prologue to *Expositio in libros Physicorum*, Ockham also defines science as knowledge founded on the assent to propositions held to be true, meaning that he foresees axiomatically informed forms of logic and reasoning. In prophecies, the truth of the content is not self-evident the way it is in other scientific propositions, but is based on

²⁰ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. IV, q. 4 (ed. Wey 1980, p. 318): “Prophetae habuerunt talem notitiam evidentem de futuris contingentibus (...) sed quid de facto sit nescio.” For the discussion of this topic within the discussion of utterances on contingent futures, see here chapter 2, pp. 58–60.

²¹ Cf. Aristotle, *APo.*, A, 2, 71b19–22 (ed. Ross, 1964, p. 86). [transl. Barnes 1994, pp. 156–157]

the indemonstrable certainty of belief. The foundation is ensured by the *auctoritas*, which possesses many normative traits beyond the pragmatic ones, and underpins the employment of the method of propositional logic. The fully conventional syncategorematic terms serve to connect and regularize the terms of propositions, and the same function is performed by the reference ground constituted by this conception of *scientia*, meant to strengthen the bond between the divine order and the certainty of the truth-value of propositions. Prophecies are normative propositions, because they showcase the principles of the divine order within which one must operate, while also leaving open the possibility to navigate more freely within this order of the world (*ordinatio*). Expressed in *fide digni* enunciates, the divine *auctoritas* serves as a necessary premise:²² starting from the certainty of this grounding, the argumentative chain will be able to arrive at true conclusions. Therefore, in the testamentary tradition, the prophet is fundamentally an exegete of the sacred scriptures, because the point is to identify the correct way of accessing God's words and when this is accomplished, the rest will only be a matter of drawing all conclusions in conformity with the rules of logical inference.²³

Therefore, the crucial matter is not so much the truth of prophetic propositions, but rather their semiotic efficacy. Prophecies are to be construed, in Ockham's work, as signs.²⁴ They represent an exemplary model of how the *res* of

²² In his *Summa logicae*, Ockham employed the term *regula* to indicate the inferential process through which the argumentative chain, starting from determinate premises, reaches logical conclusions. Cf. Ockham, *Summa logicae*, II, 27 (ed. Boehner, Gál, Brown 1974, p. 334). The *regula*, obviously, also applies to inferential links between false propositions, but this is not the case of argumentative chains founded on enunciates *fide digni*, which Ockham holds to be necessarily true in that they guarantee the truth of the conclusions derived from inferences if these are drawn in a logically sound way.

²³ Put differently, it will be a matter of assuming a position which enables a "vision" of the state of affairs present in the divine cognition but inaccessible to our own without the Revelation. A mandatory reference for the link between *visio* and prophecy is the Augustinian theory of the three visions (*corporalis*, *spiritualis*, and *intellectualis*) in the *De Genesi ad litteram* (12, 1–3), a tripartite structure which helps Augustine distinguish qualitatively diverse degrees of prophecy; cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, 12, 1–3, (PL 34 [245–486], ed. Zycha 1899, pp. 219–224).

²⁴ It is in this way that they are understood by, for example, Paul: "Tongues, then, are a sign, not for believers but for unbelievers; prophecy, however, is not for unbelievers but for believers" (*I Cor* 14, 22). Prophecy is a sign through which God, via the prophet, "speaks to people for their strengthening, encouraging and comfort" (*I Cor* 14, 3). The idea that prophecies are signs, acts of a communicative relationship between God and humans, recurs throughout the exegesis of the Old Testament.

the *ordinatio* must be connected through the cognitive salvation of the soul. As underlined by Claude Panaccio, the function of the mental syncategoremas is to act as a token of Ockham's linguistic pragmatism.²⁵ The same happens in the case of prophetic enunciates, understood as linguistic trace in what stands out as a pragmatics of theological language.²⁶ This can be interpreted two ways, one of these being mental: specifically, that the prophetic enunciates are paradigms based on which the *viator* can establish rules of a logic of faith to help her/him tune in on the rectitude of references to things, thus approximating the simplicity of God and the divine order in the world through the ways of knowledge. At the same time, this pragmatic interpretation must be understood in a moral way, insofar as prophecies indicate the right path which can be accessed and followed by heeding the warnings explicitly or implicitly contained in each *revelatum*.

The effectiveness of Ockham's solution in neutralizing the deterministic implications of prophecy cannot be verified if prophecy is taken to mean a purely descriptive enunciate. Prophetic propositions are a semiotic object, and as such presuppose not only a subject (God) who, in making those utterances (object) possible, becomes a warrantor of their truth, but also a reference context in which the speaker's communication is directed towards a referent (the human) to whom prophecies are addressed and according to whom they must be understood. It is through prophecies, in fact, that God allows God's creatures to partake in God's eschatological plan and identify themselves in the order of the world, which they would not be able to recognize without the Revelation. God supports the *viator* and accompanies her/him on this path by unveiling the counterfactual situations and the options that her/his free will come across. As such, what confers structure on the prophetic science is a form of paronymic relationship: the (particular) single state of affairs prophesized and the sign with which God shows humans what to do to simultaneously make up a prophetic enunciate that indicates the (universal) necessary sense of this act in relation

²⁵ For Ockham, the syncategoremas of mental language have the same function. As a matter of fact, they regulate discourse just like prophetic enunciates, binding terms so that they can be correctly substituted for things in propositional language. By using them, the human intellect learns the rules of language in its simplest form, that of the *suppositio*. The Latin linguistic structure is the language chosen by God for the new covenant with humankind and for the universal dissemination of God's word. It is then a sign which takes a pragmatic shape for humans. Syncategoremas and more broadly the mental language bring humans closer to authentic words proper to faith, just as prophecies lead them to moral salvation and the correct understanding of things. See Panaccio 2014, p. 180.

²⁶ See Piron 2014, pp. 4, 20.

to the time of salvation.²⁷ The prophetic enunciate is then a “word with which ‘things have to be done;’” a linguistic *complexum* which not only describes a state of affairs, but also contributes to determining it. In terms of Austin’s interpretation, a prophetic enunciate corresponds to an

expositional performative utterance (...) where the main body of the utterance has generally or often the straightforward form of a ‘statement;’ but there is an explicit performative verb at its head which shows how the ‘statement’ is to be fitted into the context of conversation, interlocution, dialogue, or in general of exposition²⁸

a statement, then, which produces a determinate effect on the listeners and induces them to act in one way rather than another.²⁹ As we have seen in the Chapter I of this book, the original sin made humans incapable of following the ethical and logical *rectitudo* required by the world’s order. As a response to this congenital deficiency, God offers the gift of prophetic revelation so that when humans encounter contradictions which present themselves as equally accessible, prophecy is able to manifest the logical and necessary relation between an act of the intellect and a future event in order to educate the human intellect about correct links between cognitive acts and the *res*. The end is pragmatic and lies in enabling humans to freely make right choices aligned with their ethical purposes.³⁰

Given its fundamentally semiotic and normative nature, prophecy is then defined as a practical science, which in the context of the theological debate of the first half of the 14th century, means evoking Duns Scotus’ epistemological break with the redefinition of the status of theological science. In his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, Ockham starts precisely by analyzing Scotus’ definition of the nature of theology, concluding that “[t]heology is not a knowledge or a science, but it has or contains more really distinct knowledge, some of which is absolutely practical, while the rest is speculative.”³¹ It is the practical part, he adds, that is tied to the sphere of operations which are actually open to

²⁷ On the importance of paronymy in Ockham’s logic, see Panaccio 2004.

²⁸ Cf. Austin 1975, pp. 85–86: “When I say ‘I prophesy that..;’ (...) the clause following will normally look just like a statement, but the verbs themselves seem to be pure performatives.”

²⁹ Austin 1975, p. 76.

³⁰ For more on this, see chapter I, pp. 17–39.

³¹ Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, 12 (ed. Kelley, Etzkorn 1979, p. 337): “Theologia non est una notitia vel scientia, sed habet vel continet plures notitias realiter distinctas quarum aliquae sunt practicae simpliciter et aliquae speculative.”

human free will and others which are only a possibility to us.³² In this way, as explained by Ockham, propositions (uttered in T1 ... Tn) such as ‘God must be loved in the highest degree’ involve the achievement of a series of (practical and cognitive) acts which become possible insofar as they are regulated by the truthful revelation contained in these enunciations. Prophecies belong among such enunciations, as it is through them that God engages with human temporality and disturbs its rules. Mundane time becomes the time of Salvation, and an ethical and logical space for a prophetic revelation opens up in the hiatus between the enunciation and the enunciated fact.

3.5 Knowing and Believing

In the propositional context, *to know* is a verb with implications not only for its subject but also for the predicate object, whereas *to believe* defines a psychological state, with neither any guarantees about reality nor any ties of necessity to the predicate object. A cognitive act expressed in the form *scio quod* implies the truth of the factual status as described by this act, and ‘I know that P’, acknowledging that the sapiential content of the proposition is real, necessarily means ‘that P’. Assimilating *credo* and *scio* (and *scire* to a *notitia evidens*), as Ockham does, means that propositions ruled by belief are also assumed to be of cognitive character, in need of and binding towards their own object.³³ This is corroborated by a brief passage in *Quaestio quodlibetalis IV*, which calls for attention as it offers some precious insights into the unity and coherence of the *Venerabilis Inceptor’s* theory, in which Ockham revisits the question of prophecies, claiming that “prophets had an evident knowledge of future contingents. Or (...) God showed them such truth by simply causing in them faith.”³⁴

³² Ockham, *Ordinatio* I, 12 (ed. Kelley, Etzkorn 1979, p. 338): “Dico igitur quod aliqua pars theologiae est practica, quia est de operibus nostris, accipiendo opera nostra pro omnibus quae sunt in potestate nostra, sive sint operationes sive operata; et aliqua est speculativa, quia non est de talibus?”

³³ Cf. Michon 2002, pp. 162–163.

³⁴ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. IV, q. 4 (ed. Wey 1980, pp. 315–317): “Potest dici quod prophetae habuerunt talem notitiam evidentem de futuris contingentibus. Vel potest dici quod Deus revelavit eis tales veritates causando in eis solum fidem. Sed quid de facto sit nescio, quia non est mihi revelatum” (...). The passage continues: “[s]i dicis: si aliquis vidisset Virginem parere, post posset evidenter recordari Virginem peperisse, per habitum derelictum ex illa visione; igitur si Deus causasset in aliquo consimilem habitum ante partum, potuit evidenter scire quod Virgo pariet: Respondeo quod ante partum potest aliquis evidenter scire istam propositionem de futuro ‘Virgo pariet’, sed non mediante illo habitu nec consimili, quia ille habitus

As Aron Edidin and Calvin Normore expound, if the distinction between *secundum rem* and *secundum vocem* can explain prophetic revelations when pronounced by humans, Jesus's announcement to Peter of his impending betrayal appears irreducible to the definition in the *Tractatus*, according to which all prophecies are to be construed as conditional propositions in disguise.³⁵ Given what the prophet's utterance affirms and who the subject pronouncing it is, the words appear to have a purely assertive and altogether not-hypothetical character. As we have seen, Ockham relies on the tools of logical-linguistic argumentation and semantic investigation based upon a variety of temporarily indexed references (*secundum rem* et *secundum vocem*) which allow him not to undermine the principle of bivalence and to have to resort, like Duns Scotus, to neutral propositions instantiated by the arbitrary choice of the will.³⁶ On the other hand, Ockham's semantic-compatibilist way out tries to solve theological problems by guaranteeing both divine foreknowledge and human freedom at the same time. But the linguistic nature of his solution must not lead to flattening it to a purely nominalist drift, which would define the natural conclusion of Ockham's argument and the demonstration of the limits of his semantics. In fact, in the *Tractatus*—as well as in distinction 38 of the *Ordinatio*, and the *Expositio*—the propositional analysis finds its grounding in the performative force attributed to the statements of religious belief, which at the same time respond to the pragmatic need to provide the premises for a causal chain leading to certain conclusions on future contingents so that the *viator* can regulate, based on them but starting from free will, own actual choices.³⁷

In *Quaestio quodlibetalis IV* Ockham claims that although God has enunciated that proposition P is necessary in as far as it has acquired the necessity of the past, it does not imply that God has indicated such a proposition as true. Normore insists that the truth-value would then be attributable to the occurrence of the linguistic event and not to its semantic content. If understood this way, prophecies might not correspond to the future order of things, and God might deceive. But, as Edidin and Normore continue,

solum inclinat ad actum respectu praeteriti et non respectu futuri. Ad argumentum principale dico quod futurorum contingens potest sciri evidenter, large accipiendo 'scire' pro evidenter cognoscere."

³⁵ Edidin, Normore 1982, p. 186.

³⁶ For more on this, see chapter 7, pp. 155–168.

³⁷ See Fedriga 2015, 2019.

that God can deceive does not imply that he can be mistaken. Rather, it implies the possibility that the deception might not be wrong. The deception is not wrong in a necessary way, but in a contingent one in regard to God's will.³⁸

God does not do what God does because God rates it as fair, but what God does is fair because it is done by God, and this entails the possibility that God's actions may also include deception.³⁹ But if God can deceive us and the prophecy is not stably anchored to truth-value, how is it that belief as faith in the divine word can be founded? According to Normore, those who, like Ockham, intend to develop a theory of prophecy which preserves both the infallibility of divine foreknowledge and the contingency of prophesized events will face two alternatives, each heralding contradictions or theologically hazardous solutions: either denying the necessity of the past or accepting that God may be wrong. The latter option, which would present theologically insurmountable difficulties, was the exact matter to be progressively explored by the theologians of the 14th century.

It is actually a passage of the *Quodlibeta 4* that highlights the limits and allows us to better explore Ockham's point of view. The passage in question is the *tertium dubium* (*qualem notitiam habuerunt prophetae de facto talium futurorum*), which includes a claim that prophetic enunciations are truths revealed by God to humans by "simply causing faith in them" (*causando in eis solum fidem*), i.e., endowing them with the certain knowledge of future contingents, a form of adherence to a *fide digna* pronouncement. The prophetic statement is the causal ground and not the effect of the prophecy: the answer to the question whether prophecies are to be understood as certainly true (i.e., depicting states of affairs that will effectively become real in a Tn-frame of time) is a premise of a conditional inference and not an object of representation of Ockham's reasoning. The goal is to determine the conditions which make it possible to ascertain firmly that prophecies are true and that this is so because they are retraceable back to the act through which God produces in the human intellect a cognition certain of the prophesized events *causando solum fidem*. As in the other cases mentioned above, Ockham does not state how this is possible, claiming to "ignore how that happens in fact" (*quid de facto sit nescio*). If it is not possible to

³⁸ Cf. Edidin, Normore 1982, p. 186.

³⁹ Hester Gelber has also commented on this passage of the *Quodlibeta* in light of discussions on the possibility of a deceiving God and of untruthful prophecies, as a signal of a broader debate on the nature of contingency, involving a group of authors, from William Ockham to Hugh Lawton, from Robert Holcot to Richard of Campsall, Thomas Bradwardine, William Crathorn, Arnold of Strelley, and Adam Wodeham; cf. Gelber 2004, pp. 200–201.

learn how God grants a certain cognition of the truths contained in prophetic enunciations, that is because, for Ockham, “it has not been revealed to me” (*quia non est mihi revelatum*). The reference to the *revelatum* is more than a generic evocation of the limits of knowledge granted to the *viator*. It indicates that truth is an internal principle of the logic of Revelation and not an external parameter of evaluation. As such, each *revelatum* is true.⁴⁰

The *revelatum*, conceived as a statement relating to future contingent events, is the part of the prophecy accessible to humans, so that, by inferring the logic which connects the terms of the propositional *complexa* to each other and then to the *res*, they can be open to the comprehension of the otherwise inscrutable state of the future. The *revelatio*, on the other hand, is an act beyond the reach of human competence. It consists in focusing on a determined Tn point in the temporal flux of the *ordinatio* and offering it to the knowledge of the human intellect. The Revelation is thus an act which produces knowledge, but which cannot in turn become its object. This does not mean that the laws of nature make it possible to formulate syllogisms productive of knowledge starting from the premises taken for granted. Hence, the factual reality of divine revelation can allow the articulation of an argumentative chain of prophecy, just as rigorous in its inferences and in the certainty of its conclusions, even though it originates from a theological rather than a logical foundation (divine revelation).

In this context, Ockham’s *nescio* reaffirms that, in the sphere of prophetic science, the truth-value must be sought within the rules of a *logica fidei*, that is, accessible only from the foundation of the *revelatum*, where it is unavailable and no proper knowledge, theologically recognized as such, can be attained. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact the *quaestio* ponders whether God can make knowledge of future contingent events possible by triggering in the human intellect the same mental habits that occur in memory following the recollection of a past event. Ockham asks whether the knowledge of the prophesized events is made stable and certain by the necessity of the past, although it is exceptionally produced by God even in the absence of the occurred event. While Ockham generally admits the possibility of a *notitia intuitiva de re non existente*, for prophecies he also acknowledges a certain likelihood of knowing the truth of the prophecy “Behold the Virgin shall conceive and bear a Son” (Is 7, 14) even before the said event has occurred, not through the habit produced by the necessity of the past, but rather through the *habitus* induced by causing *only faith* in humans.

⁴⁰ See here p. 76 and 80; see also p. 129, fn. 45. For a broader inquiry into the logic and the pragmatic foundations of belief, see Fedriga 2015.

If this reasoning on prophecies is extended onto future contingents, it becomes clear that what interests Ockham is not merely the truth-value of prophecies but primarily their relation to the contingency of human choices. Nevertheless, for Ockham, this is an ethical and theological problem rather than a logical one. Maintaining their nature of enunciates within a more comprehensive, soteriological perspective, prophecies are not just propositions describing states of facts. They also have an ethical and deontic value as admonishments that affect created wills in order to steer them towards the practice of good and, further, towards the salvation of the soul. Therefore, prophecies are not merely descriptions. They must also be understood as propositions of performative nature, as it were. As already mentioned, faced with contradictory pairs (p and $not-p$), the task of prophecy is to reveal the logical and necessary connection between an act of the will and a future fact, with a view to inducing the human will to freely make the best choice as assessed by the ethical finalities posed by faith.

Prophecies and enunciates of divine foreknowledge of future contingents should thus be regarded as characteristically “pragmatic,” since such enunciates produce a testimony worthy of faith for those interpreting them, guiding those who listen or read to truthful conclusions and practical action in pursuit of the salvation of the soul. This interpretation helps offer a coherent account of the meaning of Ockham’s position, particularly of his claims that all prophecies must be understood as implicit conditionals,⁴¹ even though many of them do not seem to presuppose any condition but simply establish facts, as with Isaiah’s prophecy “Behold the Virgin shall conceive and bear a Son” or in the prophecy of Peter’s denial. The former represents a prophecy which the canonical distinctions of medieval theology define as being “of predestination.” Namely, it only concerns *recte* things (i.e., goods) and does not require an intervention of human free will. It could not be defined as an implicit conditional while being understood in purely logical terms and as a mere enunciation of the approximation of a future event, because there is no possibility for the situation object of the enunciate not to occur as it has already been enunciated. But if prophecies are interpreted as signs of pragmatic value, the proposition “Behold the Virgin shall conceive and bear a Son” will appear (if not convincing for all the highlighted doubts) at least coherent with the definition in the *Tractatus*. The recognitions of the Virgin’s birth and of Christ’s arrival have, in fact, the meaning of an announcement and a testimony that must provide the *viator* with the

⁴¹ The theology taught in the Franciscan schools of the late 13th century, in which Ockham studied, clearly distinguished different classes of prophecies: those of threat, those of foreknowledge, and those of predestination. For the academic and theological world of the young Ockham, see Courtenay 2008.

correct reading of future events to help her/him rightfully interpret her/his own conduct. Prophecies are a particular case of testimonies, as they are founded on the divine *auctoritas* (or of divine origin), which justifies and epistemically legitimizes the truth of belief. In this sense, testimony produces a community of individuals who identify themselves with it and consequently define their own epistemic parameters on the basis of the content and rules inscribed in it.

With the prophecy about Peter, whatever interpretative option we choose to adopt, it seems to clash with the deterministically oriented nature of Peter's denial, given that the one prophesizing it is a divine, foreknowing, and infallible subject.⁴² However, the aim of prophecy is not to describe a future event, but rather to induce, through its revelation, a determined act of the will in humans.⁴³ That which fulfils Peter's prophecy is not necessarily the betrayal itself, which remains a contingent fact (in the sense that it could also have not been), but rather the emergence in Peter of the correct comprehension of the interrelatedness of the deliberations of the will, the acts of the intellect, and the plane of reality. This is because the prophecy, in fact, holds value as a clue, for a human weakened by the original sin, of God's otherwise inscrutable will. For this reason, it is important that the prophetic language is clearly understood and that the interpretation of the said figurative language is precise and univocal, similar to what we find with scientific language.

Before announcing Peter's betrayal, Jesus quotes Zc 13,7 to prophesize the disciples' shocked reaction. In terms of Ockham's theory, he demonstrates how his words (reinforced by the fact that, for their part, they reclaim the word par excellence, i.e., the Scripture's *Verbum*) must be correctly connected with the ensuing events, and Peter will prove himself unable to grasp the principle of such a relationship, denying that there are such things as the acts of his master capable of triggering a betrayal in him. This incapacity is a prelude to the announcement of Peter's denial ("Truly I tell you," Jesus answered, "this very night, before the rooster crows, you will disown me three times." Mt 26, 34). While contemplating the words in Jesus's prophecy, the prophetic enunciate will carry out an actual *action recta*: by producing the correct comprehension of the link between the terms of the proposition and the plane of reality, which becomes possible only after the prophesized event has already occurred. The

⁴² For a thorough examination of different possible interpretations, see Michon 2004, pp. 70–94.

⁴³ The connection between prophetic enunciations and future facts does not have a casual nature, but corresponds to that form of "soft" implication which the philosophy of religion defines as *bringing about*. For more on this, see the classic, but still essential, Dummett 1964, pp. 338–359.

level of prophetic discourse must correspond to the ontological and metaphysical levels of reality, which Ockham's theology views as simple. This ontological parsimony can only be perceived if one starts from the epistemic simplicity with which the human intellect connects cognitive acts to the acts of the will in the context of the divine order. It will, therefore, be the pragmatic effectiveness that defines the scope of evaluation of the prophecy. Such a normative function seems analogous to that of syncategorematic terms in a proposition. The former has more power, as, instead of only binding two terms, it anchors the entire propositional context to a state of things (without thereby implying any difference in ontological density), but both have a conventional origin and perform the same normative function, albeit to different degrees.

3.6 Conclusion

Prophecies and future contingents confirm that there are states of affairs and events which can be verified through causal inference, but within which it is not possible to identify, and *prima facie* distinguish, the *explanandum* from the *explanatum*. These cases imply the existence of what is recognized today as normative grounding. Such an *ordinatio* does not function according to causal mechanisms alone. Rather, it is articulated by a) free decision, b) causal relations, c) logical relations, and also, as far as the logic of belief is concerned, d) relations characterized by a more flexible bond, that 'causal bringing about' typical of faith statements. In this sense, the normative ground and the relation of bringing about, which links these statements to the states of affairs or events they describe, display a kind of causality, which can also be described in terms of self-referential intentional causality, and which characterises the irreducibility of mental states that differs from the rigid causality of natural sciences. A prophecy, therefore, must not be understood as a statement *secundum vocem* that anticipates itself as a statement *secundum rem*, but rather, it must be interpreted as a normative proposition that indicates the rules of this world's order by which one must abide and within which humans nevertheless still retain the possibility to act in more than one way.

PART II

THE COMPLEX AND
MULTIFARIOUS NATURE
OF THE WILL AND ITS ACTS

CHAPTER 4

WALTER CHATTON ON THE WILL AND ITS ACTS¹

Monika Michałowska

4.1 Introduction

Walter Chatton (ca. 1285/1290–1343)²—an English philosopher and theologian, who studied at Oxford in its most prolific and intellectually stimulating period of the 14th century—has long been recognized as an original thinker and an acute critic of nominalism. His incisive polemic with William Ockham inspired both of them,³ encouraging them to develop and reformulate their views on cognition, individuation, and future contingents.⁴ While interest in Chatton’s metaphysics and theology has flourished recently, his ethical ideas still remain understudied.⁵ This is rather surprising, given that he actively engaged in the ethical debates of his time, proposing original approaches to a range of ethical issues, such as conditional willing/nilling and first- and second-order volitions,

¹ I would like to thank Tobias Hoffmann, William Duba, and Chris Schabel for their fruitful comments that helped me to improve this chapter.

² For more details of Walter Chatton’s life and career, see Brown 1985, pp. 81–115; Courtenay 1978, pp. 66–74; Keele 2007b, pp. 660–669.

³ Insightful discussions of their mutual influence can be found in Brower-Toland 2015, pp. 204–234; Kelley 1981, pp. 222–249; Pelletier 2016, pp. 311–334; Schierbaum 2016, pp. 15–46.

⁴ For more particulars of Ockham’s concept of future contingents, see chapter 1, pp. 17–39, and sections 2.3–2.5, pp. 52–56.

⁵ To my knowledge, the only article to date devoted to Chatton’s ethics is by Tobias Hoffmann. Also, some ethical issues in Chatton’s writings have been discussed by Rondo Keele. See Hoffmann 2008, pp. 57–82; Keele 2018.

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

or higher-level phenomena, to use the term coined by Harry Frankfurt⁶ and developed quite extensively in the 20th century.⁷

Although Chatton never composed a commentary on any text of moral philosophy, his interest in ethical issues and, in particular, his focus on the freedom of the will and the interaction of the intellect and the will in moral decision-making are clearly visible in two sets of question commentaries on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, on which he lectured twice: in his *Reportatio super Sententias* (which he delivered in 1321–1323) and *Lectura super Sententias* (dated to 1323–1324).⁸ Some ethical problems are also addressed in his later work, the *Quodlibets* (1329–1330 or 1330–1331).⁹ Admittedly, Chatton never dedicated an entire question to the acts of the will, yet he frequently touched upon this issue throughout his works, formulating meticulous distinctions that came to serve as the foundation for his concepts.

As a result of this dispersion, Chatton's analyses of the moral act, which is understood as an act of the will in this chapter, are frequently embedded in lengthy arguments concerning other ethical dilemmas, such as the will's autonomy from the intellect, the intellect's role in the will's choice-making, the role of prudence or circumstances in moral decision-making, and the concepts of vice and virtue. Therefore, Chatton's account of the moral act does not form a disciplined and concise whole, but has to be pieced together from his many scattered comments and remarks. Chatton provides his most detailed exploration of the acts of the will in his *Reportatio* I, distinctions 1 and 3; *Reportatio* III, distinction 33; *Lectura* I, distinction 1; and his *Quodlibets*, questions 12 and 13. These texts will principally underpin my analysis below. As an important caveat before I begin, some considerations in Chatton's *Reportatio* are rather obscure and ambiguous, which poses certain interpretative dilemmas. One of

⁶ Frankfurt 1971, pp. 5–20.

⁷ For the most recent defenses of free will using this notion, see, for example, List 2019.

⁸ While there is a complete set of questions by Chatton commenting on all the four books in the *Reportatio*, only a part of the *Lectura* has survived, namely commentary on book I, distinctions 1–17, through to question 7 in distinction 17. There has been some disagreement as to the exact dating of Chatton's *Lectura*. While Joseph C. Wey and Girard J. Etzkorn, as well as Stephen Brown agree on the timeframe of 1323–1324, Rondo Keele offers a more cautious approach, stating that the text was composed between 1324 and 1330. Keele 2018, n. 3: "The *Lectura* dates are based on mention of Ockham's *Summa logicae*, which gives a *terminus post quem* of 1324; Wodeham's citation in 1330 of *Lectura* material gives a *terminus ante quem* of 1330." For more information on the dating of the *Reportatio* and the *Lectura*, see Brown 1985, pp. 81–115; Chatton, *Reportatio* I, "Introduction" (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. VII); Chatton, *Lectura* I, "Introduction" (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, pp. VII–VIII).

⁹ For more details on the dating of Chatton's *Quodlibets*, see Keele 2007b, pp. 672–674.

the reasons for this ambivalence, as Chris Schabel¹⁰ argues, is that this question commentary represents an uncorrected and unedited version of the notes taken by Chatton's students, thus being an excellent example of true *reportationes*. Following Schabel, Jon Bornholdt depicts Chatton's style of argument as rather perplexing and observes that

the dialogical character of the text combines with a prose that is often vague, awkward, and concise to the point of unintelligibility; in consequence, it is a considerable challenge to distinguish the thread of Chatton's opinions from that of his often unnamed interlocutors, many of whose doctrines are in any case frustratingly close to his own.¹¹

Interestingly, some of the arguments that are cursory in the *Reportatio* are given more honed and detailed explanations in the *Lectura*. Therefore, my analysis in this chapter sometimes draws on both texts.

Chatton develops an original idea of the complex structure of the will that rests on a series of distinctions and terms providing the conceptual framework for his account of the moral act. First, Chatton portrays a subtle interplay between the will's dictates and the intellect's judgments to argue that, since the will can go against the judgments of the intellect, the will has a substantial role in decision-making, whereas the intellect merely executes its own acts. To ponder this issue, he first introduces the distinction between dictate, choice, and implementation, all of which add up to a moral act. Secondly, Chatton breaks down the judgments of the intellect into two components—apprehension and assent—and argues that the will must choose (will) what is apprehended, but it may will or nill what is assented to. In this way, by pondering the relation between the components of the intellect's judgment (apprehension and assent) and the will's final choice, which he employs to examine the acts of willing and nilling, Chatton debates the possibility of a person nilling God and hating God. Chatton's concept of the acts of nilling and willing is anchored in a distinction between absolute and conditional senses, as a result of which his account of the conditionality of the will's acts bears some resemblance to popular 12th- and 13th-century concepts of the will.

The fact that Chatton discusses the will with respect to conditionality speaks to his endorsement of the concept of the will as multidimensionally structured. Chatton's vision of the will's activity as comprising a varied range

¹⁰ Schabel 2000, p. 231: "(...) the text really appears to be more or less a true *reportatio*, without any signs of authorial reworking (...)"

¹¹ Bornholdt 2017, p. 180.

of acts (such as dictate, choice, and implementation; willing and nilling understood in an absolute and a conditional sense; and virtual volitions) helps him 1) safeguard the freedom of the will; and 2) explain the mechanisms of moral decision-making.

4.2 The Will's Choice-Making

In discussing Ockham's considerations of the act of love of one's neighbor for the sake of God,¹² Chatton posits a tripartite composition of the moral act. In the *Reportatio* I, distinction 1, question 1, he identifies three elements of this act, namely dictate (*dictamen*), choice (*electio*), and implementation (*executio*).¹³ In the *Lectura* I, distinction 1, question 1, he adverts to the definition of a virtuous act and specifies the interrelations of the three elements, stating that every virtuous act implemented by the will (*actus executivus*) must be preceded by the two other elements: right reason and choice-making.¹⁴ Thus, a complete moral act consists of the following stages: first, a dictate is issued by the intellect,¹⁵ then a choice is made by the will, and finally the implementation of the choice takes place. It can be reasonably assumed that if there is a dictate coming from the intellect, the intellect must already have cognized and acquired some information about what it dictates.

Chatton's description of the relationship between the dictates of the intellect and the choices of the will is fairly standard for the scholastic tradition. Medieval thinkers commonly agreed that the will could neither act at random nor

¹² Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, pp. 8–15); Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 1 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 374, 386). It has also been pointed out that article 1 of this question contains Chatton's comprehensive critique of Ockham's account of the objects of judgment. See Brower-Toland 2015, pp. 212–213.

¹³ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 13): "Responsio: Apparet satis quid ego dico hic. Ego distinguo inter dictamen et electionem et executionem."

¹⁴ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 5): "Primum assumptum patet, quia omnis actus executivus, ad hoc quod sit virtuosus, praesupponit rationem esse rectam et electionem esse rectam conformem rationi respectu eiusdem obiecti."

¹⁵ Chatton quite often specifies that by *dictamen* he understands the dictate of right reason. See, e.g., Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 4): "(...) aut [actus] diligendi seu eligendi conformiter [ad] dictamen rectae rationis."; Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 5): "(...) ille actus est virtuosus quod [elicitur] conformiter ad rectam rationem dictantem."; Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 33, q. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, pp. 216–219). Notably, however, this is not the only meaning that Chatton ascribes to the term *dictamen*, since it can also be based on false premises.

remain entirely blind while making a decision. Therefore, it was rather obvious to them that the will's act presupposed some knowledge about the object of its choice. For example, Thomas Aquinas claimed that the dictates of the intellect became the objects of the will.¹⁶ Chatton subscribes to this widespread opinion when he introduces his original concept of assent¹⁷ into the debate and frames the act of willing as assent to (willing) or dissent against (nilling) an (intellective) apprehension. The apprehension-based structure of willing is particularly lucid in the case of judgment. The role attributed to judgement is highlighted by Susan Brower-Toland, who shows that Chatton regards judgment as an apprehension followed by an act of assent to or dissent against what has been apprehended.¹⁸

Chatton attributes a major role to the implementation of the choice. He argues that the expression "to be performed" (*esse exsequendum*) can be understood in three ways: 1) as something that deserves to be performed; 2) as something that is performed and in this sense it is contingent; and 3) as something that one has to perform by complying with an order.¹⁹ While discussing this issue, he also touches upon the role of circumstances in producing an act of the will.²⁰ I shall return to this issue later.

¹⁶ Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I–II, q. 13, art. 1, ad 1 (editio Leonina 1891, p. 98).

¹⁷ Riccardo Fedriga and Roberto Limonta have recently showed that the notion of assent also plays an important role in Chatton's concept of future contingents. Fedriga, Limonta 2020, p. 246. As they claim, "The case of prophecies is a prime example of this. According to Chatton, God makes prophecies possible (and truthful) by leading the prophet's mind to grant assent to states of affairs that, being future, are beyond human intellect's cognitive capacities. Incidentally, this aspect of his account allows Chatton to retrieve some elements of Scotus' approach and of the prophetological tradition, even while moving within a now Ockhamist perspective. The assent given to the predicted state of affairs has a determinate truth only in the form of a direct causal inference, i.e. the one that links the *res* to the statement describing them at a future time, when both the state of affairs and the corresponding statement co-exist. As for God, he does not cognize through language: prophetic statements are but the means through which God 'testifies' and 'communicates' a kind of knowledge that, by its very nature, is not discursive."

¹⁸ Brower-Toland 2015, pp. 207–208, 212.

¹⁹ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 12, n. 22: "Nota quod aliquid esse exsequendum potest intelligi tripliciter: uno modo quod sit dignum exsequi; alio modo quod tale exsequetur et illud est contingens; tertio modo quod homo tenetur illud exsequi ex praecepto, et illud debet regulare hominem in moralibus." I would like to thank Rondo Keele for sharing the transcription of Chatton's *Quodlibets* with me.

²⁰ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 5); Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 4, n. 69: "Ad aliud dico quod si loquitur de actu elicitio qui habet circumstantias

Central to my discussion at this point is the relationship between the judgments of the intellect and the choices of the will. Medieval debates on the will's choice-making,²¹ especially the discussions on *akrasia*, repeatedly dwell on the fact that the person may not have the complete and accurate knowledge of a given situation while making a choice. For instance, one of the premises may be false or missing, the conclusion may be incorrect, or the practical syllogism may be formally wrong.²² If this is the case, the will may, and indeed sometimes does, make a wrong choice and choose evil. The fact that apprehensions can be faulty raises a problem for Chatton's model; specifically, it appears that the will may be directed towards an unknown thing or a not fully cognized one. Yet, if the will did not know the object it was about to choose, the choice of this object would have to come from outside the will, and therefore, an outside force would have to cause the will to move, a situation that would jeopardize its freedom.

To safeguard the freedom of the will and to prove that the will is the sole efficient cause of any volition, Chatton elucidates, in his *Reportatio* I, distinction 1, question 2, how the will can choose something in spite of not having an

exsecutionis pro obiectis, non tamen proprias circumstantias habet pro obiectis, ut scilicet quod aggrediendum est bellum propter pacem vel communitatem aliquam, et isto modo dico quod illud quod est sic virtuose, alterum non potest esse vitiosum.²³ For the concept of performative acts, see Fedriga, Limonta 2015, pp. 399–432.

²¹ The literature on this subject is extensive. See, for example, Barnwell 2010, pp. 49–67; Eardley 2006, pp. 161–203; Hoffmann 2006, pp. 71–92; Hoffmann, Müller, Perkams (eds.) 2006; Holopainen 1995, pp. 1276–1284; Holopainen 2006, pp. 405–425; Ingham 2002, pp. 88–116; Kent 1986, pp. 119–139; Saarinen 1994.

²² This issue has a significant history in medieval philosophy and was frequently addressed by medieval philosophers and theologians, who offered various solutions to the problem. Since discussions of the practical syllogism often start with the famous Aristotelian example of a desire for sweet things (*Nicomachean Ethics*, VII, 1147a29–33), many of such considerations can in fact be found in commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. See, for example, Albertus Magnus, *Ethicorum libri X*, lib. VII, tract. 1, cap. 5 (ed. Borgnet 1891, p. 476); Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, lib. 7, lect. 3 (editio Leonina 1969, pp. 392–393); Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I–II, q. 6, art. 7, responsio (editio Leonina 1891, p. 62); Olivi, *Sent.* II, vol. III, q. 86, responsio (ed. Jansen 1922, p. 187); Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I, q. 17, ad arg. (ed. Macken 1979, p. 135); Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 4 (ed. Etkorn, Kelley 1984, pp. 133–134); Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 169, 192); Greystones, *Sent.*, II, dist. 4, q. unica (ed. Henninger, Andrews, Ottman 2017, p. 188); Burley, *Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis* VII, tract. I, cap. 3 (1521, ff. 121rb–va); Roseth, *Lectura*, q. 2, art. 1: *Utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus*, Vat. Lat. 1108, f. 24r.

actual (*in actu*)²³ cognition of what it chooses.²⁴ In such a case, that is, where the will does not have an actual cognition, he claims that a perfect choice requires (at least) some consideration. In his later *Lectura* I, distinction I, question I, Chatton returns to the *dubium* on the will proceeding without cognition,²⁵ and offers a more detailed reply that sheds some more light on this problem. He professes that, “As to the second principal *dubium*, first I argue that the will can have as its object something that is not being actually cognized.”²⁶ In the reply, he explains that it can indeed be the case, since “not every volition towards an object is caused by the cognition of that object.”²⁷ Thus, it appears that there are volitions unconnected with cognition.²⁸ Yet, although the will may proceed with its acts without scrutiny provided by the intellect, Chatton’s employment of the term “perfect choice”²⁹ (*perfecta electio*) in his considerations in both commentaries suggests that the intellect’s cognizing has a significant function in the acting of the will. Chatton spells out the mechanism of a perfect choice:

²³ I use the term “actual” in the meaning of “happening at this very moment.”

²⁴ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 34): “Ad secundum *dubium* supra dico quod, licet sit conclusio inconsueta dicere quod voluntas potest causare aliquem actum quando non cognoscitur obiectum actualiter, vera tamen est. Sed quin tunc vel prius sensu vel intellectu, et hoc vel in generali vel in speciali, fuerit cognitum esset inconveniens dicere, vel saltem sicut cognoscitur actus proprius hominis quando inest; dictum est enim supra quod ad experiendum actum, non est necessarium ponere actum reflexum”; Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 1, n. 20: “Ad secundum: voluntas potest se conformare tali dictamini intellectus, verum est quod voluntas potest velle aliquid de quo tantum habetur notitia incompleta in intellectu.”

²⁵ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 31): “Secundo, quia voluntas ferretur in incognitum, quia actio voluntatis [in] cognita est, etc.”; Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 47): “Secundo, si voluntas causaret suum actum, ferretur in incognitum, quia praeciperet intellectui executionem aliquam de qua intellectus non cogitavit.”

²⁶ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 51): “Ad secundum *dubium* principale, arguo primo quod voluntas possit habere pro obiecto aliquid quod non est actu intellectum.” [transl. M.M.]

²⁷ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 55): “Sed non omnis volitio obiecti causatur per cognitionem eiusdem obiecti (...)” [transl. M.M.]

²⁸ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 35): “Non requiritur igitur intellectio actualis et sufficit virtualis, et aliquando credo quod posset sufficere sensatio.”

²⁹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, pp. 34–35): “Perfectissima electio praesupponit iudicia contraria, quia requirit deliberationem de utraque parte causae (...)” Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 51): “Primo, quia perfecta electio requirit iudicia contraria.”

1. The will has a grasp of various judgments, including contrary ones (*iudicia contraria*), which, at least at this point, do not constitute a complete view of a given situation. Rather, they are necessary presuppositions, since deliberation on a given decision requires a thorough grasp of two alternatives.
2. The intellect deliberates on contrary judgments one after another, and not simultaneously.
3. Once the alternatives have been weighed, the will can make a choice.³⁰

Chatton adds that a recent memory of the requisite judgments suffices, so they do not have to be considered again. Nor do they need to be probed *in actu* for the will to make a choice. Elaborating on how this is possible, he argues that the will may, and frequently does, order the intellect to consider ‘A’, yet then the intellect does not go on to cognize ‘A’. Indeed, the will can divert the intellect from understanding ‘A’ as long as the intellect is not actually cognizing ‘A’.³¹ In contrast to the ideal situation outlined above, a typical sequence of events resulting in a choice inferable from Chatton’s considerations is:³²

1. ‘A’ appears before the will.
2. The will decides to consider and to know the options concerning ‘A’ (above all, the mutually exclusive ones).
3. The will orders the intellect to consider the alternatives, especially the contrary ones, one after another.
4. After one option is considered, the will may like it and accept it, making a choice without any further or deeper considerations.

Chatton underlines, however, that it is essential for the will to explore all the possible options at the beginning of the choice-making process. Thus, all that he deems necessary for the process of the will’s choice is a virtual, rather than an actual (i.e., happening at the moment),³³ intellection of the alternatives, since if

³⁰ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, pp. 34–35): “Persuasio pro ista conclusione inconsueta est hoc communissimum argumentum. Perfectissima electio praesupponit iudicia contraria, quia requirit deliberationem de utraque parte causae; sed ambo illa iudicia non sunt simul, quia contraria, igitur unum succedit alterum; illa successione potest voluntas eligere; sufficit igitur quod maneat recens memoria de iudicio quod transit.”

³¹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 35): “Item, voluntas frequenter imperat intellectui considerare *a*, et tunc non cognoscit *a*, aliter frustra imperaret. Item, potest avertere intellectum ab intellectione quam non actu cognoscit. Item, potest appetere maiorem cognitionem quam habeat intellectus.” Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 51): “Tertio, quia voluntas potest avertere intellectum a consideratione et suspendere actus suos et statim velle volitiones suas et sensationes quas experitur, licet intellectus actu illa non intelligat.”

³² Cf. notes 25–27.

³³ Cf. note 28.

the will likes one of the presented alternatives, it does not have to wait for the intellect to go over the other.³⁴ In the *Lectura* I, distinction 1, question 2, Chatton lists three situations (modes) in which the will may choose something without the intellect actually cognizing it.³⁵ All three of them are based on analogy between certain acts and the acts of the will. One of them relies on juxtaposition with the acting of the intellect, which can retain an intellection of a previously cognized thing, even though the thing itself is no longer present. Likewise, the will can will (or not) an object advised by the intellect, even though cognizing is no longer happening. Another situation refers to the relation between the choice of the will and its implementation as an exterior act, which does not always require a preceding act of the will. Likewise, as Chatton implies, the act of the will can sometimes take place unpreceded by an act of the intellect. The third situation, which is quite vaguely intimated, draws on the example of deriving pleasure from the cognition of a thing that is not pleasurable in and of itself. Likewise, the will may take pleasure in willing an object without actually cognizing the object.

Since the apprehensions that form the basis of a choice can be drawn from memory, or can otherwise be temporally distant from the moral act, Chatton claims that the particular time and place are not really significant for the will's choice. Although circumstances make up a part of a complete act of the will (and, in this sense, they are necessary), they are contingent and, as such, may vary.³⁶ This interpretation is consistent with Chatton's remark in the *Reportatio* III, where he underscores that the moment at which a particular situation occurs neither makes the act morally good or evil nor contributes to it

³⁴ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 51): "Sexto, quia voluntas velle intellectum non habere aliquam intentionem et potest continuare illa volitionem: aut ergo intellectus obedit sibi [et] tunc stabit volitio sine intellectione; aut non, ergo intellectus non esset potentia liberior quam ignis." Ibidem (pp. 52–53): "Et illis cognitionibus positus in intellectu, de suis obiectis voluntas imperat intellectui quam cognitionem debet continuare et quam non (...)."

³⁵ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, pp. 53–54).

³⁶ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, pp. 2–8). Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 7): "Quantum ergo ad istum articulum, dico quod ad hoc quod aliquis causet dilectionem Dei vel proximi, vel quemcumque actum virtuose, non oportet quod ille actus habeat circumstantias suas proprias pro obiectis partialibus (...)." Ibidem (p. 8): "Ex isto sequitur quod circumstantiae contingenter concurrunt cum actione laudabili et e contra." Ibidem (p. 11): "Item, multae sunt aliae circumstantiae a quibus actus non dependet essentialiter, ut ubi oportet, quando oportet?"

becoming such.³⁷ If this were the case, the circumstance of time would refer to the act of the will's choice rather than to the content of the act. If a memory of what has recently been known or examined suffices for the will to choose, the temporal aspect of the action³⁸ (e.g., whether it happens on Monday or on Tuesday, in the morning or in the evening) is irrelevant to moral decision-making.

This analysis suggests a few insights. It appears that Chatton's concept of moral choice holds that the will is free from determination by the intellect and has a wide latitude to choose what it wants, with some of the intellections only being virtual. If the intellections were not virtually present, the will would not be completely free in a given act, but rather dependent on what the intellect actually presented. If the will had to wait for the intellect to display all the options, the will would depend on the intellect for the order of deliberation, its completion, and actuality. The fact that the will can divert the intellect's action suggests that Chatton's ethics requires the options to be virtual, rather than necessarily in sight at a given moment. Chatton insists that the will plays the key role throughout process. Although the intellect provides a dictate to follow, it is the will, and not the intellect, that chooses whether the intellect should reconsider other options. The role of the intellect is thus limited to dictating its own acts,³⁹ namely the presentation of proper premises and conclusions so that the will can assess the arguments.

This constraint on the power of the intellect can be traced back to Duns Scotus's voluntarist defense of the absolute freedom of the will relative to the action

³⁷ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 33, q. 3, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 223): "Similiter, si loquamur de circumstantiis, actus habens quascumque circumstantias est indifferens, saltem respectu eorum quae sunt ad finem. Patet in exemplo de circumstantiis loci et temporis, quia posses talem causare loco et tempore quando teneris meliorem actum, et non illum, elicere; puta quando teneris causare actum dilectionis Dei propter se vel consimilem circa finem ipsum. Immo aliquis actus est indifferens ad omnem differentiam loci et temporis, sic quod non plus ascriberetur tibi ad laudem vel vituperium in uno loco vel in alio."

³⁸ Chatton's interest in the temporal aspect of assent can also be identified in his concept of future contingents. See Fedriga, Limonta 2020, p. 247: "The assent God prompts in the prophet's mind is an *assensum*, so to speak, *in absentia*; but this absence simply amounts to the fact that the state of affairs (in itself true) is located at some temporal distance. The assent prompted by God thus substitutes the inferential chain that, starting from the *res*, would produce assent in the mind under normal conditions. In so doing, the prophet becomes a witness: at the moment of his prophetic uttering, it is possible for those who heed it to grasp the concurrence between word and event, which mundane temporality locates on two different levels: present and future."

³⁹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 15): "Et ad illud, ubi stat tota vis argumenti, dico quod voluntas potest habere electionem de actibus propriis, et intellectus dictare de suis propriis actibus."

of the intellect. As Tobias Hoffmann has shown, Scotus avers that the will can make a choice regardless of whether the intellect displays its practical judgment to the will.⁴⁰ Chatton appears to follow Scotus by claiming that the intellect submits alternative options to the will, and the will freely chooses among them.

4.3 Nilling and Hating God⁴¹

Chatton distinguishes between the intellect's ability to produce dictates and its capacity to assent to these dictates; specifically, while the intellect can dictate something from false premises, it need not necessarily assent to such dictates.⁴² Given that the intellect can consider both possible and impossible things, and, what is more, that the will may want either of them, the following questions arise: 1) Is a dictate to hate God for God's sake (*propter se*) possible; or, to put it differently, is the hatred of God possible while cognizing God as God with a proper cognition? 2) If it were possible, would the intellect assent to it? 3) If it were possible, would the will choose it?

Chatton's assertions about whether the intellect can issue a dictate to hate God are rather enigmatic and inconsistent. In the *Reportatio* I, distinction 42, question 1,⁴³ when reflecting on whether God can sin, Chatton broaches the case of God inducing an act of hatred of God in a soul. He claims that such an act is possible since it entails no contradiction.⁴⁴ He neither elaborates on this example nor links it to the intellect's dictate and assent. Elsewhere, Chatton rather vaguely deals with the possibility of the hatred of God by merely averring that, even if a dictate like this were feasible, it would be made upon false premises.⁴⁵ He does not explain, however, what these false premises would be. The only excerpt that may shed some light on Chatton's position on this subject

⁴⁰ I wish to thank Tobias Hoffmann for this suggestion. For a thorough discussion of this subject, see Hoffmann 2013, pp. 1071–1090.

⁴¹ I use the term “nilling” to convey the idea of “willing against something.” Cf. Pironet 2001, pp. 199–220.

⁴² Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 59): “Dicendum quod aliud est dictare et aliud assentire. Unde licet intellectus possit hoc dicere ex propositionibus falsis, tamen illud dictamen non sufficit ad causandum assensum.”

⁴³ The discussion on the sinning problem and the notion of free will can be traced back to Anselm. For a more detailed account, see Fedriga, Limonta 2016, pp. 357–386.

⁴⁴ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 42, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 410): “A aliud, non video repugnantiam quin possit Deus causare in anima actum odiendi Deum.”

⁴⁵ Cf. note 42.

is his earlier, albeit not original, rehearsal of the commonly-accepted opinion that such a hatred of God would in fact not be *propter se*, but with regard to extrinsic reasons. In other words, there would have to be some other, external reasons to make a person hate God.⁴⁶ Chatton, however, does not undertake to discuss the possibility or impossibility of such an act beyond citing this view. He revisits the issue in his *Lectura* I, distinction I, question 3, where he defines the proper cognition of God as the cognizing of God and not others.⁴⁷ Chatton's analysis of the problem of hating God in the *Lectura* in conjunction with the concept of assent and the correct principles of cognition may suggest that the false premises in fact involve an incorrect definition of God. I shall return to this issue below.

At the same time, Chatton pays considerable attention to the second of the "hatred-of-God" questions, that is, to whether the intellect would assent to a dictate to hate God *propter se*. In his *Reportatio* I, distinction 1, question 3, he explains that a dictate "to hate God *propter se*" alone would not suffice either for the intellect to assent to it or for the will to will it.⁴⁸ Therefore, even if he considers a dictate to hate God for God's own sake possible, he does not regard it as sufficiently convincing or appealing. Inferably, should such a dictate exist, it could neither be assented to by the intellect nor wanted by the will.

Chatton also discusses the problem of assent in the context of intellectual cognition. Within an act of judgment, assent occurs after a proposition is apprehended, and consists in the intellect accepting the apprehended proposition as

⁴⁶ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 59): "Confirmatur, quia si ponit aliquo modo odire [Deum], hoc non est nisi quia vult experiri libertatem suam, aut quia vellet aequiparari sibi et non potest, aut quia non dat sibi beatitudinem, aut quia punit, vel huiusmodi. Sed hoc non est odire Deum propter se sed propter extrinsecum; et sic [habetur propositum], quod non est in potestate naturae causare odium Dei propter se. Utrum autem Deus possit causare in voluntate creata, non dico modo."

⁴⁷ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 92): "In ista quaestione suppono primo quid intelligo per cognitionem propriam Dei, et dico quod per eam intelligo cognitionem qua cognoscitur Deus et non alia a Deo (...)."

⁴⁸ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 60): "Item, aliud est dictare et habere volitionem respectu impossibilium, et aliud respectu possibilium, [posito] quod intellectus et voluntas aequantur in actibus suis. Licet igitur intellectus possit dictare Deum esse odiendum et Deum esse malum, sicut dictat impossibilia, tamen illae propositiones non sunt natae causare assensum, et ideo nec voluntas potest efficaciter odire illum propter se." Cf. Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 2, q. 9 (ed. Wey 1989, p. 154); Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 4 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 438–439).

true.⁴⁹ In the next step, Chatton argues in favor of the implication: ‘if the dictate is evident, the intellect must assent to it’. He concedes that the implication may seem doubtful, since there is no necessity that the intellect should assent to a proposition it apprehends.⁵⁰ Yet if this were the case, then, on apprehending the proposition ‘I hate God for God’s own sake’, the intellect could assent to it. In fact, this is not the case. Chatton assumes, for the sake of argument, that the statement is true, but then he immediately states that there is no evidence whatsoever of God being evil such that a person could actually hate God.⁵¹ In short, while the intellect can apprehend the hatred of God for God’s own sake, it cannot assent so as to affirm its truth. This is because, if the intellect is furnished with proper definitions, it cannot assent to God being evil *propter se*.⁵² This conclusion is confirmed in the *Lectura* I, distinction 1, question 3, where Chatton discusses the same problem, namely whether a person is able to not-love God and/or hate happiness despite having a cognition of God. Having introduced the distinction between voluntariness taken as such and unconditionally (*voluntarium simpliciter*) and voluntariness understood as mixed and conditional (*voluntarium mixtum*), he claims that it is impossible for the will to truly and effectively nill happiness *simpliciter*, because it is impossible for the intellect to assent to the proposition ‘having happiness is unconditionally wrong’.⁵³ Chatton elaborates on this issue in the reply to conclusions 3 and 4

⁴⁹ This distinction was pointed out by Brower-Toland 2015, p. 232: “(…) a single act of judgment is comprised of two distinct types of act: a complex or propositional apprehension and a separate act of assent ‘by virtue of which the intellect takes (*asserit*) the complex apprehension (*complexum*) to be true.” A detailed analysis of the apprehension-assent issue can be found in this paper and in Keele 2003, pp. 41–48. See also Fedriga, Limonta 2020, pp. 241–248.

⁵⁰ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 63): “Dico quod dubium est, quando est dictamen evidens, utrum intellectus necessario assentiat; saltem hoc est certum, quod potest assentire.”

⁵¹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 63): “Tamen ad propositum dico quod nulla syllogizatione vel dictamine potest intellectus assentire Deum esse malum propter se, quia nec aliquod dictamen evidens potest habere ad hoc.”

⁵² Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 12, n. 20: “Ad aliud cum dicitur ‘aliquis odit Deum propter creaturam; dicitur ab aliquibus quod Deus potest odiri propter se.—Tamen illud non teneo, quia non credo quod voluntas possit odire eum plus quam se quam intellectus possit assentire quod Deus est malus propter se. Sed hoc non potest intellectus facere, loquendo de intellectu bene disposito.”

⁵³ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 104): “Quantum ad tertiam conclusionem opinionis, si viator potest odire beatitudinem, vel etiam videns Deum, possit odire fruitionem beatificatam, si illam non haberet, videtur dicendum quod accipiendo voluntarium simpliciter prout distinguitur contra voluntarium mixtum, potest dici quod non potest voluntas

in the same part of the *Lectura* I where he postulates that the intellect cannot dissent from certain principles that regulate human (practical and speculative) cognition, one of these principles holding that ‘having happiness is a good *per se* and *propter se*’.⁵⁴ Therefore, once the intellect properly cognizes God as God, it cannot assent to understanding God as evil, and consequently, the will cannot nill/hate God.

To sum up, Chatton’s argument unfolds in the following stages: there is no evidence that God is evil, while evidence is required for the intellect to assess something as true; there is a distinction between the apprehension and the assent of the intellect; although the intellect may have the notion that God is evil and apprehend the hatred of God for God’s own sake, the intellect cannot find any evidence to support this claim and truly assent to the hatred of God for God’s own sake; therefore, no assent like this can take place. Consequently, the will cannot hate God *propter se*.⁵⁵

Debating this issue, Chatton delves into the idea of the possibility of a person nilling God and hating God. An object of immense interest, this problem was approached from multiple angles, stirring a multifaceted debate that tackled issues as varied as whether a person could hate/nill God, whether a person could hate/nill God to exist, and whether God could induce an act of hatred of God in a person, with the latter developed into a discussion of God acting

creata nolle eam, maxime si credet sibi talem possibile, quia intellectus non potest assentire quod simpliciter esset malum propter se habere talem beatitudinem, igitur non potest propter se simpliciter nolle sibi eam, si sit possibilis.” Ibidem (p. 105): “(...) sed simpliciter assentire non potest propter se quod malum esset habere eam; igitur etc. Unde intellectus non assentit quod ipsum sit malum propter se, igitur non potest voluntas efficaciter odire eum propter se.”

⁵⁴ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 104): “(...) quia inter principia practica regulantia appetitum concupiscentiae, hoc est unum de primis, quod habere beatitudinem est per se bonum et propter se; sed principia prima practica intellectus non plus erant quam circa prima principia speculativa.”

⁵⁵ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, pp. 58–60); Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 105): “Quantum ad quartam conclusionem opinionis, utrum viator possit odire Deum propter se, scilicet odio distincto contra fruitionem quae est dilectio Dei propter se, quia aliud odium non est ad propositum. Et dico quod nulla creatura potest causare odium Dei propter se, ita quod ideo odiat Deum quia ipse est Deus. Probo per priora, quia intellectus dictans ipsum esse malumper hoc quod ipse est Deus, si intelligat significatum termini, nullo modo assentit; igitur nec voluntas potest causare actum odiendi ipsum propter hoc quod ipse novit ipsum esse Deum.” Cf. Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 12, n. 20; cf. note 52.

via absolute or ordained power.⁵⁶ The possibility of nilling God was pondered, for instance, by Ockham in his *Sentences* I, distinction I, question 6, where he argued against the idea that the will always consented to the rule of willing or nilling what God wanted to be willed or nilled.⁵⁷ In his considerations, Ockham availed himself of suicide as, in his view, a convincing illustration.⁵⁸ Entering the debate triggered by Aristotle's example of suicide,⁵⁹ Ockham maintained that the act of suicide meant simply nilling to exist. Thus, nilling to exist entailed nilling happiness and good since, as Marilyn McCord Adams rightly observes, happiness "logically and metaphysically presupposes existence."⁶⁰ From this premise, Ockham reasoned that a person could nill both a particular good and the ultimate good; consequently, a person could nill God.⁶¹ Likewise, the will could consciously and deliberately want evil, even though recognizing evil for what it was. Some scholars have suggested that Ockham even believed that one could want and pursue evil for evil's sake,⁶² although he never stated that

⁵⁶ The distinction gained quite a popularity among medieval authors especially in the 13th and 14th centuries. See, for example, Olivi, *Sent.* II, vol. III, q. 116, auctoris argumentatio (ed. Jansen 1922, p. 347); Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 6, q. 1, nn. 12–13 (editio Vaticana 2001, p. 28); Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 6, q. 2 (editio Vaticana 2001, pp. 35–67); Duns Scotus, *Notabilia super Metaphysicam*, lib. 5, par. 271 (ed. Pini 2017, p. 86); Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 500–507); Ockham, *Sent.* IV, q. 16 (ed. Wood, Gál, Green 1984, p. 352); Kilvington, *Sent.*, q. 2: *Utrum per opera meritoria augeatur habitus caritatis quo Deus est super omnia diligendus*, Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio A. 985, ff. 14rb, 16ra–b; Roseth, *Lectura*, q. 2, art. 1: *Utrum voluntas sit causa sui actus*, Vat. Lat. 1108, f. 17v.

⁵⁷ Ockham, *Sent.* I, *Ordinatio*, lib. I, dist. 48, q. unica (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 2000, pp. 689–690).

⁵⁸ Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, p. 504): "Praeterea, quicumque potest efficaciter velle antecedens, potest velle consequens scitum vel opinatum esse consequens; sed aliquis potest efficaciter velle non esse, et potest sciri evidenter quod non esse beatum est consequens ad non esse; ergo potest velle non esse beatus, et per consequens nolle beatitudinem. Assumptum patet, quia multi utentes ratione—tam fideles credentes vitam futuram quam infideles nullam vitam futuram credentes—interfecerunt se ipsos et exposuerunt se morti; ergo volebant non esse." See also Ockham, *Sent.* IV, q. 16 (ed. Wood, Gál, Green 1984, p. 350).

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, 1116b.

⁶⁰ McCord Adams 2006, p. 258.

⁶¹ Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, p. 504): "(...) quod non esset nisi tunc habuisset 'nolle' respectu beatitudinis non in generali tantum sed etiam in particulari. Secunda conclusio est quod aliquis potest nolle beatitudinem in particulari."

⁶² Adams 2006, pp. 260–261; Osborne 2012, pp. 442–443. Cf. Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 500–507); Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 8 (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1984, pp. 442–446).

explicitly. Chatton clearly disapproves of this view, and insists that evil cannot be loved for its own sake, and good cannot be hated for its own sake either.⁶³ The reason behind this assertion appears to be analogical to the case analyzed above and the distinction between dictate, apprehension, and assent. To love something for its own sake means assenting to it, and a human soul seems unable to truly assent to evil. Admittedly, Chatton acknowledges at some point that a person can hate God. He specifies, however, that this is only possible if a person is moved by something external to them, or when a person hates God for the sake of God's creation (*propter creaturam*). He adds that an act of the hatred of God for the sake of creatures can be understood in a twofold way: 1) as a whole in a compound sense; 2) in a divided sense, when love for created things makes a person hate God.⁶⁴

Chatton's endeavor to safeguard the freedom of the will—though again within certain bounds and not across the entire range of possible acts—also surfaces in the *Lectura* I, distinction 1, question 3, where he references three articles⁶⁵ from the 1277 condemnation,⁶⁶ most likely in order to distance his own position from the condemned theses. Chatton employs this strategy in his ponderings on future contingents, where he cautiously chooses phrasing and arguments, as explained by Bornholdt, “Chatton felt that he was playing with fire in even discussing these ideas, and his desire to avoid getting burned contributes to our exegetical problems.”⁶⁷ The same circumscription is also at play in his considerations on the will, which does not come as a surprise, given the accusations levelled against Ockham in 1324.⁶⁸ The first half of the 14th century witnessed a fierce debate on the so-called error of Pelagius, with numerous theologians engaging in the discussion on the implications of accepting double predestination and on the role of human deeds in salvation. Like Ock-

⁶³ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, pp. 63–64): “Verumtamen quia nullus potest assentire quod malum sit propter se diligendum, ideo dico quod non propter se potest diligere, sicut nec bonum propter se potest odire.”

⁶⁴ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 63); Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 12, n. 20: “Quod ergo ille actus quo aliquis odit Deum propter creaturam sit malus, potest intelligi dupliciter: vel quod totum sit volitum, vel quod amor creaturae moveat ad odium Dei ut prius.”

⁶⁵ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 98).

⁶⁶ For an informed account of the 1277 condemnation and its influence on theological debates, see Aertsen, Emery, Speer (eds.) 2001; Bianchi 1990; Thijssen 2018; Wippel 1977, pp. 169–201.

⁶⁷ Bornholdt 2017, p. 181.

⁶⁸ For more details on Ockham's view on double predestination and God's foreknowledge, see chapter 1 (especially sections 1.4–1.6), pp. 25–37.

ham, Chatton felt obliged to address the issue.⁶⁹ Having distanced himself from the error of Pelagius, Chatton outlines another scenario in which some nilling of God is indeed possible, under a certain condition though. As he explains, a person can hate God despite having some cognition of God,⁷⁰ because not every cognition culminates in a complex apprehension (*complexum*) that allows grasping it as true. This is the case with, for instance, a cognition based on false principles (*erraret in principiis*),⁷¹ and possibly also with the intellect not forming the *complexum* “God is good.” If so, the intellect does not assent to it, and consequently the will can nill it.⁷²

This discussion paves the way for Chatton to add yet another aspect to his concept of the moral act; namely, he posits that acts of volition and nolition are the only acts that the will can produce.⁷³ As noted above, in an act of willing or nilling, the will may direct itself towards any object, even an impossible one.⁷⁴ However, not all things can become actual objects of the will’s negative attitude (hatred), which means that not everything can become an object of nilling. Chatton reiterates that God cannot be actually nilled for God’s own

⁶⁹ For a more in-depth discussion of Chatton’s solution to avoid Pelagius’s error, see chapter 7, pp. 157–161.

⁷⁰ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, pp. 92, 98, 99, 127).

⁷¹ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, pp. 92, 127).

⁷² Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, pp. 97–98): “Quarto sic. Aequae possum cognoscere Deum, et tamen non assentire ipsum esse bonum sicut cognoscere creaturam non assentiendo ipsam esse bonam. Igitur similiter aequae cognoscere Deum non diligendo ipsum, sicut cognoscere creaturam non diligendo eam. Consequentia patet, quia non apparet quare magis necessario ad cognitionem Dei sequatur amor Dei, qui est actus causabilis mediante tali assensu, saltem amor qui est fructio, quam ille assensus qui natus est immediate causari a cognitione Dei. Antecedens probatur, quia stante cognitione Dei possum non discurrere vel formare complexa per quae causatur assensus rei significatione per istam ‘Deus est bonus’; igitur etc.”

⁷³ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 33, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 208): “Et videtur quod non, quia nullus actus videtur posse impri voluntati nisi nolle vel velle.”; Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 33, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 209): “Dico quod istud reputo verum, quod omnis actus quem voluntas libere elicit immediate est velle vel nolle.”; Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 126): “Et dico ad hunc intellectum quod dolor passionis qua Christus principaliter erat afflicto, non erat actus volitivus, sed erat actus causatus ad transmutationem organi corporis, quia sicut pluries tetigi, omnis actus causatus immediate a voluntate est volitio vel nolitio.”

⁷⁴ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, pp. 60, 66). Cf. Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, p. 503): “(...) igitur potest nolle omne sibi possibile,—et certum est quod potest nolle omne sibi impossibile,—ergo quilibet potest nolle.”

sake. While he concedes that the soul indeed seems to be able to null its own existence, he insists that this cannot happen in accordance with right reason.⁷⁵

4.4 Willing and Nilling in Absolute and Conditional Senses

To prove that the will cannot possibly either null to exist or null God to exist, Chatton elaborates on the problem in the *Reportatio*, book III, whereby he draws on the distinction between the absolute and conditional senses of willing and nilling,⁷⁶ a motif that became quite popular at that time.⁷⁷

Resorting to a rather hackneyed example of jettison,⁷⁸ derived from book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,⁷⁹ Chatton adopts Duns Scotus's interpretation informed by the distinction between willing in an absolute sense and nilling in a conditional sense. For Scotus, willing absolutely is identical with an act of the present will (*volo*), while the act of nilling conditionally remains in the realm

⁷⁵ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 66): "Ad primum argumentum principale concedo quod anima potest velle se non esse, licet non secundum rectam rationem?"

⁷⁶ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 128): "Sed ego dico ad praesens quod aliquis est dolor qui sequitur nolle vel velle absolutum; aliquis est qui sequitur velle vel nolle conditionale, sicut patet de illo qui videt [tempestatem] necesse vult velle absolute proicere merces in mari, nollet tamen conditionali nolitione, si aliter posset evadere, et ex tali nolitione causatur tristitia." For the analysis of God's willing and nilling in terms of necessity and contingency as employed by Chatton in the debate on the future contingents, see Bornholdt 2017.

⁷⁷ For more insights into the distinction between these two senses of willing and into the senses of conditionality in medieval philosophy and theology, see Bornholdt 2017; Gelber 2004; Knuuttila 1993, pp. 182–196; Knuuttila 1996, pp. 127–143; Knuuttila 2004, pp. 208–209, 263–271; Knuuttila, Holopainen 1993, pp. 115–132; Robiglio 2006, pp. 165–166.

⁷⁸ The example was quite a staple in medieval philosophical and theological commentaries. It was especially popular with medieval authors who examined the notions of voluntary and involuntary acts. As it would be impossible to list here all the authors who employed the Aristotelian case, I offer a fairly representative sample. See, for example, Alexander of Hales, *Sent.* III, dist. 34, n. 50 (ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, p. 435); Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, dist. 25, pars 2, art. unicus, q. 4 (ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, p. 615); Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, q. 3, art. 12 (editio Leonina 1982, p. 92); Aquinas, *Sent.* IV, dist. 29, q. 1, art. 1, corpus, l. 5; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 13, solutio (ed. Wilson 1987, p. 148); Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* XII, q. 26, solutio (ed. Decorte 1987, p. 153); Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. III (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 155); Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, Prologus, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, p. 18); Holcot, *Sent.* I, q. 2 (ed. Witt, Lyon 518, f. 27ra).

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, III, 1101a.

of possibility, provided that the person could will otherwise (*si possem aliud*).⁸⁰ Chatton argues likewise: if someone sees a storm coming, they will in an absolute sense to throw the cargo into the sea; yet, (s)he could nill to jettison it by virtue of a conditional nolition, supposing that the situation were otherwise—namely, if there were any other chance to save her/his life. In other words, if, under other circumstances, there were an alternative solution to avoid the threat of death, (s)he would nill to dispose of the merchandise into the sea.⁸¹

According to a different account, which was advanced, for instance, in Ockham's *Quaestiones variae*, question 6, article 9,⁸² a person wills conditionally to throw out the cargo, with the coming storm representing the circumstances that make the moral agent act in this particular way in order to save her/his life. In his interpretation, Chatton not only differentiates between absolute (unconditional) and conditional willing/nilling, but also provides an account of virtual conditionality, that is, the act of nilling by virtue of a conditional nolition, which he calls virtual as opposed to formal. To distinguish between formal and virtual acts of the will, Chatton again cites assent, this time in his examination of the nature of the act of hope. The act of hope can be called formal if there is firm assent to follow this act, but it is virtual if someone wills to will to assent.

⁸⁰ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, dist. 15, q. unica, n. 58 (editio Vaticana 2006, p. 504): “Praeter modos trislandi praedictos duos (vel tres, si secundus modus dividatur in duos), videtur posse poni tertius (vel quartus) modus trislandi: propter nolle condicionatum, quando scilicet aliquis nollet aliquid quantum in se esset, tamen in aliquo casu vult illud. Exemplum: mercator, periclitans in mari, nollet—si posset—eicere merces; sed hoc nolle est condicionatum, scilicet, quantum in ipso est, nollet, tamen simpliciter vult eicere, quia non coactus ab extrinseco eicit: licet enim propter aliquid non volitum, puta periculum, eiciat, tamen non cogitur invitus eicere. Haec volitio absolute exprimeretur per ‘volo’, nolitio condicionata per ‘nollem si possem aliud’” Ibidem (pp. 526–527). Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, dist. 26, q. unica, n. 116 (editio Vaticana 2007, pp. 38–39). Cf. Duns Scot, *Lectura* III, dist. 15, q. unica, nn. 79–81 (editio Vaticana 2003, pp. 383–384).

⁸¹ Interestingly, Chatton analyzes this example in the *Lectura* I as well, but in a different context, focusing on the dilemma of pleasure and love and their connection to the acts of will. Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, pp. 60–79). See also Kitanov 2003, pp. 324–328.

⁸² Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 9 (ed. Etkorn, Kelley 1984, p. 265): “Ulterius sciendum est quod omnis delectatio et tristitia causatur in voluntate mediante volitione vel nolitione sicut patet ex praecedentibus. Sed volitio et nolitio est duplex: quaedam absoluta, quaedam condicionata. Absoluta est illa qua simpliciter volo aliquid sine omni condicionem; condicionata est illa qua volo vel nolo sub condicionem, sicut nauta nolet proicere merces in mari si posset evadere submersionem. Et utraque tam volitio quam nolitio absoluta et condicionata est sufficiens ad causandum tristitiam et delectationem modo prius declarato.”

It seems that besides the factor of actual versus virtual cognition, as discussed above, the notion of a virtual act of the will is augmented with a second-order component. While a formal act of the will is a first-order act, a virtual one involves willing to will.⁸³ Willing and nilling in an absolute sense mean actual volition and nolition, respectively. Thus, as Chatton argues, the act of nilling to dump the cargo in a conditional sense can co-exist in a soul with the actual act of willing to dump the cargo.⁸⁴ Although Chatton does not talk of *velleitas*, his solution appears to revive this concept.⁸⁵ Popular in the 12th century and the first half of the 13th century with authors such as Peter of Poitiers (1130–1205), Stephen Langton (1150–1228), William of Auxerre (1150–1231),⁸⁶ and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274),⁸⁷ *velleitas* was commonly evoked to distinguish a simple act of the will (*vult*), which is actual, from a conditional one (*vellet*), which could come forth under certain conditions. By the 14th century, the term had fallen out of favor with thinkers, who adopted the terminology of *voluntas absoluta* and *voluntas condicionalis*. I shall return to the notion of *velleitas* and the *volo-vellem* distinction in Chapter 5.

Debating the case of jettison, Chatton ponders whether the will can simultaneously produce an act of willing and an act of nilling, yet another dilemma that attracted the attention of 13th- and 14th-century philosophers and theologians. Known as synchronic (simultaneous) and diachronic (successive) contingency in the modern literature, the issue was vividly analyzed by Duns Scotus in his

⁸³ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 26, q. unica, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2005, p. 190): “Et primo distinguo de spe. Uno modo accipitur pro passione. Alio modo pro qualitatibus ad quarum praesentiam causatur talis passio. Terio modo pro virtute moderativa huiusmodi passionis. Sed nullo istorum modorum loquor hic, sed de spe quae est virtus theologica respectu futurae beatitudinis. Et isto modo dupliciter potest accipi, scilicet formaliter, et sic non est nisi assensus firmus quo quis assentit quod Deus dabit sibi beatitudinem. Alio modo, et sic est illud velle quo quis vult se ipsum assentire.” Ibidem (p. 191): “(...) si loquaris de sperare virtualiter, tunc est velle me assentire etc., et istud velle potest esse affectio iusti et commodi. Si accipias formaliter, tunc nec sic nec sic, sed est actus imperatus.”

⁸⁴ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2005, p. 129): “Similiter, quando quis vehementer diligit, et tamen nollet diligere, potest nolle condicionaliter illud quod vult absolute.”

⁸⁵ For more details of this notion and the authors who employed it, see Knuutila 2004, pp. 208–209; Saarinen 1994, pp. 66–82.

⁸⁶ William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, lib. I, tract. XIV (ed. Ribaillier 1986, p. 235): “Queritur de velleitate sive de voluntate condicionali. Quarto queritur de velleitate sive de voluntate condicionali; est enim velleitas promptitudo volendi sub hac conditione.”

⁸⁷ For an analysis of Aquinas’s employment of the notion of *velleitas*, see Robiglio 2002, pp. 50–55, 75–82.

Lectura I, distinction 39, to make a case for the possibility of the will's freedom with regard to opposite acts.⁸⁸ Suffice it to say, the idea was a source for quite a number of 14th-century theories, and Chatton was no exception. In the *Reportatio* III, Chatton elaborates on the problem tackled in the *Reportatio* I by claiming that it is impossible to will and nill the same thing simultaneously, since willing and nilling contradict each other. In this context, he resorts to the terminology of effective (*efficaciter*) willing and nilling, the acts that result from the will's assent to or dissent against an object. Thus, for Chatton, if the will assents to something, it cannot concurrently nill it by virtue of dissent.⁸⁹

In the case of jettison, Chatton solves the dilemma by falling back again on his distinction between conditional and absolute senses. Since willing and nilling are mutually exclusive acts, the will cannot will and nill the same thing at once; thus, they cannot coincide in a soul. Nevertheless, Chatton does not entirely rule out such a concomitance, explaining that willing and nilling can co-occur as long as they are not taken in the same sense. The two acts are not contradictory *per se* if one understands the former in a conditional sense and the latter in an absolute sense, for instance, if one considers 1) an absolute act of willing to love and 2) a conditional act of nilling to love what is actually loved. They do indeed contradict each other, but only indirectly (*indirecte et mediate*),⁹⁰ because, as Chatton reasons, the two acts have two different objects.⁹¹ Absolute willing has love for a person as its object, whereas the object

⁸⁸ For a scrutiny of this problem in Scotus's works, see, for example, den Bok 2000, pp. 243–254; Knuutila 1993, pp. 139–149; MacDonald 1995, pp. 169–174; Normore 1996, pp. 161–174. For more information on Scotus's concept of contingency, see chapter 6 (especially section 6.2), pp. 139–154.

⁸⁹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 3, q. 6, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, pp. 335–336): “Si sic, sequeretur quod eadem anima indivisibilis simul posset velle et nolle idem, efficaciter et ultimate. Consequens falsum; (...) Sed falsitas consequentis patet, quia non potest anima simul velle et nolle idem tanquam assentire et dissentire eidem simul, sed illud est impossibile; igitur etc.”

⁹⁰ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 128): “Ex hoc arguo: cum velle absoluto prociendi merces in mari stat nolle condicionalis; igitur multo magis cum illo velle absoluto stabit tristitia conformis illi nolitioni condicionali”; Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 129): “Eodem modo arguo per oppositum de passione doloris stante et volitione seu dilectione illius de quo doloris vel de velle exsequi etc. Similiter quando quis vehementer diligit, et tamen nollit diligere, potest nolle condicionaliter illud quod vult absolute. (...) Nec tamen contrariuntur directe et per se, sed indirecte et mediate.”

⁹¹ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 128): “Similiter aliquis experitur se aliquid diligere, et tamen simul cum hoc experitur in se actum nolendi oppositum condicionalem. Nec tamen sunt contraria, quia obiectum unius actus est illud quod experitur per simpliciores categoriam et obiectum alterius illud quod experitur per condicionalem.”

of conditional nilling is a second-order act of not willing what is willed, that is, an act of not willing to will to love the person. Chatton's reference to different objects in the discussion of synchronic contingency is again sourced from Scotus, who stresses that the will can indifferently will various objects, various acts, and various effects.⁹²

The problem of the impossibility of simultaneous willing and nilling, posed in the *Reportatio* I, is undertaken by Adam Wodeham (ca. 1295–1358),⁹³ one of Chatton's students who attended his lectures in London (ca. 1317–1321). In the *Lectura secunda* (ca. 1320s), Wodeham quotes passages from Chatton's *Reportatio* I, and advances two arguments to refute his teacher's claims. In Wodeham's view, the acts of willing and nilling the same thing can co-occur in a soul, because they are not contrary acts.⁹⁴ They do not contradict each other formally,⁹⁵ that is, they are not fully executed yet as the acts of the will. In his reply to Chatton, Wodeham sets an effective act of the will understood as a complex one apart from a mere inclination of the will towards something.⁹⁶ The notion of a complex volition surfaces in Wodeham's *Lectura* I, distinction I, question 5, where he deliberates on volition in terms of "a complex volition" (*volitio complexa*) and "a simple volition" (*volitio incomplexa*) to conclude that

⁹² For more details, see den Bok 2000, pp. 243–254.

⁹³ For an account of Wodeham's life and works, see Courtenay 1978, pp. 160–181; Slotemaker 2019, chapt. 2; Wood, Gál 1990, vol. I, pp. 5ⁿ–10ⁿ. For new evidence on the dating of Wodeham's lectures, see Schabel 2020, pp. 66–72. I wish to thank Severin Kitanov for his expert comments on the first draft of the section on Adam Wodeham.

⁹⁴ Although in his reply to Chatton Wodeham focuses on the argument that willing and nilling are not contradictory, and thus they can exist simultaneously, in the *Prologus* to his *Lectura*, he cites willing and nilling as an example of contradictory acts, claiming that the will can have both of them even with regard to the same object. He does not specify, however, whether this can happen simultaneously. Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, Prologus, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, p. 20): "Nam voluntas respectu eiusdem obiecti potest habere actus contrarios, puta velle et nolle (...)"

⁹⁵ It seems that Wodeham uses the term *formaliter* here in the same sense as Chatton uses *efficaciter*.

⁹⁶ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 3, q. 5 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, p. 215): "Et cum dicis 'tunc contraria [essent] simul,' non sequitur, quia etiam secundum te illi actus non sunt contrarii formaliter, licet persecutiones in quas inclinant sint contrariae." Wodeham also provides a supporting argument by pointing out various reasons why the soul can will and nill the same thing. Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 3, q. 5 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, p. 216): "(...) sed ille esset nolle alterius rationis ab illo nolle qui stare potest simul cum tali velle (...). Sed illud velle esset alterius rationis ab isto velle quod conceditur simul stare cum tali nolle."

a human soul can have both of them.⁹⁷ In his reflection on Chatton's simple and complex cognitions, Wodeham develops an interesting concept of his own, equating volitions (as well as emotions) with cognition of a certain kind. In his analysis, Dominik Perler highlights this element of volition and observes that volition entails a cognizing element. Having examined the nature of this cognizing component, Perler insists that it is an apprehending cognition "grasping the content," rather than a "full-fledged judgement," and stresses that,

In his [Wodeham's] third thesis, he unequivocally says that "a volition one has formed is an apprehending volition, not an assenting one" and argues for this claim as follows: "... something pleasurable can be loved as apprehended if it is apprehended exclusively by a simple, non-complex cognition. And something can be loved when it is apprehended in a complex way, without there being any assent or dissent. Therefore, a volitional act is only an apprehension."⁹⁸

In his paper on Wodeham's take on emotions and cognitions, Martin Pickavé⁹⁹ shows that this unusual approach is Wodeham's original contribution to the discussion on emotions and volitions and that it, as it were, anticipates contemporary theories of emotions. Taking a cognitivist stand, Wodeham claims that some volitions may comprise a cognitivist component, and their content "can be equally either a proposition or a simple object."¹⁰⁰ Although, in Wodeham's view, some volitions are cognitions (with a propositional component), and some even involve an act of assent, not all volitions are such, as Pickavé underlines. The human soul can experience various kinds of volitions. Thus, as Severin Kitanov rightly notes, "[a]ll volitions are cognitions to the extent to which volitions include an act of apprehension and, sometimes, an act of assent or dissent to a propositional content."¹⁰¹ Wodeham's distinction between these two kinds of cognition involved in willing and forming an act of the will apparently follows Chatton's subtle arguments as presented above.

Remarkably, Chatton's investigation of willing and nilling devotes no special attention to *non-velle*, that is, a suspension of the will's decision till later, a topic that was eagerly debated by philosophers and theologians, such as Scotus,¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 1, q. 5 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, pp. 281–282).

⁹⁸ Perler 2005, pp. 266–267. [transl. Perler]

⁹⁹ Pickavé 2012, pp. 94–115. See also Knuuttila 2004, pp. 275–283.

¹⁰⁰ Pickavé 2012, p. 102.

¹⁰¹ Kitanov 2013, p. 76.

¹⁰² Duns Scot, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 118 (editio Vaticana 1960 p. 100): "Item dico quod duo sunt actus voluntatis positivi, scilicet nolle et velle; et licet nolle non sit nisi respectu

Ockham,¹⁰³ Richard Kilvington,¹⁰⁴ and John Buridan,¹⁰⁵ who all agreed that the will could indeed find itself in the state of not-willing. Although the authors differed on whether the act of not-willing (*non-velle*) was an active or passive state of the will, they affirmed its significance in moral decision-making.¹⁰⁶ Possibly, the will cannot be in the state of suspension for Chatton, since whenever he considers the acts of the will, he always talks of either willing or nilling.¹⁰⁷ He observes that the will can suspend the action of the intellect,¹⁰⁸ but he never entertains the idea of the will suspending its own action. It may suggest that Chatton finds the idea of the will at rest absurd. The stages of the will's choice-making recounted above imply that if the will suspends the intellect's consideration of 'A', it is because the will does not like 'A', and thus immediately nills 'A'. Therefore, the will inferably is not only free to decide about its own acts and to stop or suspend the action of

alicuius quod habet rationem mali, vel respectu obiecti defectivi, tamen voluntas potest negative non velle obiectum in quo est nihil mali nec ratio obiecti defectivi, quia sua libertas est ad contradictoria; unde licet non potest nolle beatitudinem, potest tamen non velle illud."

¹⁰³ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 1, q. 16 (ed. Wey 1989, p. 88): "Potest tamen evidenter cognosci per experientiam, per hoc quod homo experitur quod quantumcumque ratio dicit aliquid, potest tamen voluntas hoc velle vel non velle vel nolle." Cf. Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, p. 506): "Si autem accipiatur frui large pro actu appetendi, sic dico quod finem ultimum, sive ostendatur in generali sive in particulari, sive in via sive in patria, potest absolute voluntas eum velle vel non velle vel nolle." Cf. Ockham, *Sent.* III, lib. III, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etzkorn 1982, p. 156): "Aliter potest dici quod non est in potestate cuiuscumque semper suspendere actum voluntatis simpliciter quin si praesententur voluntati mala obiecta, licet voluntas posset suspendere actum suum circa unum obiectum vel aliud, non tamen respectu cuiuscumque."

¹⁰⁴ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. X (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 334): "Ad quintum principale: conceditur conclusio quod prudens habens rationem dictantem quod suspendendus est aliquis actus prudentiae per aliquod tempus futurum propter rationabile melius, haberet secundum rectam rationem suspendere illum actum per tale modicum tempus."

¹⁰⁵ Johannes Buridanus, *Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, lib. III, q. 1 (1513, f. 41vb): "Peto ergo utrum voluntas cum fuerit ita in suspenso sit aliquid passa ab obiecto vel qualitercumque immutata aut non."; Ibidem (f. 41vb): "Nota quod quaestio specialiter hic est intelligenda quoad ordinata in finem de quibus in prima quaestione dicebatur quod voluntas libere potest velle aut nolle aut differre."

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, "Introduction" (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 13–14); Osborne 2012, p. 450; Pironet 2001, pp. 199–220.

¹⁰⁷ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 15, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, pp. 126–129); Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 3, q. 6, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, pp. 335–336); Chatton, *Reportatio* II, dist. 5, q. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 240).

¹⁰⁸ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 6, n. 98: "Alio modo, quia voluntas mala suspendit intellectum a vera consideratione et facit illum ab illa desistere."

the intellect, but also dependent on nothing except itself. This again proves that Chatton views the will as the most significant factor in moral decision-making, one that is constantly active, in the state of either willing or nilling.

4.5 Conclusion

The historians of medieval thought agree that Chatton deserves our attention for his vigorous involvement in the debate on future contingents and for his extensive philosophical critique of Ockham's ontological concepts, which culminated in the formulation of his own philosophical idea, or what Rondo Keele has called "the Chatton Principle."¹⁰⁹ However, this historical portrayal needs some refining brushstrokes. Chatton's ethical considerations show that his engagement with ethical dilemmas was by no means only incidental; nor was it merely instrumental in attacking the positions of his contemporaries who dealt with other philosophical and theological problems. His detailed inquiries, numerous and meticulous distinctions, and his dedication to terminological precision when examining the stages and components of moral decision-making prove his genuine interest in the ethical disputes of his day. His ethical investigation centers around the will and its acts, and in particular seeks to safeguard the freedom of the will.

Chatton charts a multipartite structure of the will-act. In doing this, he emphasizes a limited influence of the intellect via its judgments on the will's choice, and highlights the will's power to both accept and reject the intellect's inclination. The will can also, as Chatton underlines, act against what the intellect advises. Therefore, the will is not bound to assent to what the intellect offers. What is more, the will can make the intellect reconsider what was previously analyzed or divert it to consider other options. The will can even suspend the intellect's activity and make a choice without any actual cognizing. While an actual cognition is a valuable element of moral decision-making, it is not a requisite one. As a characteristic of the will, its capacity to deliberate virtually (rather than actually) on the alternative options, in particular the mutually contrary ones, is pivotal in safeguarding the freedom of the will. This suggests that Chatton's emphasis on the will's independence from the intellect's comprehension of a moral situation and from its assent to executing a given act is aligned with strong voluntarism. Chatton's voluntarist leanings are also borne out by his claim that the only power capable of determining the will's choices is the will itself.

¹⁰⁹ Keele 2018.

CHAPTER 5

SECOND-ORDER VOLITIONS

Monika Michałowska

5.1 Introduction

A second-order volition, a term coined by Harry Frankfurt, has become one of the central notions in contemporary debates on free will, employed to argue that some moral agents have the capacity to act freely. In Frankfurt's view, all agents are capable of wanting something, yet some are also capable of performing a higher act of the will that makes the first act of wanting its object. Let us imagine, for example, that I am passing by a pastry shop offering fine-dining chocolate desserts; I love chocolate and, following my wish, I buy one of them. My wish to eat a chocolate dessert is a direct desire; my act of deliberation on whether I want to want to eat this chocolate pastry, which confirms that I indeed identify myself with the wish, is a higher-order desire. Thus, Frankfurt distinguishes between first-order desires, which move an agent to act, and second-order desires, which are reflections on the former and result in an agent's self-identification with them.¹ For Frankfurt, this ability to reflect on one's desires is a necessary condition of having one's own will. He labels an agent incapable of forming second-order desires as a "wanton."² While Frankfurt's account of free will has provoked several critical responses,³ it has made a meteoric career for itself in compatibilist and incompatibilist discussions on free will, moral responsibility, control, and agency. His framework has been

¹ Frankfurt distinguishes various kinds of second-order acts, such as desires and volitions, yet for the purpose of this chapter, I will use them synonymously. Frankfurt 1971, pp. 5–20.

² Frankfurt 1971, p. 11.

³ For more details, see McKenna, Coates 2019, who provide an excellent survey of the criticism.

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

contested from various perspectives, one of which addresses the problem of an infinite regress⁴ of ever higher orders of acts. The endless series of higher-order acts mounting one upon another makes the verification of the acceptance or rejection of a first-order one impossible, and makes us wonder, to use Gary Watson's phrasing, "Can't one be a wanton, so to speak, with respect to one's second-order desires and volitions?"⁵

Although ground-breaking and galvanizing for contemporary discourse on free will, the notion of second-order volitions was doctrinally recognized, albeit not labelled as such, in medieval theories of free will. Yet, contemporary discussions on higher-order volitions rarely acknowledge the fact that several hierarchical accounts of the structure of the will were formulated in medieval philosophy. In fact, the idea can be traced back as early as Augustine's theory of the will, which provided a model for a series of its later medieval iterations, culminating in complex and multifaceted versions crafted in the late Middle Ages. Fourteenth-century philosophers and theologians not only advanced the debate on higher-order volitions and the reflexive structure of the will, but also perceived the problem of infinite regress. In this chapter, I trace the medieval development of the notion of higher-order volitions to analyze the approaches that 14th-century Oxford thinkers adopted to address this aspect of free will.

5.2 The Development of the Notion of High-Order Volitions

The issue of higher-order acts of the will has been shown to go back to Augustine (354–430), who gestured at a certain structural complexity of the will, which could refer to its own acts via acts of a higher order. Augustin's famous phrase *volo me velle* from *De Trinitate* has already been acknowledged to have played a significant role in the development of the notion of second order-volitions.⁶ As Augustine put it,

⁴ While Frankfurt is aware of this problem, he insists that there is an end to the series of desires, yet the reason he gives raises concerns. See Frankfurt 1971, p. 16: "Another complexity is that a person may have, especially if his second-order desires are in conflict, desires and volitions of a higher order than the second. There is no theoretical limit to the length of the series of desires of higher and higher orders; nothing except common sense and, perhaps, a saving fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively refusing to identify himself with any of his desires until he forms a desire of the next higher order."

⁵ Watson 1975, p. 217.

⁶ On the development of the concept of second-order volitions from Augustine to William of Auxerre, see Michałowska 2017.

For I remember that I have memory, understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, will, and remember; and I will that I will, remember, and understand. At the same time I remember my whole memory, understanding, and will.⁷

Although Augustine neither coined any precise terminology for nor elaborated on the problem, the phrase he used has made a groundbreaking career in the history of ideas. There is, however, some disagreement about to what extent Augustine's remark was indeed a conscious word choice meant to differentiate first- and second-order volitions, and whether his concept indeed provides a scaffolding for a multi-layered structure of the will or whether it merely indicates the indecisiveness of the moral subject caught between two competing inclinations or desires.⁸ Augustine's theory of the will is difficult to reconstruct for two reasons. Firstly, he investigated the will-problem in many of his works (ranging from his early to his late writings), which frequently were his responses to the theological problems widely discussed in his day. Secondly, Augustine's terminology tends to be vague.⁹ While discussing the will-problem, Augustine himself employs, often synonymously, an array of terms, such as the will (*voluntas*), to will (*velle*), to incline (*inclinare*), to intend (*intendere*), to choose (*eligere*), to wish/desire (*desiderare*), to consent (*consentire*), and to assent (*assentire*). As a result, Augustine's understanding of the will extends over a comprehensive range of elements and acts attributed to the will (preliminary desire, acceptance of a desire, intention, approval, and choice). Consequently, his definition of the will (and second-order volition as well) is inherently contextual and embedded in ethical discussions devoted to other issues and not designed to specify what the will actually is. The conflict between different (even opposing) desires is experienced by the soul as the tension of partition, of being split into two desires: partial willing and partial non-willing, neither of which is capable of forcing the will to make a decision on how to act. As Augustine states,

⁷ Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lib. X, cap. 11 (ed. Mountain 1968, p. 331): "Memini enim me habere memoriam et intellegentiam et uoluntatem, et intellego me intellegere et uelle atque meminisse, et uolo me uelle et meminisse et intellegere, totamque meam memoriam et intellegentiam et uoluntatem simul memini." [transl. McKenna 2002 p. 58]

⁸ For more details of the discussion on Augustine's account of second-order volitions, see Ekenberg 2016, pp. 9–24; Rist 1994, pp. 184–185; Saarinen 1994, pp. 28–29; Stump 2006, pp. 125–135.

⁹ Kahn 1998, pp. 255–259; Stump 2001.

Evidently, then, it does not want this thing itself with the whole of itself, and therefore the command does not proceed from an undivided mind. Inasmuch as it issues the command, it does will it, but inasmuch as the command is not carried out, it does not will it. What the will is ordering is that a certain volition should exist, and this volition is not some alien thing, but its very self. Hence it cannot be giving the order with its whole self. It cannot be identical with that thing which it is commanding to come into existence, for if it were whole and entire it would not command itself to be, since it would be already. This partial willing and partial non-willing is thus not so bizarre, but a sickness of the mind, which cannot rise with its whole self on the wings of truth because it is heavily burdened by habit. There are two wills, then, and neither is the whole: what one has the other lacks.¹⁰

The notion of willing to will was later pondered by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), who focused on the theological aspect of higher volitions, and further associated them with willings to sin. Much like with Augustine, there is a discussion among contemporary historians of philosophy on whether Anselm actually formulated and championed an account of second-order volitions. The opponents of the view that Anselm’s philosophical interest lay in the hierarchical structure of the will address the problem from an epistemological perspective and argue that the two levels are in fact two modes of willing.¹¹

Anselm tackled the issue within the framework of the discussions on sin, free will, and free choice versus involuntary acts (*inuitus facere*) rife in this day. Although the term “involuntary” had been introduced by Augustine, it was in fact meaningfully ushered into the will-debate by Anselm.¹² To prove that the freedom of the will could not be reductively equated with the ability to sin

¹⁰ Augustine, *Confessiones*, lib. VIII, cap. 9.21 (ed. Verheijen 1981, pp. 126–127): “Sed non ex toto uult: non ergo ex toto imperat. Nam in tantum imperat, in quantum uult, et in tantum non fit quod imperat, in quantum non uult, quoniam uoluntas imperat, ut sit uoluntas, nec alia, sed ipsa. Non itaque plena imperat; ideo non est, quod imperat. nam si plena esset, nec imperaret, ut esset, quia iam esset. Non igitur monstrum partim uelle, partim nolle, sed aegritudo animi est, quia non totus assurgit ueritate subleuatus, consuetudine praegratuus. Et ideo sunt duae uoluntates, quia una earum tota non est et hoc adest alteri, quod deest alteri” [transl. Boulding 1997, p. 201]

¹¹ For more particulars of Anselm’s concept and the discussion on whether Anselm advocates the theory of second-order volitions, see Fedriga, Limonta 2016, pp. 357–386; Goebel 2006, pp. 5–37; Rogers 2008, pp. 66–67; Tyvoll 2006, pp. 155–171.

¹² Augustine, *De spiritu et littera*, cap. 31.53 (ed. Urba, Zycha 1913, p. 210): “Quanquam, si subtilius aduertamus, etiam quod quisque inuitus facere cogitur, si facit, uoluntate facit; sed quia mallet aliud, ideo inuitus, hoc est, nolens facere dicitur.” I wish to thank Riccardo Fedriga for drawing my attention to this doctrinal fact.

(since angels and God, while unable to sin, had free will), Anselm contrasted two meanings of “involuntarily” (unwillingly) by setting willing involuntarily (*velle invitus*) against being involuntarily tortured (*torqueri invitus*). While the state of being tortured can take place without a person’s will, and thus be intrinsically involuntary, willing always lies in the will’s power, “[f]or everyone who wills, wills his own willing.”¹³ To further explore the claim that an act of willing is always willed, Anselm comes up with an example of a liar who lies in order to save her/his life, and thus has two conflicting desires for how to act: on the one hand, (s)he does not want to lie, but on the other hand (s)he wants to lie, because otherwise (s)he will lose her/his life. Since the liar actually does not want to lie, but wants it solely under certain circumstances, it seems that (s)he wills unwillingly. Yet, to stress that such a conclusion is faulty, Anselm employs another distinction: one between acting necessarily (*ex necessitate*) and acting unwillingly/involuntarily (*invitus*), and claims that the liar can choose how to act, and that her/his willing is not necessitated by anything. Consequently, (s)he wants to lie:

So in this sense someone who lies to avoid death is said to lie against his will, unwillingly, and from necessity, since he cannot avoid the lie without risking death. Therefore, just as someone who lies for the sake of his life is improperly said to lie against his will, since he is willing to lie, so also it is not properly said that his *willing* to lie is against his will, since he does not will to lie otherwise than willingly. For just as when he lies, he wills that lying, so also when he wills to lie, he wills that willing.¹⁴

The notion of second-order willing helps Anselm differentiate between two meanings of the term “the will.” One of them refers to the conflicting wills a moral agent has; it belongs to the realm of possibility (*in potestate*) and is, to a certain extent, contingent: it can be actualized or remain unfulfilled. The

¹³ Anselm, *De libertate arbitrii*, cap. 5 (ed. Schmitt 1938, pp. 214–215): “Sicut igitur qui mentitur propter vitam, improprie dicitur invitus mentiri, quoniam mentitur volens: ita non proprie dicitur invitus velle mentiri, quoniam hoc non nisi volens vult. Nam sicut cum mentitur, vult ipsum mentiri: sic cum vult mentiri, vult ipsum velle.” [transl. Williams 2007, p. 153]

¹⁴ Anselm, *De libertate arbitrii*, cap. 5 (ed. Schmitt 1938, p. 215): “Hoc igitur modo qui mentitur ne moriatur, mentiri invitus et nolens dicitur et ex necessitate; quia mendacium vitare non valet sine mortis difficultate. Sicut igitur qui mentitur propter vitam, improprie dicitur invitus mentiri, quoniam mentitur volens: ita non proprie dicitur invitus velle mentiri, quoniam hoc non nisi volens vult. Nam sicut cum mentitur, vult ipsum mentiri: sic cum vult mentiri, vult ipsum velle.” [transl. Williams 2007, p. 154]

other is the will understood as a capacity of the soul, an integral and inalienable power of the soul. While in the former sense, the will can be coerced and become weaker or stronger, in the latter, it is always free.

Advancing the discussion on the conditionality of the will, 12th-century theologians, such as Peter of Poitiers and Stephen Langton, analyzed the issue of willing to will (to sin) in a similar vein, and focused on the *volo-vellem* distinction as a specific dimension of higher-order volitions. In his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, Peter of Poitiers distinguished between "I will to be good" (*volo esse bonus*) and "I may have willed to be good" (*vellem esse bonus*), two sentences referring to different levels of the will's acting. While the former expresses a direct (first-order) act of the will, the latter concerns the will's willing—a reflective act of the will towards its own acting. Peter of Poitiers indicated two possible senses of *vellem*: a) a positive expression of the present wish to be such; and b) a negative expression of the wish for things to have been different than they actually were. It could thus concern a previous willing or manifest a conditional willing for things to have been otherwise.¹⁵ Although both senses of *vellem* represent a higher-level act of the will, the latter sense is more relevant to my further analysis, since it conveys a kind of conditionality that is presented to the will and remains in the realm of potentiality, rather than being the will's actual willing. This understanding of *vellem* was further discussed by Stephen Langton¹⁶ in his *Quaestiones theologiae*, where he perceived *vellem* as a conditional will that might become an actual willing of the will, and investigated "whether the desires that remain unrealized—not for the lack of opportunity or power, but because they are abandoned for the sake of something else—can be called a will (*voluntas*)," as Magdalena Bieniak

¹⁵ Peter of Poitiers, *Sententiae*, lib. II, cap. 14 (ed. Moore, Garvin, Dulong 1950, pp. 98–99): "Hoc enim verbum, scilicet *vellem*, vel est presens optativi modi vel est preteriti imperfecti coniunctivi. Si sit optativi, subintelligitur hoc adverbium *utinam* ut sit sensus: utinam vellem esse bonus, id est utinam addeset michi gratia qua habita dicerem vere: Volo esse bonus. Si vero sit preteriti imperfecti coniunctivi, is est sensus, scilicet: si addeset michi gratia, que quamdiu aberit, numquam vere potero dicere: Volo esse bonus, et: vellem esse rex, non tamen volo esse rex. Aliud ergo est 'vellem esse bonus' quam 'volo esse bonus' et hoc multis patet exemplis, ut ire vellem Romam si forte aliqua occurreret necessitas vel commoditas. Non tamen volo ire Romam."

¹⁶ Stephen Langton, *Magistri Stephani Langton Ex Summa Quaestionum Theologiae*, (ed. Quinto 1992, p. 140): "Ad hoc quidam uolunt et solent soluere dicentes quod uoluntas furandi est in isto non qua 'uult' furari, set qua 'uellet' furari; et cum dicitur 'iste uellet furari', sub conditione copulatur uoluntas quod uellet furari si sciret penam non sequi."

observes.¹⁷ Langton's notion of *vellem*¹⁸ furthered the development of second-order theories of the will, since it was associated with the distinction between an absolute (realized and unconditional) will and a conditional (unrealized but not impossible) will.¹⁹ This distinction would make a career in medieval will-debates, eventually contributing to the forging of sophisticated and multifaceted theories of higher-order volitions in the writings of John Duns Scotus, William Ockham,²⁰ and their 14th-century followers and critics, as shall be seen in the following sections of this chapter.

5.3 The Sources of 14th-Century Concepts of Second-Order Volitions: John Duns Scotus and William Ockham on Higher-Order Acts of the Will

Duns Scotus examines the possibility of higher-order volitions both in his early and in his mature writings, whereby he employs a vast range of terminology, such as a reflective act (*actus reflexus*), to reflect (*reflectere*), and willing to will (*volendo velle*). In the *Lectura* II, distinction 25, Scotus claims that both powers of the soul (the will and the intellect) are, to a certain extent, the cause of choice and co-operate in producing it, while neither of them is capable of effecting it on its own. However, he also underlines that the will is the principal (or rather more fundamental) cause²¹ in the sense that it is not constrained by the laws of

¹⁷ Bieniak (forthcoming).

¹⁸ William of Auxerre regarded Peter of Corbeil as the founder of this distinction, but the origin of the account of *velleitas* still remains uncertain and unidentified. Since the works of Peter of Corbeil have been lost, it is impossible to verify his authorship of the division, and Peter of Poitiers's commentary cannot be ruled out as another possible source of Langton's concept.

¹⁹ For more details of Langton's concept of the will, see Bieniak (forthcoming); Michałowska 2017.

²⁰ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 6, art. 11 (ed. Etzkorn, Kelley 1984, p. 303): "Quarta ratio est, quia voluntas reflectens se super actum suum voluntarie elicium." Cf. *Ibidem* (pp. 304–312).

²¹ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, dist. 25, q. unica, nn. 73–74 (editio Vaticana 1993, p. 254): "Voluntas tamen est causa principalior, et 'natura cognoscens' minus principalis, quia voluntas libere movet, ad cuius motionem movet aliud (unde determinat aliud ad agendum); sed natura 'cognoscens obiectum' est naturale agens, quod—quantum est ex parte sui—agit semper: numquam tamen potest esse sufficiens ad actum eliciendum, nisi concurrente voluntate; et ideo voluntas est causa principalior. Et hoc etiam patet per ea quae dicta sunt distinctione 3 primi libri, quod intellectus est causa principalior quam obiectum, respectu actus intelligendi. Ex hoc patet quomodo est libertas in voluntate. Nam ego dicor 'libere videre', quia libere possum

physics. More precisely, the will does not have to abide by Aristotle's principle of motion, which holds that everything that is in motion must be moved by something else, but the will can move itself.²² Although the will cooperates with the intellect to bring about an act of free choice, the will significantly differs from the intellect in being the only power of the soul that can commit itself to any act it chooses, including its own acts, such as willing to will.²³

Scotus reaffirms and consolidates this position in the *Ordinatio* I, distinction 1,²⁴ where he probes whether the will can suspend its own acts. To prove that the will's nature involves the possibility of being in the state of suspension, Scotus claims that the will is capable not only of redirecting the intellect's activity from cognizing one object to cognizing another, but also of completely averting the intellect's act from the object that is the goal of cognition, consequently deflecting the intellect's act from this particular cognition.²⁵ Interest-

uti potentia visiva ad videndum; sic in proposito, quantumcumque aliqua causa sit naturalis et semper uniformiter agens (quantum est ex parte sui), quia tamen non determinat nec necessitat voluntatem ad volendum, sed voluntas ex libertate sua potest concurrere cum ea ad volendum vel non volendum et sic libere potest uti ea, ideo dicitur 'libere velle et nolle' esse in potestate nostra." Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, dist. 34–37, q. 4, n. 123 (editio Vaticana 1993, p. 357). On Scotus's account of the will as a partial or total cause of choice and the role of the intellect in the *Lectura* II, distinction 25, and in the *Reportatio* II, distinction 25, see Dumont 2000, pp. 719–794; Ingham 2000, pp. 88–116.

²² Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, dist. 25, q. unica, n. 70 (editio Vaticana 1993, p. 253): "Ideo dico quod cum voluntate in ratione causae effectivae concurrat intellectus—actu intelligens obiectum—ad causandum actum volendi, ut sic breviter 'natura actu intelligens obiectum et libera' est causa velle et nolle; et in hoc consistit liberum arbitrium, sive in nobis sive in angelis."

²³ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, dist. 38, q. unica, n. 15 (editio Vaticana 1993, p. 375): "Ad aliud, quando arguitur quod 'intendere est per medium in aliud ferri et ordinari in aliud';—dicendum quod verum est. Sed dico quod sic ordinare et conferre non est tantum ipsius intellectus, sed voluntatis, quae potest ordinare unum in aliud et referre; et prout tunc refert unum in aliud, dicitur 'uti illo'; potest etiam reflectere se super se, volendo se velle."

²⁴ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 92 (editio Vaticana 1950, p. 66): "Ex hoc duae conclusiones: prima, ergo actus voluntatis magis est in potestate voluntatis quam aliquis alius actus; secunda, ergo actus ille est in potestate voluntatis non tantum mediate sed immediate. Ex prima ultra sic: actus intellectus circa finem est in potestate voluntatis; ergo et actus voluntatis. Ex secunda ultra sic: ergo si actus voluntatis sit in potestate voluntatis mediante actu alicuius alterius potentiae, multo magis est in potestate voluntatis immediate; sed in potestate voluntatis est velle vel non velle finem mediante actu intellectus; ergo hoc est in potestate voluntatis immediate. Minor patet, quia in potestate voluntatis est avertere intellectum a consideratione finis, quo facto voluntas non volet finem, quia non potest habere actum circa ignotum."

²⁵ See also Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, dist. 49, pars 1, q. 4, n. 185 (editio Vaticana 2013, p. 335): "Minor probatur: Quoad primam partem: tum 'quia obiectum voluntatis est finis,

ingly, Scotus claims that a reflexive act of the will presupposes a direct one, and thus he places the former on a different ontic level, granting it the status of a “meta-act.” Any direct act of the will is embedded in the will’s activity as such, which precedes all its direct acts. The aforementioned deflection has yet another consequence. Given that the will cannot have an act of willing something that is unknown, putting an end to the intellect’s act of cognizing an object means stopping the act of willing this particular object. Thus, for Scotus, the will controls the acts of the intellect to cognize or not to cognize an object, because it does or does not want to will this object. The reflexive character of the will is further examined with respect to the will’s ability to suspend its act. This scrutiny prompts Scotus to state that any act of the will (though not all acts at the same time) may be suspended by the will, this suspension becoming a second-order act in relation to a first-order act of either willing (*velle*) or nilling (*nolle*) something.²⁶

Scotus revisits the problem of second-order volitions in his *Ordinatio* I, distinction 47, where he delves into the causes of sinning and the meaning of the phrase “willing to allow” (*volens sinere*) in order to explain how sin is possible, given God’s foreknowledge, which seems to allow sins to happen. According to Scotus, God’s will can also comprise second-order volitions, and it can thus be regarded as involved in sinning in two senses: a) God’s will wills what God allows; and b) God’s will reflects on this act to realize that it is not willed. The conundrum spawned by the possibility of God permitting humans to sin provokes Scotus to explore the status of negative second-order volitions, and his

ergo omne velle est quoddam ordinari ad finem,—tum ‘quia velle non potest esse primum volitum (praesupponit enim aliud a velle prius esse volitum, quia actus reflexus praesupponit actum rectum terminatum ad aliud ab actu illius potentiae, alioquin esset processus in infinitum).’”

²⁶ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 1, pars 2, q. 2, n. 150 (editio Vaticana 1950, pp. 102–103): “Posset tamen dici quod ipsa voluntas per aliquod velle elicited imperat actionem potentiae inferioris vel prohibet. Non autem potest sic suspendere omne velle, quia tunc simul nihil vellet et aliquid vellet. Sed quidquid sit de suspensione omnis velle, saltem potest suspendere omnem actum circa istud obiectum per aliquod velle elicited, et hoc modo nolo nunc aliquid elicere circa istud obiectum quousque distinctius ostendatur mihi. Et istud nolle est quidam actus elicited, quasi reflexus super velle obiecti, non quod inest vel inluit, sed quod posset inesse; quod etsi in se non ostendatur, ostenditur tamen in sua causa, scilicet in obiecto ostenso, quod natum est esse principium actus in aliquo genere principii.” For more insights into the will’s suspending its own acts, see Ingham 2017; Koszkała 2019, pp. 146–150.

inquiry results in an emphatic distinction between a direct act (*actus rectus*) of the will and a reflexive one²⁷ (*actus reflexus*).²⁸ As Scotus explains,

And as for what is called “willing to allow,” this can be understood not as God’s having a direct willing concerning what he permits, but rather as a reflexive act. For *this person will sin* or *this person sins* is presented to the divine will. First his will has no willing with respect to this (for God cannot will that this person sin); second, he can understand his will’s not willing this, and then he can will his will’s not willing this. And that is what is meant by saying that God wills to allow and voluntarily allows, that he wills to permit and voluntarily permits. Similarly, in the case of Judas, when Judas is presented to the divine will, first God has a not-willing of glory for Judas—not, at first, a willing-against, according to the final position in distinction 41—and then, second, he can reflect on that negation of an act and will it. And thus what God willingly or voluntarily chooses is not that Judas will be a sinner to the end, or a willing-against glory for Judas, but rather his not-willing of glory for Judas.²⁹

²⁷ I use “reflexive” for Latin *reflexum*. Another term that is frequently employed in the literature is “reflective”; see, for example, Vos 2018, p. 298.

²⁸ This aspect of Scotus’s theory of second-order volitions as anchored in the opposition of active-passive acts of divine will and concerning God’s permitting/not allowing humans to sin is analyzed by Antonie Vos, who claims in Vos 2018, p. 299, “Here, there is divine not-willing which is willed by God. This willing is to be contrasted with God’s willing of sin which the necessity model proposes. Christian theology was in need of new developments and new developments in the theory of will, including negative acts of will, are vital to Duns Scotus’s theory of divine willing. The notion of a negative act of will is integrated with the notion of a second order, reflective act of will: God *wills that* he does *not* will! This is also the meaning of ‘volens sinere’ = willing to allow/to let.” For more details of this account, see Vos 2018, pp. 296–300.

²⁹ Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 47, q. unica, n. 9 (editio Vaticana 1963, p. 384): “Et quod dicitur ‘volens sinere’, hoc potest intelligi non quod habeat velle rectum circa illud quod permittit, sed actum reflexum: offert enim voluntati suae hunc peccatum vel peccare, et primo voluntas eius circa hunc non habet velle (velle enim ipsum habere peccatum non potest); secundo potest intelligere voluntatem suam non volentem hoc, et tunc potest velle voluntatem suam ‘non velle hoc’;—et ita dicitur volens sinere et voluntarie sinere, volens permittere et voluntarie permittere. Sicut ex alia parte, praesentato sibi Iuda: primo Deus habet non velle sibi gloriam, et non primo nolle (secundum illam ultimam positionem, distinctione 41); et potest tunc secundo reflectere super istam negationem actus, et velle eam,—et ita volens (sive voluntarie) non eligit Iudam finaliter peccatum et nolitionem gloriae, sed non volitionem gloriae.” [transl. Williams 2017, pp. 100–101] A detailed analysis of this passage can be found in Vos 2018, pp. 288–299.

This distinction between direct and reflexive acts is frequently employed by Ockham and becomes one of the central notions both in his study of higher-order volitions and in his theory of cognition. Ockham ascribes reflexivity to the will and the intellect alike, investigating the nature of first- and second-order acts and analyzing whether they are two separate acts or whether they are in fact one act. He devotes special attention to this query in *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, Reportatio*, question 17 (*Utrum actus rectus et reflexus sint idem realiter aut diversi actus*),³⁰ in *Quodlibeta septem*,³¹ quodlibet 2, question 12 (*Utrum actus rectus et reflexus sint unus actus*), and in *Quaestiones variae*, question 5. In his *Sentences* and *Quodlibet 2*, Ockham addresses the issue in relation to the activity of the intellect. The ability of the intellect to produce second-order acts, as Ockham observes, is embroiled in the problem of infinite regress. If, for example, I think about object 'A', and then want/or am naturally led to think about thinking about object 'A', I may also want/or be naturally led to think about "thinking about thinking about object 'A,'" and so forth. If these two acts are considered to be two/three/etc. acts of the intellect, rather than one continuous act of thinking, there may be no reason for the series of acts to come to an end. Aware of this complication, Ockham offers a lengthy analysis of the issue, in which he advances an array of arguments to support the claim that a direct act and a reflexive act must be two distinct acts. One of these arguments relies on a comparison of the intellect's operations to the way the will acts and produces its acts. Ockham cites the acts of love and hatred to insist that while they cannot be considered the same act (given their different natures), one can refer to the other (for instance, my love of chocolate can be an object of my disgust or even hatred when I am on diet). As Ockham claims:

Likewise a direct act of the will is not the same as [its] reflexive act; nor [is it] thus [the case for] the intellect. The antecedent is obvious, since the act of love is not the same as [the act] of hatred; yet one sometimes loves one's own hatred, thus etc.³²

³⁰ Ockham devotes entire question 17 in his *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, Reportatio* to the query whether a direct act is the same as a reflexive act in number and/or species, and specifically whether there is a real distinction between them, and consequently whether they can exist independently of each other.

³¹ Ockham mostly deals with this problem in quodlibet 2, question 12, but he also touches upon this issue in question 13 in the same quodlibet. See, Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 2, q. 12 (ed. Wey 1980, pp. 165–167), q. 13 (ed. Wey 1980, esp. pp. 171–173).

³² *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 2, q. 12 (ed. Wey 1980, p. 166): "Item non est idem actus rectus voluntatis et reflexus; igitur nec intellectus. Antecedens patet, quia non est idem actus amoris et odii; sed aliquis quandoque amat ipsum odium suum; igitur etc." [transl. M.M.]

The comparison between second-order acts of the intellect and the will is further elaborated on in question 5 in the *Quaestiones variae*, where Ockham scrutinizes the reflexivity of the will. He observes that although a direct act differs from a reflexive one, there is a relation between them. For both powers of the soul, a reflexive act depends on the direct one, without which it cannot exist. Ockham asserts that higher-order acts of the intellect are attributable to the activity of the will, which wants to cognize direct acts.³³ Therefore, the direct act aimed at cognizing an object becomes a starting point for and a condition of the appearance of the intellect's reflexive act. Yet, the intellect's activity alone does not suffice for the reflexive act to take place, and the involvement of the will is in fact a necessary condition for the intellect to reflect on its own prior act.³⁴ Ockham substantiates this notion with a reference to experiential knowledge (*experientia*), stating that if the act of the will were not indispensable, a cognizer would immediately and necessarily execute the process of thinking, exactly the way it is for love: a person in love does not necessarily realize that (s)he is in love, and another act (of a higher order) is needed to know that what (s)he feels is actually love.³⁵ Thus, if it were not for the involvement of the will, an infinite regress of the acts of the intellect reflecting on its previous acts would apparently be an inevitable consequence.³⁶ While a parallel reservation can be formulated for the act of the will, Ockham immediately underlines the difference between the will and the intellect in forming volitions of a higher-order, and emphasizes that the will can will a certain act of the intellect to be cognized (at a higher level), yet it cannot will another act of the intellect.³⁷ The difference

³³ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 177): "Ideo dico quod actus reflexus causatur ab actu recto tanquam ab obiecto et ab actu voluntatis quo vult illum actum intellegi. Quod autem causetur ab actu recto patet, quia actus reflexus necessario dependet ab actu recto quia non posset causari nisi existente actu recto. Igitur in aliquo genere causae dependet, et patet quod non—nisi sicut ab efficiente."

³⁴ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, pp. 177–178): "Quod autem actus voluntatis requiritur patet, quia aliquis potest aliquid intelligere et tamen non percipere se intelligere, sicut potest aliquis videre et tamen non percipere se videre"

³⁵ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 178): "Sed si actus reflexus causaretur praecise ab intellectu et actu recto, statim posito et stante actu recto, intellectus necessario statim perciperet se intelligere quod est manifeste contra experientiam." Ibidem (p. 179): "Et ita quando aliquis amat, non oportet quod percipiat se amare (...)"

³⁶ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 178): "Igitur requiritur actus voluntatis quo vult illum actum cognosci."

³⁷ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 178): "Et sic patet quod non oportet ponere processum in infinitum, quia potest voluntas velle unum actum intellectus cognosci absque hoc quod velit alium cognosci"

between the two powers of the soul is highlighted even more vividly with respect to their ability to reflect on their own and each other's acts: the will can reflect not only on the acts of the intellect but also on its own acts, which is an ability the intellect does not possess.³⁸

5.4. Walter Chatton on Willing the Opposite and Higher-Order Willing

The comparisons of higher-order volitions produced by the will and by the intellect undertaken by Ockham to reflect on the nature of these powers of the soul and on the production of second-order desires inspired Walter Chatton, who advanced this aspect of the will-debate. As already shown, Chatton contributed to the discussion on the will by introducing an assent as a key factor in the will's acting.³⁹ He also examined the role of the intellect in producing the will's acts in connection to higher-order volitions. The issue of first- and second-order volitions is addressed in article 6, question 13 of Chatton's *Quodlibets*, where he argues that the will can will the opposite of a person's final practical judgment, that is, that the will can act against the dictate of the intellect.⁴⁰ This serves as the point of departure for his considerations on the will choosing the contrary of what the intellect advises. Chatton begins by identifying two meanings of the expression *contrarium eligente*, which stands either for the will choosing the opposite of what is actually being done, as in when it wants the intellect not to deliberate something, or for the will willing the opposite of what the intellect dictates.⁴¹ As his case study, Chatton depicts a situation in which the will wants something, and in order to achieve this, it resolves to will all the

³⁸ Ockham, *Quaestiones variae*, q. 5 (ed. Kelley, Etkorn, Wey 1984, p. 178): "Ex hoc patet ad aliud quod est in potestate voluntatis reflectere se super actum suum et super actum intellectus. Et non est sic in potestate intellectus, quia est pure passivus. Et si esset activus adhuc, cum naturaliter ageret, non esset in eius potestate plus reflectere se super unum actum quam super alium?"

³⁹ For more details, see chapter 4, pp. 92–106.

⁴⁰ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, n. 1: "Quod sic probatur: quia anima rationalis potest appetere aliquid pertinens ad gustum et voluntas potest velle oppositum, et sicut in istis ita in aliis."; Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 1, n. 22: "Ad aliud dico quod stante dictamine in intellectu, voluntas potest in oppositum et velle oppositum."

⁴¹ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 6, n. 86: "Quando quaeritur utrum aliquis habitus etc., distingo de isto vocabulo 'contrarium eligente'. Quia uno modo potest intelligi quod voluntas contrarium eligat, scilicet quod velit intellectum non deliberare de aliquo certo tali. Alio modo quod voluntas velit oppositum illius quod dictatur ab intellectu, etc."

means that lead to this thing. He describes the process by listing several stages: 1) the will wants ‘A’; 2) the intellect shows the means leading to ‘A’; 3) the will must will the means; thus 4) it cannot will the opposite, because it has committed itself to want to will the means.⁴² At point 4, a second-order volition by virtue of which the will commits itself to will both what it wants and what the intellect shows as the proper means becomes binding and impossible to reject. With this structure in place, the intellect is hardly anything more or else than a tool subservient to the will’s order, whereas the will enjoys the status of a self-determining faculty. Consequently, the will cannot disobey or contradict itself; namely, it cannot command itself not to will the order it has given to itself.⁴³ Chatton reaffirms this conclusion in his replies, immediately clarifying that the will may nonetheless will the opposite, because it can make the opposite of what it wants an object of a second-order act. Therefore, by virtue of a second-order volition by which the will resolves to will what it wants, the will can also want to consider the opposite of what it has already ordered itself to will. Subsequently, the will can compare the two willings.⁴⁴ The will’s capacity to choose between opposites is a vital aspect of Chatton’s account of the freedom of the will and, as should be noted, stems from Ockham’s idea that the freedom of the will is

⁴² Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 6, n. 87: “Alia est distinctio de prudentia, ut quia voluntas vult finem aliquem, ut sanitatem, et determinat se ad volendum omne medium per quod poterit haberi. Et eodem modo si vult beatitudinem, et omne medium, et intellectus dicitur quod benefacere proximo est unum medium ad illum finem, tunc ex determinatione sua non potest in oppositum.”

⁴³ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 6, n. 89: “Si autem intelligatur alio modo quod voluntas contrarium eligat, id est non velit dictatum, et cum hoc accipitur quod voluntas velit omne medium, tunc si intellectus dicitur aliquid esse medium etc., non potest voluntas in oppositum quia non potest contrariari sibi ipsi.”

⁴⁴ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 6, n. 97: “Et videtur mihi quod difficile est invenire quando intellectus habet iudicium ultimum. Et ideo dico quod si intellectus non habeat nisi unum actum incomplexum de aliquo, quod voluntas potest in oppositum eius quia potest eius oppositum per actum secundum comparare, non tamen virtuose potest tunc agere nisi habuit aliquos actus ut deliberativos et huiusmodi. Dico ergo pro argumento quod ubi voluntas vult esse medium, non potest contra etc., quia ibi accipit intellectus unam praemissam ex determinatione voluntatis etc.”

founded on its liberty to decide on any alternative that presents itself,⁴⁵ as shown in Chapter 1.⁴⁶

Interestingly, although Chatton weaves the notion of a reflexive act (*actus reflectus*)—a term frequently used in the debate on first- and second-order acts of the will—into the volitional context⁴⁷ in the *Reportatio* III, he rarely evokes it in his analysis of second-order volitions. However, his remark in the *Reportatio* III poses a riddle. In a counterargument incorporated into his considerations on whether virtues can be called circumstances, Chatton distinguishes between first- and second-order volitions (*velim me bene velle*), yet he calls the reflexive act the circumstance of the first-order act. This is rather curious, since across the *Reportatio*, he clearly claims that first- and second-order acts are not the same, but distinct things, and different “real acts.”⁴⁸ This understanding of the reflexive act is restated in the *Lectura*.⁴⁹ Apparently, this particular remark in the *Reportatio* III only serves as an argument in Chatton’s discussion of infinite regress. Chatton is familiar with the notion of a reflexive act and uses it frequently, for example, in passages devoted to first- and second-order acts of the intellect. The concept of the intellect’s reflexive act is analyzed in several questions, for example, in the *Prologus*⁵⁰ and the *Reportatio* I,⁵¹ where Chatton questions Ockham’s early view that every act of judgment must comprise a second-order act of consideration. Affirming that a person can have a reflexive act of judgment that has a mental proposition (*complexum*) as its object, Chatton observes that

⁴⁵ Ockham, *Sent.* I, dist. 1, q. 6 (ed. Gál, Brown 1967, pp. 506–507); Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 4, q. 1 (ed. Wey 1989, pp. 299–300). The idea of founding the freedom of the will on the possibility of choosing between opposites was also contemplated by Scotus. See, for example, Duns Scot, *Ordinatio* III, dist. 17, q. unica (editio Vaticana 2006, pp. 568–569); Duns Scot, *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, lib. IX, q. 15 (ed. Andrews et al. 1997, pp. 677–689, 695). See also Adams 2006, pp. 255–261; Osborne 2012, p. 437.

⁴⁶ For more details, see sections 1.3–1.4, pp. 23–29.

⁴⁷ Chatton, *Reportatio* III, dist. 33, q. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2005, p. 221): “Quod non, quia tunc non essent in certo numero; immo esset processus in infinitum, quia actus reflexus est circumstantia actus recti, requiritur enim quod velim me bene velle; et eadem ratione respectu illius reflexi suus actus reflexus est circumstantia, et sic in infinitum.”

⁴⁸ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 40). Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 23, q. unica, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 145). Cf. Chatton, *Prologus*, q. 5, art. 5 (ed. Wey, 1989, pp. 125–128).

⁴⁹ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2007, p. 54).

⁵⁰ Chatton, *Prologus*, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, 1989, pp. 21–23). Cf. *Ibidem*, q. 5, art. 5 (ed. Wey, 1989, pp. 125–128).

⁵¹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 34). A detailed analysis of Chatton’s critique of this view can be found in Brower-Toland 2015, pp. 212–218.

an infinite regress of second-order acts of the intellect is possible,⁵² a case also frequently discussed by Ockham.⁵³ Although Chatton regards such an infinite regress as possible, he argues in the *Quodlibets*, question 13, that a person can arrive at a point in deliberation where its outcome contains no uncertainty. This point marks the end of the reflexive process.⁵⁴ In the *Lectura*, the notion of a reflexive act appears in the volitional context more frequently, which suggests that once Chatton had analyzed it in relation to cognition and debated the dilemmas concerning the structure of the acts of the intellect, he employed the same analytical tool to explore the acts of the will.⁵⁵ Recognizably, the argument used to refute an infinite regress of the acts of the intellect also applies to second-order volitions of the will in the *Lectura*. Although an infinite regress of volitions is theoretically possible, the will eventually acquires certainty about what it really wants.

Chatton's reply is susceptible to the same criticism as Frankfurt's concept, which—as contemporary philosophers complain—does not specify how the will definitely terminates the infinite series of acts and executes a given act rather than any other. Interestingly, Chatton's identification of reaching the point of certainty as the end of the infinite series of higher-order acts resonates with Frankfurt's solution to the problem and his insistence that

It is possible, however, to terminate such a series of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself *decisively* with one of his first-order desires, this commitment “resounds” throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders. Consider a person who, without reservation or conflict, wants to be motivated by the desire to concentrate on his work. The fact that his second-order volition to be moved by this desire is a decisive one means that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of desires or volitions of higher orders. (...)

⁵² Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 3, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 248); dist. 3, q. 3, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 261); dist. 3, q. 3, art. 3 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 277). Cf. Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 3, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2008, pp. 98–99).

⁵³ See, for example, Ockham, *Quaestiones variaae*, q. 4 (ed. Etkorn, Kelley 1984, pp. 159–160); Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 2, q. 12 (ed. Wey 1989, pp. 165–167).

⁵⁴ Chatton, *Quodlibet*, q. 13, art. 2, n. 33: “Ad primum dico quod sicut est possibile quod in actibus reflexis sit processus in infinitum, ita de una deliberatione potest fieri altera deliberatio. Sed ubi deveniatur ad unum dictamen ubi non est dubitatio aliqua de praemissis, ibi est standum, nec oportet ultra procedere.”

⁵⁵ Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, pp. 76–78). Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2007, p. 54). Chatton, *Lectura* I, dist. 10, q. 2, art. 2 (ed. Wey, Etkorn 2009, pp. 193–194).

The decisiveness of the commitment he has made means that he has decided that no further question about his second-order volition, at any higher order, remains to be asked.⁵⁶

5.5 Richard Kilvington: The Self-Determining Nature of the Will

A clear inspiration for debating whether a direct act of the will is the same as a reflexive one can be found in the writings of Richard Kilvington, yet another 14th-century master active at Oxford in the 1330s. Richard Kilvington (ca. 1302–1361)⁵⁷ was a co-founder of the “Oxford Calculators,” a group of scholars who studied and lectured at Oxford in the first half of the 14th century and whose contribution to the development of logic and mathematical physics is unquestionable today. As tends to be the case with many medieval authors, we know relatively little about Kilvington’s life. He was the son of a priest from the diocese of York and was born in Kilvington in Yorkshire, thus the modern spelling of his name introduced into the subject literature by Barbara and Norman Kretzmann. Yet we know more than sixty different spellings of his name that could be found in the colophons of his works.

Kilvington, one of the most representative and prolific members of the Oxford Calculators, authored *Sophismata* (1321–1322), three question commentaries on Aristotle’s works: *On Generation and Corruption* (1322–1323), on the *Physics* (1323–1324), and on the *Ethics* (1324–1325), and a theological commentary on the *Sentences* (1332–1333),⁵⁸ all of which were composed during his academic years at Oxford. The suggested order of Kilvington’s work can be additionally supported by the fact that he quotes from or refers to his earlier works. For instance, in his *Ethics*, he refers both to his *Physics* and his commentary on Aristotle’s *On Generation and Corruption*. In the *Sentences*, we find references to Kilvington’s *Physics* and *Ethics*.⁵⁹ The only treatise that Kilvington wrote after leaving the university was *In causa domini Ardmachani: allegationes magistri Ricardi devoti viri contra fratres*, stemming from his sermons against

⁵⁶ Frankfurt 1971, p. 16.

⁵⁷ For a more detailed discussion of Kilvington’s ethics and concept of the will, see chapter 8, pp. 169–181.

⁵⁸ Suggesting the new dates of Kilvington’s works was possible thanks to new evidence that proves that he was Thomas Bradwardine’s *socius* when Bradwardine lectured on the *Sentences*. For more details, see Jung, Michałowska 2023 (forthcoming). See also Kitanov, Schabel 2022, pp. 163–236. See also Jung 2000, pp. 181–223; Jung 2020, pp. 13–18.

⁵⁹ For more details, see Michałowska 2016, pp. 6–8.

the privileges of the mendicants. The dispute he engaged with together with Richard FitzRalph (1299–1360) resulted in a papal bull in 1359 shortly before Kilvington’s demise in 1361.⁶⁰ Out of Kilvington’s all works, only *Sophismata*,⁶¹ *Questions on the Ethics*,⁶² and question 3 and 4 from *Questions on the Sentences* have been critically edited.⁶³

While Kilvington’s achievements in logic and mathematical physics have already been acknowledged, his contribution to the will-debate has received less scholarly attention. This neglect may stem, among other things, from the fact that his *Questions on the Ethics*, where he extensively debates various aspects of the will, is written in a highly technical language replete with terminology specific to terminist logic and mathematical physics, as well as with arguments underpinned by the rules of logic and natural philosophy. As a result, his lengthy reasoning may seem not to have any ethical content. Yet, this first impression is misleading and a closer scrutiny of his writings reveals that Kilvington indeed engaged in the will-debate in a two-fold way. Firstly, he was the only Oxford Calculator to write a commentary on Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*; secondly, the employment of new analytical tools and methods to inspect the will and its acts initiated a new trend in investigating voluntarist issues, a tendency that could be labelled “Calculatory ethics.”⁶⁴ Kilvington’s new solutions and methodological approach were soon referred to and advanced not only by the Oxford Calculators, such as Robert Halifax or Thomas Bradwardine, but also by other scholars working at that time at Oxford.⁶⁵ Recent studies have proved that

⁶⁰ Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 3222, ff. 111v–116v. For more particulars of the dispute in which he engaged with Richard FitzRalph, see Dunne, Nolan (eds.) 2013; Walsh 1975, pp. 223–245; Walsh 1981.

⁶¹ Kilvington, *Sophismata* (ed. Kretzmann, Kretzmann 1990). The text has been translated into English. Cf. *The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington* (transl. Kretzmann, Kretzmann 1991).

⁶² Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum* (ed. Michałowska 2016).

⁶³ *Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, Infinity, and Being Simultaneously in Rome and Paris. Critical Edition of Question 3 Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum with an Introduction* (ed. Michałowska 2021). *Richard Kilvington Talks to Thomas Bradwardine about Future Contingents, Free Will, and Predestination: A Critical Edition of Question 4 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* (ed. Jung, Michałowska 2023, forthcoming).

⁶⁴ For a more thorough account of Kilvington’s method of analysis, see Michałowska (forthcoming). For the influence of his concepts and methodology on his contemporaries and followers, see Kitanov (forthcoming); Lukács (forthcoming).

⁶⁵ Edit Lukács has examined some cases which were used by Kilvington and then instantly discussed and developed by Halifax. See Lukács 2022 (forthcoming). More comparative studies of Kilvington’s and Halifax’s ethical and theological concepts and arguments are likely to be

Kilvington and Bradwardine were actively engaged in the debate on future contingents mutually referring to each other's arguments, which suggests that they were each other's *soci* when lecturing on the *Sentences* in 1332–1333.⁶⁶

Kilvington devotes entire question 4 of his *Questions on the Ethics* to the analysis of the will and its structure. He endorses the standard medieval account of two fundamental acts of the will, namely, willing (*velle*) and nilling (*nolle*), both of which lie in the power of the will.⁶⁷ To study what causes the will to act and how in fact the will makes its choice when it has two options—'A' and 'B'—presented to it, Kilvington employs the concept of the reflexivity of the will, and insists that the will commits itself to act towards 'A' more than towards 'B' to execute the choice. Following Ockham, he starts with the claim that the will is indifferent towards its acts, and thus it can choose either 'A' or 'B'.⁶⁸ As already shown in Chapter 1,⁶⁹ the notion of indifference was central to Ockham's account of the will. The ability to be in the state of indifference, which entails the liberty to choose between alternatives and which is not determined by anything else than the will itself, was a key argument Ockham employed to safeguard the freedom of the will:

encouraged when critical editions of Halifax's and Kilvington's commentaries on the *Sentences* appear. Lukács and I are currently collaborating on a critical edition of questions 5 and 6 (q. 5, *Utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit esse subito productus a voluntate*; q. 6, *Utrum voluntas respectu cuiuscumque actus sui et obiecti sit libera*).

⁶⁶ Jung, Michałowska 2023 (forthcoming), pp. 5–6; Kitanov, Schabel 2022, pp. 163–236.

⁶⁷ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 204: 14): "(...) quia licet voluntas sit libera ad volendum et nolendum (...)"

⁶⁸ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 168: 23 – p. 168: 11): "Secundo ad principale: si voluntas libere etc., tunc duobus aequaliter moventibus voluntatem vel intellectum voluntas posset libere unum prosequi et aliud dimittere, et tunc a potentia aequali proveniret actio, quod est contra Commentatorem II *Physicorum* commento 48. Et consequentia patet, quia in talibus duobus aequaliter moventibus non videtur ratio quare unum esset magis volitum quam reliquum. Huic dicitur quod a potentia aequali non proveniret actio stante aequalitate. Unde voluntas volendo unum et non aliud determinat se ad unum non autem ad aliud; et ita est maior ratio de uno quam de alio. Contra illud arguitur sicut prius: voluntas indifferens est ad determinandum se ad A et ad B. Sit A unum movens et B aliud, ergo voluntas non determinabit se ad A plus quam ad B et econtra, nisi iterum voluntas determinet se ad determinandum se plus etc. Et ita quaelibet determinatio voluntatis in isto casu praesupponeret aliam determinationem voluntatis, et ita requiruntur infinitae tales determinationes quae sunt impossibiles etc."

⁶⁹ For a closer scrutiny of Ockham's account of the "freedom of indifference," see section 1.3, pp. 23–25. See also Osborne 2012, p. 439; Pinckaers 1995, pp. 242–243.

What I mean by freedom is the power I have to produce various effects, indifferently and in a contingent manner, in such a way that I can either cause an effect or not cause it without any change being produced outside of this power.⁷⁰

While Kilvington follows Ockham in attributing the ability to choose indifferently to the will, he realizes that this begs the question about the causality of the final choice. Given that the will is in the state of indifference, there would be no reason for the will's choice were it not for some determination to execute one act rather than the other. Therefore, Kilvington stresses that although the will can just as well choose 'A' or 'B', the motive for choosing one rather than the other lies completely in the will's power, specifically in the will's ability to reflexively focus on its own act of choosing either of the alternatives. Although Kilvington does not employ the standard higher-order volition terminology, his conclusion reveals his approach to the problem of the reflexivity of the will when he stresses that it is possible for the will to commit itself to its own willing via a second-order act. Kilvington explains,

As to the second argument: I say, as it is mentioned while arguing, that a particular action does not come into being from a potency equal to it. Therefore, the will, while being moved by two [things] equally, determines itself. And when it is argued that the will is in an equal potency to commit itself to 'A' or to 'B', therefore the will does not commit itself to 'A' or to 'B', unless the will limits itself anew to commit itself to 'A' more than to 'B'—it is conceded.⁷¹

Kilvington elaborates on the reflexivity of the will to establish whether a first-order act and a second-order act form one act or are two different acts. Like Ockham's, his analysis includes a comparison of the acts of the will and the acts of the intellect. Contrary to Ockham, however, Kilvington claims that the

⁷⁰ Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, Q. 1, q. 16 (ed. Wey 1980, p. 87): "Circa primum sciendum quod voco libertatem potestatem qua possum indifferenter et contingenter diversa ponere, ita quod possum eundem effectum causare et non causare, nulla diversitate existente alibi extra illam potentiam." The translation appears in Pinckaers 1995, p. 242. [transl. Noble]

⁷¹ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 190: 13–18): "Ad secundum principale: dico, sicut tangitur in arguendo, quod a potentia aequali non provenit actio stante aequalitate. Unde voluntas duobus aequaliter moventibus determinat se. Et quando arguitur quod voluntas est in potentia aequali ad determinandum se ad A vel ad B, igitur non determinat se voluntas ad A vel ad B nisi iterum voluntas terminet se ad determinandum se ad A plus quam ad B—conceditur." [transl. M.M.]

will's willing (committing itself) to 'will A' is one act,⁷² and the act of a higher-order presupposes the first-order act. In other words, willing to will 'A' is ontically prior to willing 'A'.⁷³ Thus in Kilvington's view, for the will to make any choice, it must incline itself to it in the first place. It seems that second-order volitions are granted a different status in Kilvington's theory of the will as meta-acts of the will that reveal its constant activity and presuppose all its other acts.⁷⁴ This aspect of his concept of the reflexive character of the will undoubtedly rests on the Scotistic theory of the will, which places higher-order volitions on a different ontic level.

5.6 Conclusion

Although the notions of first- and second-order volitions were only introduced into ethics by Harry Frankfurt in the 20th century, their earlier manifestations in the history of thought can be traced back to medieval philosophy. It has been argued that the idea of a second-order volition can already be identified in the reflection of Augustine and Anselm, yet its fully-fledged and explicitly formulated form appeared much later: in the 14th century, when higher-order volitions were interwoven with the will's various acts. Walter Chatton and Richard Kilvington are certainly among the authors who time and again rely on the

⁷² Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 190: 18–22): “Sed dicitur: eodem actu terminat se ad terminandum se ad A et terminat se ad A, et ita non quaelibet terminatio praesupponit aliam terminationem in termino, quia, ut prius dicitur, non est alius actus quo voluntas terminat se ad A et quo terminat se ad terminandum se ad A.”

⁷³ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 190: 23 – p. 191: 22): “Sed forte posset aliquis sic arguere: si voluntas sit in potentia aequali ad terminandum se ad A et ad terminandum se ad B, tunc videtur quod voluntas prius naturaliter, licet non tempore, terminet se ad terminandum se etc., quam terminet se ad A. Sit ergo C ille actus quo voluntas terminat se ad A et terminat se ad terminandum se ad A. Tunc probatur quod C actus sit prior se ipso, naturaliter prius est terminare se ad terminandum se ad aliud quam terminare se ad illud, ergo cum C sit actus quo voluntas terminat se ad terminandum etc., sequitur quod C actus sit naturaliter prior se ipso. Ad quod respondetur quod C, ut est actus quo voluntas se terminat ad terminandum se ad A, est prior se ipso, ut est actus quo voluntas terminat se ad A.”

⁷⁴ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 179: 15– 19): “Et tunc arguitur sic: voluntas volet nolitionem A, et voluntas est libera ad nolendum sicut ad volendum, ergo voluntas nolet A, et per consequens idem erit volitum et nolitum sub eadem voluntate. Et per idem probatur quod voluntas non potest se velle nihil nolle, quia si velit se nihil velle, igitur vult.”

concept of first- and second-order volitions to underline the self-determination and self-reflexivity of the will and to prove its freedom. The approach they both adopt to analyze the structure of the will and defend the freedom of the will by outlining its higher-order acts extensively draws on Ockham's theory. Arguably, this concerted focus on the power of self-determination as the source of the will's actions makes both Chatton and Kilvington advocates of a strongly libertarian notion of the will and, in particular, of the agent-causal libertarian stance.

PART III

THE WILL AND TIME

CHAPTER 6

THE WILL, TIME, AND SIMULTANEOUS CONTRADICTORIES

THE ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM

Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska

6.1 Introduction: After the Condemnation of 1277

Fourteenth-century philosophers and theologians were fascinated by change. The issue was discussed in all its facets and across its areas, such as the process of generation and corruption (natural philosophy), the change of place by a moving object and the change of velocity (physics), the change of ethical attitudes and becoming vicious or virtuous (ethics), and changes in human and divine wills (ethics, the metaphysics of the will, and theology). The possibility of change in the will's acts, which was to safeguard the freedom of the will, and diverse aspects of the problem were under thorough scrutiny, including explorations of its causality (the will's relationship with the intellect and the faculties of the soul) and its temporality (the instant of change that involves instantaneous change and/or "the contradiction theory of change"¹). The concept of the instant of change had an impact on logical and physical debates in the 13th and 14th centuries, as Simo Knuuttila and Anja Inkeri Lehtinen have shown, and

¹ The term was coined by Simo Knuuttila and Anja Inkeri Lehtinen, who identified the rise and development of the medieval theory of change according to which contradictories could be true and coexist at the same instant. For more details, see Duba 2017; Knuuttila 2017, pp. 22–35; pp. 60–84; Knuuttila, Lehtinen 1979, pp. 189–207; Sylla 2017, pp. 103–129; Trifogli 2017, pp. 85–102.

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

Stephen Dumont has provided some evidence that it also significantly affected theological debates in this period.²

Dumont has established moreover that the problem of contradictories being true at the same temporal instant originated in Henry of Ghent's analysis of Mary's conception and the simultaneous coexistence of sin and grace.³ He also avers that the conundrum can even be traced back to Stephen Tempier's condemnations of 1277. Since the latter source seems more important for our analysis, we shall broach its main points here. Dumont identifies two statements that could spur the debate on willing the contradictories; these are condemned article 129⁴ (recognized as erroneous by Tempier) and the so-called *propositio magistralis*,⁵ a sentence from Giles of Rome's *Sentences* regarded as true by the same theologians who collaborated with Tempier on the list of statements to be condemned. The two statements form a stark opposition (meaning that "rectitude and malice can/cannot be present in the will at the same time"),⁶ which was, as Dumont notes, quite immediately recognized. Resolving this puzzle called for some effort of reconciliation, with first such attempts separately undertaken by Henry of Ghent and by John of Pouilly, who each offered a different solution to the problem. Pouilly's attempt to reconcile the two problematic statements in his *Quodlibeta*⁷ reveals his intellectualist approach, as discussed recently by Tobias Hoffmann,⁸ whereas Henry's solution was firmly embedded in his voluntarist perspective, as demonstrated by Dumont. Although representing different positions, both philosophical strategies contributed to paving the way for the related debate in the Late Middle Ages. We shall dwell upon Henry's voluntarist bent, since it was more pivotal to the development of voluntarism in 14th-century ethics.

² For more information, see Dumont 1992, pp. 561–597; Knuuttila 1986, pp. 256–266; Knuuttila, Lehtinen 1979, pp. 189–207.

³ For a more comprehensive discussion, see Dumont 1992; Knuuttila 2017, pp. 32–33, pp. 571–577; Knuuttila, Lehtinen 1979, pp. 194–195.

⁴ Article 129 (ed. Piché 1999, p. 118): "Quod uoluntas, manente passione et scientia particulari in actu, non potest agere contra eam." See also Dumont 1992, p. 587.

⁵ "*Propositio magistralis*: There is never malice in the will unless there is error or at least some ignorance in the intellect." See Dumont 1992, p. 587. For more on the *propositio magistralis*, see Hödl 1999, pp. 245–297. For more on the articles of Condemnation of 1277 and the *propositio magistralis*, see Aertsen, Emery, Speer (eds.) 2001; Giles of Rome, *Apology* (ed. Wielockx 1985).

⁶ Dumont 1992, pp. 578–579, 586.

⁷ For more information on John Pouilly's *Quodlibeta*, see Hödl 2007, pp. 199–229.

⁸ Hoffmann (forthcoming).

One solution proposed by Henry of Ghent was based on distinguishing broad and narrow meanings of both “error” and “rectitude,” in order to acknowledge both statements as true. He claimed that the terms “error” and “rectitude” were used in a different sense in each statement; therefore, they produced no contradiction.⁹ The other explanation of the problem relied on the distinction between different signs of nature, assuming

that the instant at which malice begins is divided into two signs, so that in the prior sign malice occurs in the will together with complete rectitude of the intellect, just as it had been correct the whole preceding time, and in the posterior sign some clouding of the intellect results.¹⁰

In the early 14th century, the idea that contradictions could be true at the same instant was pondered by several philosophers, such as Landolfo Caracciolo and John Baconthorpe,¹¹ whom Norman Kretzmann has called quasi-Aristotelians,¹² a moniker which has been criticized as inaccurate (or even misleading).¹³ Recent evidence suggests that the concept itself was in fact first advanced by Hugh of Novocastro, although Caracciolo was indeed the central protagonist in this story due to his active role in disseminating the idea.¹⁴ Their

⁹ Dumont 1992, pp. 587–588.

¹⁰ Dumont 1992, pp. 588–589. A similar interpretation has been suggested by Knuuttila. Cf. Knuuttila 2017, pp. 24–25. See also Hoffmann 2021, pp. 80–84. For more details about this doctrine, see also Brower-Toland 2002, pp. 19–46.

¹¹ For a discussion of Caracciolo’s concept, see also Knuuttila, Lehtinen 1979, pp. 195–199.

¹² The term “quasi-Aristotelianism” was introduced into the literature by Norman Kretzmann and adopted by Stephen Dumont. For more details, see Dumont 1992, pp. 561–597; Kretzmann 1982, pp. 270–296. This terminology has been criticized by Simmo Knuuttila and by William Duba. For more, see Knuuttila 2017, p. 25, n. 6: “Because of the discussions of Aristotle’s view in the contradictory theory of change analysed in ‘Change and Contradiction,’ Norman Kretzmann and those following him, such as Dumont, call it ‘quasi-Aristotelianism.’ This is somewhat misleading and gives a wrong impression of the theory. Its background was the discussion of the instant of change in Aristotelian natural philosophy, but it is a general philosophical theory rather than a piece of misguided Aristotle exegesis, which is only part of it.” See also Duba 2017, p. 61.

¹³ For more information on the interconnections between these authors, see Duba 2017, pp. 60–84. See also Schabel 2009, pp. 149–219.

¹⁴ Duba 2017, p. 61: “(...) a clear picture of the history of the ‘curious doctrine’ emerges (...): the Franciscan Landolfo Caracciolo gained notoriety by appealing repeatedly to the doctrine of simultaneous contradictories during his *principia* exercises, but he was preceded in this teaching by his fellow Franciscan Hugh of Novocastro.” Ibidem, p. 84: “Since Hugh taught

solution to the “opposition” problem was based on the distinction between the natural and the temporal orders of things, which enabled them to “interpret the law of non-contradiction in terms of natural rather than temporal simultaneity.”¹⁵ Dumont explains that “[s]ince these signs are ordered and separated according to nature, the first principle is not violated.”¹⁶

Notably, another possible genesis of the contradictories problem has been suggested recently. William Duba has proposed tracing it back to Duns Scotus.¹⁷ Novocastro’s doctrine of simultaneous contradictories arose, as Duba claims, from the discussion on the creation of the world, and was in fact derived from the Scotistic concept of synchronic contingency and instantaneous creation.¹⁸ Duba convincingly demonstrates that Novocastro’s framework was quite original since

his doctrine of an order of nature between opposites implies the actual existence of opposites, while his summary of Scotus’ position shows that he is well aware that the Subtle Doctor allowed for only a habitual existence (in a contrary-to-fact sense), not an actual one. Hugh has gone beyond Scotus—and everyone else—and but he downplays this novelty.¹⁹

6.2 John Duns Scotus as a 14th-Century Source: A Contingent Approach

Duns Scotus’s approach was, however, one of the most influential for Oxonian thinkers in the first half of the 14th century. Developed chiefly in the *Lectura* I, distinction 39, and then revisited in the *Ordinatio*’s distinction 39, Scotus’s theory is indebted to Henry of Ghent’s divine voluntarism. In his *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, the Flemish *magister* argues that God’s will determines what will

the doctrine in the Franciscan convent and expressed it in the written versions of his *Sentences* lectures, he primarily addressed his innovation to other Franciscan theologians. Landolfo Caracciolo adopted the doctrine with flair in his *principia* disputations with the other bachelors of theology at Paris. In this way, Caracciolo brought it out of the Franciscan convent and to the attention of the university theologians, where it provoked shock and ridicule from philosophers, from John of Jandun to Norman Kretzmann and beyond.”

¹⁵ Dumont 1992, p. 567.

¹⁶ Dumont 1992, p. 567.

¹⁷ Duba 2017, pp. 70–84.

¹⁸ Duba 2017, pp. 79–80.

¹⁹ Duba 2017, pp. 80–81.

become real by granting it what he calls *existentiae*, that is, a passage into the actual existence of essences, which are the object of God's knowledge. In this way, the divine intellect learns about future contingents through the knowledge of the determinations of God's own will.²⁰ According to the *Doctor Subtilis*, God acts in a contingent way, in the sense that the order of the real world is not a limit for God; specifically, the necessity that binds the phenomena caused, insofar as they derive from the first cause, does not prevent it from acting contingently. Consequently, the world itself is utterly contingent, since it is founded on the absolute contingency of the divine will, as well as on its capacity to simultaneously will opposite things.²¹

Scotus puts this theory of contingency at the heart of creation. Creation is indeed an act of God's free will, which not only wants freely but also can, at the same instant, want and not want the same thing (according to the synchronic theory of modality founded on present contingency). Even if entangled in the causal chains made necessary by the order wanted by God, the human will finds the foundation of its own freedom in the analogy with the divine will, with contingency being an essential attribute of the divine order of the world, rather than representing the limit of the human and temporal sphere. Scotus's theory eliminates the typically Aristotelian connection between "possible" and "being *in potentia*": a possibility can be real if it is not and will never be actualized. The temporal necessity of the present disappears, since Scotus understands possibility as an ontological property of the real order of things, detached from necessity, especially from temporal one. While the ontological distinction between past necessity and future contingency may retain its validity, it is not to be interpreted as governed by temporal necessity. Rather, it can be concomitant with any other solution which is not logically contradictory (*possibile logicum*).²²

The concept of *possibile logicum* enables Scotus to shift from purely logical considerations to exploring the ethical and theological implications of the issue. At the moment of willing, the will precedes its own act of volition and

²⁰ In Henry of Ghent, cognition—both human intelligence and divine foreknowledge—stands out as an act of the intellect which grasps itself as the knowing subject of the act with a determined content of thought. See Goehring 2010, pp. 124–129.

²¹ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 49 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 494): "Potentia logica non est aliqua nisi quando extrema sic sunt possibilis quod non sibi invicem repugnant sed uniri possunt, licet non sit possibilitas aliqua in re." See Hoffmann 2002.

²² Besides these Scotistic positions, Henry of Ghent also sought to disentangle the action of the will from the foreknowledge of the intellect by reference to the definition of divine intelligence where "[i]dem est intellectus speculativus et practicus"; cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones quodlibetales* (Venezia 1613, II f. 3va–b).

can contingently involve both willing and not willing. The will remains open to all logical possibilities, and which possibilities will be carried out and thus made real is determined by volition. Two “instants of nature” are contracted in a single temporal instant: at the same T1, agent-subject A may want p and also want $not-p$. In this way, the necessity of the present, propounded by Aristotle, also fails to occur.

Among the conditions that determine the freedom of an action, the free contingency of the action itself is decisive. Agent A is free to perform p if the action takes place in two distinct moments in time: 1) in which A considers the alternatives (p and $not-p$) from which to choose, and 2) in which A, having inspected the possible alternatives, chooses one of them. If there were only 2, since there would be no moment T1, prior to the choice when A could review the different options, A would only choose one of the two alternatives. The problem is therefore related to temporal necessity and to A’s ability to establish and measure the time sequence from 1 to 2. In this case, either A is not free (because A cannot distinguish, measure and choose between the alternatives, violating insofar [1]); or A is only free within the necessity of the present (which is another way of saying that A is not free to choose). Scotus’s well-known solution to this problem, involves introducing two types of anteriority: temporal and ontological/natural. He grounds the latter in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (book Δ, 11, 1019a 1–4), in which Aristotle distinguishes the anterior and the posterior on the basis of the concepts of nature and substance: A precedes B if B cannot be explained without recourse to A (whereas A stands without being derived from B). This represents the case where, although there is no temporal precedence, there can be causal precedence between p and q , that is, p and q can be simultaneous at instant T1, but, at the same time, A (cause) can precede B (effect) in nature. In this solution, two instants of nature are contracted into one logical possibility: at the first instant, A faces the case of 1, and in the second the choice is made, which salvages freedom.²³

Scotus’s solution was well known among the first generation of 14th century Oxonian masters, but, notably, it marked a shift from a temporal/physical model to a metaphysical/ontological one in considerations on change-measuring intervals.²⁴ For Scotus, if the human will is in any way free, it is so because at the same moment that it wants it can also not want. The same is true for the divine will. Because creating is an act of the will, it follows that the divine will can create and not create at the same time, and that whatever God created was thus created contingently. Scotus’s reasoning envisages double contingency. As the

²³ See Mugnai 2013, pp. 101–109; Vos et al. 1994, p. III.

²⁴ Gelber 2004.

modal status of the first cause is transferred onto creatures and second causes, the contingency of created wills corresponds to the contingency of the divine will. For Scotus, the absolute contingency of the first cause forms a model of foreknowledge which oscillates between the indeterminism of neutral propositions, on which the comprehension of the divine intellect is exercised, and determinism effected by the action of the divine will.²⁵ God foreknows which part of a contradiction concerning future contingents is true because God's own will willingly determines which part is true and which is false. Divine knowledge is sequential, proceeding from the intellect to the will and back to the intellect. First, the divine will comprehends propositions about the future as neutral; subsequently, God's will entirely contingently chooses which part of the contradiction will become real and which will not, thus determining the truth and falsity of the propositions. Finally, God's intellect comes to know which proposition is true and which is false through inspecting God's own will, where the attribution of the propositional truth-value takes place. Divine knowledge is therefore certain, because its propositions depict events as fulfilled and simultaneously as contingent, and because it is rooted in the absolute contingency of God's will.²⁶ Consequently, Scotus regards knowledge as possible, since the necessary truths of contingent facts are given: for example, the fall of a rock is a contingent event, but it must nonetheless necessarily occur in a straight line from top to bottom.

Focused on contingency and creation, Scotus's contribution to the debate on simultaneous contradictories brings another of their aspects to the forefront.²⁷ Scotus not only explores God's perfection, but also is committed to showcasing God's fully effective omnipotence and freedom. As a result, he radically redraws the paradigm of causality, freedom, and contingency, with his philosophical perspective having a significant impact on Oxonian thinkers and sparking an array of issues, such as causal chains, necessity, and the freedom of the will.

In distinction 39 of Book I of his *Lectura*, where Peter Lombard wonders whether divine knowledge can increase or decrease, whether one can know or pre-know something that one has not known before, that is, whether knowledge takes place in and according to time, and whether one can know more than one

²⁵ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 62 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 500); et textus compositus *Ordinatio* I, dist. 38 pars 2 et dist. 39, qq. 1–5 (editio Vaticana, 1963, pp. 428s.).

²⁶ On the *formido* in relation to Scotus's thought, see Fedriga 2015, pp. 641–650; Fedriga, Limonta 2016a, pp. 153–159; Mugnai 2013 pp. 101–109.

²⁷ For the influences of the Scotus's thought on contingency, counterfactual reasoning, and instants of change, see Gelber 2001.

already knows, Scotus accepts that God knows all things, including the future ones.²⁸ Scotus's main object is to assert the contingency of these future things, wherein he must fend off, on the one hand, the assumptions of necessity cherished by philosophers and, on the other, the risk of necessity being transferred from God's knowledge to things known, to the point of denying the very necessity of divine knowledge and, thus, precluding the exercise of its freedom in the chain of causes that ordain the world.²⁹ Scotus splits the question of contingency into two, and ponders i) whether there is contingency in things, and ii) how this contingency can coexist with God's positive knowledge of things. Contingency with respect to proximate causes must be excluded, because imperfection (to which contingency is comparable) is produced in things by proximate causes. To introduce contingency into things through the chain of proximate causes would be to admit that they are affected by a metaphysical principle of imperfection. But this cannot be. Therefore, it remains only to exclude contingency from the chain of causes and to look elsewhere for the grounding of contingency in things. Hence, Scotus is compelled to admit that contingency is introduced into the world by the first cause, although its actions are traditionally characterized by necessity and perfection.³⁰ Secondly, since the first cause is related to the second cause through effect and anteriority, if the first cause assigns necessity to the effect, the second cause cannot assign contingency to it, because the effect should not be both contingent and necessary.³¹ Furthermore, Scotus continues,

²⁸ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 62 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 499); cf. Peter Lombard, *Sent.* I, dist. 39 (ed. Quaracchi 1971, p. 280).

²⁹ Vos et al. 1994, p. 19: "Scotus demonstrates that God's knowledge and the contingency of things are indeed compatible, since God's knowledge is *determinate, infallibile, immutable*, but *not necessary* (...). By the way in which he structures his argument, Scotus makes clear that the main question is *not*: Does God have knowledge of the future anyway? He departs from the assumption that God has. The main question is: Is the future contingent and is God's knowledge of it compatible with its contingency?" [italics original]

³⁰ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 35 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 457): "Igitur oportet quod si sit contingentia in rebus, quod prima causa vel contingenter moveat causam secundam, vel quod contingenter moveat effectum, ita quod contingentia proveniat ex actione primae causae."

³¹ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 36 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 457): "Si autem dicatur quod simul causa prima et proxima dent esse effectui, non potest adhuc causa secunda dare esse contingenter effectui si causa prima det esse necessario, quia non potest esse quod idem effectus secundum suum esse habeat necessariam habitudinem ad causam perfectam, et contingentem ad causam imperfectam (quia si necessariam habet habitudinem ad causam perfectam, igitur si causa contingens non sit, adhuc effectus habebit esse; igitur non capit esse a causa contingentem)."

souls, though created directly by God, are contingent, which emphatically belies the idea that the first cause always acts necessarily. Finally, on the one hand, the necessity attributed to the first cause actually derives from confounding the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent; at the same time, the possibility and potency attributed to it should not be understood as imperfection (e.g., deprivation and sin), but as “vera passio entis et immediate a Deo sicut necessitas.”³² If the first cause moves the second cause in a necessary way, and the second cause can only move with the same necessity, it must be admitted that contingency in things (*contingentia in rebus*) is produced by God through *ad extra* acting, which is not necessary but contingent.

What then is it in God that acts upon entities in a contingent way? Since the intellect and the will are the only divine faculties through which God produces changes (even if a third executive faculty were admitted, it would only act according to the mandates of the divine intellect and will), one of the two must be the cause of contingency in things. The intellect must be ruled out, because it knows in a certain and necessary way. Hence, if God’s action were based on it, God would either always act necessarily or act against the dictates of God’s own intellect, that is, God would act evilly. In brief, there is no practical knowledge in God, since it would force God to always act in a necessary way.³³ As opposed to this, when the divine intellect learns that “this must be done” (*hoc esse faciendum*) before the deliberation of the will, it learns a neutral statement (*dictum*) that does not exclude either of the two contradictory

³² Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 83 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 506). For Duns Scotus, the question regarding the presence of contingency in things is divided into three themes: the very existence of contingency, whether it has its cause in God, and what it is in God that produces the contingency of things. As for the first aspect, the author states that he cannot prove that there is contingency: in fact, the proof proceeds either “a priori” or “per notius,” and neither of these two ways is effective in this case, since “per notius,” it is possible to infer what is more noble and perfect from what is less so, that is, it is possible to infer the existence of the necessary from that of the contingent, while the opposite is not possible. Equally, it is not possible to demonstrate “a priori” the existence of contingency in things; rather, this must be assumed as evident to the senses, and thereby accepted, under penalty of having to admit, against experience, that we do not need to think and choose our deliberations. See Hoffmann 2020.

³³ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 43 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 492): “Quidquid cognoscit ante actum voluntatis, necessario cognoscit et naturaliter, ita quod non sit ibi contingentia ad opposita. Propter quod in Deo non est scientia practica, quia si ante actum voluntatis intellectus apprehenderet aliquid esse operandum aut producendum, voluntas igitur vult hoc necessario aut non? Si necessario, igitur necessitatur ad producendum illud; si non necessario vult, igitur vult contra dictamen intellectus, et tunc esset mala, cum illud dictamen non posset esse nisi rectum.”

propositions in a contingent matter. Conversely, when the divine will decides to produce a thing, the intellect learns that it is true and excludes the contradictory proposition.³⁴ Given this, God's will is without a doubt the cause of contingency in things, analogously to the human will.³⁵ Hence, it is possible to conclude about the divine will as the cause of contingency from consideration of the human free will.

6.3 Three Ways of Free Will

According to Scotus, the human will is free in three respects: in aiming at opposite acts, in these acts aiming at opposite objects, and finally in aiming at

³⁴ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 44 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 493).

³⁵ On the human will, especially on free will and its foundation, as comprehended within the voluntarist framework adopted by Franciscan thinkers as well as within the intellectualist framework adopted by the Dominican and more traditionally Aristotelian milieu, see respectively, Peter John Olivi, *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum* (ed. Jansen 1922–1926), q. 57, pp. 341–376; q. 58, pp. 411–435; q. 59, p. 564; Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I* (ed. Macken 1979), q. 14, pp. 86–89, q. 15, p. 90, qq. 16–17, pp. 91–93; *Quodlibet IV* (ed. Wilson, Eitzkorn 2011), q. 22, pp. 107–150; *Quodlibet IX* (ed. Macken 1983), q. 5, pp. 121–138, q. 6, pp. 139–149; *Quodlibet X* (ed. Macken 1981), q. 9, pp. 245–248, q. 10, pp. 259–265, q. 13, pp. 288–289; *Quodlibet XII* (ed. Decorte 1987), q. 26, pp. 136–157; Walter of Bruges, *Quaestiones disputatae* (ed. Longpré 1928), q. 3, p. 31, q. 4, pp. 40–44, q. 5, pp. 51–53, q. 6, pp. 52–60; Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* (Louvain 1646), I, q. 19, p. 40M III, q. 16, pp. 180–183; III, q. 17, pp. 186–193; III, q. 18, p. 193; III, q. 15, pp. 176–180; IV, q. 21, pp. 256–259; V, q. 5, pp. 176–178; *In secundum librum Sententiarum* (Venice 1581), dist. 1, art. 2, p. 24, art. 1, q. 1, p. 243 (vol. II); dist. 25, art. 3, q. 1, p. 298 (vol. II); Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I: q. 80 art. 2, q. 82 art. 3, q. 82 art. 4; I–II: q. 1 art. 5, q. 9 art. 1, q. 9 art. 3, q. 26 art. 1, q. 46 art. 4, q. 66 art. 4; *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 22 art. 3, q. 22 art. 12, q. 22 art. 4, q. 24, art. 1–2–4; *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, q. 6; *Summa contra gentiles*, book 2, chapter 48, n. 6, book 3, chapter 107, n. 7; Thomas Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae* (ed. Schneider 1977), q. 6, pp. 165–178, q. 7, pp. 211–222, q. 24, pp. 658–676; *Quodlibeta* (ed. Schmaus, González-Haba 1969), III, q. 13, p. 428; Godfrey of Fontaines: *Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines* (ed. de Wulf, Hoffmans 1914), VI, q. 7, pp. 152–164, q. 11, p. 220, q. 12, pp. 234–235; *Le huitième Quodlibet, Le neuvième Quodlibet, Le dixième Quodlibet* (ed. Hoffmans 1924–1931), VIII, q. 16, pp. 145–165; X, q. 13, p. 373; X, q. 14, p. 381; *Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines* (ed. Lottin 1937), XV, q. 4, p. 30; Sigeri di Brabante: *De necessitate et contingentia causarum* (ed. Duin 1954), pp. 32–35; *Impossibilia* (ed. Bazán 1974), 5, p. 86; *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* VI (*reportatio Viennensis*, ed. Dunphy 1981), q. V, art. 8, pp. 330–331; *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* CA (*reportatio Cantabrigiensis*, ed. Maurer 1983), q. 5, art. 36, p. 269; art. 37 p. 272; q. VI, art. 9, p. 325. See Hoffmann 2020.

the effects it can produce either immediately or through the executive faculties that it activates. While the will freely pursuing opposite acts is attributable to imperfection (in the sense of mutability), its freedom in regard to opposite objects and effects indicates perfection, similarly to the capacity of the intellect to grasp such objects. Two types of contingency and possibility stem from the will's freedom with regard to opposite acts and objects. In one of them, the will wants an object and its opposite at successive instants of time.³⁶ This type of possibility and contingency is what makes propositions such as 'white can be black' and 'the will that loves an object can hate it' true if they are understood in a divided sense³⁷ (that is, 'a white object at T1 can be black at T2'). The other type of possibility, deriving from the same freedom of the will, is logical potency (*potentia logica*),³⁸ according to which a modal proposition of possibility is true so that its terms are not logically contradictories (*repugnantes*) to each other; for example, before the world was created, the proposition "the world can be" had also been true. This possibility does not stem from the fact that the will can perform opposite acts at successive instants, but from the fact that it can desire them at the same time. In fact, Scotus continues, to want *p* at a given instant is not essential to the soul; nor is it one of its natural passions. Therefore, it does not contradict the logical power for the soul to want and not want at the same time. This is because "to want" and "not want" are accidental and, therefore, not incompatible with the subject "will."³⁹ While in the Aristotelian diachronic model, the adoption of one alternative precludes the opposite one, in the Scotistic synchronic model nothing is excluded, except in the actual realization of one of the possible alternatives. This, however, does not invalidate the simultaneous possibility of the other alternative: the unselected alternative remains possible,

³⁶ It is referred to as "diachronic contingency"; see Vos et al. 1994, pp. 113, 115. See also Mugnai 2013, p. 105.

³⁷ That is, by dividing the *dictum* (white) from its substrate (the *res*): the thing (which is now white) can be (at another instant) black. Conversely, the composite sense does not distinguish these two aspects, thus conveying the blackness not of the thing that is white, but of the white *tout court*.

³⁸ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, nn. 47–49 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 494).

³⁹ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 50 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 495): "(...) in eodem instanti in quo voluntas habet unum actum volendi, in eodem et pro eodem potest habere oppositum actum volendi (...) nam velle pro illo instanti et in illo instanti non est de essentia ipsius voluntatis nec est eius passio naturalis; igitur consequitur ipsam per accidens. Sed oppositum 'accidentis per accidens' non repugnat subiecto pro aliquo instanti; et ideo voluntas volens *a* in hoc instanti et pro hoc instanti, potest nolle *a* in eodem et pro eodem. Et est haec possibilitas logica respectu extremorum non repugnantium." See Mugnai 2013, p. 101.

and the implementation of its opposite does not make it logically contradictory (*repugnans*) and, as such, impossible.

This change of perspective may take place because the will is the cause of its own acts and therefore considers them before exercising them.⁴⁰ In fact, there is a conceptual difference between the will's aiming at two opposite acts and its deliberation between one of them. As a result of the distance between the two acts, the deliberation of the will can be effectively free, enabling the will to choose between two alternatives towards which it is directed.⁴¹ The contingency of deliberation and the contingency of readiness for the opposite choice justify each other⁴² and result in the shift from the logical possibility to the actual potency (*potentia realis*) of the will to want and not want the same thing at the same time.⁴³

⁴⁰ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 51 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 495): "(...) omnis causa praeintelligitur suo effectui, et ita voluntas in illo instanti in quo elicit actum volendi, precedi natura volitionem suam et libere se habet ad eam; unde in illo instanti in quo elicit volitionem, contingenter se habet ad volendum et contingentem habet habitudinem ad nolendum."

⁴¹ This differs from the Thomistic approach, which views the will as moved by the intellect to choose the act or the object it recognizes as good or better. See Hoffmann 2013.

⁴² Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 51 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 495): "(...) nunc—quando est causa eliciens actum volendi—contingentem habet habitudinem ad actum, ita quod 'volens in a, potest nolle in a'. Et est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem: et in sensu compositionis falsa (...) in sensu autem divisionis est propositio vera, non quia extrema intelliguntur pro diversis temporibus (...) sed (...) quia sunt ibi duae propositiones: enuntiatum enim actus volendi de voluntate in una propositione, et oppositum actus de voluntate absolute accepta cum nota possibilitatis enuntiatum in alia propositione (...)" The divided meaning which is traditionally applied to the diachronic distinction "[t]he will that wants in a may not want in b" is used here to distinguish two different attitudes of the will that take place at the same instant: one with which it deliberates, and a more "remote" one, aimed at opposite acts or objects, which makes truly free deliberation possible.

⁴³ Cf. Vos et al. 1994, p. 119: "The factually existing potency to will can actualise the logical potency; the potency to will is the cause which actualises the level of possibility. This is the reason why Scotus calls the potency to will a 'real potency': there is something in reality which has the potency to actualise. It is important to observe that this does not indicate that, for the potency to actualise, it would have to actualise factually. The concept 'real' is added to 'potency', but it does not function as a synonym for a logical possibility being actualised. 'Real' refers to the reality of the will, i.e. the factual existence of a potency able to actualise possibilities."

6.4 From the Human to the Divine Will

If these freedoms are ascribed to the divine will as well, a *libertas prima*, which allows the will in itself to lean towards the production of opposite effects, must be established. While for humans this role is executed by freedom towards opposite acts, this is not the case for God (for it would only indicate imperfection and changeability). The divine will is, in fact, only capable of one act of volition, which is superior to all the individual acts of the human will, as it can have as its object the different objects of individual human volitions, in the same way as a single divine insight has the objects of multiple human insights as its object.⁴⁴ As a result, unlike human freedom, which can turn to opposite acts realizable at different instants, God's freedom is not diachronic, but synchronic. Similarly, being absolutely simple and thus unable to distinguish its essence from its acts, the divine will cannot have different acts, but one thing—for example for the stone to be—with a single volition, and, with the same volition, it may want the stone not to be, or it may not want the stone to be. In that the will of God is operative *ad intra*,⁴⁵ it precedes itself in that it is productive *ad extra*. Its operativity enables it to aim at opposite objects at the same instant of eternity in which its productiveness makes it choose one of the two objects.

Table 1.

	Human will	Divine will
First Act	Turning towards both opposing acts	Operatively turning towards both opposing objects in a single act
Second Act	Choosing one of the two opposite acts	Productively choosing an object
Produced Reality	Object resulting from the act	Object/effect caused

⁴⁴ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 53 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 496): "(...) voluntas autem divina non potest habere nisi unicam volitionem, et ideo unica volitione potest velle opposita obiecta, nam eius unica volitio est praevalens omnibus volitionibus creatis respectu diverso rum, sicut eius unica intellectio respectuo omnium intellectionum creaturarum. Unde eius unica volitio habet praevalentiam respectu omnium volitionum tendentium in diversa obiecta, quia quaelibet nostra volitio limitata est ad suum obiectum. Si igitur ponitur aliqua una illimitata, quae est volitio divina, illa poterit oppositorum obiectorum esse. Est igitur libertas voluntatis divinae quod ipsa unica volitione potest tendere in opposita obiecta, et in infinitum liberius quam nos diversis volitionibus."

⁴⁵ That is, in natural, as opposed to temporal, instants.

The reality produced by the acts of the will must be distinguished from the real possibility for the will to remain directed towards the object or act opposite to the chosen one. For Scotus, the contingent is real, and the choice of one of the two contradictories (represented in the first box of the Table 1) does not eliminate the other (from the same box). Rather, it shifts the chosen alternative (to the lower box), whereby the omitted object is still aimed at by the will, and therefore the possibility to choose it is retained.

Table 2.

First Act	<i>Velle</i> in real possibility	<i>Nolle</i> in real possibility
Second Act	<i>Velle</i> put in act	<i>Nolle</i> in real possibility

Conversely, the more traditional conception of freedom and contingency would see the exclusion of the omitted alternative from the realm of what is actual:

Table 3.

Before Choice	<i>Velle</i> possible	<i>Nolle</i> possible
Choice	<i>Velle</i> real – necessary	<i>Nolle</i> impossible

Scotus imagines two objections that might be aimed at his theory. First of all, following Aristotle, it is objected that *omne quod est, quando est, necesse est* and therefore it is not possible that the will, at the same instant in which it wants to, may not want to, the choice of one of the two alternatives must exclude the other. A further objection is based on the (13th century) rules of the *obligatio* dispute, which hold that “if a false contingent is posed about a present instant, it should be denied that the posed instant is the actual present.”⁴⁶ This objection is quickly overcome through a metarule: as the *obligatio* dispute can be well explained even without resorting to the *necessitas per accidens*, there is nothing to hold us back from discarding this useless rule.⁴⁷ The answer to the first objection

⁴⁶ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 56 (editio Vaticana 1966, pp. 498–499): “(...) posito falso contingenti de praesenti instanti, negandum est praesens instans esse (...)” For the reception of the Scotistic interpretation of the *Obligationes* in Oxford (e.g., by Walter Burley), see de Rijk 1975, p. 32; Gelber 2002, pp. 142–143; Spade 1992, p. 173; Yrjonsuuri 1998, pp. 235–247.

⁴⁷ Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 59 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 499): “Ad aliud: negatur illa regula. Verumtamen ars obbligatoria bene traditur ab illo magistro sine hac regula; unde non dependet ex veritate huius regulae.”

is more elaborate and more pertinent to our interest. It briefly explains modal logic by pointing out that the proposition of the Aristotelian principle *omne quod est, quando est, necesse est* can be understood either in a composite sense or in a divided sense. In the former sense, the proposition will be categorical and will express the necessity of the consequence: the proposition “all that is, when it is, has been” is necessarily true.⁴⁸ However, in a divided sense, the proposition will be hypothetical and will express the necessity of the consequent: if (when) a thing is, then it must be. In this latter sense, the proposition is false and would force us to exclude contingency radically; in fact, the contingent act could in no way be if its very being makes it necessary.⁴⁹ Therefore, Scotus concludes, the will that contingently wants at time p may, for what it wants contingently, not want p at the same instant.

6.5 Conclusion

The introduction of contingency into the world and competition among different causes, particularly causal competition among free agents, may trigger deviant causal chains. These result either in an unwanted effect from the first agent of an action or in the desired effect obtained through other means than those initially foreseen. Furthermore, deviant causal chains rupture the more rigorously deterministic models of the world, precisely because the entire concatenation of causes and effects eludes the determination originally established by the action—whether free or not—of the first cause, and is instead open to the intervention of a random mix of different and differently ordained agents.⁵⁰ Similar chains, “deviating” from their aim, cause, and order, are explored in relation to such vast and ethically and theologically relevant issues as free will, predestination, personal salvation, instilled grace, and justification.

The problem of simultaneous contradictories attracted the attention of 14th-century Oxonian philosophers and theologians, who advanced the debate on

⁴⁸ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 58 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 499): “(...) in sensu compositionis vera, et denotatur necessitas concomitantiae, et est sensus ‘omne quod est quando est, necesse est esse’, et denotatur esse necessarium ‘omne esse quando est’ (...)”

⁴⁹ Duns Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 39, q. 5, n. 58 (editio Vaticana 1966, p. 499): “(...) in sensu divisionis falsa, et denotatur necessitas concomitantis sic ‘omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse’, et significatur quod ‘omne quod est, est necessarium esse quando est’, et hoc falsum est, quia contingens non est necessarium quando est.” For more, see Knuuttila 2012; Knuuttila 2021. For a critical point of view about Scotus’s innovativeness, see Pasnau 2020.

⁵⁰ See chapter 1, pp. 17–39.

what are known as the instants of change to an apex of sophistication. The question whether and how contradictions could be true at the same instant continued to be pondered against the background of volitional acts, changes in the will, causal chains, and the problem of necessity and freedom. These discussions spawned different approaches to and illumined various facets of the issue. This part of the book offers more insight into the theories of William Ockham, Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham (Chapter 7), and Richard Kilvington's positions (Chapter 8).

CHAPTER 7

ACT IN A DECENT WAY

FREE WILL, CHARITY, AND INSTILLED GRACE

Riccardo Fedriga

7.1 Introduction

The simultaneity of contradictions, the succession of temporal continuum and its interruption, wayward causal chains, and the action-guiding role of covenant theology in a world ordained for change are all at the heart of the debate around theological virtues, such as charity, and the relationship between free will and instilled grace. In the *Reportatio parisiensis*, distinction 17, part 1, question 1,¹ Duns Scotus states that, acting by the ordained power (*de potentia ordinata*), a single object (*res*) is necessary for God to want to save a certain human, since God cannot will and not-will to save a human in the same act. As God's will cannot in and of itself change from one opposite to the other, if there is a difference (the act of saving, rather than that of not saving), this must be due to a distinction relative to the object (a human to be saved) and this distinction indicates the presence or absence of grace in that human.² Shortly afterwards, in his response to the question (*ad formam quaestionis*), Scotus makes a distinction

¹ Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wolter, Bychkov 2004, pp. 460–474).

² Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wolter, Bychkov 2004, pp. 463–464): “Volitio divina, quae in se est unica et simplex, non habet in se rationem volitionum oppositarum, ut velle et nolle, nisi sit aliqua distinctio ex parte obiecti, aliter enim contradictoria essent simul vera de aliquo, nulla facta distinctione circa illud, quod est impossibile (...). Ergo tantum propter habitum caritatis oportet esse distinctionem et variationem. Alioquin contradictoria erunt vera de eodem.” For the concept of Covenant theology see Courtenay 1984b; see also here chapter 2, p. 25.

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

between absolute and ordained powers. *De potentia absoluta*, God can accept and beatify a soul without having to instill charity or grace (one coinciding with the other) in it through the sacraments, and this volition would be for the good.³ However, according to the ordained power, God has established law and order such that no one is accepted for eternal life if the habit of instilled grace is not inherent in their soul. This law is valid only insofar as it has been instituted by God. If God exercised the will to save a person regardless of whether or not this person possessed grace, a new law, different from the present simply obtaining grace would be enough for salvation, with those not possessing it inevitably damned, regardless of God's acceptance or repulsion of them. So much so that not even the divine will could intervene in this matter, which is intrinsically, absolutely necessary and not subject to the divine order.⁴

7.2 In the Shadow of John Duns Scotus: Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham in Dialogue with William Ockham

Similar problems are raised by Walter Chatton in the first question of his *Reportatio* concerning Peter Lombard's distinction 17.⁵ In the *Reportatio*, the answer to the question "Is it necessary to posit that charity is inherent in the soul" (*utrum*

³ Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wolter, Bychkov 2004, pp. 466–467): "Sicut in Deo ponitur duplex potentia, ordinata scilicet et absoluta, ita proportionaliter ponitur in eo duplex necessitas. Deus autem, de potentia absoluta, non necessatur ut infundat caritatem ad hoc quod anima formaliter sit sibi accepta et ordinetur ad vitam aeternam, quia potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis, nec per consequens aliis formis creatis, quin de potentia absoluta posset illam naturam in se sine aliquo habitu formaliter inhaerente vel quocumque alio ut merito acceptare, si vellet, ad vitam aeternam. Nec si hoc vellet, male vellet, nec inordinate vellet. Sed ex hoc quod sic vellet, bene vellet."

⁴ Duns Scotus, *Reportatio Parisiensis*, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wolter, Bychkov 2004, p. 467): "Potentia tamen ordinata qua secundum legem sapientiae suae statuit ut nunquam aliquis acceptaretur nisi tali habitu animae inhaerente, quo anima meretur vitam aeternam, quem conferret sibi et quo formaliter anima esset sibi grata, non posset aliquem acceptare, ista lege stante, sine habitu tali quo meretur et ex illo praemiaretur. Sed de potentia absoluta posset aliam legem ordinare qua aliter homo salvaretur tunc quam modo. Verbi gratia, si principia practica, secundum quae agit modo Deus, essent necessaria ex terminis sicut in nobis, tunc omnis habens gratiam salvabitur et nihil habens non salvabitur. Leges autem istae sunt ex gratia et libertate, non necessariae ex terminis, sed secundum acceptionem divinam sic quod habens gratiam salvabitur et non habens non salvabitur."

⁵ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn 1977, p. 44; ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 42).

necesse sit ponere caritatem inhaerentem animae) is divided into three articles, each of which focuses on a particular aspect of the deviance of causal chains. These respective aspects are: 1) whether a sinner can be turned into a non-sinner without having charity instilled, or whether the desired effect can be obtained through a different path than the one normally ascribed to it; 2) whether an act can be worthy of eternal life even if grace is not inherent in the soul; and 3) whether charity must in fact be instilled in the soul (the latter problem does not explicitly concern a deviant causal chain, though this aspect surfaces in its treatment).

Generally agreeing with Scotus and Ockham, Adam Wodeham (1295–1358) responds to and advances his own objections against Walter Chatton (ca. 1290–1343)⁶ and Peter Auriol (1280–1322). Wodeham shares Scotus’s and Ockham’s belief that, as God, by God’s own absolute power, can accept and like a person, even if this person has no inherent supernatural form (such as grace or charity), God can accept the natural acts of this person as being worthy of eternal life.⁷ Wodeham justifies this position by quoting profusely from Ockham’s *Scriptum in I Sententiarum*: being acceptable to God is nothing more than being sentenced to eternal life by God, so that one obtains eternal life by the mere fact of persevering in this state. But, as Wodeham adds, God can grant this disposition even without any habit of grace or charity, since the beatific vision does not depend on having this habit or not, but only a) on God as the active principle that freely creates the vision, and b) on the intellectual human power as the passive principle that receives it.⁸

7.3 Walter Chatton: Habits and the Necessity of Grace

Chatton’s theory is two-tiered. In strictly theological terms, it highlights how Ockham’s opinion opposes ecclesiastical teachings and leads to Pelagianism.

⁶ See Schabel 2002.

⁷ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 207): “Teneo conclusionem oppositam, quam etiam tenent Ockham et Scotus ista distinctione, quod de potentia Dei absoluta potest aliquis esse acceptus Deo et carus sine omni forma supernaturali inhaerente sibi, et quod non solum possit naturam beatificabilem existentem in puris naturalibus ad vitam aeternam acceptare, sed etiam [possit] actum eius ad quem esset sola inclinatio naturalis acceptar ut meritorium vitae aeternae.”

⁸ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 208): “Quod autem Deus sine tali habitu possit conferre vitam aeternam, probatur et bene, quia visio beata a tali habitu non dependet, sed a Deo sicut ab activo et a potentia sicut a receptive.” The text follows by presenting an ample series of proofs obtained by Ockham.

Thematically, it pays greater attention to the nature of grace's necessity.⁹ Chatton believes grace to be necessary by the very nature of things. Since sin essentially implies the deprivation of the habit of instilled charity, its elimination must coincide with habit (*habitus*) being instilled.¹⁰ At the same time, there is a natural link between acts that are morally good and grace itself, since they are accomplished through it by divine precept.¹¹ To resolve this antithesis, Chatton cites God's ordained power. Accordingly, sin can be understood either i) as contravening the laws already laid down by God, or ii) as potentially contravening different laws, should they be imposed. In i), where good acts are essentially linked to grace, a person cannot possibly be freed from sin without the instilling of charity; in ii), which expresses a possibility of a new order instituted by God's absolute power, Ockham's opinion could be admitted, if it did not imply the contradiction that it now implies (according to Chatton) in the current order of this world (*ordinatio*).¹²

Chatton's criticism of the *Venerabilis Inceptor* is propelled by Ockham's answer to one aspect of the question of whether grace is an absolute necessity for salvation, one of his theses examined for alleged heresy by the papal theological commission in Avignon in 1324. Commonly regarded as an object (*res*,

⁹ Etzkorn 1977, 32-65.

¹⁰ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 55–56; ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 43): “Peccatum formaliter includit deprivationem habitus infusi; igitur non tollitur sine infusione habitus. Consequentia patet, quia privatio non tollitur nisi per habitum. Antecedens probat: quia nisi peccatum includeret privationem gratiae, nullus teneretur de facto habere gratiam et caritatem quia nullus tenetur nisi vitare omne peccatum omissionis et commissionis.”

¹¹ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn 1977, p. 56; ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 43): “Item, omne peccatum privat actum bonum; igitur et gratiam. Consequentia patet, quia actus bonus includit tamquam circumstantiam requisitam gratiam inhaerere elicenti actum bonum. Antecedens patet, quia peccatum repugnat praecepto quo obligamur ad implenda mandata ex caritate. Et ideo, eo ipso quod ponitur peccatum, omittitur vel committitur aliquid cuius oppositum requirit actus bonus bonitate requisita ad impletionem praecepti.”

¹² Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn 1977, p. 58; ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 43): “Peccatum dupliciter sumitur: vel pro eo quod modo de facto est peccatum secundum leges nunc a Deo institutas; vel pro eo quod esset peccatum si Deus aliter ordinaret. Primo modo loquendo, dico quod contradictio est quod tollatur peccatum sine infusione doni, ita quod Deus non potest tollere peccatum, quod modo de facto secundum istas leges est peccatum, sine collatione gratiae. Sed loquendo secundo modo, si Deus alias leges ordinaret, quod utique non foret contradictio, tunc probabiliter potest teneri via praecedens, scilicet Ockham (...). Isti tamen non obstantibus concedo quod sine habitu posset quis acceptari iuxta alias leges. Sed tunc aliter sumeretur peccatum. Nam loquendo de eo quod modo est peccatum foret hic contradictio.”

understood as a habit or a form), grace is created and instilled in the soul by God, and then weakened to the point of destruction by sin. While this arrangement was deemed necessary in view of the ordained power of God, the question of its necessity in relation to God's absolute power remained open. Faithful to the principle of economy and the abolition of all intermediaries between the absolute simplicity of God and God's free actions, Ockham considered divinely instilled grace unnecessary for human salvation, at least *de potentia absoluta*. This particular view provoked condemnation with a curious thematic twist, as it was regarded as approximating Pelagianism. Paradoxically, therefore, Ockham's intention to argue that God's power was free from all conditioning was interpreted by the examiners of the *Inceptor* as coinciding with a position that reduced divine work to the acquisition of salvation. While reduction was indeed present, its direction was the exact opposite, as it aimed to curb the complexity of the causal chain of the world's order (*ordinatio*).¹³

Returning to Chatton's analysis, the answer to the second article, which he also developed around the ordained/absolute power distinction (and the consequent exclusion of Pelagian positions), clarifies his interpretation even more. By divine law, we know that only the morally good acts that are performed with grace are worthy of eternal life. If it were otherwise, the divine precepts could be fulfilled by purely human means. It is the exact error made by Pelagius into which Ockham also fell.¹⁴ Therefore, even if a different view is logically admissible (*de potentia absoluta*), it is more important for Chatton to consider the question *de potentia ordinata* as in fact it is now, and to conclude undoubtedly that i) grace is necessary for an act to be worthy, and that ii) conversely, it is not

¹³ A careful examination of the question could better capture the difference between Ockham's non-necessity of grace and the sufficiency of human moral action professed by Pelagius and his followers: Ockham's position could well deny (even if, in fact, the argument is developed otherwise) that human acts suffice to obtain personal salvation, while also denying the necessity of grace as it is understood *de potentia ordinata*, and thus suggesting a different kind of divine election, one immediate and yet independent of the human action towards which it is directed. See Hoffmann 2008.

¹⁴ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 58–59; ed. Wey, Etzkorn 2002, p. 46): “Aut loqueris de meritorio quod posset esse si alias leges statueret Deus vel statuisset, et hoc non est ad propositum; vel de meritorio secundum leges nunc statutas. Si igitur loquaris secundo modo de illo quod est meritorium de facto, sic est contradictio quod actus sit meritorius sine caritate. Immo esse meritorium includit caritatem, tum quia aliter posset homo ex naturalibus implere praecepta Dei, cuius oppositum est verum nam hic est error Pelagii. Tum quia aliter posset ex naturalibus vitare omne peccatum, et hic similiter est error Pelagii.”

possible for there to be instilled grace, and yet for an act performed by using it not to be worthy.¹⁵

The same standpoint is confirmed in the third article of the question, where Chatton states that given the existence of God's law, the presence of grace instilled in the soul is necessary for salvation. Otherwise, Chatton continues, we would fall into the error of Pelagius, which could be admissible on the condition that God had set or would set different laws. But, as this is not the case, it now has to be avoided. Grace is necessary both in the positive sense, to fulfil the divine precepts,¹⁶ and in the negative sense, to avoid sin.¹⁷ This does not mean that things could be different if God were to establish a different order, but Chatton does not elaborate on this idea, concluding that questioning other unrealized possibilities is essentially pointless.¹⁸

¹⁵ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etkorn 1977, pp. 59–60; ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 47): “Ad primum pro alia conclusione, cum arguitur: nullus inimicus Deo—cuiusmodi est peccator—fit necessario amicus Deo, aliquo posito in eo quod non est in potestate sui etc. Aut loquaris de necessitate quae foret si essent aliae leges, et tunc non est ad propositum. Aut de illa necessitate quae est secundum leges statutas, et tunc illa propositio falsa est. Dices: volo absolute loqui de necessitate. Dico quod si loquaris per propositionem de praesenti, tunc loquaris de illa quomodo de facto est necessitas; et falsum, ut dixi, accipis. Vel per propositionem de futuro seu de possibili, et non ad propositum.” See Schierbaum, 2016.

¹⁶ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etkorn 1977, p. 63; ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 51): “Aut potes implere praecepta sine done infuso, et tunc ex naturalibus, et hoc est error Pelagii. Aut non, et propositum. Et haec est una causa necessitatis gratiae, quia praecepta dantur nobis ut impleantur mediante caritate, ita quod hoc cadit sub praecepto. Aliter incidetur in errorem Pelagii.”

¹⁷ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etkorn 1977, pp. 63–64; ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 52): “Dico ulterius quod contradictio est quod talia fiant sine caritate. Quia vadamus ad impletionem praeceptorum, quid intelligimus per ‘implere praecepta’? Certe intelligimus solvere servitium quo Deo obligamur mediante gratia et id quod Deus nobis praecipit. Aliter enim posses implere sine gratia, et sequitur error Pelagii. Hoc est enim diligere Deum prout diligere cadit sub praecepto: diligere Deum ex caritate. Nec est possibile istud praeceptum implere, et ita de aliis, nisi mediante caritate, quia facere hoc ex caritate, seu mediante gratia, cadit sub praecepto.”

¹⁸ Chatton, *Reportatio* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Etkorn 1977, p. 64; ed. Wey, Etkorn 2002, p. 53): “Ad primum dico quod si Deus hoc statueret, tunc non esset peccatum quod modo est peccatum. Immo hoc mutaret significatum vocabuli quod modo currit. Se contradictio est peccatum tolli et tamen gratiam non infundi. Ponas alias leges, et aliter respondebo.” See Keele, 2007.

As with other questions,¹⁹ Chatton seems to exclude the real possibility of wayward causal chains, which have objects that are not (yet) present (e.g., miracles and prophecies) as referents of their propositions, and which are decisive tests in Ockham's model of causality, parsimonious but not radical. In fact, Chatton does not seem to care about the risks of the effects of God's simplicity in the fideistic voluntarism envisaged by Ockham in his *Tractatus*, in theology as well as in epistemology.²⁰ His object is to eliminate any solution that is neither immediately referential nor rigidly causal in epistemology and in the theory of action. In doing this, he conflates the mental with the physical, increasing the arbitrary nature of divine will. The effect of Scotus's influence as interpreted by Chatton is the exact opposite of what the Subtle Doctor wanted to achieve. The intent of opposing Ockham's theses is tackled by a return to a stanchly Aristotelian attitude to the direct apprehension (*notitia intuitiva*) of the conceptual framework of things. A return underpinned by the careful study of theological *auctoritates* in light of the recent condemnations.²¹

7.4 Adam Wodeham and Propositional Realism

Adam Wodeham analyzes the theme of question 17 by dividing it into four questions of his *Lectura secunda*:²² i) whether a soul can be pleasing to God without having created charity being instilled; ii) whether a sinner can become a non-sinner without having charity instilled; iii) whether there is any supernatural form in God's soul which would be required to accept the same soul; and finally iv) whether, within the current world order, every moral act worthy of eternal life presupposes the presence of charity in the soul that acts. Having

¹⁹ Examples in the *Reportatio* are distinctions 40–41, q. 1, “Utrum mysterium incarnationis divinae fuerit meritum praedestinationis humanae” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 369–392); and q. 2, “Utrum stent simul quod Deus vult a necessario fore et tamen quod a contingenter eveniat” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 393–400); dist. 42, q. 1, “Utrum Deus possit facere factibile a quacumque creatura” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 401–411); dist. 45, q. unica, “Utrum voluntas Dei sit causa prima et immediata omnium” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 432–438); dist. 46, q. 1, “Utrum divina voluntas possit impediri” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 439–444) and q. 2, “Utrum productio activa creaturae sit volitio Dei” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 445–452); dist. 47, q. unica “Utrum Deus possit praecipere malum fieri” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 453–457); dist. 48, q. unica, “Utrum voluntas creata teneatur conformari voluntati divinae” (ed. Etzkorn 1977, pp. 458–461).

²⁰ See Pelletier 2015. See also Keele 2003.

²¹ I would like to thank Pascale Bermon for leading me to reflect here on the theological rather than the political aspect of the controversy. See Bermon, 2007.

²² Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, pp. 204–206).

considered and rejected the position of Peter Auriol, Wodeham proceeds to one of Chatton's objections. To Chatton, passing from the absence of grace to its presence without receiving its form with this change is as much of a contradiction as passing from non-white to white without receiving whiteness. The passage is possible only in an accidental way (*denominatio extrinseca*), but not in an essential way (*denominatio intrinseca*). Yet, since sin essentially (i.e., intrinsically) deprives us of grace, in order to remove one, it is necessary to instill the other. Wodeham reasons that this is irrelevant in view of his distinction between two readings of the meaningful uttered proposition 'to be pleasing to God,' which can mean either i) to be accepted for eternal life on the basis of one's present condition, or ii) to possess, inherently in one's soul, a supernatural form that makes it acceptable to God (that is, the form of grace).²³ While one can be welcome in the former way (without the instilling of charity), the change in the intrinsic *denominatio* of the latter way remains contradictory if the instilled form is not given.²⁴

An essential change takes place if a person who is unwelcome and deprived of charity is made acceptable by virtue of charity (meaning that either this person has received it or they would not be such), and no change takes place if a person is made admissible even without charity. Notably, the difference between Chatton's and Wodeham's positions rests on fine semiotic differentiations. Specifically, in one possible sense, *carus* is a concrete paronym of abstract *caritas*, meaning *caritatem habens* and thus standing for intrinsic essence or at least the accident of quality. In the other sense, *carus* means *carus Deo*, or *acceptus Deo*, and denotes a relative character of the subject, which Wodeham considers extrinsic.

Unlike Chatton's (and Scotus's) voluntarism, Wodeham's solution is reached through the use of propositional realism, the doubly modal reading of a *dictum*'s referential significance. In other words, the solution of the *de re* problem is developed by means of logical-linguistic tools, which disambiguate the different

²³ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 208): "Esse carum" dupliciter potest accipi: uno modo pro esse acceptum et praeparatum secundum statum praesentem ad vitam aeternam, et alio modo pro habere sicut formam et qualitatem sibi inhaerentem illud donum quod vocatur caritas qua sic acceptatur"

²⁴ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 208): "Et correspondenter potest abstractum dupliciter accipi, et correspondenter accipiendo abstractum in sensu correspondente a parte concreti, verum est quod est impossibile aliquem 'esse carum sine caritate'. Sed non sequitur quin aliquis posset esse carus primo modo accipiendo 'esse carum' sine caritate quae est qualitas etc."

meanings of the same term and elucidate how the predicamental difference corresponds to a real difference in the nature of the things to which they refer.²⁵

The contingency of receiving bliss and the free action of giving it beyond causal necessity can be further clarified by exploring possible change, which Wodeham (and Ockham) believes may occur through the passage of time. Specifically, a person who is willing to receive beatitude receives it only from a certain moment onwards and without even having undergone any essential change in one's disposition.²⁶ The combination of the two examples provides a complete picture of how Ockham's intentional causation model functions when applied to bliss and grace in theology.

It is no surprise, then, that Wodeham concludes it is not proven that created charity is originally instilled in the soul so as to make it pleasing to God. God *ab aeterno* preordained to give charity to John the Baptist's soul, devoid of charity, without this implying either i) any change in God (what it would be like to begin this volition) or ii) any change in John other than the reception of this form. Similarly, God can bestow beatitude on a soul that is not blessed without there being either a change in God or a change in the soul that receives the form. Just as John only goes from not receiving to receiving the preordained grace, so something else goes from not being blessed to being blessed without any other changes occurring, such as, for example, from not having charity to having it.²⁷ In this way, Wodeham elegantly solves both the problem of the possible dictatorship of theological voluntarism (since there is no change in God's simplicity) and the problem of realist necessitarianism. In fact, it is possible to go from one way of receiving grace to another in the same way that in semantics

²⁵ Brower-Toland 2007a, 610.

²⁶ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 222): "Et per istum modum, et per nullum alium quam talem vel aequivalentem, ad solam transitionem temporis est possibile sine omni mutatione in quocumque quod sit transitus de contradictorio in contradictorium, in casu ubi ipsa contradictoria non significant tempus nec prius et post ipsius temporis—quod dico pro exemplo praedicto de conservatione et similibus."

²⁷ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 219): "Item, aliter potest leviter dici ad argumentum, quod in nullo probat caritatem creatam originaliter infundi animae ut ipsa sit cara. Quia dicetur et bene quod sicut Deus aeternaliter praedordinat dare caritatem animae Ioannis praeexistenti non carae secundum statum praesentem [per] infusionem suae gratiae, et quod non est ibi transitus de contradictorio in contradictorium nisi per hoc quod Deus infundit sibi caritatem, ita quod Deus nonquam incepit velle sibi dare caritatem, ita diceretur de alio cui prius non beato daret beatitudinem, licet bene inciperet sibi dare beatitudinem, ita quod in secundo casu nonquam fieret de non caro carus ante, sed de non beato beatus, sicut nec in primo casu de non praedordinato ad caritatem recipiendam praedordinatus ad caritatem praedordinatam, sed tantum de non recipiente recipiens."

it is possible to go from a privative to a non-privative, i.e., without this entailing either a change *in re* over time or any relative causal and theological determinism. It is the chain of causes that undergoes modifications, and not the things that are grounding that chain.

In fact, in the second question, disagreeing with Chatton's negative opinion, Wodeham affirms the possibility that by God's absolute power, God turns a sinner into a non-sinner without infusing any supernatural form into their soul.²⁸ Indeed, there is no human sin, nor a set of human sins such that God cannot entirely settle without supernaturally gifting an inherent form to the soul of the human involved.²⁹ When establishing an order and laws for the world, God did not institute anything that could prevent God from exercising God's omnipotence, so that God can freely produce any effect (except modifying the past as a past), without this happening necessarily or implying a change in God.³⁰

In agreement with Duns Scotus, Wodeham distinguishes between the remission of guilt and the instilling of grace so that they are independent from each other, and their concomitance is not a natural necessity, but merely a contingent

²⁸ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 228): "Sed quamvis de facto et de potentia Dei ordinata nullus de peccatore fiat non-peccator et acceptus Deo ad vitam aeternam [sine dono], et quatenus argumenta ad hoc deducta sunt reduplicativa, et auctoritates multae etiam valeant et verum concludant, tamen quin de Dei potentia absoluta aliter valeat fieri nec video nec credo. Sed firmiter, oppositum opinando, tenendo tam de ipso peccato loquendo quod de facto peccatum est, quam de isto quod esset peccatum homine non obligato ad habendum donum supernaturale caritatis—scilicet, quod talis posset esse vel fieri carus et acceptus Deo sine infusione alicuius doni supernaturalis."

²⁹ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 228): "Tum tertio, quia ad preces vel mutationem in alio, posset Deus originale vel actuale peccatum alicui remittere et ad vitam aeternam ordinare. Quodlibet istorum posset Deus ordinare hodie vel cras circa quemcumque peccatorem et obligatum et oneratum omnibus peccatis mundi quae de facto sunt peccata vel fuerunt. Immo, quod plus est, dico quod nec de possibili posset homo tantum peccare, quin Deus posset remittere totum sine omni dono supernaturali formaliter inhaerente ei."

³⁰ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 228): "Deus enim per nullas leges praeordinatas privavit se sua misericordiae omnipotentia, quin plene et libere possit adhuc de quibuscumque futuris ita ad omnem partem contradictionis ordinare sicut potuit ab aeterno, licet non valeat incipere ordinare. Sed potest modo contingentissime et liberrime ab aeterno ordinasse de qualibet parte contradictionis futurorum causabilium sicut sibi placeret, licet hoc solo privetur Deus (...) [i]ngenita posse facere quae utique sunt facta." For the relationship with Ockham's thought on these topics see here chapter 1, p. 23.

occurrence deriving from the divine decrees.³¹ Since faults and, therefore, deprivations are many, many habits must be the object of deprivation and not grace alone, unless grace itself is regarded as multiple or composite.³² Moreover, while Wodeham rules out the instillment of a form in the soul being necessarily bound up with guilt being taken away by God, at the same time he denies that the remission of faults must coincide with the infusion of grace.³³ Therefore, remission can be granted by God independently of the gift of any inherent supernatural form. That one can be pleasing to God even without grace is finally demonstrated by the fact that, whoever is saved, God has not only always wanted but also accepted that person for who they are. At the same time, God's acceptance means that God has consistently been pleased until the moment that the person performs a sinful action and is therefore deprived of grace.³⁴

³¹ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 230): "Licet ita sit de facto, non tamen ex natura rei nec necessario, sed ad ordinationem Dei contingentem, qui aliter ordinare posset, cum et gratia posset poni sine remissione cuiuscumque culpae (...). Et e converso [sine infusione gratiae] de quacumque culpa a qua sicut ab actu transeunte quis dicitur peccator, immo et culpa quae est carntia gratiae quae praecipitur haveri, quia posset quis absolvi ab isto teneri sicut ab isto debito. Et tunc esset carus et acceptus ad vitam aeternam sine infusione gratiae, vel esse posset."

³² Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, pp. 230–231): "Item, omnibus illis privationibus correspondebant proprii habitus (...) [p]raeter gratiam quam communiter ex statuto Dei libero et contingenti privant. Item, si non esset contingentia, expediret multas culpas commisisse, vel multae gratiae vel partes gratiarum infunderentur vel saltem aequivalerent."

³³ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 231): "Ista forma, quae vocatur et est de facto gratia, posset manere in anima de potentia absoluta Dei absque hoc quod culpa quaecumque commissa remitteretur (...). Nulla enim forma causabilis in anima viatoris potest Deum necessitare ad beatitudinem conferendam vel culpam commissam remittendam. Et sicut non necessitatur ad positionem gratiae (...) remittere culpam, ita nec ad remissionem culpae ponere gratiam." On the broader question regarding the supposed Wodeham's internalism, see Karger 2015.

³⁴ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 234): "Tunc enim scit Deus determinate utrum dabit sibi gratiam suam in qua debeat se finaliter daturum. Vult hoc determinate, igitur et vult isti vitam aeternam. Igitur dum iste actu peccat, est carus et acceptus ad vitam aeternam. Dicendum igitur ad utrumque quod quem Deus novit finaliter habiturum vitam aeternam, sive dum actu peccat sive postquam peccavit et manet reus, ipsum determinate acceptat Deus ad vitam aeternam, sed non secundum statum praesentem, quia secundum istum est dignus poena aeterna." See Wood 1990.

7.5 Conclusion

Philosophical tools employed to produce an account of the order of a world created for change are not simply pragmatic means required by theological theories in order to access the world itself. Like habits, they are also vehicles of the metaphysical assumptions underpinning these theories, if not their political agendas. This has been shown briefly in Chatton's misunderstanding of Ockham's doctrine of grace.

As such, the way Wodeham takes it upon himself to defend his master against criticism from his opponents is very important. Its relevance is not only doctrinal, but also lies in the confirmation that theology requires covenantal rules (in this case, logical-linguistic ones) by which, thanks to the habits determined by the regularity of causes and in the flux of time, it is possible to achieve a true awareness of the laws that govern our knowledge of the current world, and the belief that we can act in a decent way to change it, if we so wish.

Responding to Chatton's view that sin includes the deprivation of grace, Wodeham introduces a new argumentative device. He does so by i) returning to the theme of causal actions and chains, and ii) like Ockham, linking it to the responsibility of righteously following divine precepts. In fact, while on the one hand, according to the ordained power, it is impossible to remove sin without instilling grace, on the other, according to the absolute power (*de potentia absoluta*), God can absolve the sinner not from sin but from the precept itself whose non-observance leads to sin. In this way, without any change in the man's conduct, this same conduct would change from sin to non-sin, and its agent would be freed from the burden of sin without receiving any supernatural form for his soul. Instead of changing the order of the causal chain, God uses the absolute power to alter the precept whose breaching otherwise results in sin. This deviates the causal chain that determines the regularity of an action, when it is performed in such a way that it follows the agent's intention. Although no change occurs in the agent A's actions, their sinful behavior may become non-sinful, and A may be freed from the burden of sin without having any supernatural form inherently impressed on their soul.³⁵

³⁵ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, pp. 237–238): “Concede quod peccatum, quod de facto est peccatum, includit privationem alicuius habitus supernaturalis, quia includit carentiam gratiae quam ille obligatur et tenetur habere, qua per omissum vel commissum demeritorie se privavit, loquendo de peccatore a peccato actuali denominato. Et ideo verum est quod peccatum, quod modo de facto est peccatum, non tollitur sine infusione gratiae. Sine tamen illa infusione tolli posset de potentia Dei absoluta, quia Deus

Wodeham goes on to observe that it does not matter that the removal of the precept would make a sinner a non-sinner without entailing any change from sinfulness to non-sinfulness in this person, and that, consequently, with there being no change, no inference about grace not being necessary for change could be made. What does matter is that sin can be removed without instilling grace. Removing it by changing the binding law that carries the penalty of sin is tantamount to removing it regardless of the gift of any form or habit inherent in the soul. This means that the change is entirely extrinsic and, as such, represents the deviance of the causal chain.³⁶

In view of the accusations of Pelagianism his reasoning might provoke, Wodeham makes an important distinction: that it is heretical to affirm that it lies in the power of a human to avoid sin by human natural forces alone, but it is not heretical to affirm that it is in the power of God to accept a human merely because of the natural dispositions of this power.³⁷ While the third question briefly ponders whether God can deny a human eternal life if that human has had charity instilled in them, the fourth question tackles a broader issue: namely, whether an act can be worthy if it is detached from instilled charity. Regarding this issue, Wodeham relies on the notion of uncreated charity, coinciding with the Holy Spirit and therefore with God's own acceptance of humans, to argue that, by God's absolute power, God can accept a person, with uncreated charity being the only condition of this acceptance. The uncreated charity of absolute power is necessary for a human to be accepted by God, and for their actions to be worthy. At the same time, if this does occur, the human involved

potest libere absolvere eum sine infusione cuiuscumque ab illa obligatione et tentione qua modo de facto obligatur et tenetur habere caritatem quam non haberet. Quod si fieret, licet ille non haberet caritatem, quia tamen non teneretur eam habere, ipsum non habere caritatem non imputaretur sibi ad peccatum nec inluderetur in peccato suo."

³⁶ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 238): "Respondendo: argumentum solvit se ipsum, quia si (...) peccatum, quod modo de facto est peccatum, possit non manere vel cessare esse peccatum ad solam laxationem obligationis, absque cuiuslibet doni infusione, hoc est plene et plane intentum, [scilicet quod illud] quod modo de facto est peccatum posset a Deo remitti absque infusione gratiae. Et hoc non includit contradictionem?"

³⁷ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 238): "Licet [non] subsit potestati hominis ex puris naturalibus sine gratia infusa vitare omne peccatum, cuius oppositum dixit Pelagius et male, quia non est in potestate hominum naturali obligari ad habendum huiusmodi gratiam, tamen in potestate Dei est hominem in puris naturalibus acceptare."

cannot help but be saved.³⁸ By the ordained power, created charity, which God instills in the soul, is only necessary for an act to be worthy in the present order, and by absolute power, God can accept a person who does not have it and not accept someone who does.³⁹ Finally, like Ockham, Wodeham claims that the will can deliberate on and enact an unworthy deed, and it can also deliberate on and enact a deed that is *de facto* worthy. What the will cannot do, however, is ensure that this deed is or is not accepted by God, as that decision depends on God alone and not on the deliberations of created wills.⁴⁰

³⁸ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 250): “Magister loquitur de ista caritate sine qua nullus potest eses carus et acceptus Deo ad vitam aeternam de quacumque potentia et sine qua etiam de potentia absoluta Dei nullus potest opus aliquod meritorium facere, nec Deum aut proximum meritorie diligere. Illa, inquam, caritas etiam secundum veritatem est sola gratuita Dei voluntas liberrime acceptans aliquem tamquam dignum vita aeterna. Et ideo per appropriationem caritas ista est Spiritus Sanctus sic acceptans (...). Repugnancia enim est et contradictio quod Spiritus Sanctus libere disponat dare isti vitam aeternam nisi ille ponat obicem, quod est velle dare vitam aeternam secundum statum praesentem, id est si perseveret in tali, quin ille sit acceptus Deo et carus ad vitam aeternam secundum iustitiam praesentem. Sed hoc potest Deus disponere absque omni forma supernaturali actualiter perficiente istum.”

³⁹ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, pp. 250–251): “Sed praeter istam caritatem increatam dat Deus caritatem creatam sine qua, etiam de facto, nullum acceptat, nec ut creditur acceptabit. Sed absolute et sine ea posset [acceptare], et ea etiam posita posset non acceptare habentem [tale formam] de sua absoluta potentia ad vitam aeternam istam beatificam de qua prius.”

⁴⁰ Wodeham, *Lectura secunda* I, dist. 17, q. 1 (ed. Wood, Gál 1990, vol. 3, p. 252): “Praeterea, omne illud quod potest ex se sufficienter,” cum generali Dei influentia in substantiam actus causandam, ‘in actum demeritorium, posset consimili modo ex se’ si placeret Deo actum ex naturalibus elicatum acceptare sicut de potentia absoluta facere posset, ‘in actum meritorium’. Hoc patet, quia non videtur maior repugnancia naturae in solis naturalibus consitutae ad actum meritorium quam ad actum demeritorium. Utrobique enim substantia actus boni vel mali naturaliter elicibilis est in potestate voluntatis. Sed quod acceptetur ad vitam aeternam vel quod reddat reum poena aeterna, ita quod sit meritorius vel demeritorius, non est in potestate nostra naturali, sed in libertate Dei acceptantis et praesentialiter sic disponentis.”

CHAPTER 8

RICHARD KILVINGTON ON THE WILL'S ACTING AND TIME

Monika Michałowska

8.1 Introduction

Richard Kilvington is best known for his interest in epistemic and ontic logic, his contribution to the study of physics, and especially his theories of the quantification of qualities, of local motion, and of the calculus of compounding ratios.¹ He was also enthusiastically involved in ethical and theological disputes of his time. The problems that mostly attracted his attention included the structure of the will and the specificity of the will's acting. He analyzed various voluntarist issues in several questions in his *Questions on the Ethics* and *Questions on the Sentences*, some of which are focused entirely on the concept of the will and its acts. For instance, question 4 in Kilvington's *Questions on the Ethics*, entitled *Utrum voluntas suos actus producat libere*, ponders a range of will-related themes, such as the freedom of the will and its active character, the structure of the will, the concept of second-order volitions (Chapter 5), and the nature of various acts of the will.² Kilvington's interest in ethics is also conspicuous in his *Questions on the Sentences*, where he analyzes the trendiest dilemmas of his day, such as the human and the divine wills, the problem of the human will vis-à-vis predestination, and the concept of future contingents (question 3 *Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta*, and question 4 *Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid*). While these

¹ Jung, Podkoński 2020, pp. 55–58.

² Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 165–208).

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

issues are dominant in Kilvington's explorations of the will, he also looks into less prevalent and less frequently debated aspects of the will's acting. One of them—specifically, the role of time in the will's acting—is addressed in question 5.1 *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis pro aliquo instanti debeat ipsum actum per aliquod tempus necessario tenere*, whose critical edition is included in this volume. While some facets of Kilvington's theory of the will have already been analyzed, especially with reference to the most prevalent topics of the 14th-century voluntarist debate,³ its less obvious or minor points still await investigation. To redress this gap somewhat, I focus on one of such minor problems in this chapter and examine the role of the circumstance of time in the will's acting as discussed by Kilvington in question 5.1. I show to what extent, in Kilvington's view, the circumstance of time can affect the nature of the will's acting and the will's freedom.

Kilvington's interest in the issue reveals one of the complex facets of the so-called instantaneous change and/or "contradiction theory of change," whose origin has been mapped in Chapter 6. As the problem of the instant of change evolved into an autonomous issue in the 14th-century, making a career of its own especially in logical treatises, various solutions to the problem were proposed,⁴ not least by Kilvington. In his *Sophismata*, he examines in depth the first and last instants of change, and the so-called *incipit-desinit* problem.⁵ The theological origin of these issues seems important for understanding both some of the facets of 14th-century voluntarism in general and Kilvington's voluntarist position in particular. By dedicating a separate question to these thematic concerns in his theological commentary, Kilvington continues this tradition. When broaching the concept of the first and last instants of change in his considerations on the will, Kilvington offers a hybrid (ethical and physical) perspective that to some extent epitomizes his preferable methodological strategy. Thus, to assert the possibility of the simultaneous coexistence of different (even opposite) acts in the will, Kilvington relies on his methodological tactic of bringing various areas together and providing comparisons between physical and ethical realms. Question 5.1 undoubtedly exemplifies this approach.

³ For more details, see Michałowska 2008, pp. 85–94; Michałowska 2011, pp. 467–494; Michałowska 2018, pp. 347–364; Michałowska, Jung 2010, pp. 104–122.

⁴ The literature on this problem is extensive; see, for example, Ebbesen 1989, pp. 121–180; Kretzmann 1976, pp. 101–136; Kretzmann 1977, pp. 3–15; Libera 1989, pp. 43–93; Nielsen 1982, pp. 1–83; Pérez-Illarbe 2012, pp. 287–303; Podkoński 2020, pp. 205–223; Spade 1994, pp. 193–221.

⁵ Kretzmann 1977, pp. 3–15; see also Murdoch 1989, pp. 3–28; Murdoch, Sylla 1978, pp. 241–246.

While addressing the problem of the freedom of the will, I examine in more detail several issues raised by Kilvington in this question, such as to what extent the will's acting resembles natural processes and whether change in the will's acting requires time. I also highlight a unique methodological aspect of Kilvington's writing that makes it possible to study and describe ethical and physical processes in a similar manner. I conclude that by using this analytical tool, Kilvington exposes both a certain uniformity of the world and the specificity of the will. The second part of the chapter contains a critical edition of question 5.1 preceded by an introduction to the edition.

8.2 The Structure and Sources of the Question

At the beginning of the 14th century, a new trend in theological commentaries arose, ushering in a new independent genre for debating theological issues. William Courtenay notes that

Sentences commentaries themselves were undergoing changes in the early fourteenth century, perhaps more in England than anywhere else (...) *Sentences* commentaries gradually severed their dependence on the structure of Peter Lombard's work and concentrated on those questions that were of most interest to the author and his contemporaries.⁶

Kilvington's *Questions on the Sentences* reflects this new tendency. It comprises eight questions of various length and complexity, exhibiting all the characteristics of a 14th-century question commentary as depicted by Courtenay, and later more elaborately portrayed by Paul Bakker and Chris Schabel. Specifically, Kilvington's work only examines a set of theological issues chosen by the author, instead of inspecting all the problems as formulated by Peter Lombard, and, consequently, becomes "more specialized" rather than "encyclopedic," to use Bakker and Schabel's terminology. Because the selected standard theological issues are quite often intertwined with non-theological (mostly logical and physical) ones, both "major" and "minor" dilemmas appear. The structure of each question is more complex and differentiated due to the employment of various techniques by means of which "'minor' problems can be inserted into one single 'major' question."⁷ In line with common practice, Kilvington subdivides questions into sub-questions, as is the case with question 5.1. Apart from

⁶ Courtenay 1987, pp. 252–253.

⁷ Bakker, Schabel 2002, p. 429.

dividing a question into articles, which usually correspond to the principal arguments set down at the beginning of the question, Kilvington also elaborates on some arguments or replies to arguments he finds especially important. Quite frequently, he develops them into a separate entity, leaving the rest of the arguments listed earlier unanswered.⁸

5.1 is a sub-question within question 5 (*Utrum peccans mortaliter per instans solum mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpolata*), and deals with various temporal issues concerning sinning, such as the first and the last instant of sin and punishment, the process of gaining merits and receiving punishment, and the role of the circumstance of time in increasing/decreasing the intension of a sin. It has a standard, albeit rather basic, form of a 14th-century Oxonian question and consists of sixteen principal arguments, the author's opinion, and replies to the arguments. Unlike Kilvington's other questions, which abound with direct quotations from and references to authorities, question 5.1 only contains eleven references, mostly to Augustine's works (*De civitate Dei*, *De Trinitate*, and *De libero arbitrio*). Kilvington also refers to Anselm's *De casu diaboli*, Averroes's *Commentary on the Physics*, and Gregorius Magnus's *Moralia in Iob*. Surprisingly, there is not a single reference to Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which is heavily quoted and referred to by Kilvington in other questions in his *Sentences*. For instance, in question 3 (*Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta*), fifty-nine quotes from and references to Lombard's *Sentences* have been identified, with a slight preference for book I.⁹

Several characteristic features of Kilvington's writing should be brought up here. Although the discussion of the will and time is a part of a theological commentary and is anchored in the problem of sinning, the focus of the analyses is on the human will as a faculty frequently considered in disjunction from any theological context. Furthermore, Kilvington quite often examines a problem by marshaling multiple hypothetical situations, whereby he uses the *ceteris paribus* analytical tool, which helps him study the relation of two factors of a situation, while its other factors remain unchanged. Any alteration of the factors or conditions may influence a given case, and result in various, sometimes even contrary, outcomes, consequently promoting different replies to the question raised. Kilvington's common practice involves scrutinizing various aspects of the same problem and various possible solutions to it, yet often without formulating any answer of his own. Another of his signature features is to reduce the argument to absurdity, again leaving the addressed problem unsolved at times. Finally,

⁸ For a more detailed account of Kilvington's style of structuring theological questions, see Michałowska 2021, pp. 7–11.

⁹ Michałowska 2021, pp. 11–12.

Kilvington rarely defines the terms he employs. Embedded in his analyses, they are usually of a contextual nature. All of these characteristics are identifiable in question 5.1.

8.3 The Will's Acting and Time

The problem posed in the title of the question, namely, whether once the will chooses its act (a volition) at a certain instant, it has to sustain this volition for a certain time, is distributed over several issues, such as: 1) whether the will's acting is similar to natural processes; 2) whether a change from one act of the will to another requires time or happens at an instant; and 3) whether the will can produce and dismiss its act at an instant. Let us have a closer look at the most interesting arguments advanced in the question.

Analyzing the role of time in the will's production and dismissal of its acts, Kilvington invariably draws on examples from natural philosophy and compares the will's acting to the induction of physical qualities. In argument 4, he employs the example of heat production in an object; in the replies to arguments 2 and 14, he describes the action of light in a medium; and in the reply to argument 3, he compares the will's action to the production of or increase in heat and the decrease in coldness in water. Interestingly, Kilvington uses the same comparison in his *Ethics*, when discussing the ethical change.¹⁰ For Kilvington, these comparisons play an important role in determining the nature of the will's acting. In his view, every natural quality, as well as every ethical one, such as justice, prudence, and generosity, varies within a certain latitude that includes all possible degrees, ranging from the greatest to the smallest. To introduce the concept of latitude¹¹ into their argumentation on qualities was a common procedure among the Oxford Calculators, although, as Edith Sylla states,¹² they differed in their understandings of the notion and eventually devised various

¹⁰ Cf. Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. VIII (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 269: 4–8): “Ad sextum principale: dico, sicut dictum ibidem fuit, quod Socrates est liberalior in A quam unquam prius fuit, quia, sicut lux in primo instanti quo generatur in aqua summe frigida talis lux non agit calorem, sed incipit agere calorem, sic mala volitio in primo instanti nihil remittit de liberalitate, sed incipit remittere.”

¹¹ For the concept of latitude in 14th-century thought, see Murdoch, Sylla 1978, pp. 231–241; Sylla 1991.

¹² For more particulars on this subject, see Sylla 1973, pp. 221–283.

“competing theories” of latitude.¹³ Thus, the association of a quality with a certain latitude was already entrenched among Kilvington’s contemporaries. On his take, any qualitative (natural/physical or ethical) change is a motion along the latitude and means a gradual intensification of a quality; for instance, becoming hot, cold, just, or prudent requires taking on ever greater degrees of heat, coldness, justice, or prudence, respectively.¹⁴ Importantly, Kilvington resembles many other thinkers of the day in ascribing a wide spectrum of processes to the term “motion,” which can denote movement (local motion) and any qualitative change.¹⁵ If the motion of the will was a frequent theme in ethics and theology, the analogy of local motion and the will’s acting reached its climax of sophistication and became a leitmotif in the early 14th-century. It can be found in the writings of both Parisian and Oxonian thinkers. For instance, Francis of Marchia (1285/1290–?) “uses an explicit parallel between volition and motion, between *actus volendi* and *actus movendi*,” as Andrea Robiglio points out.¹⁶ Francis of Marchia’s analogy was supposed to underline that although the will can act against the intellect’s judgement, it is the intellect that in fact initiates the will’s activity.¹⁷ Richard FitzRalph (1299–1360), an older colleague of Kilvington’s, was one of the Oxonians who employed this analogy in their examinations of the will’s acting. Article 1 of question 10, entitled *Utrum voluntas sit activa respectu suae actionis vel passiva* and devoted to the activity and passivity of the will, in FitzRalph’s *Lectura on the Sentences* (composed between 1328 and 1329)¹⁸ frequently employs this argument by comparing the will’s acting to local motion with respect to both their principles and their nature. Similarly to Kilvington, FitzRalph embeds this analogy in the investigation of the will’s change, when

¹³ Sylla 1973, pp. 225. As Sylla claims (p. 226), “It is, therefore, an intriguing aspect of the history of the concepts of latitude developed at Oxford in the first half of the fourteenth century that intrinsically reasonable but mutually contradictory concepts were developed, none of which could decisively defeat the others in winning the support of succeeding natural philosophers. One seems to have neither a ‘pre-paradigm’ situation, nor a mature science based on a single paradigm, but rather a ‘multi-paradigm’ enterprise.”

¹⁴ For a more detailed account of this subject, see Jung 2020; Michałowska 2011, pp. 467–494; Michałowska 2018, pp. 347–364.

¹⁵ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. VIII (ed. Michałowska 2016 p. 270: 2–5): “Et consimile argumentum potest fieri in naturalibus, quia non sequitur: requiritur aliquod spatium ad hoc quod fiat motus, ergo vel tantum spatium requiritur ad hoc quod fiat motus etc., nullum enim spatium necessario requiritur ad hoc quod motus fiat.”

¹⁶ Robiglio 2006, p. 165.

¹⁷ For an in-depth discussion of this theme, see Robiglio 2006, pp. 156–165.

¹⁸ For more information on FitzRalph’s life and works, see Dunne 2010, pp. 405–437; Dunne 2019.

exploring what initiates the will's activity.¹⁹ This approach can also be found in yet another member of the Oxford Calculators, Robert Halifax (?–ca. 1350). Halifax extensively re-tools the concepts of optics to analyze ethical issues in his commentary on the *Sentences*, question 1, as Edit A. Lukács points out,

Almost every argument in it contains an analogy from physical motion and change, and draws on proportional calculation, the mathematics of the infinite, or a sophism. One such argument is probably his most complex thought experience, mixing optics, geometry, astronomy, proportional calculation of motion, and ethics, which Halifax placed at the beginning of his commentary.²⁰

In question 5.1, Kilvington does not provide either a definition of latitude or an explanation of how change exactly happens, but in all likelihood, he adopts the same concepts of the latitude and change of qualities as in his *Physics*, where he claims,

And likewise [it is said] about latitude, since the latitude of heat and heat are the same thing in reality, and the latitude of heat has parts just like time, thus heat, as it undergoes change, is called the latitude of heat. When it does not undergo change, it is called heat, not latitude.²¹

¹⁹ FitzRalph, *Lectura*, q. 10, art. 1, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15853 (P), f. 54rb: “Si a se, tunc quaerendum est (*om.* P) de ista mutatione sicut de ista volitione: utrum nunc (nunc] non P) primo habeat voluntas posse sufficiens respectu illius vel non? Et erit processus in infinitum ita quod omnem mutationem factam in voluntate praecessit immediate alia mutatio quae fuit causa istius mutationis (...). Iste totus modus arguendi patet per Commentatorem VIII *Physicorum* commento 6 et 7, ubi probat per hoc argumentum quod omnem motum factum de novo praecessit alius motus.” For this passage, I used Oriel College 15 as a controlling manuscript. For an account of FitzRalph's concept of the will, see Michałowska (2023, forthcoming). More studies of FitzRalph's ethical ideas are likely to be encouraged when critical editions of his commentary on the *Sentences* appear. Michael Dunne and I are currently collaborating on a critical edition of FitzRalph's questions 10 and 11 (q. 10, *Utrum omnis amor procedat ab aliqua notitia*; q. 11, *Utrum appetitus contrarii vel passiones contrariae possint esse simul in voluntate*). I am also working on a critical edition of questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Kilvington's commentary.

²⁰ Lukács 2022, p. 79.

²¹ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super Physicam*, Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. VI 72 (2810), f. 95vb: “Et consimiliter est de latitudine caliditatis, nam eadem res realiter est latitudo caliditatis et caliditas, et latitudo caliditatis habent partes sicut tempus, et eadem caliditas ut est in transmutari dicitur latitudo, et quando non transmutatur dicitur caliditas et non

Some insight into the issue examined in question 5.1 can also be found in his *Ethics*, where Kilvington delves into the nature of ethical qualities and aspects of ethical change. Probing the nature of virtue and vice (each being an ethical quality), he states that each of them is a divisible latitude ranging between two extremes, with an infinite number of degrees of intensity in between.²² In his *Ethics*, Kilvington also dwells upon the concepts of a permanent thing (whose parts exist simultaneously) and a successive thing (whose parts exist one after another). He claims that an ethical quality is a permanent thing (*res permanens*),²³ whereas any ethical change should be classified as a successive thing.²⁴ If this is the case, some characteristics of such a change can be listed. First, change is quantitative and concerns the intensity of a quality, whereas the nature of this quality remains the same. Second, change happens gradually, degree by degree. Therefore, what in fact changes is the degree of intensity taken on by an object. Finally, if the taking-on of degrees happens successively, any change must require time.

Like all natural and ethical qualities, the will's act also has a certain latitude (*latitudo actus voluntatis*). Therefore, a question arises whether a change in the will's acting bears resemblance to a change of physical and ethical qualities, as Kilvington puts it, when considering whether a change in the will's acts happens over time: "a natural agent can produce its act within any time interval, however short, and [it can also] end it; thus, the will can produce its act and end it within any time interval."²⁵

Admittedly, Kilvington does not phrase this argument explicitly, but the chain of reasoning he presents in question 5.1 unfolds as follows: if an act 'A' of the will is "stretched" over a latitude, its intensity can vary between the maximum and the minimum degree, consequently becoming stronger or weaker. Let us assume that it becomes stronger (by taking on ever greater degrees of

latitudo." I wish to thank Elżbieta Jung for sharing her transcription of Kilvington's *Physics* with me. [transl. M.M.]

²² Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. VII (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 267: 14–26).

²³ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. I (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 66: 5–6): "Item, cuiuslibet rei permanentis est accipere primum instans sui esse; virtus est res permanens; ergo eius dabitur etc."

²⁴ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. V (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 210–211).

²⁵ Kilvington, *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis*, p. 190: "(...) agens naturale potest actionem suam producere in quocumque tempore quantumcumque parvo et istam finire, igitur voluntas potest producere actionem suam et istam finire in quocumque tempore."

intensity), which is a process happening over time, yet at a certain moment the will wishes to act upon an opposite volition 'B'; deciding to dismiss act 'A'. Two major questions arise in conjunction with this scenario: 1) Is it easier to dismiss 'A' than it was to produce it?; and 2) Can the will dismiss the whole of act 'A' (i.e., the entire latitude of this act) instantly? Or, rather, is time required for the act to undergo a converse change (becoming weaker and weaker)? Briefly, the issues examined by Kilvington in this question cluster around the relation among a) the will's willing to produce a certain act; b) the dismissing of an opposite act; c) the change in the intensity of this act; and d) the role of time in this change. If, as stated above, any change happens over time, a change in the will's acts is presumably of the same nature, too. To assert that the dismissal of an act of the will happens over time has its implications, with the most problematic one pertaining to the will's freedom.

Let us assume that a sin is such an act of the will that it decides not to will anymore. If time were required to dismiss one act of the will and commence another, the will, while wishing to initiate a new act, would be forced to hold on to the previous one (a sin, in our case) for some time, as Kilvington argues. Naturally, this would jeopardize the will's freedom. Moreover, such a situation leads to an absurdity, as Kilvington maintains, since if the will is forced to hold on to a sin, it is not a sin (for any sin is voluntary), and therefore the same act should be considered a sin and not a sin at the same time.²⁶ However, Kilvington underlines in his *Ethics* that the will can never be forced to sin (either over time or at an instant), because it is in the will's nature not to be forced to do anything.²⁷ Since continuing a no longer desired act cannot possibly be imposed

²⁶ Kilvington, *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis*, p. 197: "Octavo sic: si voluntas potest necessitari ad tenendum aliquod peccatum, et actus quem voluntas habet est peccatum, igitur voluntas potest necessitari ad tenendum aliquod peccatum, et ita posset esse quod illud simul foret peccatum et non peccatum."; Ibidem, pp. 190–191: "Sed in casu dato non sequitur, quia nec per tempus nec per instans necessitaretur ad peccandum."

²⁷ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. I (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 79: 16–24): "Et quando arguitur quod voluntas habentis A non cogitur ad bene vel male operandum post instans primum esse A virtutis, id est, quo posito A est virtus, licet non primo sit in rerum natura, igitur potest male operari sine medio post idem instans; ponatur ergo in esse, et sequitur argumentum. Ad quod dico quod prima istarum consequentiarum non valet, quia non est aliqua coactio proprie loquendo nisi per aliquod tempus necessario cogetur." See also ibidem, q. III (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 152: 27–31): "Unde sicut in motu voluntatis ipsa voluntas inclinatur quodammodo ad malum propter aliquod delectabile movens extra, nec ex hoc ipsa voluntas motu delectabili extra movente potest cogi. Unde delectabile movens in nullo remittit libertatem voluntatis, quia si in aliquo remitteret, argumentum bene probabiliter probaret quod ab aliquo posset voluntas cogi." See also ibidem, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 171–172, 194).

on the will, the will is inferably capable of dismissing its acts instantly, as Kilvington insists in argument 3 and the reply to it:

Thirdly: an act of the will produced from love is contrary to lust; therefore, the producing of [such] an act of the will [acting] instantly excludes the contrary act of lust; therefore, a latitude of such an act of the will can be excluded instantly—which was to be proven.²⁸

The scenario described above breeds yet another dilemma about the nature of change in the will's acting. If the will which at a given moment has an act of lust (act 'A') chooses to have an opposite act, that is, an act of love (act 'B'), then, as Kilvington argues, either both 'A' and 'B' coexist in the will and are compatible (while one is being dismissed, the other is being produced) or 'A' and 'B' are not compatible, and, consequently, 'A' must be entirely destroyed before 'B' is brought forth.²⁹ Kilvington resolves this problem in a rather cursory and derivative manner by simply insisting that the two opposite acts can indeed coexist in the will,³⁰ whereby he does not elaborate on how that can actually happen. His standpoint can be explained based on his considerations in his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Kilvington addresses the issue on several occasions, debating whether a) different acts are produced instantly and simultaneously; and whether b) two opposite acts can coexist and be acted upon.

In question 4, argument 6 (*Utrum voluntas suos actus producat libere*), Kilvington deliberates whether the will can produce all its intentional acts (*intentiones*) concurrently and instantaneously. Although this is theoretically not impossible (*impossibile per se*), as Kilvington concludes by drawing an analogy between the acting of the intellect and the acting of the will, the will can in fact choose all its acts simultaneously, yet in practice one act is always more appealing to the will than others, and therefore the will is always disposed to ponder one

²⁸ Kilvington, *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis*, p. 189: "Tertio sic: actus voluntatis productus a caritate est contrarius cupiditati, igitur productio <talís> actus subití voluntatis excludit actum contrarium cupiditatis, igitur aliqua latitudo actus voluntatis potest excludi subito—quod est probandum." [transl. M.M.]

²⁹ Kilvington, *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis*, p. 195: "Unde posito quod Socrates habeat A actum cupiditatis qui non compatitur secum B actum caritatis, tunc dico quod Socrates non potest elicere B nisi prius corrumpat vel remittat A. Si aliter ita sit quod A et B sint compossibiles, tunc dico quod Socrates non obstante A potest producere B, nec oportet ex hoc quod subito remittatur, et tunc ulterius dicendum est sicut prius."

³⁰ Kilvington, *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis*, p. 195: "(...) ideo consimiliter dico quoad aliquid quod aliquis actus caritatis stat cum actu cupiditatis."

act before others.³¹ The possibility of different (even opposite) acts coexisting in the will is also appraised in question 2, argument 2 (*Utrum virtutes morales ex defectu et superabundantia corrumpantur*), where Kilvington discusses whether two acts of vices which are the extremes of the same virtue (specifically, an act of wastefulness and an act of meanness) are compatible.³² To address this issue, he employs the distinction between taking things in an absolute sense (*simpliciter*) and in a certain respect (*secundum quid*).³³ If the two acts involve different things, they are not opposite in the sense that would make their coexistence impossible. Therefore, it is possible to be mean and wasteful in a certain respect simultaneously; for example, one can be mean towards one person, yet wasteful towards another. However, if being mean and wasteful is taken in an absolute sense, such a coexistence is impossible. Notably, Kilvington uses the example of the coexistence of two acts to survey the possibility of the coexistence of two vices, which serves him to argue that the two vices of the same virtue and the virtue itself form one latitude, that is, one species. If this is indeed the case, yet another argument is furnished in support of the thesis that two opposite acts (a mean one and a wasteful one) are compatible. The point is that, since the two acts belong to the same species (within the latitude of wastefulness-generosity-meanness), they are not in fact opposite and, consequently, can coexist in the same soul.³⁴ The same conclusion is formulated for the acts of love and lust

³¹ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. IV (ed. Michałowska 2016, p. 201: 6–14): “Ad aliam formam, quando ponitur quod omnes intentiones sint aequaliter in potentia in intellectu, dicitur quod hoc est impossibile, forte quia continue est aliqua imaginativa actu movens intellectum. Et ideo forte continue est in intellectu aliqua intentio in actu vel saltem non valde remota ab actu. Posito tamen, quod concedatur, quod possibile sit omnes intentiones aequaliter in potentia esse in actu, tunc voluntas terminabit se ad intellegendum unam plus quam aliam, et ita intellexeret unam ante aliam, non tamen foret in aliquo casu impossibile per se quod voluntas educeret simul intentiones de potentia ad actum.”

³² Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. II (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 93: 1 – 94: 18).

³³ Importantly, the distinction between the notions of *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* with respect to the acts of the will already appears in Kilvington's *Sophismata*, which reveals that he became interested in voluntarism at the beginning of his career. Kilvington, *Sophismata*, 48 [40] (ed. Kretzmann, Kretzmann 1990, pp. 149–150): “Sicut isti duo termini ‘volitum simpliciter’ et ‘non volitum simpliciter’ sunt contraria, et ideo nihil simul est ab eodem simpliciter volitum et non volitum; sed isti duo termini ‘volitum secundum quid’ et ‘non volitum secundum quid’ non sunt contraria, et ideo possibile est quod aliquid sit volitum secundum quid et non volitum secundum quid.”

³⁴ Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum*, q. II (ed. Michałowska 2016, pp. 111: 15 – 114: 17, 115: 11–20). For a more detailed analysis of this problem, see Michałowska 2011, pp. 467–494.

discussed in question 5.1: “therefore, in like manner, I say with reference to this [argument] that an act of love can coincide with an act of lust.”³⁵

The two conclusions drawn by Kilvington in question 5.1—namely, that 1) opposite acts of the will can coexist (*aliquis actus caritatis stat cum actu cupiditatis*), and that 2) the production of an act of love ousts an act of lust (*igitur productio <talīs> actus subiti voluntatis excludit actum contrarium cupiditatis*)—seemed contradictory and posed a conundrum for medieval thinkers, since they obviously violated the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction.³⁶ Kilvington tackles the problem by distinguishing between the two senses, as mentioned above, and claims that such a violation would indeed occur if we considered the cases true as taken together. However, if we inspect these scenarios separately, the realization of one of them does not exclude the other. Moreover, Kilvington’s concluding insight that any latitude of the act of the will can be discarded instantly (*igitur aliqua latitudo actus voluntatis potest excludi subito*) may further illumine this point. Apparently, Kilvington aims to stress the freedom of the will, which can either act at an instant, destroying one act and producing another, or retain both acts for some time. If both these options did not lie in the power of the will, the will would be forced either to continue one act unwillingly for some time or to will only one thing towards one object at a given moment. Naturally, the former option denies the will any freedom to act as it wishes. The latter limits the range of its acts to one at a time (which seems counterintuitive) and, what is more, leaves no room for hesitation, since under such circumstances, for one act to appear, the other must be destroyed. Either of these alternatives puts the freedom of the will at risk.

8.4 Conclusion

The concept known as a “contradiction theory of change,” initiated by the Condemnation of 1277, appeared to be fruitful and engendered a range of approaches adopted by 14th-century ethics and theology. It became one of the leitmotifs in Kilvington’s investigations on the will, coming into its full-fledged form in one

³⁵ Cf. note 30. [transl. M.M.]

³⁶ Kilvington investigates the problem in various areas and with respect to various (temporal, spatial, and ontological) aspects. For instance, in question 3 of his *Sentences*, he devotes an entire article to the simultaneous existence of opposites and multiplies examples and situations of Socrates being wise and stupid, white and black, bearded and non-bearded, or him being in Rome and in Paris. Cf. Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*, question 3 (ed. Michałowska 2021, pp. 150–154).

of his theological questions and paving the way for the incorporation of physical concepts and tools into the realm of ethics. Blending various perspectives in the exploration of the nature of the acts of the will and the will's acting allowed Kilvington to employ analytical tools from the field of physics to describe and analyze the domain of the will's activity. Although bound to different realms, physical and ethical qualities appeared to be similar in nature when it came to their first and last instants. Kilvington did not confound this similarity with identity. He did believe that the analytical tools for describing physical qualities with respect to their onset, cessation, enhancement, and reduction could be applied to the examination of the will's acting. Nonetheless, he insisted that the distinctiveness of the will's realm revealed itself in the will's capacity to initiate its own acts and, more importantly, in its ability to have diverse, even contrary, acts simultaneously. The approach of braiding various methods and dilemmas into considerations on the will and its acts not only speaks to Kilvington's originality, but also made him conclude that independence and freedom were characteristic features of the will. I can conclude again that this conviction situated him on the voluntarist wing of the will-debate.

8.5 Introduction to the Edition

8.5.1 The Description of the Manuscripts

Question 5.1: *Utrum voluntas eliciens actum voluntatis pro aliquo instanti debeat ipsum actum per aliquod tempus necessario tenere* from Richard Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* has been preserved in three manuscripts:

A—Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio, A. 985 (ff. 41va–42rb);
 G—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 14576 (ff. 192rb–193va);
 H—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 15561 (ff. 226va–226vb).

Other manuscripts that contain Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* are:

B—Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, 188;
 C—Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, 503;
 D—Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek Erfurt/Gotha – UB Erfurt, Dep. Erf. CA. 2° 105;
 E—Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II 281;
 F—London, British Library, Harley 3243;

- I—Praha, Národní knihovna České Republiky, III B. 10;
 J—Tortosa, Biblioteca de la Catedral y del Cabildo de la Santísima Iglesia Catedral, 186;
 K—Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4353;
 L—Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu, IV F 198.

Kilvington's other works that have been preserved in the codices containing *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* are:

- a) various parts of *Quaestiones super libros Physicorum* to be found in Praha, Národní knihovna České Republiky, III B. 10 (the question entitled *Utrum qualitas suscipit magis et minus*), and in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4353 (*Expositio super libros Physicorum et quaestio prima: Utrum omne scitum sciatur per causam*);
- b) *Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione* included in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. Lat. 4353 (the question entitled *Utrum in omni generatione tria principia requirantur*), and in Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, 503;
- c) *Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum* to be found in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 15561 (a set of all ten questions), Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek, 503 (a set of all ten questions), and in Wrocław, Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu, IV F 198 (an incomplete set of questions).

The complete set of eight questions of Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* is only preserved in the codex of Bologna, A 985, and comprises:³⁷

1. *Utrum Deus sit super omnia diligendus.*
2. *Utrum per opera meritoria augeatur habitus caritatis quo Deus est super omnia diligendus.*
3. *Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta.*
4. *Utrum quilibet actus voluntatis per se malus sit per se aliquid.*
5. *Utrum peccans mortaliter per instans solum mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpolata.*
6. *Utrum aliquis nisi forte in poena peccati possit esse perplexus in his quae pertinent ad salutem.*

³⁷ The order of the questions varies slightly across manuscripts. I have followed the one preserved in Bologna A. 985.

7. *Utrum omnis actus factus extra gratiam sit peccatum.*
8. *Utrum aliquis possit simul peccare venialiter et mereri vitam aeternam.*

The only question preserved in all the witnesses is question 2. Question 1 has been preserved in eleven manuscripts, question 3 in nine manuscripts, question 4 in five codices, and questions 5 and 6 in three codices; questions 7 and 8 in their complete form can only be found in the Bologna codex, while some fragments of question 7 have been preserved in B and K, and some portions of question 8 in B, G, and H.

Kilvington's question commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* follows the scheme of a fourteenth-century question, with each question containing principal arguments, arguments for and against, the author's opinion, and responses to the arguments against. In this piece, Kilvington avails himself of a variety of arguments, including commonplace arguments of his day, arguments from authorities, his own original ideas, and chains of reasoning. The questions considerably differ in length, ranging from around two folios, to four-six folios, to twelve-thirteen folios. Kilvington's *Questions on the Sentences* contains questions, sub-questions, articles (which elaborate on the principal arguments), and *dubia* (which are developments of some of the arguments formulated by Kilvington).

8.5.2 The Manuscript Tradition

Question 5.1 has been preserved in three out of the twelve surviving manuscripts of Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*, namely in AGH, with H giving a substantially abbreviated and contaminated version of the text. Question 2 is the only one preserved in all the witnesses; therefore, I have collated large excerpts of question 2 for the analysis of the manuscript tradition. Also, questions 3 and 4 have been fully collated. My research indicates that some important witnesses have been lost. Since the family tradition and the *stemma codicum* are presented in detail in *Richard Kilvington on the Capacity of Created Beings, Infinity, and Being Simultaneously in Rome and Paris: Critical Edition of Question 3 from Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*,³⁸ below I only offer the gist of key comments on the manuscript tradition. Based on the full collation of questions 3 and 4, as well as several extensive sample passages of question 2, I have established that all the surviving manuscripts of Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum* form two families of ABCGH (family 1) and of DEFIJKL (family 2).

³⁸ For a detailed description of the manuscripts and manuscript tradition of Richard Kilvington's *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*, see Michałowska 2021, pp. 21–49.

In family 1, a subgroup of BCGH can be distinguished on the basis of accidents shared by BCGH (variants, additions, and omissions of more than one word), suggesting that they all had a common ancestor which is not among the surviving manuscripts and should be considered lost. Since the text of H is considerably abbreviated and contaminated, its utility as a reference in the comparison of the BCGH family is limited. As A shares some similarities with BCGH, it can be safely assumed that it belongs to family 1. However, it seems to stand alone, a conclusion inferable from a number of isolated variants of various kinds preserved in A.

Within family 2, the manuscripts of DIJL form a separate group sharing identical variants, which suggests that they come from the same ancestor. The analysis of the text as preserved in E has revealed that it bears a resemblance to the DIJL group, but it contains a bad copy of the severely abbreviated text. Therefore, it only serves as a reference point to a limited extent, and its position in the group remains impossible to establish. Within the DIJL group, a subgroup of IL can be distinguished, which has been concluded from the fact that question 3 ends in the same place in I and L, as well as from long omissions of several arguments and shared variant readings of questions 2 and 3 in the two manuscripts. Neither of them could have been derived from the other, because each has omissions of the text that was preserved in the other. The analysis of various accidents present in all the manuscripts of the two families has found that none of the manuscripts depends on any another, and that their common ancestor has been lost.

8.5.3 Editorial Principles

I have analyzed the manuscripts with respect to their textual quality and the number of omissions, additions, variants, and obvious scribal errors. The study has revealed that manuscript A should be adopted as the basis for this edition. A and G have been fully collated. The remaining Parisian manuscript, namely H, has been collated partially. However, it has been excluded from the apparatus because of its bad quality. The text of H provides a poor witness as far as textual cohesiveness is concerned, and, as mentioned, it is strongly abbreviated and contaminated with idiosyncratic variants.

For the present edition, I have followed the text of A, a choice dictated by its textual quality. In terms of sense and consistency, A preserves a better copy of the text than G, and contains fewer text “contaminations,” such as scribal corrections of the meaning, added explications, and scribal negligence. All variants, omissions, and additions of G have been included in the critical apparatus. There are some exceptions to these principles:

1. Variants of ‘ergo/igitur’ have been excluded from the apparatus.

2. The words deleted by the scribes have been ignored. The same rule has been applied to the passages of the text labelled by the scribes as “*va ... cat*,” which have been excluded from the *apparatus criticus*.
3. Wherever I deem the text of A wrong or improbable, the reading of G has been followed.
4. In the rare cases where, in my view, neither the reading of A nor that of G seems to make sense, I have offered conjectures, providing the readings of both manuscripts in the critical apparatus.
5. In several instances, I have found it necessary to offer conjectures of words that must have been omitted, yet they are relevant to the understanding of the text.

The division of the question follows the original arrangement of the text as preserved in AG. The section titles, such as *Argumenta principalia*, *Responsiones*, and *Opinio auctoris*, are mine. Importantly, the order of replies to arguments 7, 8, and 9 in the manuscripts is wrong. While the codices give the consecutive numbering of the replies, they are arranged otherwise and their actual sequence is: the reply to argument 8, to argument 9, and finally to argument 7.

Spelling differences have been excluded from the *apparatus criticus*.

The punctuation of the text follows modern conventions.

Only immediate references and quotations have been identified, and all of them are italicized to distinguish them from Kilvington’s own text.

In the present edition, I have classicized the orthography. I have used diphthongs wherever required by classical Latin. In particular, I have used the ‘ae’ and ‘oe’ diphthongs where the medieval manuscript practice uses ‘e’. I have also changed ‘ci’ to ‘ti’ and implemented the Renaissance v/u distinction. I have used the full names of Socrates and Plato, even though the manuscripts consistently give ‘S’, ‘Sor’, and ‘P’.

No abbreviations with the exception of ‘*etc.*’ have been used.

Abbreviations

-] scripsit
- {...} textus ab editore suppletus
- (?) textus dubius
- (!) sic!
- add.* addidit
- codd.* codices
- coni.* conieci
- hom.* homoeoteleuton
- inv.* invertit
- iter.* iteravit

lac. lacuna
lect. dub. lectio dubia
om. omisit

Sigla

A—Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell'Archiginnasio, A. 985

G—Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Lat. 14576

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8.6 Question 5.1

UTRUM VOLUNTAS ELICIENS ACTUM VOLUNTATIS PRO ALIQUO
INSTANTI DEBEAT IPSUM ACTUM PER ALIQUOD TEMPUS
NECESSARIO TENERE

5

A 41^{va}/G 192^{rb}

<Argumenta principalia>

10

(1) Probatur quod non, quia non in infinitum facilius est elicere actum voluntatis quam actum elicitem dimittere, igitur non in infinitum maior mensura requiritur ad dimittendum actum elicitem quam ad elicendum noviter actum, ceteris paribus; et per consequens: si voluntas possit elicere actum in instanti, igitur et ipsum dimittere. Antecedens probatur (quod non in infinitum facilius etc.), quia alicuius difficultatis est elicere actum noviter et maxime respectu tristitiae, igitur si in infinitum foret difficilius actum dimittere quam elicere, sequitur quod infinitae difficultatis foret dimittere actum. Et potest confirmari: si in duplo difficilius praecise esset dimittere actum quam elicere in uno instanti, voluntas potest similiter illum dimittere in duobus instantibus, et sic de triplici difficultate; consimiliter arguo: et sic non posset sine infinita difficultate dimitti.

(2) Secundo sic: si sic, tunc consimiliter foret in infinitum maioris difficultatis remittere actum voluntatis quam ipsum intendere. Patet consequentia, quia voluntas potest actum talem per aliquam latitudinem subito intendere, quin posset per aliquam latitudinem subito remittere, igitur etc. Maior probatur, quia, cum voluntas producit unum actum in aliquo instanti, minus impeditur a contrario actu quam in principio, et agens sive eliciens voluntatem ita forte est post primum instans sicut in primo instanti, igitur tantam latitudinem actus potest causare sine medio post primum instans sicut in primo instanti—quod est probandum.

(3) Tertio sic: actus voluntatis productus a caritate est contrarius cupiditati, igitur productio <talīs> actus subiti voluntatis excludit actum contrarium

4 debeat] debet G 12 quia non] *om.* G 13 non] *om.* G 14 elicitem] allectum (?) G 16 probatur] *om.* A 17–19 noviter ... potest] et poenam G 20–22 in² ... difficultate¹] et voluntas posset elicere actum in uno instanti voluntas posset G 22 arguo et] arguitur G 25 potest] posset G || quin] et non G 26 subito] *om.* G || maior probatur] maiorem probo G 27 producit] potuit in A 28 et] vel G || eliciens] alliciens G || ita] ista G 30 potest] posset G 32 sic] *om.* A 33 excludit] excluditur G

cupiditatis, igitur aliqua latitudo actus voluntatis potest excludi subito—quod est probandum.

(4) Quarto sic: agens naturale potest actionem suam producere in quocumque tempore quantumcumque parvo et istam finire, igitur voluntas potest producere actionem suam et istam finire in quocumque tempore. Antecedens probatur, quia capiatur ignis in summo et agat in aliquod passum quousque fecerit ex eo ignem in summo; et sit A agens et B passum. Tunc probo quod in quolibet tempore potest agens naturale incipere suam actionem et istam terminare quantumcumque sit tempus parvum, quia A agens in quocumque parvo tempore generat in B ignem in summo, et cum facit <ignem> per quolibet tempus in idem passum, <igitur> per omnia, si in principio temporis inciperet agere et in fine acquireret sicut medio, igitur etc.

(5) Quinto sic: Deus potest facere hominem qui potest producere actum in instanti et immediate post instans illum dimittere, quia non claudit contradictionem. Ponatur in esse et patet tota difficultas argumenti, ut in principio positionis.

(6) Sexto sic: si tempus requiritur ad depositionem actus voluntatis post primum instans in quo causatur vel producitur, ceteris paribus omnibus, igitur tempus solum remitteret actum et corrumperet, et ita tempus esset de potentiis activis. Consequens falsum et contra Averroem super IV *Physicorum* commento 84,^a ubi dicit quod quantitas non est de virtutibus activis et passivis.

G 192^{va} (7) Septimo sic: si voluntas habens actum per tempus | necessario tenebit eum, igitur, eadem ratione, voluntas semel vacans semper vacaret.

(8) Octavo sic: si voluntas potest necessitari ad tenendum aliquod peccatum, et actus quem voluntas habet est peccatum, igitur voluntas potest necessitari ad

1 latitudo] supponendo A 5 potest] *iter.* G || actionem] volutionem G 6 ignis] aliquis G 7 eo] ipso G || sit] sic G 8 quolibet tempore] qualibet parte A || potest] posset G || suam actionem] *inv.* G 9 a] *om.* G || quantumcumque] quocumque G 10 parvo tempore] *inv.* G || cum facit] tamen facit A 11 in¹] quod A 11–12 inciperet] incipiat G 12 acquireret] acquirat G 13 potest¹] posset G || potest²] posset G 14 et immediate] *om.* G || post] primum *add.* G || illum] illud A 15 ponatur] igitur *add.* G 17 sic si] *inv.* G || ad depositionem] aut dependet A 18 causatur] terminatur A || ceteris ... omnibus] ortis omnibus paribus G 20 activis] et passivis *add.* G || super] *om.* G 21 84] 88 A || non] nulla G 22 sic] *om.* G || tenebit] servabit G 24–25 aliquod ... habet] actum quemlibet et actus quem habet voluntas G

^a Averroes, *In Physicam*, IV, comm. 84, p. 97^{vb}: “Et differentia est inter illa, quoniam caliditas fit ab alia caliditate in actu, quod non invenitur in quantitate, scilicet quia non fit per aliam quantitatem secundum viam generationis. Cum non sit quantitas de potentiis activis, sed sequitur potentias activas et operationes earum, scilicet calidum et frigidum.”

tenendum aliquod peccatum, et ita posset esse quod illud simul foret peccatum et non peccatum.

(9) Nono sic: aliquem actum voluntatis tenere meritorium est difficilius quam elicere actum peccati delectabilem, ergo facilius potest talis actus non teneri et ita faciliter sicut actus peccati elici, et unus potest elici in instanti, ergo et reliquus potest dimitti in instanti et subito, et sic nullum tempus requiritur. 5

(10) Decimo sic: in casu tanta difficultas est resistere obiecto delectabili exterius moventi, sicut unum modicum actum voluntatis deprimere, sed subito et sic in non-tempore potest voluntas omni obiecto moventi resistere, igitur sine mora vel tempore potest reliquum, scilicet talem actum modicum, dimittere. Antecedens patet, quia aliter voluntas potest cogi ad peccandum sive merendum. 10

(11) Undecimo sic: non est in infinitum difficilius dimittere actum peccati ut peccatum est quam actum peccati ut actus voluntatis est, sed actus peccati sive voluntatis potest dimitti sive deponi subito, igitur actus peccati ut actus voluntatis est potest dimitti subito. Quod actus peccati ut peccatum est potest dimitti subito patet in multis casibus: praecipiat Deus alicui quod non tangat planum aliquod, tunc moveat quis digitum suum super circulum contingentem planum, et talis hic solum peccabit per instans, quia solum per instans tangit planum et facit contra praeceptum. 20

(12) Duodecimo sic: velit aliquis continue per diem: volo instans praesens esse et nolo duo instantia esse simul, tunc actus voluntatis quo vult A esse solum manet per instans, <et> sit A unum instans illius diei, quia si maneret per tempus, tunc vellet duo instantia esse simul—quod est contra casum. 25

(13) Decimo tertio sic: reatus peccati potest excuti subito, sicut patet: quando gratia infunditur primo, tunc tollitur actus peccati. Sed difficilius est tollere reatum peccati quam actum peccati, igitur subito potest tolli actus peccati. Quod reatus peccati difficilius tollatur quam actus peccati probatur, quia solus

1 posset] potest A 3 tenere meritorium] *inv.* G 4 potest ... actus] posset actus talis G 5 et] vel G || elici] elicit G 6 et] *om.* G || instanti] alio G 9 modicum ... voluntatis] motum voluntatis actum A 10 non-tempore] tempore G 11 mora] motu A || modicum] motum A 12 potest] posset G 14 est ... difficilius] in infinitum difficilius est G 16 voluntatis] ut peccatum est *add.* G 17 est] *om.* G 19 digitum] *lect. illegibilis add.* A || super] per G || circulum] *lac.* G 20 et] *om.* A || hic] *om.* G 21 et] est G 22 aliquis] sic *add.* G 23 esse?] *om.* G 24 sit] sic G || diei] dies G || maneret] moveret G 27 actus] reatus G || peccati] probatur *add.* G 28 tolli] *lac.* G 28–29 actus ... quod] reatus peccati quam G 29 quia] quod G

Deus tollit peccatum quoad reatum, ut patet per Augustinum XIII *De Trinitate* capitulo ultimo,^a ubi dicit Augustinus quod *virtutes in hac vita non valent tantum ut hic non sit aliquando necessaria remissio peccatoris, quae non fit nisi per eum qui suo sanguine vicit principem peccati*, sic igitur patet quod non potest reatus peccati tolli sine Deo specialiter et principaliter tollente. Actus autem 5 peccati per solum lapsum temporis et per naturalia tollitur.

A 41^b (14) Decimo quarto sic: si actus voluntatis qui est volitio potest | causari in instanti, igitur quaelibet volitio sive actus voluntatis posset causari in instanti, et ita quilibet potest in instanti primo alicuius temporis habere actum voluntatis ita intensum sicut unquam post illud instans potest elicere, et ita potest homo 10 tantum proficere pro qualibet mensura sicut vellet. Consequens falsum et contra Gregorium XIX *Moralium* capitulo 4:^b *illi qui sublevante spiritu ad summa rapiuntur, quamdiu in hac vita sunt, ne aliqua elatione superbiant, quibusdam temptationibus reprimuntur, ut nequaquam tantum proficere valeant quantum volunt*. Et prima consequentia patet, quia omnes actus voluntatis sunt eiusdem 15 speciei quantum ad causalitatem et productionem, igitur si unus potest produci subito, igitur | quilibet.

G 192^b (15) Decimo quinto sic: Augustinus *De civitate Dei* capitulo 9^c probat quod voluntas non potest habere primam volitionem a se, quia tunc fecit se meliorem quam Deus eam facit; igitur per eum prima volitio non est a potentia voluntatis. 20

1 reatum] peccati *add.* G || XIII] 3 A 2 hac vita] vita ista G 3 sit aliquando] sunt aliunde G || peccatoris] peccatorum G || quae] *coni.*; *codd.* quod A 3–4 quae ... peccati] *om.* G 5 specialiter ... principaliter] principaliter et specialiter G 6 solum lapsum] lapsus solum G || per²] sola *add.* G 7 volitio] volutio G || potest] possit G 8 volitio] volutio G || sive] sicut A 9 potest] posset G || instanti primo] *inv.* G 10 ita¹] *om.* A || illud] aliquod A || potest¹] posset G || elicere ... potest²] *om.* G 14 reprimuntur] reprimeretur G 16 causalitatem] corruptionem G 17 igitur quilibet] et reliquis A 18 sic] *om.* A 19 habere] *om.* A || volitionem] volutionem G || fecit] facit G 20 facit] fecit G || volitio] volutio G

^a Augustinus, *De Trinitate*, XIII, 20, 26, p. 419: “Quae tamen in hac uita non ualent tantum ut aliquando non sit hic necessaria qualiumcumque remissio peccatorum, quae non fit nisi per eum qui sanguine suo uicit principem peccatorum.”

^b Gregorius Magnus, *Moralia in Iob*, XIX, 6, 9, p. 962: “Quia sancti ipsi qui subleuante spiritu ad summa rapiuntur, quamdiu in hac uita sunt, ne aliqua elatione superbiant, quibusdam temptationibus reprimuntur, ut nequaquam tantum proficere ualeant quantum uolunt, sed ne extollantur superbia, sit in eis ipsarum quaedam mensura uirtutum.”

^c Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, XII, 9, pp. 363–364.

Et confirmatur per Anselmum *De casu diaboli* capitulo 12:^a *qui movet se ad volendum, prius vult se ita movere*, igitur omnem volutionem praecedat alia, igitur nulla est prima.

(16) Decimo sexto sic: non quaelibet intentio in <virtute> imaginativa sufficit ad tenendum intellectionem in intellectu. <Si> non minima quae sufficit ad causandum intellectionem, igitur minor sufficit ad causandum minorem; si maxima quae non sufficit, igitur ibi erit una prima intellectio vel primum instans intellectionis in intellectu; et tamen volitio non potest esse sine intellectu, igitur nec primum instans volitionis.

<Opinio auctoris>

His tamen non obstantibus dici potest ut prius. Ad formam igitur primam et ceteras pro maiori parte respondetur sicut in materia naturali de productione rei naturalis, ut hominis vel asini, quorum est accipere primum instans sui esse et non ultimum, ut patet per Philosophum. Unde haec argumenta duo prima possunt ibi fieri ita evidenter sicut hic, et ideo responde hic sicut ibi et sicut respondes de lucido quod agit lucem in primo instanti et continue post intendit per partem ante partem secundum latitudinem in forma.

<Responsiones ad argumenta principalia>

(Ad 1) Unde ad primam formam negatur unum assumptum quod in infinitum est difficilius dimittere actum voluntatis elicitedum quam ipsum elicere in instanti, et non potest ipsum dimittere nisi in tempore vel per tempus, igitur in infinitum difficilius est etc., quia cetera non sunt paria, quia in una est necessitas naturalis ad dimittendum, qualis non est in productione actus.

² ita] *om.* G || volutionem] voluntatem A || praecedat] procedit G 4 in ... imaginativa] imaginaria A 5 tenendum] causandum G || minima] minor A 6 ad causandum] quia talis sufficit producere aliquam A 7 ibi] *om.* G 8 volitio] volutio G || potest] *om.* G 9 volitionis] volutionis G 13 tamen] *om.* G || et] ad *add.* G 14 respondetur] quia G 16 philosophum] philosophos G 17 et²] vel G 23 negatur] nego G 24 est difficilius] *inv.* G 26 est] dimittere actum voluntatis elicitedum quam ipsum elicere in instanti et non potest ipsum dimittere nisi in tempore igitur in infinitum difficilius *add. iter.* A *om.* G 27 productione] procreatione G

^a Anselmus, *De casu diaboli*, XII, p. 254: "Dic ergo quia quidquid se movet ad volendum, prius vult se ita movere."

(Ad 2) Ad secundum dicitur quod in casu potest voluntas subito intendere actum voluntatis per aliquam certam latitudinem. Et in casu isto respondendum est sicut ad primam formam: sed non semper est voluntatem intendere actum suum per certam latitudinem. Et quando arguitur quod sic, quia voluntas, cum produxit actum aliquem voluntatis, tunc minus impeditur a contrario actu ad producendum quam in principio, ergo tunc potest subito tantum actum producere et tantam latitudinem actus sicut in principio. Pro isto, sicut dixi prius, respondendum est sicut de lucido agente lucem in primo instanti. Tunc lucidum illud causat aliquod lumen in primo instanti et semper post primum instans est lucidum ita forte sicut prius et passum melius dispositum ad capiendum lucem, igitur continue post tantum causabitur de lumine sicut in primo instanti, et ita in toto tempore lumen infinitum causaretur. Unde sicut dicendum est in actione vel productione lucis ita dicendum est in productione actus voluntatis quod, licet voluntas sit ita fortis post primum instans sicut in primo instanti, non tamen quantum ad hanc sed ad productionem novi actus vel intensionem prioris, sicut dicendum est de lucido etc.

(Ad 3) Ad tertium quando arguitur: actus voluntatis meritorius qui procedit a caritate est contrarius actui cupiditatis, igitur cum latitudo aliqua in actu caritatis producit subito in voluntate, igitur actus voluntatis contrarius sibi secundum aliquam latitudinem excutietur subito a voluntate, et ita habetur propositum— hic responde sicut de lucido quod per lucem suam causat calores in aqua. Tunc lux in aqua subito causatur et per quendam motum contrarietatis incipit remittere frigiditatem aquae, et tamen in primo instanti nihil praecise corrumpit de latitudine frigiditatis sed incipit expelli frigiditas; sic, licet non fuerit totaliter simile, actus voluntatis meritorius in primo instanti causatus non subito expellit habitum cupiditatis secundum aliquam latitudinem eius sed in primo instanti incipit expellere. Unde concede consequenter, sicut oportet concedere, quod quaecumque caritas stat et compossibilis est per instans cum quocumque habitu cupiditatis, quia nulla pars alicuius cupiditatis subito expellitur in primo instanti

G 193^{ra}

1 subito] *om.* G 2 actum] *iter.* A || voluntatis] suum G || aliquam] *om.* G 3 voluntatem] *coni.*; *codd.* voluntas A 2–4 et ... latitudinem] *om.* (*hom.*) G 6 ergo] et G 7 tantam] totam A 8 sicut] *om.* G 9 aliquod] aliquam lucem vel G 10 capiendum] causandum A 11 tantum causabitur] *inv.* G 14 sit] lucis G 15 sed] si G || intensionem] intentionem G 17 arguitur] quod *add.* G 19 producit] producat G || voluntatis] *om.* G 21 responde] respondes G || sicut] *om.* G || calores] calorem G 22 in ... motum] subito in aqua et per motum quendam G || incipit] tres (?) sapit G 23 tamen] cum G 25 in ... causatus] causatus in primo instanti G 27 concede] concedo G 28 quaecumque caritas] quicumque gradus caritatis G || et] vel G 29 alicuius] actus G || expellitur] expellere G

in quo infunditur caritas. Sed quia argumentum fit de expulsionem habitus, ideo consimiliter dico quoad aliquid quod aliquis actus caritatis stat cum actu cupiditatis. Unde posito quod Socrates habeat A actum cupiditatis qui non compatitur secum B actum caritatis, tunc dico quod Socrates non potest elicere B nisi prius corrumpat vel remittat A. Si aliter ita sit quod A et B sint compossibiles, tunc dico quod Socrates non obstante A potest producere B, nec oportet ex hoc quod subito remittatur, et tunc ulterius dicendum est sicut prius. 5

Contra hoc potest sic argui posito, sicut positum est, quod A et B sint compossibiles. Tunc: si Socrates potest immediate post A producere B, igitur potest fieri transitus a cupiditate ad caritatem sine medio. Et ita, eadem ratione, posset fieri transitus a stultitia ad sapientiam sine medio et econtra—quod est contra Augustinum III *De libero arbitrio* capitulo 41,^a ubi probat quod est quoddam medium quo ad sapientiam de stultitia transitur vel econtra. Item, <neutrum> dici potest; et ponit exemplum, sicut est in somno et vigilia etc.^b 10

15

1–2 ideo ... dico] consimiliter est dicendum G 2–3 cupiditatis] non tamen quilibet actus caritatis stat cum quolibet actu cupiditatis *add.* G 3 socrates] scire G || a] *om.* A || compatitur] capitur G 4 socrates] scire G 4–5 nisi ... b] *om.* (*hom.*) G 5 sint] ita *add.* G 6 socrates] scire G || nec] neque G 7 remittatur] remittitur G 9 potest¹] posset G || a] *om.* A || potest²] posset G 10 ad] gratiam vel *add.* A || sine] si G 10–11 et ... medio] *om.* A 12 est] *om.* A 13 econtra] medium neque stulte neque sapienter stultum *add.* G || item] *om.* G

^a *Recte* Augustinus, *De libero arbitrio*, III, 24, 73, pp. 318–319: “Turbat autem considerantes quod ita quaerunt: stultitia primus homo recessit a deo an recedendo stultus factus est? quia si responderis eum stultitia recessisse a sapientia, uidebitur stultus fuisse antequam recederet a sapientia, ut stultitia illi esset causa recedendi. Item si responderis recedendo eum stultum esse factum, quaerunt utrum stulte an sapienter fecerit quod recessit. Si enim sapienter fecit, recte fecit nihil que peccauit; si stulte, iam erat, inquit, in eo stultitia qua factum est ut recederet. Non enim stulte aliquid sine stultitia facere poterat. Ex quo apparet esse quiddam medium quo ad stultitiam a sapientia transitur, quod neque stulte neque sapienter factum dici potest, quod ab hominibus in hac uita constitutis non nisi ex contrario datur intellegi. Sicut enim nullus mortalium fit sapiens nisi ab stultitia in sapientiam transeat ipse autem transitus si stulte fit non utique bene fit, quod dementissimum est dicere; si autem sapienter fit iam erat sapientia in homine antequam transisset ad sapientiam, quod nihilominus absurdum est; ex quo intellegitur esse medium quod neutrum dici potest, ita et ex arce sapientiae ut ad stultitiam primus homo transiret, nec stultus nec sapiens ille transitus fuit. Uelut in somno et uigiliis neque id est dormire quod obdormiscere neque id est uigilare quod expurgisci, sed transitus quidam ex altero in alterum. Uerum hoc interest, quod sine uoluntate plerumque ista fiunt, illa autem numquam nisi per uoluntatem, unde iustissimae retributiones consequuntur.”

^b *Ibidem.*

Pro isto dico quod consequentia prima ad quam deducitur est bona; et ad Augustinum, si bene intellegitur processus, non est multum ad propositum, licet quibusdam videatur hoc esse de mente Augustini quod nulli actus tales contrarii sint immediati. Videtur enim | ibi Augustinus respondere ad unum argumentum quod aliqui arguebant: si primus homo recessisset a Deo, aut stultitia recessit a Deo aut recedendo stultus factus est. Si primo modo, igitur prius stultus factus fuit antequam recessit, et ita prius stultus <esset> quam stultus fuit. Si dicitur quod recedendo stultus factus est, tunc aut sapienter recessit, et ideo non peccavit, <aut>, si stulte, iam erat in eo stultitia. Et respondit concedendo secundum modum quod recedendo stultus factus est. Et tunc quando arguitur aut stulte recessit aut sapienter, respondet quod neutrum oportet, videlicet nec stultitia nec sapientia fuerat naturaliter praevia; et ideo facta illa stultitia nec fuit sapiens sapientia praevia nec stultus stultitia praevia, quo viso patet quod ponit contra dictum.

(Ad 4) Ad quartum quando arguitur quod agens naturale potest in quocumque tempore parvo inchoare et terminare actionem suam, igitur voluntas potest etc., concedo conclusionem. Unde sicut agens naturale in quocumque tempore parvo potest incipere suam actionem et terminare, sed nullam actionem suam potest finire et incipere in quocumque tempore parvo, sic dico de voluntate quod in quocumque tempore potest voluntas incipere et finire actionem suam, sed nullam actionem suam finire potest in quocumque tempore.

Sed forte dicis: voluntas potest in minori mensura incipere et finire actionem suam quam agens naturale aliquam suam actionem, sed agens naturale potest in quocumque tempore finire actionem suam et inchoare, igitur voluntas potest producere et finire actionem suam in instanti.

Hic oportet dicere consequenter quod voluntas non potest in minori mensura producere et finire suam volitionem quam agens naturale suam actionem, non tamen <potest voluntas suam volitionem> simul in minori mensura producere et finire quam agens naturale. |

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2 augustinum] eius consequens A 3 videatur ... esse] hoc videatur G 4 unum argumentum] *inv.* G 5 recessisset] recessi A || aut] igitur G 7 factus] et *add.* A *om.* G || antequam] quam G || recessit] a deo *add.* G || stultus fuit] *inv.* G 8 dicitur] dicitur G || ideo] ita A 9 peccavit] peccat A || iam] non A || respondit] respondendum G 10 modum] modo G 11 respondet] respondit G || videlicet] quod *add.* G 12 stultitia¹ ... sapientia] sapientia nec stultitia G || fuerat] fuit G || facta] *coni.*; *codd.* factio AG 14 ponit ... dictum] non facit contra dictam G 15 quartum] quintum A 16 terminare] causare A 17 unde] uti G 19 parvo] *om.* G 21 quocumque] quolibet A 22 forte dicis] *inv.* G || actionem] volitionem G 25 suam] *om.* G 29 naturale] etc *add.* G

(Ad 5) Ad quintum concedo quod Deus potest facere aliquem viatorem qui potest producere actum voluntatis in instanti. Et tunc quando dicis: stat tota difficultas de merito instantaneo et temporali, dico quod non, quia sicut potest facere quod unus purus viator potest infinitos actus instantaneos producere in quocumque tempore ita potest facere quod talis meretur praemium de condigno infinitum sic quod infinities maius praemium <meretur> quam foret aliquod praemium infinitum quod Deus potest creare, sicut patet in materia de infinito.^a Et si quaeris quid demeretur peccans per infinita instantia, dico quod talis tunc sicut nunc quilibet peccans mortaliter meretur tunc poenam infinitam intensive.

(Ad 6) Ad sextum argumentum, quando deducitur quod tempus vel quantitas esset de virtutibus activis, concedo. Sed hoc est per accidens, non per se, sicut patet ubi allegatur.

(Ad 8)^b Ad septimum oportet videre in principio utrum actus voluntatis demeritorius necessario debeat esse peccatum immediate post primum instans suae creationis, et hoc non oportet concedere. Et si hoc teneatur, tunc non sequitur: Socrates necessabitur ad tenendum actum qui est peccatum, ergo necessabitur ad peccandum. Si autem ponatur quod talis actus immediate post primum instans suae creationis erit peccatum necessario, quod non reputo verum, quia si dimittatur remissione eius naturali, tunc non erit peccatum nisi per primum instans, ut dixi, tunc foret concedendum quod Socrates potest necessitari ad peccandum, ut dixi in principio lecturae. Sed in casu dato non sequitur, quia nec per tempus nec per instans necessitaretur ad peccandum.

(Ad 9) Ad octavum difficile concedo quod aliqui sunt duo actus voluntatis: unus meritorius qui sit A et alius demeritorius qui sit B. Sed nego quod facilius potest A actus meritorius dimitti quam B elici, quia ex hoc sequitur

1 quintum] sextum A || potest] posset G || aliquem] aliquod A 2 potest] posset G 3 dico ... non] *om.* A || potest] posset G 4 unus] *om.* G || potest] posset G 5 potest] posset G || praemium ... condigno] de condigno praemium G 6 sic] sicut G || maius] magis G 6-7 quam ... praemium] *om.* (*hom.*) A 7 potest] posset G || creare] causare A 8 quaeris] quaeras G 10 sextum] *om.* A || argumentum] *om.* G 14 immediate] *om.* G 15 hoc] enim *add.* G 16 socrates] scire G 19 remissione] remissioni G || tunc] *om.* G 20 potest] posset G 25 potest] posset G || hoc] *om.* A

^a Cf. Richard Kilvington, *Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum*, q. 3: *Utrum omnis creatura sit suae naturae certis limitibus circumscripta*, art. 4: *Utrum unum infinitum potest esse maius alio*, pp. 127-148.

^b *Ordo argumentorum (7-9) ab editore correctus est.*

quod A potest dimitti in minori mensura quam in instanti. Unde non sequitur, concesso antecedente, videlicet quod facilius potest A dimitti quam B elici et cum minori poena, igitur in aequali mensura vel minori potest A elici quam B dimitti, quia secundum multos facilitas solum connotat delectationem cum amotione poenae et non minorem mensuram in tempore. 5

(Ad 7) Ad nonum dico quod non sequitur: habens actum necessario tenebit ipsum per tempus, igitur etc. Sed illi qui ponunt quod cuiuslibet actus voluntatis foret dare primum instans haberent hoc concedere quod ille qui vacat necessario vacabit per tempus. Sed ulterius non sequitur quod vacaret semper sicut quilibet homo qui est necessario erit per tempus et non semper erit. 10

(Ad 10) Ad decimum dicitur sicut ad octavum quod si per difficultatem intenditur mensura poenae et non temporis, sic conceditur antecedens et negatur consequentia. Si <intenditur> mensura temporis, tunc antecedens est falsum.

(Ad 11) Ad undecimum negatur antecedens loquendo de difficultate quae attenditur penes mensuram productionis actus, quia actus peccati potest simul incipere esse et desinere, sed non <est> sic de actu ut est actus. Argumentum tamen non probat quod solum peccavit per instans in isto casu, quia licet solum tangat planum per instans, tamen voluntas tangendi planum manet forte libere per tempus. 15

(Ad 12) Ad duodecimum conceditur quod actus voluntatis quo talis vult A instans esse manet per tempus, sed tamen solum per instans est verum quod ille actus est actus volendi A esse. Unde ut patet argumentum satis dedisse quod eadem volitio et idem actus numero potest esse successive respectu diversorum obiectorum vel volitorum. Sed hic stat difficultas: praecipiat Deus tali quod velit sic continue, ut positum est, tunc in uno instanti aliquid praecise meretur et in quolibet alio instanti tantum, igitur | in toto tempore infinitum. Quod 20

G 193^{va} aliquid praecise meretur in uno instanti probatur, quia si omitteret similiter in illo instanti sic velle, aliquid de poena ipse mereretur, igitur non tantum merebitur de praemio. Hic dico quod in primo instanti tantum meretur aliquid praecise de praemio et in aliis instantibus est in merendo. Et consequentia probatur quod sic, quia si omitteret pro aliquo instanti voluntarie, | tunc aliquid 30

A 42^{rb}

1 potest] posset G 2 potest] posset G || et] quia A 3 potest] posset G 4 quia] quod G || solum] sola A || connotat] *coni.; codd.* conatat (!) A convocat G 8 concedere] procedere G 9 vacaret semper] *inv.* G 10 erit] *om.* G 11–12 intenditur] intendit G 13 tunc] sic G || antecedens est] *inv.* G 14 negatur] *om.* G 16 est actus] *inv.* G 17 probat] probatur G || solum¹] socrates A || isto] illo G || solum²] socrates A 18 voluntas] *iter.* A || manet] maneret G 20 vult] *om.* G 21 solum per] *inv.* A 22 dedisse] deducit *add.* G 23 volitio] volutio G 24 volitorum] volutorum G 25 sic] *om.* G || meretur] mereretur G 27 similiter] satis G 28 illo instanti] *inv.* G || aliquid ... ipse] ipse aliquid de poena G || non] nunc G 30 consequentia] quando G 31 omitteret] amitteret G

meretur praecise de poena, igitur hoc aliquid de praemio. Dico quod non sequitur, quia cetera non sunt paria, quia actus talis meritorius foret libere causatus in tali instanti secundum se totum forte, sed actus quo vult in proposito iam tenetur necessitate quadam naturali.

(Ad 13) Ad tertium decimum conceditur quod reatus potest excuti subito, 5
sed hoc erit solum per Deum, ut ibi argutum est. Et sic potest actus per Deum subito excuti.

(Ad 14) Ad quartum decimum negatur consequentia: omnes tales actus voluntatis sunt eiusdem speciei etc., igitur etc. Negatur consequentia sic arguendo de lumine causato in primo instanti ab aliquo agente et de lumine causato per 10
tempus, illa duo sunt eiusdem speciei simpliciter etc., et tamen idem agens potest producere unum lumen subito et non aliud nisi successive, scilicet diffundendo medium antequam augeat vel intendat lumen suum.

(Ad 15) Ad quintum decimum dico quod Augustinus ibi non probat actum voluntatis non posse fieri in instanti, sed quod nullus actus voluntatis potest 15
esse a voluntate sine Deo principaliter operante ad actum, quod non est verum de volitione mala, quia ipsa non habet causam efficientem priorem naturaliter, quia ipsa non est naturalis. Et ad consimilem intellectum credo quod Anselmus loquitur, quia ut credo extraxit processum suum ibidem *De casu diaboli*^a de processu Augustini I *De civitate Dei*,^b et intellegit quod omne quod movet 20
se ad volendum, si ex se moveat se ad sic volendum volitione bona naturali, prius vellet se ita movere, iuxta processum Augustini XII *De civitate Dei*

1 meretur] mereretur G || hoc] nec G 2 quia¹] quod G || meritorius] demeritorius G 3 actus] om. A || iam] non A 6 per¹] propter A || potest] posset G || per²] propter A 8–9 voluntatis] om. A 9 arguendo] et add. A 10 lumine causato¹] luce de lumine tantum G 11 etc.] om. G 12 aliud] aliter A 12–13 diffundendo] disponendo G 17 volitione] volutione G || efficientem] effective G 18 naturalis] *coni.*; *codd.* materia A natura G 19 quia] quaeritur G || ibidem] ibi G 20 quod] per A 21 se¹ ... volendum¹] ad volendum se G || sic volendum] *inv.* G || volitione] volutione G 22 vellet se] velle si G

^a Anselmus, *De casu diaboli*, XII, p. 254: “Nullus cogitur vel timore vel sensu alicuius incommodi, ne attrahitur amore commodi alicuius ad volendum aliquid, nisi qui prius habet naturalem voluntatem vitandi incommodum aut habendi commodum, qua voluntate se movet ad alias voluntates. DISCIPULUS. Negare nequeo. MAGISTER. Dic ergo quia quidquid se movet ad volendum, prius vult se ita movere.”

^b *Recte* Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, XII, 9, pp. 363–364.

capitulo 9,^a ubi Augustinus arguit sic: *si boni angeli fecerunt in se voluntatem unam, utrum aliqua voluntate eam fecerint aut nulla. Si nulla, tunc non fecerunt. Si aliqua, tunc aut bona aut mala. Si mala, igitur mala voluntas fuit causa effectiva bonae voluntatis*, quod est falsum. *Si bona, igitur iam habea<n>t bonam. Et illam quis fecit nisi Deus?*[?]; et ita vult dicere quod volitionem bonam omnem 5 elicitam praecessit volitio naturalis causata a Deo. Sed quia illud tangit processum Augustini allegatum III *De libero arbitrio* capitulo 40,^b ubi videtur reprehendere consimilem modum arguendi illi quem ponit Augustinus *De civitate Dei*, ubi iam allegatum est, dicit quod negat hoc argumentum: movet se quis de stultitia ad sapientiam, aut igitur sapienter aut stulte, et supponit quod haec 10 adverbia 'sapienter' et 'stulte' connotent libertatem voluntatis, quia sic argueretur: si aliquis moveret se a stultitia ad sapientiam, aut igitur sapientia praecessit ex qua sic se movebat, aut stultitia libere sic praecessit qua sic se movebat, et neutra istarum sequitur nec etiam disiunctiva. Hic vero arguitur quod voluntas producit aliquid libere vel aliquem actum quem praecessit aliqua volitio, vel 15 <sit> naturalis vel libera, et hic bene sequitur, etiam hic sic concorda etc.

(Ad 16) Ad sextum decimum dico quod argumentum probat probabiliter saltem quod in aliquo casu non sit primum instans volitionis intrinsecum sed extrinsecum. Non tamen probatur quod semper sic erit.

1–2 in ... fecerint] *om.* (*hom.*) G 3 aliqua] sic G || mala³] *om.* G || causa] *om.* A 4 bonae voluntatis] *inv.* G || iam] ante A 5 fecit] facit G || volitionem] volutionem G || bonam omnem] omnem libere G 6 volitio] volutio G 7 allegatum] in *add.* G 8 illi] *om.* G 9 dei] dicitur G || dicit] dico G || quod] ibi *add.* G 10 aut²] vel G 11 et] vel A || connotent] convocant G 12 aliquis] quis G || moveret] moveat G || se] *om.* A 13 ex] *om.* G || se¹] *om.* G || sic²] *om.* G || sic³] *om.* G 14 neutra istarum] neutrum istorum G || sequitur] *om.* G || vero arguitur] vere arguit G || quod] si *add.* G 15 producit] producat G || volitio] volutio G 16 hic¹] haec G || hic²] *om.* G || concorda] concordi G 17 probat] probatur G 18 non] *om.* A || volitionis] volutionis G

^a Augustinus, *De civitate Dei*, XII, 9, pp. 363–364: “Nam et hoc discutiendum est, si boni angeli ipsi in se fecerunt bonam uoluntatem, utrum aliqua eam an nulla uoluntate fecerunt. Si nulla, utique nec fecerunt. si aliqua, utrum mala an bona? Si mala, quo modo esse potuit mala uoluntas bonae uoluntatis effectrix? Si bonam, iam ergo habebant. Et istam quis fecerat nisi ille, qui eos cum bona uoluntate, id est cum amore casto, quo illi adhaerent, creauit, simul eis et condens naturam et largiens gratiam?”

^b Recte Augustinus, *De libero arbitrio*, III, 24, 73, pp. 318–319. Cf. supra p. 195.

CONCLUSION

Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska

In *The Man Without Qualities*, Robert Musil envisages that the state of contemporary human must be like that of a drop of water in a cloud, that is, not only constitutively but almost ontologically determined in order to live in a changing universe.¹ This metaphor speaks to one of the perennial preoccupations of the human mind. Relations between contingency and necessity, change and regularity, or the belief in a stable order of the world and the instability of free action safeguarding this order, have always been a theme of immense relevance (either in and of themselves or, at least, for their effects) to any form of thought, be it scientific, theological, or philosophical. The answers to the questions concerning these contingent relationships are useful not only in themselves but also because the way they are posed, the guarantees of objectivity they require, and the concepts arising from them speak of the persons who asked them, in the present as well as in the past. The answers provided by the past, hence, turn out to be no less open than those offered by the future.

This inquisitive attitude is what motivated the questions posed by 14th-century Oxonian theologians and philosophers to guarantee and protect free will not in a necessary world order, but in a contingent one. In doing this, they time and again stumbled over stubbornly proliferating arguments. If they wondered how any stable criteria could be established in a constantly changing world to safeguard free will and thus give humans a chance to find their bearings, they immediately had to ponder how, above all, free will itself could be safeguarded. Answering this only sparked further questions, multiplying like the Lernaean Hydra's re-growing heads in Boethius's celebrated comparison. How can an absolutely one and simple God want different things? How is an eternal God related to a world in which time flows? What is the relationship between God's volition and God's action? All things have been created, but was their creation

¹ Musil 1978.

From: Riccardo Fedriga, Monika Michałowska, *Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will*, Kraków 2022

The research on and publication of this volume has been supported financially by the National Science Centre, Poland under grant agreement UMO-2017/27/B/HS1/00066.

instantaneous or punctuated in time? Is creation always the direct work of the creator, or do secondary causes intervene? Is it absolutely necessary, or does contingency, of fact or of law, persist in it? Is it already complete, or can it be continued and expanded? Could it have been, or could it be, otherwise than it was, or is? What is the relationship between the will, what the will wants, and the motives that determine it to act? In what sense can we logically speak of the freedom of indifference, including a freedom to refrain from acting? Furthermore, how much sense does it make to talk of free will as being of a higher order than volitions—as a phenomenon that is not physical, but mental and goal-directed, even though it emerges from the causal regularity of the relationship between intentions and the world order, as do soft facts, such as beliefs in revealed theologies, cultures, and institutions? Is a will that wants to will distinguishable from a will that does not want to will, without deferring the relation between act and object *ad infinitum*?

The period between the end of the 13th century and the mid-14th century marks perhaps the greatest commitment to addressing this dense maze of questions. This engagement produced extremely refined and ingenious solutions, from John Duns Scotus's ontology of contingency and synchrony of the will to William Ockham's rigorous use of formal, logical instruments in epistemology and ethics. In this context, describing and clarifying the attitude of theologians who, like Walter Chatton, Richard Kilvington, and Adam Wodeham, enter into discussion with Ockham, using in a relevant way Scotus's doctrinal model, helps to shed light not only on the thought of the former, but of Ockham and Scotus themselves, opening the way to new interpretations on problems apparently distant and, in fact, focused around contingency, such as free will, logic of time, change, and the unnecessary gratuity of sacramental grace.

The history of the answers, whether standard or unexpected, to the questions that we have encountered in our research is a history of philosophical and theological traditions. These traditions took different shapes, and this variability depended on the way they have been formulated and whether they had a coherent access to objective reality. This work follows a segment of the historical dialogue between theological and philosophical styles. In the history of science, "style" is usually associated with Alistair Crombie's usage of the term as related to a scientific way of thinking, that is, as a manner of finding arguments.² Nevertheless, "style" can also refer to a way of reasoning, that is, the limits and conditions required for us to understand what we mean when we talk of "objective": it is in this sense that styles determine what is assumed as "objective".³ Therefore, in agreeing with this concept of style, we first focus on

² Crombie 1988.

³ Hacking 1992, pp. 1–4; Hacking 2004.

selected themes in the answers that 14th-century theologians had offered to the question of safeguarding free will in the crux of change, contingency, and the need to negotiate norms in order to think of a changing world as stable, while being aware of the distance between rules and the order of the world that was (or could be) grounded.

This leads to a tacit awareness that events can, will, or may have turned out differently from the way they actually have or are supposed to. Given this, the conversational community based at 14th-century Oxford pondered free will and the doctrinal ways of safeguarding it amidst the paradigm shift brought about by the foundational notion of contingency. In this volume, we explore these discussions in relation to an array of issues, including logical, causal, and providential determinism; fatalism in its theological and logical iterations; temporality and the frameworks of analogy or asymmetry between past, present, and future; compatibilism between human freedom and the simple, omnipotent, and omnipresent divine mind—timeless or rooted in the eternal present; evangelical *consilia* (such as chastity, poverty, and obedience), theological precepts (such as charity), and the plurality of human beliefs regarding the variability of their foundations and of the laws that give stability to the world.

Finally, our analysis in this volume also probes into the continuity and discontinuity between the past and our regime of temporality, in which we keep asking under what conditions we can claim to possess free will. In this sense, this inquiry is an exercise of the history of ideas, and it takes place based on the observation that the arguments discussed by our selected authors are grounded and, in turn, continually redefined both synchronically (by the conversational community of our selected authors) and diachronically. This ground is given precisely by the different ideas the theologians we analyze advanced to safeguard free will against the contingency of events. In illuminating this variety, we seek not to indulge in historiographical games of interpretation, but rather to clarify new ways in which reality was assessed in the past and, in the long run, to re-contextualize the evolution of cultural habits as normative principles of discourses on states of affairs and factual realities. These facts, of course, are neither perennial nor fixed once and for all; they are open and historicized in the answers that Scotus, Ockham, Kilvington, Chatton, and Wodeham provided to the questions that emerged from the dialogue between argumentative, theological, textual, doctrinal, and, not least, philological contexts.

Our historiographic reconstruction isolates and charts a particular area of convergence alongside a transition from conceptions centered on contingency subordinated to the necessitarian determinism of the first cause and acting on the level of secondary causes to models in which contingency accrues a metaphysical and foundational meaning with respect to the world. With Scotus,

contingency comes to be situated in the first cause itself, and it is necessity—and in particular *necessitas per accidens*—that has to look for other territories and renegotiate its own modal, physical, and metaphysical status outside of the founding space, which it no longer possesses by right, as opposed to Aristotelian paradigms. With the transformations set in motion after the Scotistic breakthrough, we deal with, to use a paradoxical but effective expression, the “necessity of contingency” as the foundation of the world order(s) and the stability of its (their) laws. This doctrine must be acknowledged and/or confronted, whether directly or indirectly, by theories that vary widely but share an indeterminist foundation in their diverse approaches to the safeguarding of free will and their constitutive openness to change.

To capture the essence of these debates on the nature of change and the human’s adaptation to it, we chose some paradigmatic examples and adopted the strategy of making this shift emerge from the intertwining of perspectives and examinations that historiography usually sets apart. Our thematic examples (compatibilism vs. fatalism, temporality vs. timelessness, determinism vs. indeterminism, necessity vs. contingency, change vs. persistence, etc.) convey the mutable focus of these discussions and the redefinition of several parameters of a new conceptual scheme for accessing reality. In this way, we trace the emergence of highly original exchanges within the Oxonian community around the 1330s. Chatton, Kilvington, and Wodeham took up Ockham’s position and reflected on his views in a more or less critical way, thereby revising his standpoints on causality, future contingents, the logical foundations of faith and indeterminism, counterfactuals, prophecies, prescience, and free will. Furthermore, they also ingeniously revived Scotus’s thinking in a collective and shared reading.

As already hinted upon, the conversational community is not only synchronic but also diachronic, and encompasses discussions of other contemporary–conversational communities of the philosophy of religion. It is exactly on medieval debates, as borne out by the studies of Marilyn McCord Adams, Alvin Plantinga, and other neo-Ockhamists, that modern doctrinal analyses rely for the context of reference on concepts and cognitive tools, such as eternalism, presentism, and, above all, hard and soft facts (in the terminology proposed by Nelson Pike in 1966). Current historians and philosophers should, nevertheless, realize (how much) they use current styles of reasoning in their attempts to understand the thought of medieval authors. Equally crucially, they should be aware to what extent the conditions that medieval thinkers defined as their guarantees of objectivity are reducible to ours. Assuming that people in the Middle Ages had the same thematically-specific doctrinal object of reference—such as time, eternity, etc.—that we have, can the styles that enable us to talk about

it—that is, the conceptual schemes and habits under which it is known and which determine what it is assumed to be objective—be equivalent to theirs? Can they be equated with and superimposed on one another, *salva veritate*? Are the same states of affairs accessible, that is, thinkable and describable, in and by all conceptual schemes?

Jaakko Hintikka's inquiries into time and being in classical antiquity,⁴ John Marenbon's investigations on time and eternity in Boethius,⁵ and Simo Knuutila's examinations of modal logic in late scholasticism⁶ all demonstrate that the investigation of reasoning styles which starts from the historical semantics of some terms in different contexts is fruitful precisely because it brings to light plural and varying (though not irreducible) conceptual and cultural habits regarding some true intuitions shared by all human beings. The contingency that Scotus needed to guarantee his synchronic conception in the *Lectura I*, distinction 39 is not superimposable not only on that required by Leibniz but even on that conceptualized by Ockham, who also refers to Scotus, albeit as a counter-model, electing him as a guarantee of the conditions of objectivity of his own style. What can make a person feel authorized to denounce these conditions as wrong and declare false the conceptual negotiations underpinned by them with other worldviews? What is the rationale behind arraigining them as precursors of a backward civilization and as babblings of what is only brought to completion by us, today? Should we not rather confront the problematic nature of the conditions of guarantees that we require in order to dialogue within our own philosophical conversational communities? Is this not a form of dialogue with the past? We believe it is, while at the same time feeling that dialogue becomes impossible precisely when one imposes one's own style on a historical context and produces a complete translation of all past articulations into contemporary utterances in order to subsequently judge what is true and what is false, based on one's own guarantees of objectivity and one's own prejudices.

Marenbon envisages that a correct historical analysis must aim to bring medieval texts closer to the interests of the modern reader;⁷ but, as opposed to reductionist positions, it must take into account the distance between the two parties involved. It must illumine the differences, rather than attempting to establish systems. In bridging the gap by making the source philosophical lexicon accessible to moderns, historians and translators inquire into the assumptions, purposes, readings, and "repositories" (or the encyclopedias) of medieval

⁴ Hintikka 1981; Hintikka, Gruender, Agazzi 1981.

⁵ Marenbon 2013.

⁶ Knuutila 1981; Knuutila 1998.

⁷ Marenbon 2005.

authors in order to understand as accurately as possible (though never completely) what their questions and problems were. The error of every *philosophia perennis* lies in thinking that people have always discussed the same problems, only expressed them through different terminologies. This fallacy, therefore, resides in thinking that the re-traced source tradition is incorrect by the standards of formalization embraced by one or another contemporary tradition, and then in correcting it, in the vein on the mythical direct filiation of arguments, to obtain propositions that the target tradition holds “true” in the sole sense of the truths that this tradition is willing to accept. To expose this ideological mechanism is the major philosophical challenge tackled by investigations of the history of ideas, such as the exploration we have carried out in this volume. It is by treasuring this task, reflecting on the risks of prejudice intrinsic to any study of the past, and appreciating its critical opportunity that we conclude this book.

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CSEL Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, ed. consilio et impensis Academiae Scientiarum Austriacae [*olim* Academiae Litterarum Caesariae Vindobonensis], Wien 1866–

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SUMMARY

SAFEGUARDING FREE WILL WILLIAM OCKHAM, WALTER CHATTON, AND RICHARD KILVINGTON ON THE WILL

Safeguarding Free Will: William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington on the Will features an array of varied issues that made up the much-debated will problem in late medieval philosophy and theology. The book discusses concepts of the will produced in the first half of the 14th century, whereby its special focus is on the ideas that sprang up and evolved at Oxford in the 1330s. Although the literature on medieval concepts of the will and will-related issues is indeed extensive, this particular timeframe remains under-researched. There are several reasons for this neglect. Firstly, some important textual sources are still available solely in manuscripts. Secondly, some authors whose merits as ingenious philosophers and/or logicians have already been acknowledged did not pen texts explicitly or entirely devoted to the will and have thus been regarded as irrelevant to debates on the will. Consequently, their writings have not been studied from the will-perspective. Thirdly, the contemporary discourse on late medieval theories of the will developed by scholars working on ethics, the metaphysics of the will, and moral psychology has of late been dominated by a tendency to marginalize “minor authors” and those whose reputation lay elsewhere. We believe that this trend has particularly disadvantaged the Oxford Calculators, therefore, this book seeks to shed some light on the concepts of the will hatched at Oxford in the 1330s by exploring the themes and approaches adopted by Walter Chatton (an opponent of William Ockham) and Richard Kilvington (one of the Oxford Calculators).

This threefold volume starts with the theories of William Ockham to show how he paved the way for the Oxonian thinkers of the 1330s, some of whom were his conversation partners and opponents in disputes. In Part 1, we offer a detail study of his notions of the human and the divine wills, the freedom of the will as entwined with the problem of future contingents and divine foreknowledge, the will and time, and the will in relation to causal chains. Part 2 illumines the diversity of the will’s acts and the manifold structure of the will as envisaged by Walter Chatton and Richard Kilvington. Part 3 focuses on the complexity of the temporal entanglements of the will’s acting and shows how the problem of simultaneous contradictories was advanced by the Oxonian

philosophers to develop finally into a separate issue, known as the contradiction theory of change.

Keywords: Medieval Philosophy, 14th-Century Ethics, Oxford Calculators, Philosophy of Action, Logic of Freedom, Compatibilism

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
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This book features an array of varied issues that made up the much-debated will problem in late medieval philosophy and theology. It discusses concepts of the will produced in the first half of the fourteenth century, whereby its special focus is on the ideas that sprang up and evolved at Oxford in the 1330s. Its aim is to shed some light on the concepts of the will hatched at that time by exploring the themes and approaches adopted by William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Richard Kilvington.



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ISBN 978-83-8138-740-8



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