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# Accountability and the Cold War: The Eichmann Trial and Holocaust Representation in the Soviet Union

It is no wonder that the accused is installed in a special bullet-proof glass cage. After all, certain influential persons in West Germany would be extremely interested for Eichmann to fall silent before the trial opens.<sup>1</sup>

With these words ends the only newsreel footage about the Eichmann trial, lasting one minute and twenty-three seconds, to be found at the Russian Audiovisual Archives.<sup>2</sup> These two sentences make up about a quarter of the spoken commentary, and their placement at the end reinforces their significance. This example is characteristic of the approach that the Soviet media of the 1960s took towards Nazi crimes during World War II. Their vigorous denunciation of the failures of denazification in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and strident but unelaborated assertions of postwar collusion between former Nazis and capitalists permanently accompanied, even eclipsed, the crimes or trials. The prosecution of these crimes offered the USSR a legal weapon in its media battle against the Western bloc. If new elements were employed in presenting war crimes, such as the widespread use of testimonies with sound in films, these remained under the full control of Soviet censors. None of the testimonies filmed by Leo Hurwitz in Jerusalem was used.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet Union had led the way in the mediatization of trials of war crimes defendants, with the spectacles of the Krasnodar and Kharkiv trials in July and December 1943, respectively. These first trials, widely covered by So-

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1 *Foreign News (Inostrannaia khronika)*, no. 8, 1961, Central Studio for Documentary Films (TsSDF), Russian State Archives of Cinema and Photography (RGAKFD), no. 19647.

2 The archives of Soviet television remain silent on the Jerusalem trial.

3 See Sylvie Lindeperg and Annette Wieviorka, "Hurwitz à Jérusalem: du procès comme série télévisée," in *Le Moment Eichmann*, ed. Sylvie Lindeperg and Annette Wieviorka (Paris: Albin Michel, 2016), 85–94. The use of (Eastern European) witnesses in Western European Nazi trials brought with it concerns both factual and juridical, undoubtedly familiar to the Eichmann prosecutors in Jerusalem as well. On Western use of Soviet-bloc witnesses and evidence, see Jasmin Söhner, "After Nuremberg: The Appearance of Soviet Victims of Nazi Atrocities as Witnesses in West German Post-war Trials, 1964–1969," *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 68, no. 4 (2020): 432–454.

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viet and international journalists, sent a message to Axis troops and to domestic collaborators alike: there would be no impunity and no mercy. The trials also served notice to the western Allies that accountability for the crimes that occurred on Soviet territory would be high on the inter-Allied agenda. Other high-profile trials were filmed in winter 1945–1946; they foregrounded brief excerpts of witness, sometimes survivor, accounts of the crimes and concluded with the execution of judgments.<sup>4</sup> Besides these dozen very publicized trials, public hearings also characterized many local wartime trials of collaborators accused of violence against their co-citizens. It is important to add, however, that the overwhelming majority of trials for treason and collaboration, as well as trials of German, Hungarian, and other prisoners of war (POWs) charged with war crimes were held behind closed doors. The practice of public execution (by hanging) was limited to the years 1943–1946. By 1960, in the wake of de-Stalinization and legal reform, the USSR had begun a tentative movement towards a reopening of its Nazi-era crimes trials and the recordation of those processes in print and visual media. Witnesses counting in the dozens would play a central role in those later trials.<sup>5</sup>

In its early days, the “Eichmann affair”<sup>6</sup> had an ambiguous reception in the Soviet media. The June 24, 1960, edition of *Pravda* published the speech of the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet representative to the UN. But the

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4 An extensive recent literature exists on these spectacular proceedings. For a contextualization of these trials within the practice of international humanitarian law, see especially Vanessa Voisin, *L'URSS contre ses traîtres. L'Épuration soviétique 1941–1955* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2015); Franziska Exeler, “Nazi Atrocities, International Criminal Law, and Soviet War Crimes Trials: The Soviet Union and the Global Moment of Post-Second World War Justice,” in *The New Histories of International Criminal Law. Retrials*, ed. Immi Tallgren and Thomas Skouteris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 189–219.

5 The contributions to the volume, Eric Le Bourhis, Irina Tcherneva, and Vanessa Voisin, eds., *Seeking Accountability for Nazi and War Crimes in East and Central Europe: A People's Justice?* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2022), delve into the problems of publicity and openness in postwar Eastern European trials. Publicity such as trial testimony also created a framework within which surviving Eastern European Jews could re-center the essential place of Jews among Nazism's victims and thus affect historical memory of these events in the socialist East. See also: Kata Bohus, Peter Hallama, and Stephan Stach, eds., *Growing in the Shadow of Antifascism: Remembering the Holocaust in Communist Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2022); Vanessa Voisin, “The 1963 Krasnodar Trial: Extraordinary Media Coverage for an Ordinary Soviet Trial of Second World War Perpetrators,” *Cahiers du Monde russe* 61, no. 3–4 (2020): 383–428.

6 To borrow the title of one of the rare texts published on the subject at the time: Lev Ginzburg, “Delo Eikhmanna [The Eichmann Affair],” in *Tsena Pepla* [The Price of Ashes] (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisatel', 1961), 118–150. By this title, the journalist implied that beyond the Jerusalem proceedings, the Eichmann trial revealed a number of problems in denazification.

news report was not interested in describing Eichmann's responsibility for the genocide of European Jews, nor in the question of the violation of Argentine sovereignty, nor, to be sure, in the political and legal question of the punishment of war criminals.<sup>7</sup> Very quickly, the event was dragged into a propaganda campaign characteristic of the Cold War. The Kremlin presented the USSR as a peaceful power, disturbed by bellicose rumblings from the West. In one single denunciation, Soviet voices articulated the collusion between capitalist and Nazi interests, the "revanchism" of the West German government, and the forgetting of the USSR's role in the 1945 victory. There was not a single Soviet article, essay, or documentary film that did not take up these arguments, a pattern which the Kremlin's growing hostility towards the state of Israel intensified.

Among the consequences of de-Stalinization, launched in 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress, was a need to redefine the country's identificatory framework. Encouraged by a new memory policy, the "Great Patriotic War" (as the Second World War was officially designated in the Soviet Union) gradually became an object of veneration, with aspirations toward unity.<sup>8</sup> Such aspirations also made it possible for the authorities to present the country as the savior of a Europe that had been vanquished from within by its own "fascist" demons.<sup>9</sup> But the myth of the war was never clearly formulated by higher Soviet authorities, and at times unexpected local interpretations were sketched out in turn.<sup>10</sup> The domestic aims of the war myth and its vulnerability to individual interpretation also explain the persistence of an ambivalent treatment of the Holocaust in the media. Nonetheless, the media campaign launched around the Eichmann trial invites us to reassess the Soviet narrative maintained until that time about World War II and about the civilian victims of the Nazi occupation of Soviet territory. The foreign policy issues related to the Jerusalem trial encountered an evolving

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7 "At the UN Security Council," *Pravda*, June 24, 1960, quoted in Kirill Feferman, *Soviet Jewish Stepchild: The Holocaust in the Soviet Mindset, 1941–1964* (Sarrebruck: VDM Verlag, 2009), 55.

8 Nina Tumarkin, "The Great Patriotic War as Myth and Memory," *European Review* 11, no. 4 (2003): 595–611; Amir Weiner, "In the Long Shadow of War: The Second World War and the Soviet and Post-Soviet World," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 3 (2001): 443–456.

9 The discourse that emerged at the beginning of the 1960s was more explicit than the propaganda of the war years on the racist and antisemitic nature of Nazi ideology. Nonetheless, Soviet media continued to designate the ideology of the Third Reich as "fascist" (and not Nazi).

10 For a detailed example, based on the Latvian case, see Irina Tcherneva and Juliette Denis, "Je me souviens de tout, Richard (Rolands Kalniņš, Studio de Riga, 1967): une manifestation précoce d'une mémoire concurrente de la Grande Guerre patriotique," *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, no. 12 (2011), accessed April 29, 2024, <http://pipss.revues.org/3875>.

internal discourse that attempted to promote a return to glory, while also emphasizing Soviet sacrifices from 1941–1945.<sup>11</sup>

The scholarship has begun to analyze the press reaction in the USSR to Adolf Eichmann's arrest and the subsequent investigation, conducted over the course of an entire year, and finally to the trial and verdict.<sup>12</sup> It revealed how the Soviet propaganda campaign that accompanied these events was launched and what were its major structural facets. In the present contribution, I will follow these steps, focusing on the evolution of official discourse on the Holocaust, while insisting rather on its ambiguities and exploring literary, press, and filmic spaces in which the topic was discussed. Undoubtedly, in this regard the Eichmann trial played a vital role in the Soviet Union, even if it did not overcome resistance to public recognition of the specificity of the genocide of the Jews. The fate of the Jewish communities in the occupied territories, especially the Soviet ones, continued to be placed on the same plane as Nazi violence against the Slavs.

This study builds on news and documentary films of the time, archival documents available on their production, and the memoirs of the Jewish-Ukrainian director Rafail Aronovich Nakhmanovich.<sup>13</sup> I also examine the writings of Lev Ginzburg, a Moscow essayist deeply involved in this campaign, who participated in the production of a film.<sup>14</sup> Ginzburg, a war veteran, was a Germanist, translator, journalist, and author. In the early 1960s, he became one of the main scribes of the Kremlin's anti-fascist crusade, penning several articles on the Eichmann trial and a collection of thoughtful narratives on the war, Nazism, and the persistence of Nazi ideology in the contemporary world, which was reprinted several times over the course of the decade. Finally, he was involved in the publicity surrounding the trial of members of

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11 The proliferation of writings on this theme in the USSR during the 1960s attests to the renewal of interest and the reorientation of censorship on the history of the Second World War, particularly the memories of some of its actors, major historical syntheses, memoirs of veterans (including partisans), and the like. Particularly noteworthy is: *Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voyny Sovetskogo Soiuz 1941–45* [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945], 6 vols. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960–1965), compiled by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the CPSU and published in more than 200,000 copies, <http://militera.lib.ru/h/6/index.html>, accessed April 24, 2024.

12 Feferman, *Soviet Jewish Stepchild*; Nati Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions to the Eichmann Trial: A Preliminary Investigation 1960–1965," *Yad Vashem Studies* 35, no. 2 (2007): 103–141.

13 Rafail Nakhmanovich, *Vozvrashchenie v sistemu koordinat, ili martirolog meteka* [Return to the grid system, or martyrology of a dago], ed. Galina Nakhmanovich and Vitalii Nakhmanovich (Kyiv: Feniks, 2013).

14 Ginzburg, *Price of Ashes* (from the 1962 reprint); *Bezdna* [The Abyss] (Moscow: Sovetskii Pisetel', 1966). The documentary film in question is entitled *In the Name of the Living*, directed by Leon Mazrukho on a scenario written by Lev Ginzburg (Rostov Documentary Studio, 1964).

*Sonderkommando* 10a held in Krasnodar in 1963, writing a book on the trial as well as the script for a documentary filmed at the time.<sup>15</sup>

## A “Second Nuremberg?” Soviet Trials vs. the Jerusalem Trial

The Soviet reaction to the Eichmann trial recalls, in many ways, the situation of 1945–1946. The Kremlin, disappointed and even annoyed by the Nuremberg trial of 1945–46, embarked on a counter-offensive by trying war criminals itself: it organized eight high-profile trials of foreign criminals between December 1945 and March 1946. Another wave of similar public trials occurred in the fall of 1947, and a final one was organized in Khabarovsk in 1949.<sup>16</sup> But most trials of either foreign criminals or local collaborators unfolded behind closed doors. At the end of the 1950s a new visibility was given to these prosecutions. At the same time, the Jerusalem trial had begun. All eyes were on the trial, and as Soviet power sought to establish itself as the sole guarantor of international law, it adopted a discursive strategy of denigrating the Eichmann trial by constantly referring to the Nuremberg trial, even though it remained very critical toward the latter. In its campaign against the Western media, the Kremlin deployed rhetoric that mingled obligations of historical memory with legal arguments.

The announcement of Eichmann’s arrest by Israeli forces in early May 1960 nearly coincided with the beginning of a new wave of public trials of war criminals in Poland and the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup> While prosecutions on Soviet territory beginning

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<sup>15</sup> On Ginzburg, see Voisin, “The 1963 Krasnodar Trial,”; Maxim D. Shrayer, “Lev Ginzburg, Soviet Translator: The Story of a Jewish Germanophile Who Became a Soviet Investigator of Nazi Crimes,” *Tablet Magazine*, October 24, 2018: <https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/arts-letters/articles/lev-ginzburg-soviet-translator>, accessed May 29, 2024.

<sup>16</sup> Francine Hirsch, *Soviet Judgment at Nuremberg: A New History of the International Military Tribunal after World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). Besides the works mentioned in footnote 5, see Valentina Polunina, “Soviet War Crimes Policy in the Far East: The Bacteriological Warfare Trial at Khabarovsk, 1949,” in *Historical Origins of International Criminal Law: Volume 2*, ed. Morten Bergsmo, Wui Ling Cheah, Ping Yi (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014), 539–562.

<sup>17</sup> Work on the so-called second wave trials (i.e., those that followed the several hundreds of thousands of proceedings which occurred under Stalin) has accelerated since 2010. Among the latest publications, see Le Bourhis, Tcherneva, and Voisin, *Seeking Accountability*; Rauschenberger, Katharina, Joachim von Puttkamer, and Sybille Steinbacher, eds., *Investigating, Punishing, Agitating: Nazi Perpetrator Trials in the Eastern Bloc* (Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2023).

in 1961 received the widest media coverage, earlier trials in the peripheries or in the near abroad launched the legal and media campaign.<sup>18</sup> In March 1959, *Inostrannaia khronika* [Foreign News] offered the Soviet public a brief segment on the verdict pronounced at the trial of the former Gauleiter of East Prussia Erich Koch in Poland, which had begun in October of the previous year.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, in Chervonoarmiisk (Rivne oblast, today Radyvyliv) a team from the Ukrainian News Studio filmed the judgment against five Ukrainian UPA nationalists accused of crimes between 1943 and 1947. Like many other film productions of this period, *Narod zvinuvachue* [The People Accuse] intertwined complex domestic and international issues.<sup>20</sup> Originally, the film was intended to discredit Ukrainian nationalists against whom the Kremlin had been waging a long war of counterinsurgency, following the annexation of parts of western Ukraine to the USSR.<sup>21</sup> Though the military operations stopped in the early 1950s, the political police remained extremely wary of any sign of resumption of “nationalist” activity in these regions, especially after the return from the Gulag of many of those convicted or exiled, released thanks to the post-Stalin amnesties or simply at the end of their terms.<sup>22</sup> The documentary stresses the long-standing collusion of these nationalists with Germany, a history it traces back to 1918, as well as to the war crimes committed during World War II and afterward. This narrative choice ultimately reduced the problem of Ukrainian nationalists in the USSR to a betrayal in favor of a particularly cruel enemy. Despite the confusion between two separate albeit related issues – the relationship between Ukrainian nationalism and the Soviet regime, on the one hand, and the Nazi occupation and its violence, on the other – the documentary ad-

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18 The films, in particular, were shown throughout the USSR.

19 *Foreign News*, no. 6, 1959, TsSDF (RGAKFD, no. 18395). The segment on the Koch trial was fourth on the newscast and ran for fifty seconds.

20 *Narod zvinuvachue*, 1959, Ukraine News Studio, TsDKFFA (Central Audiovisual Archives of Ukraine), no. 2021. Sound film, 28 min. Directed and written by V. Sichevskii, camera by I. Goldstein. I checked the criminal investigation file of this trial in the HDA SBU (Sectoral State Archives of the Security Services of Ukraine) in Kyiv and the request for rehabilitation by the spouse of one of the accused was rejected by the regional military prosecutor’s office in 1993 on the basis of evidence documenting the assassinations committed by the convicted man while he was serving as a member of an “SB” combat unit (security guard of the UPA): HDA SBU 5/67722(vol.15)/201 (document dated June 23, 1993).

21 Alexander Statiev, *The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

22 Oleg Bazhan, “The Rehabilitation of Stalin’s Victims in Ukraine, 1953–1964: A Socio-Legal Perspective,” in *De-Stalinising Eastern Europe: The Rehabilitation of Stalin’s Victims after 1953*, ed. Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 170–185; Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet Frontier Politics,” *Journal of Modern History* 78, no. 2 (2006): 333–376, especially 370–371 on this specific trial.

dressed the problem of Nazi war crimes on Soviet territory. Two images of Babyn Yar enter directly at the beginning of the third section, with no relation to the crimes alleged against the accused. *The People Accuse* borrows most of the motifs we can observe in previous Soviet films on political trials since the late 1920s, and more specifically since 1943, surrounding the first trials of war criminals, particularly Krasnodar and Kharkiv. On June 20, 1960, the Soviet Ministry of Culture authorized an edited Russian version of the film to be broadcast throughout the Soviet Union, marking its importance within the state's propaganda efforts.<sup>23</sup> Several Soviet newspapers had just announced and commented on Adolf Eichmann's arrest by the Israelis. While it is impossible to establish a concrete link between these two events, their simultaneity should be noted.

Three other trial films were shot in Ukraine that same year. At the end of winter 1960, *Mi ne zabudemo* [We Will Not Forget] invoked the trial of six "nationalists" from the Sumy region, set against the backdrop of denouncing West German "revanchism." *Nizivskaia tragediia* [The Tragedy of Nizi], authorized to be released on April 9, 1960, narrated the trial in Belz (Lviv oblast) of five "UPA members" accused of violent crimes in the village of Nizi in 1944.<sup>24</sup> Finally, B. Kuptievskaia and two assistant cameramen filmed a seven-minute installment about the Kovel trial of July 14–16, 1960 (Volyn oblast), based on similar charges.<sup>25</sup> The film of most interest to us here is *We Will Not Forget*, which opens with contemporary images of "revanchist" West Germany. Shots of military parades alternate with close-ups of FRG officers, as the voice-over comments:

These shots were taken neither twenty nor thirty years ago. These shots were taken yesterday. Once again, on the streets of West German cities, are walking those whom the patrons of fascism raise for future murders, arson, and looting. Fascism rears its head. But nations do not forget nor forgive crimes.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> In this new version, *Narod obviniaet*, the original film is adapted by shortening the long lyrical introduction on Ukraine, with commentary translated into Russian. The testimonies are, however, all preserved in their original, even if they are mostly in Ukrainian. See the film folder at the TsDKFFA containing detailed descriptions (*montazhnaia zapis'*) and release authorizations of the 1959 Ukrainian and 1960 Russian versions.

<sup>24</sup> *Nizivskaia tragediia*, 1960, Ukraine News Studio, TsDKFFA, no. 2232. Sound film, 19 min. Directed by V. Sichevskii, photography by I. Goldstein, M. Poichenko. It was not possible, in this case, to find and study the criminal investigation file pertaining to this trial and therefore to assess the substantiation of the charges (based on a later re-examination through rehabilitation procedures).

<sup>25</sup> *Sud nad ounovtsami* [A Trial of OUN members], 1960, Ukraine News Studio, TsDKFFA, no. 3352. Short film, 6–7 min. Photography: B. Kuptievskaia, B. Gladchenko and a third cameraman whose name is illegible (the filming report attached to the film file is hand-written).

<sup>26</sup> *Mi ne zabudemo*, 1960, Ukrainian News Studio. TsDKFFA, no. 2225.

With no transition, the contemporary shots give way to images of sometimes questionable authenticity that illustrate the violence of the Wehrmacht in occupied Europe.<sup>27</sup> If the rest of the film did not return to these insinuations against the West German elite, the film at least opened an allegation that would continue to develop over the course of the decade.

In March 1960, the Extraordinary State Commission on Nazi crimes<sup>28</sup> was briefly revived in Moscow to mount a case against Theodor Oberländer, a minister in Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's cabinet and deputy in the Bundestag.<sup>29</sup> On April 5, the Commission held a press conference in the capital to inform the international community of crimes committed by Oberländer during the war. Foreign press correspondents were invited and a pamphlet was released the next year.<sup>30</sup> Film moved more quickly: the short feature, *Vy – prestupnik, Oberländer!* [You are a criminal, Oberländer!] reached screens in May 1960, at the very moment when the world was learning of the news of Adolf Eichmann's capture.<sup>31</sup> It was released at the same time as the first articles pointing to the high rank and quiet

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27 In Ukrainian documentaries from these years, I have observed the frequent use of images reconstituted later (for example, the Auschwitz re-enactment in the spring 1945) or images drawn from famous fictional productions (like *The Unvanquished* by Mark Donskoy, 1945).

28 The organization's full title was the "Extraordinary State Commission for the Establishment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the German Fascist Invaders and Their Accomplices and the Damage They Caused to Citizens, Collective Farms, Public Organizations, State Enterprises and Institutions of the USSR" (*Chrezvychainaia gosudarstvennaia komissiiia po ustanovleniiu i rassledovaniuu zlodeianii nemetsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov i ikh soobshchnikov i prichinnogo imi ushcherba grazhdanam, kolkhozam, obshchestvennym organizatsiiam, gosudarstvennym predpriiatiiam i uchrezhdeniiam SSSR, or ChGK*).

29 The ChGK was created November 2, 1942, to gather evidence for criminal prosecution of any "temporary fascist occupiers" who committed crimes on Soviet territory. It concluded its work and ceased operating after the completion of the Nuremberg trials. See Marina Sorokina, "People and Procedures: Toward a History of the Investigation of Nazi Crimes in the USSR," *Kritika* 6, no. 4 (2005): 797–831. Sorokina consulted the last report of the Commission, dated March 28, 1960, and preserved at the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF R–7021/116/390/831). On the ChGK and its late operations, see also the ground-breaking dissertation of Paula Chan, "Eyes on the Ground: Soviet Investigations of the Nazi Occupation" (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 2023) and the book to be published at PUF, Paris, by Nathalie Moine (2025).

30 ChGK, *Krovavyye zlodeianiiia Oberlendera. Otchet o press-konferentsii dlia sovetsskikh i inostrannykh zhurnalistov, sostoiavsheisia v Moskve 5 apreliia 1960 goda* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo literatury na inostrannykh iazykakh, 1961). The English edition of the pamphlet: *Report of an Investigation into the War Crimes of Theodor Oberländer. An International Press Conference Held in Moscow, April 5, 1960* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960).

31 Valerii I. Fomin and Aleksandr S. Deriabin, *Letopis' rossiiskogo kino, 1946–1965* [Annals of Russian Cinema, 1946–1965] (Moscow: Kanon-Plus, 2010), 491. The film is conserved at RGAKFD, no. 18627: *Vy – prestupnik, Oberländer!*, 1960, TsSDF. Sound film, 17 min.



life led in the West by a former senior official in the Nazi Ministry of the Interior, Hans Globke.<sup>32</sup> Alternating archival footage of the war years (including German images) and contemporary sequences, the film denounced the FRG's feeble denazification. It showed a man, an "inexorable fascist" and "war criminal," as complacently accepted by federal Germany's political elites as he had once been by the ruling circles of the Third Reich.

Moreover, the documentary posed two essential ideas that would return unremittably in later writings and documentaries. The first is that, in opposition to the immoral state of oblivion prevailing in the FRG (and with which other capitalist powers would soon be associated), the USSR paid tribute to the memory of victims and respected the international legal commitments concluded in 1943–1947 on the issue of war criminals. The second consisted in associating the inadequacies of denazification with the emergence of West German revanchism: the history of the interwar period would be repeated, with the complicity of the USSR's capitalist opponents, who favored German re-militarization and its entry into NATO (1955). The parallel between these two periods was particularly emphasized in Mikhail Romm's famous 1965 documentary, *Obyknoennyi Fashizm* [Ordinary Fascism]. But it appeared very explicitly as early as autumn 1961 in the second version of *From Munich to Nuremberg* by Arkady Poltorak, the secretary of the Soviet delegation to Nuremberg in 1945–1946.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, at the beginning of the summer of 1960, various newspapers and two short films were already challenging the FRG, and sometimes, in second place, the United States. At this stage of the press campaign, it was not the largest daily newspapers that carried such insinuations against Western powers, but rather *Vechernaia Moskva* (Moscow Evening), *Novoe vremia* (The New Times), and *Czerwony Sztandar* (The Red Banner), the paper of the Lithuanian Communist Party, written in Polish.<sup>34</sup> These press organs accused the West German and American governments of having sought, and continuing to aim at, the removal of Eichmann from

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<sup>32</sup> Globke had been instrumental in elaborating and implementing Nazi racial laws from the mid-1930s onward and in the 1960s was chief of staff of the German Chancellor's office. The campaign against Globke continued in the press in autumn 1960. A Belorussian newspaper suggested that Globke may have paid Eichmann's lawyer to ensure that the latter would not compromise him during the trial. See Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions," 117. Finally, a documentary from 1962 on the Koblenz trial mentions it again (*The Victims Accuse*, 1962, TsSDF, RGAKFD no. 18433). On the Globke campaign, see Jasmin Söhner and Maté Zombory, "Accusing Hans Globke, 1960–1963: Agency and the Iron Curtain," in *Seeking Accountability*, 351–386.

<sup>33</sup> Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions," 128–129.

<sup>34</sup> *Vechernaia Moskva*, June 7, 1960; *Novoe Vremia*, June 10, 1960, and June 17, 1960; *Czerwony Sztandar*, 3 June 1960 (quoted by Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions," 111–112).

prosecution, or of having Ben-Gurion limit the prosecutions to Eichmann alone, in order to protect other prominent figures.

The Soviet propaganda campaign only gradually adopted anti-Israeli indications. At the start of the case, with the announcement of Eichmann's arrest in June 1960, the Kremlin was still far from associating Ben-Gurion and Adenauer in its denunciation of capitalist leaders interested in minimizing the "Eichmann affair." Moscow expressed tacit support for Israel by not condemning the violation of Argentinian sovereignty at the UN Security Council.<sup>35</sup> The passages of the speech by Arkady Sobolev, the Soviet representative to the United Nations, which were reproduced in the June 24, 1960, issue of *Pravda*, stressed above all the duty and right of states to punish war criminals. The speech also expressed virulent criticism of several Western powers, considering their attitude towards Nazi criminals to be complacent.

*Novoe vremia*, a less visible periodical than *Pravda*, welcomed Eichmann's prosecution by Israel, given its lack of trust in Western criminal justice systems. Here, it was West Germany that was targeted, since it would not apply the death penalty.<sup>36</sup> Nevertheless, relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv deteriorated from 1957 on, as Israel appeared increasingly to belong to the Western camp.<sup>37</sup> On this precise point the Soviet media evolved between May 1960 and late 1961, as it began to wonder at the length of the investigation and insinuating that it was possible that the trial would ultimately not take place, given Western pressures and especially given economic links between Israel and West Germany.<sup>38</sup> According to *Pravda*, these links would explain an alleged agreement between the two countries on the charges against Eichmann and on others who escaped incrimination. Bonn's provision of the services of the lawyer Robert Servatius, known for his defense of Fritz Sauckel at the Nuremberg trial, served as further evidence of West Germany's influence on the trial.<sup>39</sup> This allowed Lev Ginzburg to conclude, at the end of 1961, that "Anticommunism and the 'Cold War' have united yesterday's enemies. In the courtroom of the Nuremberg trial, Göring had said with confidence

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35 The Soviet delegation abstained from the vote on a resolution proposed by the US, Feferman, *Soviet Jewish Stepchild*, 55.

36 *Novoe Vremia*, June 24, 1960, quoted in Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions," 113.

37 Yosef Govrin, *Israeli-Soviet Relations 1953–1967: From Confrontation to Disruption* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

38 "Who is protecting Eichmann?", *Moskovskaia Pravda*, October 13, 1960, in Feferman, *Soviet Jewish Stepchild*, 56.

39 *Izvestiia*, April 11, 1961, quoted in Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions," 119. The *Izvestiia* article interrogates Israel's decision to pay Servatius's fees, since the latter worked for the FRG and Israel was dealing with economic problems. The first insinuations regarding Servatius's double mission date from autumn 1960 (117).

to an American guard: ‘The day will come when you will put our remains into marble coffins’.”<sup>40</sup>

Indeed, the investigation lasted several months. A huge amount of work was carried out by the investigative team in charge of the inquiry.<sup>41</sup> Only the Eastern European countries refused to cooperate. Moscow, officially contacted on June 27, 1960, did not deign to respond even conventionally. According to Israeli diplomatic documents, the official reason for this disdain, asserted by the Soviets, was that “all the necessary information has already been presented to the Nuremberg Tribunal.”<sup>42</sup> It seems, rather, that the Kremlin feared that the Soviet Union would lose its 1944–1945 “liberating country” aura and contribute, by its aid to Israel, to presenting that state as merely another combatant against the Nazis, within a general context in which the Kremlin confirmed its policy of privileging the Arab states of the Middle East. The Soviet press went so far as to assert in September 1961 that the Jerusalem trial would not reveal anything that Nuremberg had not already taught the world.<sup>43</sup> The very system of defense was worn out, Lev Ginzburg scoffed in *The Price of Ashes*:

No, at the trial in Jerusalem, Eichmann is by no means original in his defensive tactics. This is the “style” of Kaltenbrunner, the “style” of Ribbentrop and Julius Streicher, who tried to confuse the minds of the Nuremberg judges with endless clarifications about the “framework” of their activities; this is an unscrupulous tactic developed by “decent people” in West Germany, who, speaking of the past, are ready to confess almost everything—that they were blind people, fools, soldiers, bureaucrats, but not the people they really were, murderers.<sup>44</sup>

Lev Ginzburg wrote these lines after joking about the organizational charts that Eichmann displayed in order to show the judges that his position in the Nazi state apparatus did not place him in a position of responsibility for murder. It was indeed the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, relying on the Statute of London from August 1945, that had for the first time condemned political leaders and senior officials for crimes that had often been committed thousands of miles away from Berlin – but on their orders. The Soviets, however, had begun to chal-

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<sup>40</sup> Lev Ginzburg, “The Eichmann Affair,” 148. See also the article by the same author published in *Novoe Vremia*, no. 52, 1961: “Is the Eichmann Trial Over?” (quoted in Cantorovich, “Soviet Reactions,” 130).

<sup>41</sup> Annette Wiewiorka, *Le procès Eichmann* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1989), 28–33.

<sup>42</sup> Cantorovich, “Soviet Reactions,” 123.

<sup>43</sup> “There is only Eichmann on the defendant’s bench,” *Izvestiia*, September 3, 1961. The author of this article is Gerhard Leo from East Germany, Feferman, *Soviet Jewish Stepchild*, 56. This idea can also be found in the second edition of *From Munich to Nuremberg* by Arkady Poltorak.

<sup>44</sup> Lev Ginzburg, “The Eichmann Affair,” 126–127.

lenge Nazi senior leaders in the first public trials of German collaborators, and later German officers themselves, in Krasnodar and then Kharkiv in 1943, and in various Soviet cities in 1945–1946. The public prosecutor of the trial incriminated the political leadership of the Third Reich, *in absentia* just as much as those concrete subordinates sitting on the defendants' bench. The problem, particularly for the 1943 proceedings, was that they were a bit too reminiscent of the political trials of 1936–1938, thus raising severe doubts for outside observers.<sup>45</sup>

Ginzburg's essay continued over several pages, denouncing a purported collusion between Ben-Gurion and Adenauer, who, he argued, was less anxious to perform justice than to protect the power of NATO:

Eichmann's memoirs were discovered. 716 pages with an appendix of a long list of accomplices—from Hitler to Globke, from Himmler to Zionist traitors. It is difficult to say why Eichmann made this list—perhaps, bored in Argentina, he wrote out the names dear to his heart? The Israeli court accepted for consideration only 83 pages, the remaining 633 rejected along with the list.

The newspaper *HaOlam HaZeh* explained:

It is clear that exposing these criminals in the Eichmann trial could ruin the relationship between Israel and West Germany, and perhaps between Israel and the US, as this would damage NATO's prestige and complicate the issue of arming West Germany.

Ben-Gurion kept his word and found a "mutually acceptable path." Politics!<sup>46</sup>

In truth, Ginzburg was not the first to incriminate the Israeli government so bluntly. On January 1, 1961, an article in *Trud*, a Russian language periodical well-known and distributed abroad, had called the 25th Zionist Congress, which was being held in Jerusalem, a "gathering of bankrupts." According to this text, Israel and Zionist leaders were betraying the memory of millions of Jews by making an agreement with Hitler's successors: the "revanchists from Bonn."<sup>47</sup>

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45 Ilya Bourtman, "Blood for Blood, Death for Death," 256; Prusin, "Fascist Criminals to the Gallows!," 4–5.

46 Lev Ginzburg, "The Eichmann Affair," 143–144. *HaOlam HaZeh* (This World) had a reputation for publishing stories likely to embarrass the government, as well as sensationalist materials and photos.

47 Article quoted by Cantorovich, "Soviet Reactions," 118.

## Capitalism and Fascism: The Denunciation of a Monstrous Collusion

Thus, beginning with the Eichmann trial, the Soviet media adopted a legal standpoint in order to present the USSR as a state respectful of basic human principles and of international law that had been devised collectively – but which the former Allies had hastily forgotten in order to satisfy their political and commercial interests. This argument, crafted for international propaganda purposes, then evolved into a denunciation of the West’s refusal to consider Soviet evidence as embodied by witnesses and jurists. Before examining the first appearance of this charge in a film, it is useful to go forward in time and look at the arguments then offered by Soviet legal experts on the occasion of the twenty-year anniversary of the Nuremberg International Tribunal. Irina Lediakh and Feliks Reshetnikov recalled the Allied conventions passed during the war, which laid out the principle of a relentless pursuit of Nazi war criminals.<sup>48</sup> They then insisted on the universalization of the principles of the International Military Tribunal by the UN General Assembly, on November 21, 1947, concluding that the new states founded on the ruins of the Third Reich had the obligation to try these criminals. Only the German Democratic Republic (GDR), they found, had fulfilled this duty. In West Germany, the collusion of current with former elites, or even continuity between the two, had ensured a peaceful life for many Nazi criminals, not to mention the industrialists and financiers involved in the accession of Hitler to power or in the Nazi death machine.<sup>49</sup>

The next critique concerned the possible normalization of Nazi crimes when tried by means of existing criminal codes: while those who carried out mass crimes were inculpated as accomplices, the main instigators escaped all punishment, for want of a particular crime. “Thus, the lawyers and the courts of justice

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<sup>48</sup> The article lists the following: the Declaration of the governments of occupied countries from January 13, 1942 (the St. James Declaration); the Declaration of October 14, 1942, by which Moscow joined the St. James Declaration and which specified that participating states must aid each other in finding criminals and creating cases for prosecution, a principle that would be placed at the heart of subsequent international acts (the Moscow Declaration by the leaders of the three Allied powers of October 30, 1943; the Yalta Declaration of January 11, 1945; the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945; the London Agreement of August 8, 1945; and the Declaration of the four powers of September 5, 1945). See Irina Lediakh and Feliks M. Reshetnikov, “Kazhdyi natsistskii prestupnik dolzhen ponesti nakazanie” [All Nazi Criminals Must Be Punished] *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* [The Soviet State and the Law], no. 2 (1965): 24–33. This publication was a monthly journal of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

<sup>49</sup> Lediakh and Reshetnikov, “Kazhdyi natsistskii prestupnik,” 25–26.

of West Germany resort to all manner of quibbles and legal ruses in order to fulfil the mission entrusted to them by the leading circles of West German monopoly capital – to obstruct the severe punishment of Nazi criminals,” claimed the article, brushing aside the creation in 1958 of the Central Office for the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes in Ludwigsburg.<sup>50</sup> The text closes with an indignant tirade against the FRG government’s announcement of the statute of limitations for Nazi crimes as of May 8, 1965: Bonn’s attitude, they found, was illegal and comparable to a policy of rehabilitating fascism.<sup>51</sup>

That same month, a much more famous writer would take up the same arguments. In a text entitled “Nazi Executioners must not escape punishment,” Roman Rudenko, Soviet Procurator General and formerly chief prosecutor for the Soviet delegation in Nuremberg, condemned West Germany’s refusal to extend the statute of limitations for international crimes. The text also referred to an official declaration of the Soviet government from December 24, 1964: the FRG, as heir to the Third Reich, had the obligation to punish every war criminal; no one could exempt it from this duty. Rudenko concluded with an accusation against Bonn, claiming that in order to protect these criminals, the West German government was preventing Soviet witnesses from attending trials in the West and ignoring evidence conveyed by the USSR.<sup>52</sup>

It is with this very same argument that the documentary *The Victims Accuse* (1962), a project filmed three years earlier in reaction to the Koblenz trial, opens:

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50 Lediakh and Reshetnikov, “Kazhdyi natsistskii prestupnik,” 28. The office’s full title was the Central Office of the State Justice Administrations for the Investigation of National Socialist Crimes (Die Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Aufklärung nationalsozialistischer Verbrechen, known universally simply as Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, of ZSt-L). The Central Office was initially charged with the investigation of extraterritorial Nazi crimes, but from 1964 of Nazi crimes without reference to place or date. See Annette Weinke, *Eine Gesellschaft ermittelt gegen sich selbst: Die Geschichte der Zentralen Stelle Ludwigsburg 1958–2008* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008).

51 Lediakh and Reshetnikov, “Kazhdyi natsistskii prestupnik,” 29–30. The statute of limitations for crimes against humanity was ultimately pushed back, then abolished altogether: Wieviorka, *Le procès Eichmann*, 142.

52 Roman Rudenko, “Gitlerovskie palachi ne dolzhny uiti ot vozmezdiiia” [Hitlerian executioners must not escape punishment], *Sotsialisticheskaia Zakonnost’* [Socialist Legality], no. 3 (1965): 2–8. This journal was the bimonthly review of the Ministry of Justice. In “The Nuremberg Trial,” *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, no. 2 (1966): 3–11. Lev N. Smirnov, another important figure in the Soviet delegation to Nuremberg, insisted once again on the importance of this trial for international law.

This film is being prepared for trial in the West German city of Koblenz as a document proving the crimes committed by Heuser and other SS members on the territory of Belarus in 1941–44.

The government of West Germany did not allow Soviet jurists and investigators to arrive in Koblenz in sufficient time to present the trial with testimony and to provide the court with documentary materials on this case.<sup>53</sup>

The Soviet attacks, referring to Nuremberg, did not only target the enemies of 1941–1945. In an article from June 1965, Arkady Poltorak attacked the United States. According to him, the Americans were beginning to criticize the Nuremberg trial and its principles in order to avoid investigations into their crimes in Vietnam.<sup>54</sup> He did not, however, repeat these accusations in his *Epilogue to Nuremberg*, published later that same year, but the idea of a US betrayal of Nuremberg's principles was frequently mentioned in articles about the war in Vietnam in the late 1960s.<sup>55</sup> The aim of the legal argument put forward by the USSR was to present itself not only as Europe's liberator (as the only occupied state that had continued to fight the war on its own territory), but also as the heir to the battle against Nazism and the guarantor of Nuremberg law.

In March 1965, the Soviet Union adopted a decree, soon to be transformed into law, on the imprescriptibility of violent crimes committed during the Nazi occupation.<sup>56</sup> Adopted in a morning session, the decree appeared on the front page of the *Izvestiia* of the same day, was broadcast on Radio Moskva 1 at 12:58 p.m., and was reproduced the next day on the front pages of some republican newspapers.<sup>57</sup> Some capitalist states, to the contrary, revealed their true nature

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53 *Zhertvy obviniaiat* (The Victims Accuse), 1962. TsSDF, RGAKFD, no. 18433. Director: Irina Zhukovskaia and Pëtr Shamshur. The Koblenz trial began in mid-October 1962 and lasted several months. It ruled against defendants for their participation in the crimes of *Sonderkommando* 1005 in Belarus, in Minsk, Maly Trastsianets [Russian: Maly Trostenets], Dziarzhynsk [Koidanovo], Rakau [Rakov], Slonim, and Slutsk.

54 Arkadii Poltorak, "Niurnbergskii protsess i vopros ob otvetstvennosti za agressiiu" [The Nuremberg Trial and the Question of Responsibility for Aggression], *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, no. 6 (1965): 58–66.

55 Arkadii Poltorak, *Niurnbergskii Epilog* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965). My general observations of Soviet articles about the Vietnam war are based on research carried out building the "Database on East-European war crimes trials between 1957 and 1970, on the basis on local newspapers, project ANR-16-CE27-0001."

56 "On the punishment of those responsible for crimes against peace and humanity and war crimes, regardless of the time of the commission of crimes," *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 10, 1965, p. 186. Ratified into law on October 2, 1965: *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 39, 1965, p. 902.

57 *Izvestiia*, no. 53, March 4, 1965, p. 1. *Pravda Ukrainy*, March 5, 1965, p. 1. For the broadcast, see OSA, HU OSA 300-80-1, box 715, folder "Prestupleniia politicheskie, 1961–1967."

as soon as economic and financial questions were at stake, betraying Nuremberg law and instead protecting Nazi criminals and their accomplices. It was on the basis of this reasoning that Soviet media gradually changed their assessment of Israeli authority in judging Eichmann.

That the FRG – supported by international finance – was avoiding denazification was another recurring argument in the media campaign launched around the Eichmann trial. From 1960 to 1965, Moscow suggested, increasingly explicitly, that Eichmann was only a drop in the ocean: while all eyes were on Jerusalem, Hans Globke, Theodor Oberländer, and Friedrich Foertsch were living peaceful lives in the West. Foertsch was an interesting case, because he had been named Inspector General of the new Bundeswehr in April 1961. He was mentioned in an article in *Soviet Russia* from April 9, 1961, in which the author warned his readers not to expect too much from the Jerusalem trial insofar as Israel, like England and France, had chosen to forget the lessons of the war and to maintain cordial relations with militarists in Bonn.<sup>58</sup> In December of the same year, after the verdict in Jerusalem, Rafail Nakhmanovich's first feature film, with a screenplay by Viktor Nekrasov, came out on Ukrainian screens.<sup>59</sup> *To the Unknown Soldier* placed great emphasis on the crimes of the Nazi occupiers in Poland and Ukraine, and warned against renewed revanchism in the FRG.<sup>60</sup> A beautiful meditative sequence on the tribute paid to Kyiv fighters from 1941–1945 and their reasons for fighting – the future of their children – is followed by a shot of a military parade in West Germany juxtaposed with pacifist commentary:

These shots were taken several years after the end of the most terrible war in human history. This is not Hitler's Germany, it is the Germany of Adenauer, the gathering place for members of the West German revanchist unions. On their conscience are millions of victims. Their goal: a Third World War.<sup>61</sup>

A stock of images on West German “revanchism” would develop from this year on: they can be found, systematically, in *To the Unknown Soldier*, *Ordinary Fascism*, and *In the Name of the Living* alike, sometimes supplemented with more re-

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<sup>58</sup> Article quoted by Cantorovich, “Soviet Reactions,” 118–119. In 1961, France was still placed on the same plane as the Allies who betrayed their 1945 promises.

<sup>59</sup> *Nevidimomu soldatu*, Ukrainian News Studio, TsDKFFA, no. 2430. Sound film, 1,282 meters (43 min.). The broadcast authorization signed on November 30, 1961, allowed it to be shown on screens throughout Ukraine without a closing date.

<sup>60</sup> In his memoirs, Nakhmanovich claims to have had to add the sequence on German revanchism so that his film, which was putting too much emphasis on Auschwitz, would pass the censors, Nakhmanovich, *Vozvrashchenie v sistemu koordinat*, 92.

<sup>61</sup> *Nevidimomu soldatu* (*To the Unknown Soldier*), 1960. Ukrainian News Studio, TsDKFFA, no. 2430.



cent shots. In the middle of the film, Nakhmanovich summoned images of Nuremberg, in turn, in order to distinguish Nazism – always referred to as “fascism” – from the German people:

The Nuremberg Process. But looking at the faces of these criminals, we should not forget that our enemy was not the German people but German fascism. These monsters did not embody all Germany. There were other Germans.<sup>62</sup>

The following year, *Sud narodov* [The Peoples’ Court], a major documentary by Roman Karmen and Elizaveta Svilova on the Nuremberg trial and originally released in 1946,<sup>63</sup> was reedited and disseminated in an updated version, including abroad (and not only in the socialist camp).<sup>64</sup> The end of the film was dedicated entirely to the denunciation of neo-Nazism and revanchism in West Germany: a montage of juxtaposed shots of swastikas painted on gates or sidewalks with images of the Bundeswehr during training and with evocations of senior leaders of West Germany, incriminated during the war, and who only dreamed of revenge (Oberländer among them).<sup>65</sup>

The commentary openly denounced the collusion between the current leaders of the FRG and former war actors, sometimes attributing to them more responsibility than they actually had at the time:

Humanity declared the Nazis criminals. Yet the rulers in Bonn gave them authoritative powers. Hitler’s assistant Strauss yells ministerial speeches, demanding atomic weapons for the Wehrmacht. And American missiles are in the hands of exterminatory people.

The very first shot of the film sends the “warmongers” a warning:

This film was created in 1946. Then, in Nuremberg, the International Tribunal tried the Hitlerite leadership. The peoples of the world have sentenced fascism, which has brought untold suffering to humanity. Today, when the militarists raise their heads again, we want to remind you: Revanchists! Arsonists! Remember Nuremberg!<sup>66</sup>

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62 *Nevidimomu soldatu*.

63 On the conditions of production of this film and the representation of Nazi crimes, see Jeremy Hicks, *First Films of the Holocaust: Soviet Cinema and the Genocide of the Jews, 1938–1946* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 197–210. See also Victor Barbat, “Evidence and Soviet Rhetorical Devices: Staging Justice at the Nuremberg Trial,” in *Seeking Accountability*, 106–141.

64 The archives of Soveksportfilm, the institution in charge of film imports and exports, confirm that the film was sold to FRG television: Russian State Archives on Literature and Art (RGALI), 2918/4/22/538 and 2918/6.

65 *Sud narodov*, 1962, TsSDF, RGAKFD, no. 18430. Sound film, 57 min. Directed by Elizaveta Svilova and Roman Karmen.

66 *The Peoples’ Court*, 1962. TsSDF, RGAKFD, no. 18430.

The work of cinematography that most successfully established a link between the failures of denazification and the risk of a renewal of the horrors of 1939–1945 was carried out in 1963–1964 by Leon Mazrukho and Lev Ginzburg around the trial of nine Soviet collaborators at Krasnodar in October 1963. With a tone at once ironic, whistle-blowing, and alarmist, the montage and commentary of *Vo imia zhivvykh* (In the Name of the Living) contrast images of rearmament in West Germany and recent photographs of Nazi criminals enjoying total impunity in the West (such as Walter Kehrler) with archival footage of the liberation of the occupied Soviet territories, where the nightmare of the “new Nazi order” was embodied in shots of ruined buildings and the exhumation of corpses.<sup>67</sup> The campaign denouncing West German revanchism and the inadequacies of the prosecutions in the FRG also relied on a comparison with the legal work accomplished in the GDR. Lediakh and Reshetnikov’s article thus presented damning figures, though of uncertain origin: they found that 12,807 war criminals were tried and sentenced in the GDR, twice as many as in the FRG, even though the population of the latter was three times greater.<sup>68</sup> In the FRG, they argued, a number of Nazis had infiltrated the judiciary and the state prosecutor’s offices, which accounted for why, out of 12,882 cases tried, only 5,445 resulted in conviction; 4,033 defendants were acquitted and the courts dismissed 2,563 cases.<sup>69</sup> In 1963, we find Hans Globke, who had been vigorously denounced by the Soviet media three years prior, at the center of a trial *in absentia* in East Berlin. Soviet visual media covered the trial.<sup>70</sup>

Thus, the Eichmann trial coincided with the return, in the Soviet Union, of the discourse on accountability and war suffering that had characterized the war and first postwar years. The demand for accountability was however articulated with the Cold War antifascist campaign that claimed that yesterday’s victims

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67 *Vo imia zhivvykh*, Leon Mazrukho and Lev Ginzburg, 1964, Rostov Documentary Studio. Sound film, 37 min. Gosfilmofond.

68 The figures for National Socialist crimes trials in the Soviet occupation zone and then DDR are contested, ranging from 26,000 to 45,000. The project, *DDR-Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Die ost-deutschen Strafverfahren wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945–1990*, surveyed all “criminal proceedings for National Socialist crimes of homicide conducted by the East German judiciary in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) and – from 1949 – in the German Democratic Republic (GDR),” and identified 932 cases involving 1,642 defendants (junsv.nl, accessed April 30, 2023). One assessment argued that the “Waldheim trials [starting in 1950] heralded the end of genuine prosecution of Nazi crimes” in East Germany, after which the numbers tapered dramatically. See: Sonya Romeike, *Transitional Justice in Germany after 1945 and after 1990* (Nuremberg: International Nuremberg Principles Academy, 2016), 19–22.

69 Lediakh and Reshetnikov, “Kazhdyi natsistkii prestupnik,” 26.

70 Wieviorka, *Le procès Eichmann*, 124. *Inostrannaia Khronika*, no. 14, 1963, devotes its third news report to this trial. RGAKFD, no. 20465.

were all too easily forgotten in the name of today's capitalist interests. Yet this state-level posture did not exclude a renewed (and very public) thought for all categories of victims, notably Jewish. Efforts at memorialization never stopped in the country, yet the international attention raised by the Eichmann trial offered a new visibility to the victims of the Holocaust, beyond localized initiatives. The next section analyzes the evolution of the evocation and commemoration of the victims in the Soviet Union when Khrushchev's new stance on war suffering and war crimes intersected with East-West tensions and high-profile events focusing on the perspective of the victims, like the Jerusalem trial.

## An Ambivalent Treatment of the Holocaust

As soon as it became known to Soviet authorities, the Holocaust caused problems for the design of Soviet propaganda narratives. The genocide of European Jews intersected with an extremely predatory and lethal occupation of Soviet territory, resulting in an estimated eleven million civilian deaths. The Jews were the Soviet national minority systematically targeted by the occupiers and their local accomplices, but Jewish victims were part of a wider number of civilian losses. At first hesitant (and inconsistent), the country's media apparatus almost completely shut down on the subject beginning with the 1948 "anti-cosmopolitan" campaign, which was directed above all against Soviet Jews. Several scholars have recently returned to the oscillations and ambiguities on the part of Moscow as well as of local authorities as to the censorship applied to articles, works, or essays concerning the massacre of Soviet Jews.<sup>71</sup> Some examples of prohibition or redaction became famous: the *Black Book* prepared by Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasilii Grossman, blocked by censorship as early as 1946; Grossman's *Life and Destiny*, in 1960; Ev-tushenko's poem "Babi Yar" in 1961 and the symphony it inspired by Shostakovich; the work of Anatolii Kuznetsov (1966), which has recently been republished in a complete and annotated edition.<sup>72</sup> If these events corresponded to very differ-

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71 Karel C. Berkhoff, "Total Annihilation of the Jewish Population": The Holocaust in the Soviet Media," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 10, no. 1 (2009): 61–105. Mordechai Altshuler, "The Holocaust in the Soviet Mass Media during the War and in the First Postwar Years Re-Examined," *Yad Vashem Studies* 39, no. 2 (2011): 121–168. Olga Gershenson, *The Phantom Holocaust: Soviet Cinema and Jewish Catastrophe* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2013). Hicks, *First Films of the Holocaust*; Antonella Salomoni, *L'Unione Sovietica e la shoah: genocidio, resistenza, rimozione* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2006).

72 Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman, *The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry*, ed. and trans. David Patterson (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002). Gennadii Kostyrch-

ent contexts and issues, they were united on one point: the Kremlin's reluctance to publicly distinguish among Soviet victims of the Nazi occupation.

The years of interest here, at the turning point of the Khrushchev "thaw" and Brezhnev's toughening stand, were undoubtedly the most ambiguous. The official Kremlin line regarding the "Soviet" identity of the civilian victims in the USSR was put at test – and sometimes clearly challenged – by filmmakers, poets, and writers who used various methods in order to address the specificity of the Holocaust. The limits of what could be written, expressed, and shown were not clearly drawn, and in several cases authors applied to their works a self-censorship exceeding the caution of the authorities themselves.<sup>73</sup> Censorship authorized mention of the subject as long as it could be situated within a general framework that did not insist on the racist and in particular antisemitic nature of Nazism and which did not focus on the sole fate of the Jews.<sup>74</sup> It is also important to note that certain categories of civilian victims remained forgotten from the productions examined in this text (the Romani people, for instance). Despite this relative loosening, the authorities remained discomfited by the Holocaust, including during the Khrushchev years. Different procedures were employed in order to trivialize the lot of European Jews – even more so of Soviet Jews. In most of these cases, we can assume that the procedures were imposed by censors of different statuses and levels. Indeed, directors and screenwriters strove despite everything to sprinkle hints – visual, semantic – that could be deciphered by careful spectators, who might identify what they were really about as a result of their knowledge of local history, while learning more from the film.<sup>75</sup>

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enko, *Tainaia politika Khrushcheva. Vlast', intelligentsiia, evreiskii vopros* [Khrushchev's Secret Policy: Power, the Intelligentsia, the Jewish Question] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2012), 325–334, 351–370; Anatoli Kouznetsov, *Babi Yar. Roman-document* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2011).

73 See the discussions of Lev Ginzburg's project of feature movie on Soviet collaborators and perpetrators – ultimately never finalized – by the team of the Experimental Studio in 1965–1967: Voisin, "The 1963 Krasnodar Trial", 419–426. See also, for the East German case, Stephan Stach, "The Jewish Diaries . . . Undergo One Edition after the Other": Early Polish Holocaust Documentation, East German Antifascism, and the Emergence of Holocaust Memory in Socialism," in *Growing in the Shadow of Antifascism*, 275–301.

74 The film *The Victims Accuse*, from 1962, is a remarkable exception, but one limited to the region of Minsk. Later Latvian films (1967–1970) show the same audacity. See discussion in: Irina Tcherneva and Vanessa Voisin, "La Shoah dans les documentaires soviétiques des années 1960: une reconnaissance ambiguë," in *Filmer la guerre. Les Soviétiques face à la Shoah, 1941–1946*, ed. Valerie Pozner, Alexandra Sumpf, and Vanessa Voisin (Paris: Mémorial de la Shoah, 2015), 115–122.

75 Studies on the emergence of the memory of the war (and the genocide) from below have developed in recent years, see notably Arkadi Zeltser, *Unwelcome Memory. Holocaust Monuments in The Soviet Union* (Jerusalem, Yad Vashem: The International Institute for Holocaust Research,

The basic strategy consisted of not mentioning at all the victims' nationality and/or of focusing attention on other categories of those detained and deported. The three films on Ukrainian trials – *The People Accuse* (1959), *We Will Not Forget* (1960), and *The Tragedy of Nizi* (1960) – described victims according to their age and sex. At times, a film might specify that they belonged to the family of a Soviet partisan. The designation of victims, which became routine in official discourse, was “perfectly innocent people” (or civilians). It is possible that, in fact, these victims were not Jewish: the advanced date of the executions mentioned (1943–44), methods of killing, and the extermination of entire villages recalled instead the violence of the anti-partisan war that German troops and their local auxiliaries employed. But why, then, include in *The People Accuse* – a film adapted, moreover, for a Russian-speaking audience – photographs or reconstituted images of the Babyn Yar massacres in a sequence on the history of the occupation in Ukraine?<sup>76</sup> Indeed, the memory of Babyn Yar was especially complicated by 1959–1960; most Soviets had heard of the immensity of the massacre of Jews in Kyiv, even if only from the press in autumn 1941 or from *The Unvanquished* by Mark Donskoy (1945). Later efforts to emphasize POWs and Ukrainian civilians who were also shot at the site did not erase this memory. The allusion thus seems risky from the perspective of the censors, most likely deliberate and encrypted if one considers the film's authors, who were both war veterans and probably Jewish.<sup>77</sup>

*In the Name of the Victims* by Leon Mazrukho offers another eloquent example of deliberate silence on the identity of Jewish victims. Here, to the contrary, the film devotes a rather lengthy segment to the murder of sick children in a clinic-orphanage in Eisk (or Ieisk), on the Azov Sea, reminding a Soviet audience already familiar with this theme of the particular cruelty shown by the occupation towards children, who were sick and disabled. The film took care to show with maps the movement of *Sonderkommando* 10a across Eastern Europe and to preserve several statements from the 1963 trial referring to the extermination of

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2018) and Irina Rebrova, *Re-Constructing Grassroots Holocaust Memory: The Case of the North Caucasus* (Berlin: De Gruyter; Oldenbourg, 2020) and her traveling exhibition: <https://nsvictims.ru>, accessed May 30, 2024.

<sup>76</sup> The sequence appears at the beginning of the third section in the Ukrainian version, towards the end of the second section in the Russian version. TsDKFFA, no. 2021. The conclusions of the studio's editorial team after reading the script (in April 1959) do not mention these images, which were indeed kept in the film: TSDAMLM 1009/2/370/28–29.

<sup>77</sup> The director of photography, I. Goldstein, had also participated in the filming of *The Battle for our Soviet Ukraine* (1943) and *Victory in Ukraine from the Right Bank* by Dovzhenko (1945). These films incorporate images of the mass graves at Drobitskii Yar (Kharkiv) and Babyn Yar, but entirely pass over the fact that the majority of the victims killed in those places were Jews.

Jewish communities.<sup>78</sup> But the word “Jew” was not pronounced even once. This detail is even more intriguing given that the screenwriter, Lev Ginzburg, would not, for his part, avoid exposing the specificity of Nazi genocidal operations in his text on the trial and in the film.<sup>79</sup> The interval of two years that separated the release of the film and the book might not explain this difference; to the contrary, the authorities’ circumspection on this topic only grew between 1963 and 1966, as illustrated by the streak of bad luck suffered by Kuznetsov’s *Babi Yar*.<sup>80</sup> Given the director’s personal history as a Jew from Crimea where the same *Sonderkommando* had also left a trail of death, the avoidance of the term “Jew” cannot be mere chance. Plainly, collaboration with the KGB during the investigation and the trial imposed a certain prudence on the part of the film’s directors. In July 1964, Mazrukho even took care to ask the security services for official authorization to distribute the film throughout the country.<sup>81</sup>

In parallel to the lexical taboo, the most common strategy for mentioning the Holocaust without paying it too much attention in the films and newsreels of the 1960s consisted in minimizing the genocide within the global politics of Nazi violence. If the question of Jewish victims, or of their total losses in Europe, was sometimes explicitly at stake, the representation of persecutions against this community was placed on the same plane as violence against the partisans, disabled people, or Slavic nationalities. The subject of newsreels devoted to the Koch trial in Poland listed the victims of the latter: “Here he is: the murderer of millions of Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Jews.”<sup>82</sup> Any contribution on the Jerusalem trial, of course, could not pass over genocide in silence. But the film’s way of talking about it is revealing. Here is the voice-over commentary:

The trial of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann began in Jerusalem. The former SS *Obersturmbanführer* [lieutenant-colonel] is guilty of grave crimes against humanity. It was he who ordered the deportations of innocent people all across Europe. On his orders, 6 million Jews were tortured in the death camps. For 15 years, a fascist degenerate has been hiding under the names of others. And now Hitler’s executioner is in the dock.<sup>83</sup>

78 Voisin, “‘Au nom des vivants,’” 402–407.

79 *Vo imia zhivyykh*. Lev Ginzburg, *Bez dna* (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel, 1966).

80 On the complex story of Kuznetsov’s manuscript, see Annie Epelboin’s preface to Kuznetsov, *Babi Yar*.

81 State Archives of Rostov-on-Don oblast (GARO), R-4105/1/226/6 (film dossier). The director indicates in a letter that KGB officers attended a private screening of the film at the Writer’s House (Moscow) on July 16, 1964.

82 Commentary of shots 8 and 9 of the newsreel. *Inostrannaia Khronika*, March 1959, TsSDF, RGAKFD, no. 18395. The image is not exactly explicit: one sees a line of people in front of a Polish fortress.

83 *Inostrannaia Khronika*, no. 8, 1961. TsSDF, RGAKFD, no. 19647.

The shots outside the courtroom show us a document signed by Eichmann (illustrating the deportation order), detainees at one of the daily calls, German soldiers brutally pushing civilians, including children, a bird's eye view of the camp, the label of a box of Zyklon B in a large shot, naked bodies, and crematorium ovens. If the association of the commentary on the Jews to the camp – Zyklon B – naked bodies – ovens sequence constitutes one of the most explicit accounts of the Holocaust at the time, the relationship between the Eichmann who ordered deportations and the Eichmann who had Jews exterminated remained mysterious. The match between these “perfectly innocent people” and the “six million Jews,” in order to function at all, required that the spectator recall the site of the trial. The reasons for Eichmann's dogged antisemitism are hardly any clearer. It was only with reticence that the Soviets dealt with the Holocaust in an explicit or even blunt way, constrained by the impact of the Jerusalem trial throughout the world.

Two other productions from 1961 confirm the influence of the trial on the official representation of war crimes in the USSR. In his memoirs, Rafail Nakhmanovich described the overwhelming and humiliating effect of the “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign on him as a young Jewish filmmaker in Soviet Ukraine. Having entered the working world at precisely the moment when the campaign was beginning, around 1948, this director experienced severe difficulties in obtaining authorization to pursue his career, to receive titles, degrees, and advancement, and to broach subjects that interested him. Nakhmanovich lingers in particular over two projects, one completed, the other aborted in its early stages, both relating to the Holocaust. His 1961 film, *To the Unknown Soldier*, produced under the aegis of a tolerant News Studio director and of a celebrated writer of “literature of the front,” was the first documentary since 1945 to return to the Nazi concentration and extermination camps, except for the regrettable *Geroi ukhodiāt v bessmertie* [The Heroes Depart into Immortality], a television production from 1959.<sup>84</sup>

Nakhmanovich reused images from the Soviet short films *Maidanek* (1944) and *Auschwitz* (1945), as well as shots of the Stutthof camp near Gdańsk (formerly Danzig). He also shot a sequence on three collections painted by Zinovii Tolkahev, following the shock of the discovery of the camps. According to him, the insertion of Tolkahev's drawings and the shots of Auschwitz, including those of

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<sup>84</sup> *Geroi ukhodiāt v bessmertie*, TsSDF, TsDKFFA, no. 4862. Directed by N. Ignatovaia, F. Sakalis. Photography by I. Kuzmenko, V. Gusev. Sound film, black and white, 25 minutes. In this work, marred by serious historical confusion, particular attention is paid to the Sachsenhausen camp, where, unlike Auschwitz and Maidanek, political prisoners (including leaders of the OUN, which the film of course does not tell) and Soviet prisoners of war figured prominently among those held.

twin child detainees (images of Kutub-zade from February-March 1945), had sowed panic within the Ukrainian administrative apparatus.<sup>85</sup> The film was saved only by the intercession of well-placed people in Moscow, where the director went himself to present it to the Office of Film Distribution and Diffusion.<sup>86</sup>

The other event of the year, this time in direct relation to the Eichmann trial, was the publication of Ginzburg's *Tsena pepla* [The Price of Ashes], including the essay, "The Eichmann Affair." The work was reprinted with a run of 30,000 copies the following year. Ginzburg had been interested in the revival of Nazism in the West for some time, especially in the way that societies had partially forgotten the price of war as they returned to their capitalist comforts. The release of his book, precisely in 1961, was a Soviet response to questions raised by the Jerusalem trial. The figure of six million, repeated several times, obviously refers to the Jewish victims – even if the term itself is never associated with this statistic:

Terrible images were resurrected in the courtroom. The invisible formations of the dead – six million dead – passed by the glass cube. These were victims from all European countries: those who were killed by gas in the death camps, and ghetto prisoners who died of starvation; children shot by *Einsatzkommandos* at the edge of anti-tank ditches; and old people who were driven into synagogues and then burned alive. None of them escaped Eichmann. He organized strict accounting and put in place an exemplary system of "identification." If on the ground, in satellite countries, the authorities showed hesitation, Eichmann acted through diplomatic channels, through plenipotentiaries – this is how he "cleansed" Budapest and prepared the complete elimination of Italian and Romanian Jews. If there were hitches with transport, Eichmann "pressured" the railroads, and the trains intended for the transport of troops went to the Gestapo. When gassing process breakdowns occurred in the death camps or the camps could not cope with the overload of the crematorium, Eichmann contacted the technicians and the engineers, and the "machine" again functioned without fail.<sup>87</sup>

The Jews are mentioned often in the text. Above all, Ginzburg exposes the racist and antisemitic nature of Nazism, discussing *Mein Kampf*, the Wannsee conference, the "final solution of the Jewish question," and the quotas of Jews that each occupied country had to deliver (he cites the total goal of 11 million, mentioned at Wannsee). The author, quite unusually for the USSR, dedicated some of the text to delineating carefully the criteria of "Jewishness" according to Nazi racial laws and the problems posed by mixed-race people or mixed marriages. Far from denying the antisemitic basis of Nazism, he ridicules Eichmann's defense, which had consisted of claiming that he was not a racial antisemite, but rather a mere

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<sup>85</sup> *Filmer la guerre*, 57, 62–63. Nakhmanovich, *Vozvrashchenie v sistemu koordinat*, 61–62, 91.

<sup>86</sup> Nakhmanovich, *Vozvrashchenie v sistemu koordinat*, 52–53, 59–60, 176–177.

<sup>87</sup> Ginzburg, "The Eichmann Affair," 121.



executor of Hitler's policy and orders. To believe Eichmann, if Hitler had hated redheads, the Nazi extermination apparatus would have tracked down and liquidated all European redheads without hesitation. "Oh, please . . . !" Ginzburg mocks.<sup>88</sup> The author recounts the successive persecutions endured by the Jews: yellow star, enclosure in the ghettos, massive executions of entire communities in ditches, or deportation and gas chambers. This is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive treatment of the Holocaust that can be found in any Soviet publication, at least before the *Perestroika* years.<sup>89</sup>

However, despite this wealth of details on the nature and crimes of Nazism, "The Eichmann Affair" can be situated perfectly within the line that Khrushchev explained in person during an encounter with Moscow's intellectual community in December 1961. The First Secretary scolded the writer Evgenij Evtushenko, author of the poem "Babi Yar,"<sup>90</sup> for his emphasis put on the Jewish victims executed there:

"This question – the struggle with anti-Semitism – is very important," began the party leader. Then he suddenly spoke for himself (obviously for the sake of greater persuasiveness), "I was brought up in the Donbass. In my childhood I saw the [1905] pogrom against Jews in Iuzovka [now Donetsk], and I can only say that the majority of miners – even the miners – were against this pogrom. And when, after the pogrom, a wave of strikes broke out, who were the majority of speakers among these strikers? They were Jews. They were loved; they were respected. Then there is "Babi Yar." I worked in Ukraine and went to this "Babi Yar." Many people died there. But comrades, Comrade Evtushenko, not only Jews died there – others died there, too. Hitler exterminated the Jews. He exterminated the Gypsies, but the next stage was the extermination of the Slavs – he also exterminated the Slavs. And if we now calculate arithmetically which peoples were exterminated in greater numbers – Jews or Slavs – then those who say that the Slavs were exterminated more, there are more of them than Jews, are correct. So why highlight this, why raise this question? For what purpose? I consider this wrong."<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Ginzburg, "The Eichmann Affair," 127–132.

<sup>89</sup> On this subject, see Benjamin Pinkus, *The Soviet Government and the Jews*, 425–430.

<sup>90</sup> The first verse reads: "No monument stands over Babi Yar. / A drop sheer as a crude gravestone. / I am afraid. / Today I am as old in years / as all the Jewish people. / Now I seem to be / a Jew. / Here I plod through ancient Egypt. / Here I perish crucified on the cross, / and to this day I bear the scars of nails. / I seem to be / Dreyfus. / The Philistine / is both informer and judge. / I am behind bars. / Beset on every side. / Hounded, / spat on, / slandered." *The Collected Poems 1952–1990 by Yevgeny Yevtushenko*, ed. Albert C. Todd with the author and James Ragan (Henry Holt and Company, 1991), 102–104.

<sup>91</sup> Excerpt of Khrushchev's speech delivered at a meeting with the intelligentsia on December 17, 1962, quoted in Kostyrchenko, *Tainaia politika Khrushcheva*, 351–352.

Ginzburg was still in keeping with official practice when he wrote that the Eichmann “affair” largely went beyond the current trial and the extermination of the Jews. Emphasizing that the “bureaucrat,” the “accountant of death” also concerned himself with Czechs, Poles, and Russians, he claimed that the Holocaust was a kind of training ground for genocide on a fully different scale – that of tens of millions of Slavs.<sup>92</sup> By focusing attention on this smokescreen, the Jerusalem trial had allowed all the other criminals to emerge unscathed. And it allowed Westerners to forget that it was the heroism of the Russian (rather than Soviet) people and its army that had defeated the Nazi tanks and saved Europe.<sup>93</sup>

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The discourse on the Holocaust authorized by officials in the USSR at the beginning of the 1960s was thus accompanied by virulent accusations against the capitalist world, viewed as an accomplice of Nazism and neo-Nazism. Above all, the USSR refused to consider the Holocaust as an essential goal of Nazism in itself; the real targets were always the Slavs occupying the “vital space” desired by Hitler’s people. Thus, it was perhaps indeed wiser to revert to more discrete allusions, as Leon Mazrukho did in *In the Name of the Living* or as Gerts (Herzs) Frank and Imants Brils did in *Prigovor obzhalovaniiu ne podlezhit* [The Sentence is Final] (1965).<sup>94</sup> The latter film takes the occasion of the Riga trial in 1964 to recount the fate of Latvian war criminals who emigrated to the West, three of whom were retrieved by the Soviets. The allusion to the Holocaust on Latvian territory is coded, suggested by scattered mentions of the Jewishness of certain victims.

The global significance of the Jerusalem trial allowed the memory of the Holocaust to re-emerge from the drawer where it had remained confined since the end of the 1940s. If most artists who broached this minefield too imprudently paid a price for it with their career, or even with their general fortune, like Rafail Nakhmanovich, the Eichmann trial contributed to a ceding of the floor to witnesses and victims. The noteworthy appearance of testimonies on the Holocaust in contemporaneous documentaries of the 1960s deserves more in-depth analysis. It obviously has everything to do with the “coming of the era of the witness,” examined by Annette Wieviorka.<sup>95</sup> In the Soviet context, though, the “witness” has

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<sup>92</sup> Ginzburg, “The Eichmann Affair,” 135–141.

<sup>93</sup> On the Russocentric turn of Stalin’s propaganda, see David Brandenberger, “Stalin’s Populism and the Accidental Creation of Russian National Identity,” *Nationalities Papers* 38, no. 5 (2010): 723–739.

<sup>94</sup> Riga Studio. RGAKFD, No. 35078. Sound film, 21 min.

<sup>95</sup> Annette Wieviorka, *The Era of the Witness*, trans. Jared Stark (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).

been present, if only in the trials, from the start. It is also worth noting that a high number of Soviet trials of collaborators-perpetrators from the late 1950s onward relied even more on the evidence presented by co-perpetrators than by bystanders, survivors, or victims' relatives.<sup>96</sup> The larger place granted to the voices of witnesses in the public space and notably the media also entails complex relationships with the progressive differentiation of the memory of the war in the Soviet Union and, at an even deeper level, with the notion of the individual and of personal experience in a system meant to promote collectivism, including sacrifice in war.

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<sup>96</sup> On the propaganda dilemma that this specific category of witnesses posed to the authorities, see Rich, "Law and Accountability, Secrecy and Guilt."

