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Memory as shadow of the method in Peter Ramus and French Ramism

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Abstract

The article examines the ambiguous role of memory in Peter Ramus' reform of logic and in sixteenth-century French encyclopedic Ramism. In particular, it shows how, in Ramus' writings on dialectics, the art of memory loses its identity as an autonomous discipline and is entirely absorbed by the doctrine of method. Such an identification of memory and method presupposes a conception of knowledge as an objectification of structures and mental operations that is inadequate to the setup of an encyclopedic project aimed at guaranteeing the objective and extra-mental contents of the disciplines, as the one that asserted itself among the first generation of the *regius professor's* scholars. It is precisely in this context that, also thanks to the revival of Lullist instances, memory is charged with classificatory and unifying functions regarded as necessary and preliminary to the application to all arts and sciences of Ramus' unique method.

Keywords

Ramus, seventeenth century, method, Sasvigny, dialectics, encyclopedia

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1. *The Ramist logic like a system of local memory*

Among the first clarifications of the ambiguity of the art of memory and its denial by the reformer of sixteenth-century logic, the *regius professor* Peter Ramus (Pierre de La Ramée), were the studies of Walter Ong, Paolo Rossi and Frances Yates that, between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s, did not so much as highlight the disappearance of *ars memoriae*, but the new role that it began to play in the context of the reform in knowledge and logic promoted by Peter Ramus in the mid-16th century. In his 1958 monograph, Ong explained the progressive exclusion of memory – and, notably, local memory – from Ramus’ logic with the entirely mental localization and arrangement of logic proceedings, even more distinct in the more mature phase of the Parisian professor’s reflections: in his works, the space of the page, topically arranged thanks to the use of tree-like diagrams (the so-called “Ramist trees”) that articulated the arrangement of subject matters considered through partitions and subpartitions, reproduced a “mental topic”, which made the palaces of memory and the concrete *loci* of classical rhetoric tradition useless, and even misleading. Ramus could free himself from mnemotechnics because all the knowledge that he had based on a topically conceived logic was itself composed of “a system of local memory”.¹ Frances Yates presented an analogous evaluation in his judgement of how Ramus conceived his own dialectical method as “the true classical art of memory”. Old and new techniques of visualization and systematization justified the author of *Dialecticae Institutiones* in considering the “one method” not as an alternative, but as “another transformation of the classical art”.² The conclusion presented in the pages of *Clavis universalis* was overturned, and not only in its terminology: it was not memory that contained the method, rather the method, the “systematic and ordered disposition of notions” that “absorbed many ‘rules’ of mnemotechnics.” This was something more than a reform or update of the classical art of memory: “in the Ramist absorption of memory into logic, and identification of the problem of the method with that problem of memory”, Paolo Rossi saw the birth of “the concept of method as a classification of reality, a notion which became vitally important to European thought in the succeeding centuries”.³ The issue was no longer testing the permeability of the *méthode unique et singulière* to the rules of *ars memoriae*, but instead evaluating, starting with the stance adopted by the greatest French exponent of logic studies in the 16th century, how much those rules and problems pertinent to memory in general had found space in a wider reform of knowledge’s method which would be

¹ Ong, *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue*, 280.

² Yates, *The art of memory*, 236.

³ *Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz* is the original title of Paolo Rossi’s monograph, published in Italy in 1960. The English edition from which the following quotations are taken, has the title *The Logic and the Art of Memory. The Quest for a Universal Language*, 101.

accomplished in the 17th and 18th centuries. Thus, Ramus' denial of memory as an autonomous discipline and the absorption of the tasks it had traditionally performed by the method and the new logic, appeared more than the death of the *ars memoriae*, "the birth of the 'new method of the sciences'". According to Paolo Rossi, such a method left behind the *viae investigandi* of mediaeval logicians and took on the task of classifying the reality. The analysis of the places dedicated to memory and the method's ordinal function supports the conviction that Ramus writings actually represent a fundamental passage in the plurisecular itinerary of *ars memoriae* and not simply a variation of Ciceronian paradigms: that in which memory does not disappear, but from an *ars* that it was (from an autonomous discipline or from a part of rhetoric) becomes method.

However, this memory (requiring *loci* "simpliciora and meliora" than those of Carneades and Metrodorus in that it is nothing more than "ars ordinis [...] tota posita [...] in divisione et compositione"⁴) and the method that absorbs it (removed not only from techniques of rhetoric, but also from *inventio argumentorum*, and collocated in the second part of logic, judgement), although they represent a disruptive novelty full of subsequent developments, do not seem to have yet to embody, at least in the writings of the *regius professor*, the classificatory function regarding reality that will become the signature of the new methods of science.⁵ It is with the first generation of his scholars rather than with Ramus himself that memory and method, in their convergence in the need to classify reality, step away from the field of *artes sermocinales* and acquire the function of *new organon* of all knowledge. This happens in conjunction with the arrival of a precise "encyclopedic" function of the Ramist reform of logic and method, as well as the assertion of a conception of the encyclopaedia as a universal system in which knowledge is characterized as an organic interlacement of all the formalized disciplines and the others that could gradually reach an internal articulation that was coherent and theoretically founded.⁶ It is worth underlining that, if one excludes *Professio Regia*, an uncompleted work only partially attributable to the *regius professor*, the issue of the arrangement of the *orbis disciplinarum omnium* remains for Ramus an eminently theoretical question. The interpretation of the disciplines proposed in the *Scholae* is molded to the *methodus unica* that is invariably applied to every area of

⁴ Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 165.

⁵ Cf. Rossi, *The Logic*, 160.

⁶ This is a reference to a movement in Ramism tied to the literary and scientific fields of the Collège Royal that, unlike the so-called 'semi-Ramist' or 'Philippo-Ramist' movements widespread in German and English environments and directly involved in the reorganisation of Protestant universalities, was interested not only in the problem of the 'systemisation' and 'methodisation' of knowledge, but also to the specific content of the disciplines and the growth of knowledge. Cf. Ong, "System, space, and intellect in Renaissance symbolism", 235-239; Vasoli, *L'enciclopedia del Seicento*, 19-29; J.S. Freedman, "Encyclopedic philosophical writings in Central Europe during the high and late Renaissance (ca. 1500-ca. 1700)", 212-255.

knowledge. This approach, when used in fields of knowledge other than grammar, rhetoric and logic, arithmetic and geometry, is primarily a confutation of the criteria according to which the traditions of each discipline are built over time and an analysis of the single reasonings in light of the method, but it does not deal with specific content from the various disciplines.

Emblematic of this declination of Ramism are the *Tableaux accomplis de tous les arts libéraux*, published in 1587 by Christophle de Savigny,⁷ a mysterious vassal of Luigi Gonzaga, Duke of Nevers and Rethel, Prince of Mantua and Peer of France. The *in-folio* comprises sixteen sections or “partitions” dedicated to the sixteen disciplines,⁸ each of which is printed on two consecutive pages, one dedicated to an exposition in decreasing order of generality of the *praecepta* and the *argumenta* of each particular subject matter, and the other occupied by a “tableau” that presents, in the form of a diagram, the partitions and points of passage through which the *genus* of the discipline evolves into its increasingly specific parts. The encyclopedic dimension of the work derives from a sort of preliminary discourse (*Partition generale de tous les arts liberaux*, [Fig. 1]) that introduces the sixteen disciplines and the corresponding *tableau*, entitled *Encyclopedie, ou la suite et liaison de tous les arts et sciences* [Fig. 2]. It is difficult to establish if Savigny was the actual author of the work or if it is a pseudonym behind which a well-known figure, or group of authors hid; the volume certainly proposes an arrangement of the sixteen disciplines that is consistent with the reform not only of logic but of all knowledge proposed by Peter Ramus at the Collège Royal and continued by the first generation of his followers.⁹ The two pages of the *Tableaux* dedicated to dialectics [Figs. 3-4] are those in which the adherence to Ramist theory is most evident, but they are also those in which Savigny displays a perception of an insufficiency in the teaching of his maestro regarding memory, or better, memorative logic.¹⁰ This inadequacy is

⁷ Savigny, *Tableaux accomplis de tous les arts libéraux*; reprinted in Paris in 1619, at J. Libert. The critical edition of the volume is published in Angelini, *Metodo ed enciclopedia nel Cinquecento francese*, vol. II: *I Tableaux di Savigny*. The citations that follow refer to this edition, from now on indicated as *Tableaux*.

⁸ The disciplines included in the *partitions* and *tableaux* are: grammar, rhetoric, dialectics, arithmetic, geometry, optics, music, cosmography, astronomy, geography, physics, medicine, ethics, jurisprudence, history, theology. The pages that contain a *tableau* include a diagram with symbols and instruments that characterise the content of the disciplines considered. For an idea of the layout, see the *partitions* and *tableau* of dialectics [Figs. 3-4], which is the typographic model repeated for each of the 16 disciplines.

⁹ On this work, which represents the first and probably the only encyclopaedia from the 1500s framed by a Ramist method and conception, and on the mysterious author who penned the work, see Angelini, *Metodo ed enciclopedia nel Cinquecento francese*, vol. I: *Il pensiero di Piero Ramo all'origine dell'enciclopedismo moderno*.

¹⁰ “Memorative logic” refers to the Ciceronian connection between logic and *ars memoria* frequently, though not exclusively, used by Lullists of the 16th century that interpret the *ars com-*




Fig. 1 – provide caption




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


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


Fig. 4 – provide caption

much more evident where Ramism aims to advance a reform not only of the form, but also of the content of knowledge as a whole. The author of the *Tableaux*, who was well inside the Ramist entourage, does not miss how memory, starting with the *Dialecticae partitiones* of '43 up to the final posthumous edition of *Dialectica*, is anything but rejected, but is increasingly distanced from a technic of persuasive discourse to become a very part of philosophy and scientific demonstration, thus anticipating both its collocation in the “ministratio ad memoriam” of Baconian logic, and the meaning assigned to “enumeratio” in *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* by Descartes.¹¹ Coherent with the mature framework of Ramist doctrine, mnemotechnics disappears, together with the apparatus of *imagines agentes* and concrete places of which the oratory tradition had made full use, and memory, included in Savigny's *Tableaux* in the dialectics section, takes on, despite its name, an unprecedented function that plunders the Latin oratory and appears inseparable from the doctrine of order and disposition, due to the scope of the ambitions it pursues.

It is worthwhile to examine more closely the section of the *Tableaux* dedicated to dialectics. The page featuring its diagram [Fig. 4] does not include any graphic elements, neither in the “mirror”, nor the oval frame that surrounds it. There is just one occurrence, an open book as the trunk of “dialectics or logic” from which the two main branches of invention and judgement originate, and an inscription that winds around the tree in place of that usual illustrated frame that is missing in this table, unlike those of the other disciplines. However, the inscription is more meaningful than any other symbol: “*la memoire si elle a quelque art suyt les degrez de disposition et ordre de la dialectique quasi comme l'ombre accompagne et suyt les corps quand le soleil luit*”. This is a citation from Ramus, who had stated “*dispositionis umbra quaedam est memoria*” because “*quicquid est artis qua memoria possit adiuvari, ordo ac dispositio rerum est*”.¹² For Ramus, like for the Ramist author of

binatoria as a universal instrument of judgement (more versatile than syllogism), as well as a mnemonic system (more effective than the Ciceronian system). It is the classificatory aspect of memorative logics that has a bearing on the methodology of the 16th and 17th centuries and, as I will attempt to document in the pages to follow, that orients Savigny's “strategy” in arranging the sciences.

¹¹ In Ramus' dialectical writings, the fate of memory follows that of rhetoric: rather than being refuted, the rhetorical scheme is assigned an excess of importance as *inventio*, *dispositio* and *memoria* are transferred from the art of discourse to that of proper reasoning and the functions of logic.

¹² Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 43, 14. Ramus then added that “*ordinis porro quoniam sola dialectica dispositio doctrina est, ab ea sola. memoriae praesidium et subsidium peti potest*” (*ibid.*, 43). For further reading, see Ramus, *Scholarum Dialecticarum seu animadversio in Organum Aristotelis*, 600: “*Tum si qua ratio memoriam possit adjuvare, illa dispositionis admonitio iuvabit; licebitque philosophis et oratoribus, qui locis et imaginibus artem quandam memoriae confinxerunt, per nos quidem valere; nihil enim pollicentur, quod non uberius multo faciliusque teneamus. Aiunt enim ordinem prodesse memoriae, sed externis et commentiti-*

the *Tableaux*, this was related to liquidating mnemotechnics, negating any functions it may have other than accompanying the *dispositio* of dialectics; but, upon closer examination it is clear it was also related to recognizing its pervasiveness since, although it was without its own location or physiognomy, it is the shadow of a “lux solis” that radiates throughout all of art and science.¹³ Abandoning in the dialectic *tableau* of Savigny’s work the symbolic repertory traditionally characterizing the discipline and giving emphasis and symbolic value to two central motifs of the Ramist reform (the book and the “lux solis”) means making a dual declaration: *dialectique* does not receive the inheritance of humanist eloquence, nor that of scholastic logic, but presents itself as an entirely new science, without a tradition – an inedited book, opened to the first page for the first time – that, as Ramus reiterated many times, if it has its own antecedent and an authority to harken back to, it is the light of reason;¹⁴ memory is not a discipline nor a technique (“art”), but a part of logic and more precisely the second part of logic, which is the dialectical *dispositio*, namely the doctrine of judgement. The only *imago agens* of the discipline, the book, symbol par excellence of the transmission of knowledge, open to the inscription “*dialectique ou logique a deux parties*,”¹⁵ is a book that has yet to be written, that annuls every relationship with logic tradition and proposes a *scientia penitus nova*.¹⁶ A book that is yet to be written and a tradition just sketched

is eam signis et simulachris instruunt; nos ordinis rebus ipsis insiti doctrinam certissimam et veros locos pro rerum gradibus et generibus distinctos, rerumque verissimas imagines adhibemus. Illi verborum memoriam infinitate formarum conturbant [...] nos hanc partem rerum compositione et collacatione (quantum natura fert) adjuvamus. Quapropter quicquid est, quod ad confirmandam memoriam doctrina possit efficere, id totum dialecticae dispositionis doctrina praescribit”. Already in *Dialecticae Institutiones* from ’43 Ramus defined memory “*umbra iudicii*” (f. 43v.); in the field of the doctrine of judgement he specified that memory “*iudicii gradus perinde ac umbra lucente sole corpus sequitur*” (f. 43r).

¹³ After having compared the rules of dialectics that are equally relevant in every field of knowledge to a single law that governs over a realm as large as the universe and to which “grammatici, rhetores, poetae, historici, arithmetici, geometrae, musici, astrologi, physici, ethici” conform, Ramus returns to the image of the sun: “*Ut in mundo est unicus et singularis [...] sic una ratio hominis est generalis et communis [...] Lux solis mundum duntaxatistum corporeum illustrat, lux rationis, etiam supra mundum per illas supramundanae infinitatis regiones pervagatur*” (Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 35).

¹⁴ The source of the dialectic art for Ramus is none other than the light of reason, or better yet, the heavenly fire stolen by Prometheus, “*artificiosae methodi autor et inventor*”, from which humans were shaped so as to be dialectic in their very nature; cf. Ramus, *Scholarum Dialecticarum*, 4-5, or “*Praelectiones*” from 1572, in *Dialecticae libri duo*, 532-533.

¹⁵ The two branches that extend from the page of the book indicate the two parts into which the dialectics or logic of Ramus is subdivided, *inventio of topics* and *dispositio or judgement*.

¹⁶ The association of this book and what appeared in a dream to Descartes the night between 10 and 11 November 1619 is suggestive, as it illustrates this new logic in the *Tableaux*. Discovered on a table “without knowing who had placed it there,” this too without a story and quite “indic-

out but projected towards the future: and the future of memory, by now stably collocated among the branches of dialectics, is not to provide a repertory of emotionally meaningful *imagines*, but to follow the doctrine of judgement *like a shadow*, supporting the concatenation of the rings that articulate the progression of the dianoetic process.

In Savigny's *Tableaux*, method, with more evidence that what can be found in Ramus' theoretical writings, does not only coincide with the last two definitions of the "ars dialectica", but also constitutes the "ratio ordinis" that, while guaranteeing the proper sequence of phases of reasoning ("the light of natural reason"¹⁷), from the principles to the conclusions, ensure that in each of the sixteen disciplines – from grammar to theology – "the uninterrupted chaining of the many and different statements"¹⁸ constituting its corpus. If each doctrine or science must descend "*degrez à degrez*" from the general to the particular, if the method coincides with the degrees of the *dispositio*, if the *dispositio* is order and order is method, then *ars memoriae* too, "if it exists", can be no other than the *ars* that accompanies dialectics in its larger acceptance of logic (and thus is the concatenation of homogenous axioms) regardless the various subjects of the judgement, just like "l'ombre accompagne et syit le corps quand le soleil luit".¹⁹ This is equivalent to a confirmation of what Ramus ultimately concluded at the end of a 40 year reflection: the method is a rational process that connects "homogenous axioms" starting with those that are more evident by nature – which is to say those that are universal – and encapsulates memory.²⁰

ative of the future," is interpreted by Descartes as containing "nothing if not all of the sciences gathered together", Descartes, "Olympica", in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, 182-185.

¹⁷ Beyond the attributes that intervene in its qualification (natural, by nature, of art, artificial, doctrinal) the Ramist method never distances itself from what its own nature teaches: to proceed from that which is antecedent, more general, absolutely clear, more and earlier known, up to its particular consequences, more obscure and less known. Shaped by Prometheus in the divine fire of reason, according to the tale told in *Philebus*, humans are logical by nature; thus, this methodical artifice does not add anything to intelligence, except ensuring that, even during more complex and articulated reasonings, it continues along the straight path established by natural reason; cf. for example De La Ramée, *Dialectique*, 121-123.

¹⁸ Ramus, *Dialecticae institutiones*, f. 27r.

¹⁹ The inscription that closes the *tableau* of dialectics [Fig. 4]; see also the last three clauses of the relative *partitions* in *Tableaux*, 65. In this case as well, the source is De La Ramée, *Dialectique*, 122: "[...] Toute vraye doctrine et science doit proceder par des choses generalles, et descendre *degrez à degrez* aux specialles"; even more persuasive, on the serial nature of the "methodical order" in *Praelectiones* from 1566: "singulae ordine alphabeti notae essent, a, b, c, [...] tantum notas illas in disponendo spectares, ut quae notam primae litterae haberet, ea primo loco esset, quae secundae, ea secundo, det deinceps consimiliter" (Ramus, *Dialecticae libri duo* (1566), 374). For Ramus, the uninterrupted sequence of rings of the chain is the most eloquent image of the method as a serial order. Analogously in *Tableaux*, 65.

²⁰ "Methodus est dianoia variorum axiomatum homogeneorum pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum, unde omnium inter se convenientia iudicatur, memoriaque comprehenditur" (Ra-

If understood from the right perspective, the method, guarantor of the Homeric chain of which “nil aptius, nil compactius, nil firmitus esse possit,” does not refute memory, but envelops it, and memory, for its part, does not need to sustain or strengthen itself if not with the order of the *dispositio* of dialectics.

According to Ramus dialectical writings and *Scholae*, it is sufficient to affirm that “ars memoriae” does not need places as it is none else than an “ars ordinis [...] tota posita sit in divisione et compositione”²¹; consequently the signs and simulacrum “externi et commentitii” confuse reason, while the single, constant order intrinsic to dialectical doctrine helps and facilitates not only memorisation, but also understanding.²² Therefore, this form of memory that is *seated in the shadow of method*, does not need *imagines agentes*, not only because it has dissolved its continuity with traditional memorative techniques, but also because, entirely satisfied and absorbed by the arrangement, division and composition of method, it appears entirely dematerialised. Dematerialised and therefore removed from buildings, churches, theatres and concrete *loci* of oratory and mediaeval mnemotechnics, relegated to the shadow of dialectical *dispositio*, which is to say the *habitus* of the correct reasoning.²³

For Ramus the method is a *habitus* (*habitude* in Savigny’s French, like in *Dialectique* from ‘55) that is, an acquired behaviour characterised by the observance of rational criteria that guarantee the success of a procedure. This refers to *habitus disponendi* and, more precisely to a *habitus dividendi et compenendi*, the technique of which – the control exercised by a rule that impedes the natural propensity for reasoning to distance itself from the “main path” – confers the qualities of linear, ordered progression and graduality, requiring that “les degrez de disposition et ordre de la dialectique” are followed in order.²⁴ In Ramus *habitus ratiocinandi, methode de doctrine ou artificiele, dialectica artificialis*, memory as “umbra dispositionis” and “ordo ac dispositio rerum [...] qua quid primum, quid secundum, quid tertium animo cernamus”,²⁵ i.e. that which is innate to the same intelligence but the use of which is controlled by compelling rules (*leges imperatoriae*), tend to identify themselves. Therefore, it is clear that for Ramus and for a Ramist like Savigny, memory has a

mus, *Dialecticae libri duo*, 72-73).

²¹ Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 165.

²² Cf. Ramus, *Dialecticae Institutiones*, ff. 57r-58v.

²³ An example of this “dematerialisation” of local memory, made possible by Ramism, comes from Citolini, *Tipocosmia*. The work in large part makes use of the so-called *theatre of memory* from Giulio Camillo, but Camillo’s diagram, conceived through *imagines agentes* and *memory places*, is entirely replaced by Citolini, who instead uses tree diagrams whose branches underline the passage from the general to the particular. The work maintains a mnemonic finality analogous to the starting model, but the notion of *memory place* on which it is built goes from concrete to mental. On Citolini’s Ramism, cf. Bolzoni, *La stanza della memoria*, 250.

²⁴ From the frame in the *tableau dialéctique* in the *Tableaux*, Fig. 2.

²⁵ Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 14.

precise role; and it is just as clear that this role is directly related to the introduction of an order that is methodical and almost mathematical²⁶ in the labyrinth of *argumenta* that comprise the subject of knowledge and the disciplines contents.

2. Savigny: a renewed relationship between the *lux methodi* and the *umbra memoriae*

The problem of memory in the logic of Ramus could be settled with the definition from the last edition of *Dialectica*: “methodus est dianoia variorum axiomatum homogeneorum pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum, unde omnium inter se convenientia iudicatur, memoriaque comprehenditur”,²⁷ if it were not for the insistence on the adjective *homogeneousum*, revived by Savigny,²⁸ that qualifies the axioms on which method, including memory, is called to judge. The method together with its *shadow* (memory) is the *dispositio*, or better, the rule that guarantees that *lux rationis*, the natural dialectic propensity of reason, will not stray from the main path. Careful to identify *methodus* as “ratio ordinis” and intent on freeing himself from the useless disorder introduced by local memory, Ramus has memory and method coincide on the criterion of graduality and the uninterrupted chain of reasoning. Having established this connection that refutes artificial memory, not memory itself,²⁹ and having recognised the method as pervasive in the entire *dispositio*,³⁰ he is unconcerned with distinguishing the functions of one or the other, merely describing their relationship with the terms *lux* and *umbra*. To guarantee proper judgement, it is sufficient that the method observes rigorous rules and laws, rules and laws that are also partially derived from the ordinative criteria of *ars memoriae*, primarily from the rules of

²⁶ *Ibid.* In the inscription in the *tableau* of *dialectique*, just as in the letter dedicated to the *Tableaux*, method, order and *dispositio* (and therefore judgement) are entirely unified, in a way that is perfectly adherent to Ramist doctrine; this unification that is made even more evident by the terms *ordre* and *disposition* that take on the peculiar qualifications of the Ramist *méthode*: for Savigny, arrangement (like method) is *de doctrine*, that is to say artificial; order (like method) is *singulier*, that is to say singular. But note also how the expression “sommaire et generale partition”, and even more so in the second edition “sommaire et generale proportion”, subtly communicates that the possibility of unifying and methodically arranging knowledge is placed once again under a geometric-mathematical criterion.

²⁷ Ramus, *Dialecticae libri duo*, 72-73.

²⁸ “Méthode est un iugement discursive de divers axioms homogenez, qui sont proposés pour estre du tout et absolument procedens de nature, plus evidens, plus clairs et notoires” (*Tableaux*, 65).

²⁹ This deprives memory of the autonomy and theoretical foundations of *ars* to transfer a substantial part of mnemotechnic rules to method, enough to qualify it, and not memory, as *artificial* (in Ramus’ writings: *méthode d’art*, *méthode artificielle*, *méthode de doctrine*, *methodus artificialis*).

³⁰ Which occurs in the editions of *Dialectica* from the second half of the 60s.

division and composition that, Ramus admits once again, make the art of Quintilianus preferable to that of Cicero or pseudo-Cicero.³¹ With this choice Ramus renounces not only the *loci* and the *imagines agentes* of local memory, but also the summary, classificatory and unifying function that was part of some memorative techniques that later is part of Francis Bacon's method, or many systematic classifications of the 17th century.

Ramus renounces these aspects because the logic in which he collocated the method and its *umbra* is expended through being a doctrine of proper reasoning and considering mere dianoetic realities as its own objects. And this is because the reality it faces must be ordered according to the *prius* and the *posterius*, the more and less general, but it in no way needs to be classified because it is homogenous, as it is generated by the mind and organised within a space that is also purely intellectual.³² The 'mentalist' tendency, or the metaphysical foundation that Ramus is unable to detach from method and that guides it towards the arrangement of knowledge understood as the objectification of structures and mental operations, while it is true that it distances him from the demonstrative methods of late Scholasticism and argumentative modes of rhetoric, it also resolves the problem of variety and multiplicity and heterogeneity in knowledge inside the mind and the consistency of dianoetic operations. This also neutralises the need to identify an instrument able to classify and divide the varied subjects of knowledge with the perspective of a whole arrangement.

While Ramus approaches the problem of method with formal terms, he needs only to respect a *ratio ordinis* "ut absolute notius et clarius antecedit";³³ and, on the other hand, the adoption of classificatory criteria aimed at overcoming the singularity and heterogeneity of data is not necessary either, not even in the arrangement of the *stricto* and *lato sensu* logic disciplines (the first three liberal arts: grammar, rhetoric, dialectics). It is not necessary in the mathematical disciplines either, which he recognises as having a mental origin and considers them an exemplar of the methodical order and the rules of *dispositio* due to their axiomatic structure.³⁴ If instead he had to concretely apply the laws of method,³⁵

³¹ Cf. Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 165.

³² Cf. Ong, *Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue*, 280.

³³ Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 616.

³⁴ In these cases, dialectics finds itself in the role of arranging an entirely mental subject and for which it is homogenous or quite susceptible to homogenization in line with *lex iustitiae*. Starting with the *axiomata* that the method judges and claims is *homogenea*, they need to be arranged the more and the less general, but they in no way need to be classified because they are profoundly connected to a reality that is generated and arranged in mental places.

³⁵ This is the most synthetic formulation of the laws of *dispositio praeceptorum singulorum*, which Ramus in the *Praefatio* of the *Scholarum physicarum libri octo*, in *totidie arcomaticos libros Aristotelis*, Francofurti, (the following quote is from a reprint of the text in *Collectanae, Praefationes, Epistolae, Orationes*, 69-70): *Prima lex est veritatis, ne nullum sit in arte documentum, nisi omnino necessarioque verum. Itaque non modo falsa, sed fortuita tollentur. Secunda lege cave-*

and in particular the law of homogeneity, to content and objects from extra-mental topica, then Ramus would have had to also approach the issue of the heterogeneity of the contents to distribute and arrange; he would have to face not only the problem of the linear sequence of homogenous statements ordered according their major and minor generalities by a method that is *one single* because it is based on the unity of the dianoetic rhythm, as well as the issue of how to coordinate varied, autonomous, singular notions, that are nevertheless susceptible to unification and coordination.

But Ramus stops just before this, letting Ramists like Savigny actually engaged in formalising not only the dianoetic disciplines but “tout le savoir du monde” deal with the problem of how to combine the unity and homogeneity of knowledge with the variety and heterogeneity of content derived from a reality outside the mind. Indeed, Savigny accepts and coherently and faithfully applies the “umbratile” conception of memory outlined in *Scholae*, in which he recognises not an art but an organon of the arts that dialectics has encompassed, and more precisely, has replaced within a *habitus ratiocinandi*. But in addition to Ramus’ proposal, he attributes a peculiar and distinctive function to the *umbra dispositionis*: a function consisting in the mediation between the methodical form of the encyclopaedia (provided by the pages of the *tableaux*) and the contents it unifies (the subjects distributed in the *partitions* that articulate the sixteen disciplines; a function that, in Savigny’ encyclopaedia, foreshadows not (only) the order of reasoning and the linear sequence of the rings of the dianoetic chain, but (also) a precise criterion of classification able to restrict, in a finite number of classes, diversified and heterogeneous subjects. It is this criterion that advances concurrently with the “ratio methodi” as the shadow accompanies the illuminated body, but which cannot be identified as nor confused with the other. That’s because beyond satisfying the rigour of the *dispositio* invoked by Ramus it needs to respond to a classificatory demand that was from “encyclopaedic Lullism” well represented in 16th century Paris, not only in the teachings of Bernardus de Lavinheta, but also in the ideal teacher of Ramus and the *regii professors*, Lefèvre d’Etaples.³⁶

tur amplius, ut artis decretum sit non tantum omnino, necessarioque verum, sed homogoneum, et tanquam corporis ejusdem membrum, nec in Arithmetica sit quicquam geometricum, nec in geometriam arithmeticum, secus geometricum, in arithmetica fuerit anariqmos, arithmeticum in geometria agewmetrhton. & Hinc falsi erroris refutationes etiam verae, tamen ex arte tollentur, quia in scientiam tantum dedoceant, scientiam ipsam non doceant. Haec justitiae lex est, ad regendos artium fines, et suum cuique tribuendum, justissima. Tertia demum lege sancitum est, ut artis praecepta non sint duntaxat omnino necessarioque vera, nec homogonea tantum, sed propria et partibus reciproca; neque generale speciae, aut speciale generi tribuatur, sed generale generaliter, speciale specialiter exponatur. ... Haec tertia lex est sapientiae. De forma lex unica est, ut absolute notius et clarius antecedit, quae tametsi verbis paucissimis est contenta, usus tamen et fructu est omnium maxima”

³⁶ Bernardus de Lavinheta was a professor of Lullism at the Sorbonne starting in 1514, while Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples was the supporter of a program of reform of studies at the Collège

The fact that Savigny was concerned not only with the *suite* (notions and subjects ordered in decreasing generality), but also the *liaison*, the common element that allows the unification of the multiplicity of knowledge in an encyclopaedia, makes the need to accompany an *ars diiudicandi* (delegated to the tree laws of the method in the *Tableaux*) with an *ars inventarinadi*, traditionally fulfilled in the field of *memoria artificialis*, much more explicit and consistent than in the works of Ramus. This need also required the consideration of specific functions of a memory whose tasks were prerequisites to, but that did not correspond with, those carried out by method.

The need to not only unify but also classify and restrict knowledge is explicitly declared in the conclusion of the letter of dedication to Luigi Gonzaga in *Tableaux*:

Afin aussi de nous rafraîchir et aider la *memoire* nous a semblé bon de *recueillir*, mettre et *reduire en tableaux* un sommaire et generale *proportion* de tous les dicts arts liberaux, avec *brevité* et ouverte *facilité*, qu'il nous a esté possible, tant par l'observation du stile et *singulier ordre*, ou *methode et disposition de doctrine*.³⁷

A twin need, but also the meeting point between two different traditions, connected in a single declaration of intent. The correspondence of memory-method-order-dialectical disposition that Savigny delegates to following statements in the dedication is Ramist in origin: “aider la *memoire* [...] par l'observation du stile et *singulier ordre*, ou *methode et disposition de doctrine*,” “la *memoire* [...] suyt les degrez de *disposition et ordre de dialectique*”.³⁸ This Ramist bent is also present in the idea that this order ensured by method, an indispensable protection for memory, is modelled on an axiomatic criterion exemplified in the field of mathematical demonstration (“un *sommaire et generale proportion*”), which finds itself reflected in the serial and spatial arrangement of the sixteen tree diagrams and the corresponding pages showing the *partitions*. And, of course, the unicity and universality of this method (“*singulier ordre ou methode*”) that is a constantly recurring aspect of all *partitions* is Ramist as well. However, the aspiration towards the most synthetic and simplified presentation possible (“avec *brevité* et ouverte *facilité*, qu'il nous a esté possible”) has another origin: Savigny is able to achieve this goal through a logico-memorative process that is “sub pauci multa” and “omnia suis locis” in nature, analogous to the process theorised by Bernardus de Lavinheta,³⁹ thanks to which it is possible to *recueillir, mettre et reduire en tableaux*, an infinite number of notions. If Ramus could be content to replace

Lemoine. As for the influence that they had on Ramus and French Ramism, see Angelini, *Metodo ed enciclopedia*, vol. I, 239-256.

³⁷ *Tableaux*, 33 (this passage was taken from the letter of dedication as it appears in the second edition).

³⁸ As it appears in the frame of the *tableau* of dialectics; see Fig. 4.

³⁹ “Omnia suis locis collocat sub pauci multa comprehendens” (Lavinheta, *Explanatio*, 634).

the *loci* and *imagines* of Ciceronian artificial memory with the ‘divisionem et compositionem cum labore et exercitatione coniunctam’ prescribed by Quintilian and thus conceive ‘his dialectical method of memorising as the true classical art of memory’, to the creator of an encyclopaedia as a “sommaire et generale partition” of all the liberal arts, all of this was no longer enough. The homogeneity of the theses essential to the application of the one method⁴⁰ was in contradiction with the need to protect the variety and peculiarity of the notions of these disciplines whose contents were extra-mentem, unless you resign yourself to reduce knowledge to a purely formal framework. This homogeneity, intrinsic to the dianoetic disciplines (the sermocinal and mathematical arts), should be generated in all of the other arts and sciences, whose elements were natural phenomena, historical examples, elements of law or politics, etc. Rendering these statements homogenous was a preliminary task compared to the task assigned to method; and now this task was assigned to memory, a task which introduced a classificatory logic that allowed for the organisation of the wide variety of content of knowledge into homogenous classes, similar to Lavineta’s *cellulae* or the *certa capita* introduced by Pedro Grégoire (Petrus Gregorius Tholosanus),⁴¹ or the *communia capita* of Cornelius Agrippa.⁴² In essence, memory allowed to transfer the homogeneity required by the “lex methodi,” from the statements of the classes: uniform, homogenous classes given that they are empty, whose scope is not to substitute the subjects of knowledge but contain them. It was the role of memory to collocate each thing in its proper place and reduce many things into few *classes* or *cellulae* (“sub paucis multa”); but it was not memory as conceived by Quintilianus to fulfil this function, rather the memorative logic of Lavineta and the Lullists, which was able to associate the requirements of unity, universality and order claimed by the Ramist *méthode* with an additional synthesizing and discriminative function. This function was not simply the reduction of an otherwise rather long and tortuous process,⁴³ but thanks to the *reductio ordinata in certa capita* of all the precepts that form particular things, sciences and arts, the mind is now safe from the dangers of confusion, redundancy and pointless effort when subsequently performing its operations on these particulars.⁴⁴ Whether it was Grégoire’s

⁴⁰ Cf. *Tableaux*, 65.

⁴¹ Cf. Gregoire, *Commentaria in Prolegomena*, 22-23.

⁴² Cf. Agrippa, “In Artem brevem Raymundi Lullii Commentaria”, 788.

⁴³ Ramus spoke of “adresse et abbregement de chemin” regarding the method that guaranteed reason’s ability to choose, among many possibilities, the most direct, and safest, path on its journey from *prius* to *posterius* (cf. De La Ramée, *Dialectique*, 119).

⁴⁴ Cf. Gregoire, *Commentaria in Prolegomena*, 22-23: “Sequitur deinde illud quod est confusionis mentis et indispositarum cogitationum coordinatio, in quo latet tota artis noastrae methodus: docet enim omnium praeceptorum quae diffunduntur per res, et scientiaa, artesque particularis, in certa capita reductionem ordinatam, ex cuius cognitione postea mens dispensat ordinate et inconfuse propria uniuersique negotio oblato, disputando, tractando, consulendo, probando, vel refellendo, vel docendo, vel eligendo; haec enim in omnibus locum habet. [...] Qua ratione

Syntaxes to inspire Savigny in this sense, as is most likely, or the teachings of Lavinheta or one of his Parisian students, or comments on Ramon Llull's art, or the more chronologically distant Cornelius Agrippa, it is certain that in light of this classificatory and coordinating instance of heterogeneous and disordered precepts Savigny interprets the Ramist lesson of memory as "umbra dispositionis" and elaborates it through the distributive-classificatory criteria of the diagrams and definitions. The *partitions* of the "art de bien disputer et raisonner" and its relative table, with the image of the book that increasingly adopts the appearance of an encyclopaedia and the mnemonic statement that surrounds it [Fig. 4], are testament to the classificatory and demonstrative process – dichotomic, sequential, gradual, decreasing, synthetic, etc. – that will be unchangingly applied to the expositions of the other arts; in the same way, the *partitions-arbre* pair that illustrates the section of *dialectique* is a model of the relationship between the illustrated table and the summary of the definitions in the other sixteen sections: one (the *partitions*) represents the systematic arrangement of the statements that emphasize the criterion of order; the other (the tree diagram) is the shadow of the method, that allows for the reduction of the *partes* comprising each discipline into homogeneous places and classes.

3. The classificatory function of the diagrams and the transition *méthodique*

To ensure the mediatory and classificatory function of memory, Savigny makes use of tree diagrams and the relationships that they establish with the *partitions* and the *imagines agentes* used in the *tableaux*. However, these so-called "Ramist trees" have the non-Ramist function of collocating and conserving *extra mentem* the topica or system of memory that Ramus had expended in the dianoetic space.

It is worthwhile to compare the technique applied to the *Tableaux* with that of the tree diagrams in *Professio Regia*, the only work by Ramus that is truly rich with schemes, in which the graphic form that underpins the order of the arrangement essentially coincides with the discipline, or better, the division of the areas of knowledge considered into disciplines.⁴⁵ [Fig. 5] The diagrams of *Professio Regia* consist for definitions in descending order of generality which, rather than being presented in the paragraphs of a usual printed page, are collocated on the different branches of a diagram, so that the volume is none

et nos in hac arte magna ne quid deeset particularium finium, singularium scientiarum, veluti quoddam epitome contexuimus, ut Dei beneficio et nostro medio, quicumque nostras habuerit lucubrationes, nullis aliis libris, vel certe paucissimis egeat ad scientiarum encyclopaediam addiscendam".

⁴⁵ In the *Professio Regia* the diagrams do not appear next to the exposition, but they *are* the exposition of the various propositions that comprise the disciplines. Excluding the introductory sections of the edition, the text is nothing but the arrangement of extremely succinct definitions on the branches of the diagrams.




Fig. 5 – provide caption

other than a graphic arrangement of subsequent definitions. Here organisation and classification essentially coincide as much as Ramus’ fully developed reflection on method as “ratio ordinis” coincides with memory.

If compared with the pages of the *Tableaux*, the diagrams of *Professio Regia* appear to correspond to Savigny’s *partitions* [Fig. 3] rather than his diagrams [Fig. 4]: not to the sections of the work that present the disciplines in a schematic form, but those that contain the verbal exposition of the disciplines. In these pages of text, the criteria of order, the dichotomic division and the principle of gradualness are recovered through the systematic and iterative use of adverbs, conjunctions, locutions (*ou ... ou; premierement ...*

secondairement ... ; il est derechef; au surplus; au demeurant; à sçavoir; etc.) as well as the use of smaller font which highlight the decreasing generality of the statements. The same Ramist compliance is confirmed in observance of Solone's imperative in Ramus' *Brutinae quaestiones*: "artium fines regamus; extra terminos ne excedamus".⁴⁶ The exposition of the definitions that constitute the *corpus* of each discipline is all rigorously collected and contained within the frame of a single page allowing for a geometric and spatialized arrangement in which the relationship between the parts is present not only in the *before* and *after*, but also in the respective collocations within an illustrated space that is defined and closed.

The latter is also a determining criterion on the page that features the diagram: unlike in Ramus, in which the diagram presents the theses, instead the boxes ("cellulae") are presented, mostly labelled with a single term and, when necessary, only with a number or symbol.⁴⁷ These boxes primarily respond to a classificatory expedient rather than a criterion for definition-distribution, like the trees diagrams in *Professio Regia* or the corresponding pages of Savigny's work. While in the framework of the *partitions* it is the content that is organised in terms of decreasing generality, in the corresponding page depicting the tree diagram it is the classes that are precisely placed within the space of the discipline, enclosed by a frame that symbolically delimits the field, in line with "lex Solonis".⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ramus, *Brutinae quaestiones*, 21.

⁴⁷ See for example the extreme ramifications of the conditional and disjunctive syllogism of the dialectical tree, where further bipartition is simply marked with the numbers 1 and 2 [Fig. 2]. The same criteria are followed in the table relative to grammar, where, for example, the four departure points of the oblique conjugation are indicated with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4; the same occurs in the table of arithmetic, where "proportional distribution" is divided into three sub-classes identified as 1, 2, 3.

⁴⁸ Particularly consistent with Savigny's arrangement of the disciplines into *tableaux* is the rule of the autonomy of the arts formulated in terms of "lex Solonis": "Omnes artes, omnes artifices ex rebus ipsi proprie subiectis exponantur necesse est, non ex alienis, non ex communibus adumbrentur Rhetoricam unam quondam et singularem artem de liberalibus esse volumus. Haec ars igitur et huius artis artifices materia sibi proprie subiecta definatur. Distinguamus Rhetoricae artis materiam et a caeterarum artium materia dividamus, ut constet quod eius proprium sit, ut omnis omnino confusio tollantur; quod Grammaticae praeceptis doceatur, id rursus in Rhetoricis non misceatur, quod in rhetoricis instituat, a Dialecticis non attingatur. Breviter artium omnium fines et institutiones separentur, usus tamen coniungatur, sicuti in hominum fundis agris videamus, ut meus ager in tuum non incurrat, nec tuus incidat in meum, rerum tamen nostrarum vendendo, emendo, permutando usus communicetur. Quin illa Solonis legem (quam dicitur Atheniensibus tulisse) nobis proponamus [...]. Sic igitur de de sapientibus sapientissimus ille Solon, si quis ad alienum [...] fundum septem constituerit, extra terminum ne excedito; si murum, pedem relinquit; si domum, duos pedes [...]. Hanc igitur distinctionem finium, quaeso te, bona fide, meditemur, et unicuique quod suum est, attribuamus" (Ramus, *Brutinae Quaestiones*, 15-16). On the "three laws", cf. *supra* n. 33.

The tree diagram that precedes the page listing the definitions, the *dispositio*, with the rigorous order that rules it, is essentially achieved operating on *homogenous* classes, seeing that, having emptied the “cellulae” of the name or symbol that identifies them and, consequently, the content that they contain, they can be transferred from one discipline to another without jeopardising the demonstrative mechanism in any way, whatever the “matter” which, case by case, discipline by discipline, these classes incorporate. A procedure that can absolutely be defined as *Ramist* as it walks alongside the unity and universality of the method *like a shadow*, but it is a procedure that is not found in the diagrams of *Professio Regia*,⁴⁹ useless since it is the case of naturally homogeneous contents as they are exclusively mental

This is not the case for Savigny’s work, in which the *orbis disciplinarum omnium* arrangement does not correspond to a methodological and theoretical purely instance as it does for Ramus: not only do many of the liberal arts treated not have a mental origin (namely those indicated as special), but the content of their “summary” and individual *partitions* is the *reductio* of a composite scientific literature to the Ramist method and instances, a literature that draws from works from various authors belonging to disparate genres and linguistic traditions; an unsystematic and nonhomogeneous subject matter that requires a preliminary adjustments to then be methodised. And this is why the tree diagrams with their empty *cellulae* allow for the creation of what one of the sources Savigny has spoliated defined as “transition méthodique”, which is the reduction of the variety of “experience” to the rhythms of a procedure that is “unique et singulière”.⁵⁰ In this “transition” that leads

⁴⁹ The same procedure and function are not found in the tree diagrams in *Professio Regia*, neither in those that take inspiration from them, because Ramus interprets the classifications induced by the method and dialectical *dispositio* as functional to “make the mind recognise what is first, what is second, what is third”, cf. Ramus, *Scholae in tres primas liberales artes*, 43.

⁵⁰ This expression is used by one of the first authors that inspired Savigny’s *encyclopédie*, Pantaléon Thévenin, as well as in the comments by Ronsard and du Bartas; see *La Sepmaine, ou Creation du Monde de G. De Saluste du Bartas, passim*, but for an example see *ibid.*, 294, 308-309, 352. Ramist tree diagrams are used by the commentator of *La Sepmaine* to order and display the general subject matters of the poem, with the intention of marking, including with the emphasis of graphic signs, the decreasing relationship between the general formulation of a motif and its subsequent minute and detailed analysis, equally obtained through progressive dichotomic articulations. If, as it is clear, the *discours* of the commentator ideally follows the poem in order to explain it, the tree diagrams that divide and organise du Bartas’ work anticipate their explicative aspect and collocate themselves in an intermediate position between the author (the poem) and the commentator (the *discours* of the comment). Therefore, the trees do not display the comment or compile the commentator’s analysis, as was the case in the diagrams of *Professio Regia*, but it is the discourse of the commentator that clarifies a scheme that ideally precedes it. This scheme does not alter the content of the poem, but solely affects the arrangement of its theses. For Thévenin as for Savigny, the graphic schematisation is not carried out in the extreme formalisation of a method or form, which ultimately prevails over the content to the point that

to the method, but that is not yet the method as “*dianoia variorum axiomatum homogeneorum*”, lies the specificity of memory, namely the memorative and classificatory aspect of logic. This ensures not only *reductio multa sub paucis*, but also the production of those “homogenous axioms” without which the Ramist method could not operate; axioms that for Savigny do not belong to the *subject matter* of knowledge, but that are no less necessary than Ramus suggested, because it is through the formal consistency that they induce in the structure of disciplines that the *liaison* between the parts of knowledge is possible. And that is because – needless to repeat – knowledge for Savigny is not homogeneous *ab origine*, but becomes so through the discipline formal arrangement.

Once it is accepted that different areas of knowledge have different origins – some organic, some special, others are derived from experience or the reworking of traditions, some have reached formal completion, still others have yet to acquire a full theoretical autonomy – the author of the book that is yet to be written that appears in the *tableau* of the *dialectique* must find a mediator that ensures the transition from the multiplicity of *agumenta* extracted from the mind to the unity of formal and mental procedures. It is therefore necessary to reduce them to a common syntax that is however not that of things and neither that of the traditions that they have transmitted, rather the syntax preliminarily and artificially imposed by the *transition méthodique* carried out by the tree diagrams. Read contextually, the definitions comprising the sixteen *partitions* and the tree diagrams following them *like a shadow* suggest that the *partitions* are no else but the systematic classification produced by the tree diagrams, as if it was not the symbolic and spatial shape of the diagram constituting the translation and simplification of the statement but the statement transposing a logical and classificatory process into discursive language that *first* had to be collocated in a distinct space and separated into uniform “*cellulae*”, to *then* make use of words and definitions arranged in methodic order, but already adjusted to the needs of the dianoetic process. Therefore, the novel aspect of Savigny’s text is not the use of tables, nor the use of graphic representations in a logic proceeding, a technique widely used in the tradition of mediaeval logic, indeed. Instead, it lies in the logical and chronological anteriority and the essentiality of symbolisation-classification compared to a discursive methodical exposition. Compared to both the schemas of *Professio Regia* and Lefèvre d’Etaples writings on logic – no less rich with graphs than Ramist treatises or the

the latter is eclipsed. If anything, it constitutes a moment of *mediation* that facilitates a connection between the one method and an arranging lattice as defined by the “three laws” and the plurality of content learned through the territory of the *inventio* and not that of the *dispositio*; it ensures the separation, and the compatibility, of the inventive moment and the demonstrative, methodical moment, protecting on the one hand their heterogeneity and the anteriority of the content of the disciplines and, more generally, the acquisition of knowledge (*inventio*), guaranteeing a homogenous and consistent moulding (*dispositio*) of a scientific subject that is recognised as original and autonomous.

Tableaux – Savigny inverts the relationship between the ‘word system’ (statements, *partitions*, content of the disciplines arranged according to dialectical order) and the ‘system of symbols and space’ (diagrams, articulation of subjects into “cellulae”). And he does so because through symbols and precise collocations in space he is able to create a progressive restriction of the plurality of “cases” and notions, but above all because the *cellulae* or *certa capita*, empty shapes, are susceptible to a methodisation that, if applied directly to the content of the disciplines, would risk destroying them, much like what occurs in the majority of the systematics of the 17th century inspired by *Professio Regia*.⁵¹

Perhaps it is precisely this awareness of a preliminary *transition* in order to bend the classificatory criteria of a memorative logic that is decidedly more Llullist than Ramist to Ramus’ dialectics, which marks the birth of a method that is not only “unique et singulière” but also able to fulfil a classificatory function regarding reality. And this is precisely what the sixteen tree diagrams of Savigny’s *Tableaux* achieve, much like those used by Ramon Llull, but without roots. Because, unlike the Llullian diagrams, they severed the metaphysical roots that anchored the plane of knowledge in the plane of being; because, unlike those used by Ramus, they detach the origins of the sciences from the origins of reality and distinguish, with greater clarity than Ramus’ “three laws”, the gnoseological and ontological planes, ultimately distinguishing the *inventio* from the *dispositio*. In place of the metaphysical roots used by Llull, as well as by Ramus and Aristotle,⁵² Savigny used the uninterrupted chain of the human mind, which alludes to and places a limit on the otherwise undefined ramification and growth of knowledge.

⁵¹ See *supra* n. ****

⁵² It is precisely this association between the logic of Aristotle, Llull and Ramus that characterises the systematic and semi-Ramist orientation of the 17th century, like that of Alsted. In both *Clavis artis* and *Panacea*, the professor from Herborn insists on the necessity of summarising the three logics. And Ramus does not deny the Aristotelian origin of the “three laws” and, therefore, of his own logic; this origin impedes Ramus’ method and dialectic from fully freeing itself from metaphysics, or at least from the nexus that connect the logic organ to the ontological plane.

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